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Showing posts with label Protest - timing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Protest - timing. Show all posts

Thursday, March 29, 2018

Three strikes and these protests were out

Note to the wise and those who want to be: Read this decision in its full glory at the link. The rendition below is incomplete, perhaps inaccurate, and simply intended as an exposure to procurement problems for students of procurement; not to decide any particular controversy.

Matter of: AeroSage, LLC; SageCare, Inc., B-415267.13; B-415267.14, March 19, 2018
AeroSage LLC, of Tampa, Florida, and SageCare, Inc., also of Tampa, Florida, each a service-disabled veteran-owned small business (SDVOSB), protest various aspects of the structure and award of a request for proposals. Prior to filing the instant protests, the protesters each had a pending protest of the same procurement at issue here. In those protests, the protesters presented their grounds as “a protest of the Agency’s improprieties in negotiations and evaluation of protestor’s offers, improper contract terms, quantities, and technical requirements in violation of interagency fuel regulations, and procurement integrity violation prejudicing protestor and limiting ability to obtain certificates of analysis (COA) or best price for the government. The protesters filed the joint protests at issue here challenging DLA’s decision to continue with contract performance. The protesters also contested various aspects of the structure of the RFP and the agency’s evaluations and awards.

After reviewing the joint protests, the GAO attorney assigned to the protest instructed the protesters to indicate whether the February 9 joint protest raised new protests issues or whether the protest grounds were duplicative of those raised in the pending protests. The protesters summarized the new protest issues (i.e., those not previously raised in the pending protests) as allegations of: (1) improper pre-award and post-award notice; (2) violations of Defense Logistics Acquisition Directive (DLAD) 33.104; (3) improprieties with the override of the stay imposed by CICA; (4) problems with award and evaluation, including award made after override of the CICA stay and awards made based on allegedly flawed underlying specifications; (5) general errors in the solicitation (such as unspecified but “erroneous requirements which have just come to light”); (6) flaws in certain specifications in the solicitation, such a failure to follow the “Veterans Benefit Act”; (7) problems with the solicitation’s certification requirement; (8) failing to provide the protester with copies of certain documents; and (9) a faulty solicitation structure such that awards might decrease SDVOSB participation. In addition, the protesters provided the following statement regarding their protest grounds: “We do not know what awards were made, when, and why awards were made. Any awards that we might know about were improper and/or have been changed without notice.”

Although the protesters raise a multitude of protest grounds, each ground is dismissable under one or more of the three dismissal bases described below.

Untimely Protest Grounds

The protesters challenge various aspects of the solicitation and award, for example, the fact that awards were allegedly made on the basis of “erroneous [solicitation] requirements which have just come to light.” These challenges are untimely. These protests were filed several months after the proposal due date. Thus, to the extent that the protest grounds here, such as issues (4) and (5) above, challenge any aspect of the solicitation, they are untimely and are dismissed. (“Protests based upon alleged improprieties in a solicitation . . . shall be filed prior to bid opening or the time set for receipt of initial proposals.”). Similarly, protest grounds challenging any specific award are also untimely. In this regard, our Bid Protest Regulations provide that all protests other than challenges to a solicitation must be filed within 10 days after the basis of protest is known or should have been known.

Competition in Contracting Act (CICA)

Next, the protesters allege that the agency improperly failed to stay performance of the contract notwithstanding the protest, as required by CICA. In this regard, the protesters argue that “[t]here is no reasonable justification that these awards are urgent or compelling given they are currently available for performance by other proper acquisition vehicles.” The agency contends that “[t]his issue falls outside of GAO’s bid protest function and should be dismissed.” The protesters chose not to rebut this argument.

Under CICA, a contracting agency is required to suspend contract performance if it receives notice of a protest from our Office within 10 calendar days of the date of contract award. However, an agency’s failure to adhere to the stay requirement is not a valid basis of protest. (“GAO does not administer the requirements to stay award or suspend contract performance under CICA”.) To the extent that the protests challenge the agency’s decision to continue with performance, whether under CICA or any other statute, regulation, or guidance, those allegations are dismissed.
[NOTE TO THOSE OPERATING UNDER ABA MPC automatic stay provisions: The federal system operates differently. Do not try this at home.]
Failure to State a Valid Basis of Protest

The protesters also challenge the agency’s decision to make various awards. However, in summarizing their protest grounds, the protesters also advised our Office as follows: “We do not know what awards were made, when, and why awards were made. Any awards that we might know about were improper and/or have been changed without notice.” Our Bid Protest Regulations state that protesters must “[s]et forth a detailed statement of the legal and factual grounds of protest” and require a protester to “clearly state legally sufficient grounds of protest.” 4 C.F.R §§ 21.1(c)(4), (f). The regulations also provide for dismissal of protests that fail to satisfy either of these requirements. The statement above denies knowledge of basic, important facts relevant to the protest grounds and calls into question the existence of a factual predicate for any award-related protest ground. The statement shows that the protesters lack sufficient factual basis for their protests and the protest grounds contesting the basis of award are thus dismissed.

Similarly, the protesters raised several arguments related to lack of notice, such as “[a]wards made with [i]mproper, incorrect, and not provided pre-award and post-award notice and awards improperly changed without notice.” In all instances alleging a problem with notice, the protesters fail to state a sufficient legal basis for these protest grounds or a complete factual predicate. Thus, the protest grounds related to notice are similarly dismissed
You're out.

Wednesday, January 3, 2018

Protest must be timely and protestor must show prejudice, and a footnote about issue of contract dispute vs solicitation dispute

The following is from a protest decision of the GAO. This protest involved two protests from two protestors in the same solicitation. One protest illustrates by example when a protest is not "timely". The other illustrates a protestor's lack of prejudice, and thereby standing to protest.

Bear in mind my proclivity to re-work the original articles, leave out critical citations, paraphrase and so on, so read the original decision at the link if you need to rely on it.

Matter of: AeroSage, LLC; SageCare, Inc., File: B-415607; B-415607.2; B-415607.3, January 3, 2018 AeroSage, LLC, and SageCare, Inc., protest the award of a contract to Tayrona Oil, Inc., issued by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), for 5,000 gallons of fuel to the Milwaukee Veterans Administration Medical Center (MVAMC).

The protesters primarily allege that DLA unreasonably modified the purchase request's delivery schedule without issuing an amendment. We dismiss SageCare's protest and deny AeroSage's protest.

MVAMC placed a purchase request with DLA for 5,000 gallons of fuel for delivery. The request (1) represented that the procurement was being conducted as a small business set-aside, (2) confirmed that delivery was for 5,000 gallons of fuel on Friday, October 13, (3) requested quotations by no later than 11:30 a.m. on Thursday, October 12, and (4) provided that award would be made on a lowest-priced, technically-acceptable basis. DLA timely received quotations from the three firms that it had solicited, Tayrona, AeroSage, and SageCare. Tayrona submitted the lowest-priced quotation of $2.3487 per gallon.

The contracting specialist represents that he notified Tayrona via telephone on the morning of October 12 that its quotation was selected for award. Shortly after contacting the awardee, however, the contracting specialist represents that he was contacted via telephone by an official with the Department of Veterans Affairs indicating that the delivery had to be rescheduled for Tuesday, October 17. The contracting specialist contacted Tayrona via telephone to confirm whether the company would agree to the revised delivery schedule at the same awarded price, and the awardee confirmed.

Following that telephone conversation, the contracting specialist then emailed Tayrona to confirm that DLA was going to award the order to Tayrona and indicated that the delivery date was now Tuesday, October 17. The contracting specialist then emailed AeroSage and SageCare respectively to indicate that neither firm submitted the lowest-priced, technically acceptable quotation. Those emails also indicated that the delivery date was now Tuesday, October 17.

AeroSage's protest:

Following receipt of the notice, AeroSage filed an agency-level protest with DLA on October 12. The primary protest allegation raised by AeroSage was that [t]he contracting officer solicited the RFQ for requirement delivery for Oct[ober] 13, 2017, but awarded the purchase order for delivery four days later, October 17, 2017 thus prejudicing the protester by changing the date, and thereby creating pricing uncertainty on the new delivery date. On Monday, October 23, AeroSage filed the instant protest with our Office.

AeroSage's protest decision:

AeroSage argues that the agency unreasonably changed the solicitation's delivery schedule without amending the solicitation and allowing all offerors to compete against the new schedule. The protester contends that "[a] four day change in a solicitation time can both dramatically impact price/availability and the risks quoters are able to accept to provide best prices to [the] government." "AeroSage was prejudiced in this solicitation with a significant change in the solicitation prior to award."

We have generally recognized that when the government changes its requirements prior to award, it must notify all offerors of the changed requirements and to afford them an opportunity to respond to the revised requirements. Moreover, a contract's period of performance is generally considered to be a material solicitation requirement.

Our Office will not sustain a protest, however, unless the protester demonstrates a reasonable possibility of prejudice, that is, unless the protester demonstrates that, but for the agency's actions, it would have had a substantial chance of receiving the award. Here, the protester has offered no evidence that it was in fact prejudiced by the agency's failure to amend the delivery schedule by four days through the issuance of an amendment. The protester has not asserted that, let alone substantiated how, it would have reduced its unit pricing by an amount that would have overcome the awardee's price advantage. AeroSage's unsupported speculation that the change in delivery schedule could have impacted its proposed price is insufficient to establish competitive prejudice.

There is another teachable moment in footnote 6: The Government argued that the change in delivery schedule was a matter of contract administration, and thus not a proper subject for a protest dispute. As discussed above, however, the change occurred after proposals were submitted and evaluated, but before the contract award was formally made on October 13. Therefore, we do not find that the schedule change can reasonably be considered as a matter of contract administration, and therefore would be proper subject matter for a protest, if only the protestor had standing.

AeroSage's protest is denied.

SageCare's protest:

On November 22, SageCare filed a request to intervene in AeroSage's protest. On the same day, our Office denied the request to intervene on the basis that SageCare was a disappointed offeror, not the awardee of the protested contract.[3] We further explained that "[t]o the extent that SageCare, a disappointed offeror, believes that there were errors in the procurement, SageCare must file its own protest subject to our Bid Protest Regulations." SageCare subsequently filed its protest on November 24.

DLA moved to dismiss SageCare's November 24 protest as untimely because it was filed more than 10 days after the protester's owner and president had actual knowledge that SageCare had not been selected for award and of the change to the delivery schedule. Our Bid Protest Regulations contain strict rules for the timely submission of protests. Under these rules, a protest based on other than alleged improprieties in a solicitation must be filed no later than 10 calendar days after the protester knew, or should have known, of the basis for protest, whichever is earlier.

SageCare's protest decision:

SageCare seems to measure the timeliness of its protest from when SageCare's president received the awardee's price information through the agency report submitted in response to AeroSage's protest. DLA's October 12 notice to SageCare's president, however, clearly indicated that the protester's quotation was not the lowest-priced, technically-acceptable quotation, and that delivery was moved to Tuesday, October 17. Thus, the protester was aware of the material facts relevant to its asserted protest ground related to the modification of the delivery schedule as of October 12. Its November 24 protest, filed more than 40 days later, is untimely, and therefore the protest is dismissed.

SageCare's protest is dismissed.

Friday, June 12, 2015

How Draconian are those procurement time limits, really?

This is a question the answer to which has evolved dramatically in the last 25 years. 

The question is whether the time limit in question is determined to be “jurisdictional”. If it is, then the time limit cannot be waived or extended for any reason, and any decision made in violation of the time limit is void, an issue that can be raised at any time. The result of a decision that a time limit is jurisdictional, thus mandatory, can be drastic, as the US Supreme Court is acutely aware. “Jurisdictional rules may also result in the waste of judicial resources and may unfairly prejudice litigants.” (Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011).)

If a time limit is not jurisdictional, then rules of equity can apply to defer or extend or excuse missing a time limit. These rules of equity are not, however, an open barn door to endless litigation (as sometimes breathlessly claimed, notwithstanding the actual experience in the courts for the last 25 years). “Federal courts have typically extended equitable relief only sparingly.” (Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 US 89 (1990).) Garden variety negligence or failure to diligently pursue your own cause will not get you equity.

The two most common forms of equity seen in procedural time limit cases are equitable tolling and equitable estoppel. "While equitable tolling extends to circumstances outside both parties' control, the related doctrines of equitable estoppel and fraudulent concealment may bar a defendant from enforcing a statute of limitation when its own deception prevented a reasonably diligent plaintiff from bringing a timely claim." (Justice Sotomayor concurring, Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013).)

The Irwin decision, above, after recognizing inconsistency in its and other prior cases, and the tendency to decide the matter on an ad hoc basis, announced a “general rule”:
"Time requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily subject to "equitable tolling". Once Congress has made [] a waiver [of sovereign immunity from suit], we think that making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver. We therefore hold that the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States."
The decision also alluded to acceptance of the extenuating notions of equitable estoppel or fraudulent concealment, as described by Justice Sotomayor, above, saying it is available “where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass”.

In Henderson, above, the US Supreme Court analyzed the situation.
For purposes of efficiency and fairness, our legal system is replete with rules requiring that certain matters be raised at particular times. We have urged that a rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it governs a court's adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. Other rules, even if important and mandatory, we have said, should not be given the jurisdictional brand.

Among the types of rules that should not be described as jurisdictional are what we have called "claim-processing rules." These are rules that seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times. Filing deadlines are quintessential claim-processing rules.
At the federal level, the rules applicable to procurement appeals to the General Accountability Office (GAO) recognize tolling and estoppel by regulation: 4 CFR 21.2(c): “[GAO], for good cause shown, or where it determines that a protest raises issues significant to the procurement system, may consider an untimely protest.”

In aiding the analysis of a statutory regulation, such as a time limit, to determine if it is jurisdictional or a claim-processing rule, the US Supreme Court has provided a formula:
To ward off profligate use of the term ‘jurisdiction,’ we have adopted a ‘readily administrable bright line’ for determining whether to classify a statutory limitation as jurisdictional. We inquire whether Congress has ‘clearly state[d]’ that the rule is jurisdictional; absent such a clear statement, we have cautioned, ‘courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.’ This is not to say that Congress must incant magic words in order to speak clearly. We consider ‘context, including this Court's interpretations of similar provisions in many years past,’ as probative of whether Congress intended a particular provision to rank as jurisdictional. (Sebelius, above.)

The US Supreme Court’s inquiry “whether Congress has clearly stated the rule is jurisdictional” has probably reached its most extreme result in the recent case, United States v. Wong __ US __ (2015). The language of the Federal Tort Claim Act provides that claim against the United States "shall be forever barred" unless the claimant meets two deadlines. First, a claim must be presented to the appropriate federal agency for administrative review "within two years after (the] claim accrues." Second, if the agency denies the claim, the claimant may file suit in federal court "within six months" of the agency's denial.

The majority in Wong held, against a strident dissent, that "shall be forever barred" was not a clear expression of Congress that the time limit is intended to be jurisdictional; thus, it “conclude[d] that courts may toll both of the FTCA's limitations periods”. The Court held
“Given those harsh consequences [flowing from a finding the time limit is jurisdictional], the Government must clear a high bar to establish that a statute of limitations is jurisdictional . ... [T]raditional tools of statutory construction must plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences. ... And in applying that clear statement rule, we have made plain that most time bars are nonjurisdictional. ... Congress must do something special, beyond setting an exception-free deadline, to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional and so prohibit a court from tolling it.”
The majority found that "forever barred'' was typical of the statutory language used in the time in which the FTCA was written, and was not universally applied to "forever bar" a time limit even as thus described. [The “forever barred” language] “is mundane statute-of-limitations language, saying only what every time bar, by definition, must: that after a certain time a claim is barred.” 

Thus, a time bar does not imply jurisdiction; it simply prescribes "rules requiring that certain matters be raised at particular times".  In elaboration, the Court noted,
"The language is mandatory—"shall" be barred—but (as just noted) that is true of most such statutes, and we have consistently found it of no consequence. Too, the language might be viewed as emphatic—"forever" barred—but (again) we have often held that not to matter. What matters instead is that §2401(b) "does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts."

"This Court has often explained that Congress's separation of a filing deadline from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the time bar is not jurisdictional. So too here. Whereas §2401(b) houses the FTCA's time limitations, a different section of Title 28 confers power on federal district courts to hear FTCA claims. Nothing conditions the jurisdictional grant on the limitations periods, or otherwise links those separate provisions. Treating §2401(b)'s time bars as jurisdictional would thus disregard the structural divide built into the statute."
There are die-hards who refuse to accept the long (if a "mere" two and a half decades is long) held acknowledgement that our legal system is replete with non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules requiring that certain matters be raised at particular times, and that mindless application of such rules often causes waste of judicial resources and prejudice to innocent parties, without advancing the purpose of allowing those claims to be brought in the first place (which is what imbuing jurisdiction over claims by waiver of sovereignty is intended to do). They are not in step with the current law of the land as it has developed in the US Supreme Court.

On Guam, there is a similar last stand. See, e.g., the 2009 Decision of the Public Auditor in The Appeal of Guam Pacific Enterprises, Inc. (OPA-PA_09-003):
"The Public Auditor is required by the applicable law to strictly adhere to statutory time limits and has no discretion to consider personal circumstances or equity. Time provisions for filing an appeal are considered jurisdictional and cannot be waived. The U.S. Supreme Court held in United States v. Holpuch, 328 US 234 (1946), that a contractor's claim was "outlawed" by reason of the contractor's failure to appeal within the prescribed time."
More recently, in March of this year, the Governor of Guam, on advice of his legal counselors, vetoed a procurement reform bill (Bill 20-33) principally because of language in the bill that codified the case law noted here that the time limits are not jurisdictional. More pertinent, Guam law has kept pace with the US Supreme Court law.

In 2001 the Guam Supreme Court specifically adopted equitable tolling, in GHURA v. Dongbu, 2001 Guam 24. This case involved an insurance claim by a government agency against its carrier. The Court clearly explained the equitable rational for the doctrine, with examples clearly analogous to the protest claims process. 

In 2004, the Court applied equitable estoppel to a filing deadline, noting that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is codified in Guam law (Mobile v. Lee, 2004 Guam 24). 

In 2007, the Court applied the equities of tolling and estoppel to an administrative civil service claim made against the government (Limtiaco v. Guam Fire Department, 2007 Guam 10). 

Meanwhile, in the Guam Superior Court, two cases recognized that estoppel was applicable in procurement cases, one applying the doctrine to extend a time requirement, the other finding the facts did not justify it. (Pacific Security Alarm v. DPW, CV 0591-05, D&O, July 11, 2006 (applying tolling); and, TRC Environmental v. OPA, SP 160-07, D&O, Nov. 21, 2008 (not applying but specifically acknowledging "Limitations periods can be tolled on an equitable basis....")

It is simply quite amazing that this last decision in 2008, TRC Environmental v. OPA, was ignored by OPA in the Public Auditor's 2009 decision in the Guam Pacific Enterprises, above, adhering blindly to the hard line that "The Public Auditor is required by the applicable law to strictly adhere to statutory time limits and has no discretion to consider personal circumstances or equity."

Ai adai.

UPDATE SEPTEMBER 30, 2015

Note the following dealing with a procurement case in Ireland applying an equitable estoppel concept to extend, in legal theory anyway (based on procedural posture of the case). 

Also note that opponents of accepting equitable defenses to procurement timelines (and other administrative procedures) typically cannot help but exclaim Pandora's Box will be opened, releasing all the evils of the world. Pandora, like Eve in Abrahamic tradition, was supposedly the first woman in the world.  

Thus, Mommy's understanding hand should be kept far away and locked up from Daddy's firm fist.  According to that view.  For those of us who embrace the adoption of fair and equitable principles in the enforcement of time limits, it is worth remembering that the last little thing out of Pandora's Box was Hope.

The article was written by Peter Curran of Eversheds LLP, published on the Lexology website.

Bringing procurement challenges out of time: Pandora’s Box opened?
On 15 June 2015, the Irish High Court provided another potentially significant procurement decision in the case of Forum Connemara Ltd.-v- Galway County Local Community Development Committee.

The Court heard a preliminary application to strike out the legal proceedings on the grounds that they were commenced under an incorrect provision of the Rules of the Superior Courts and after a delay of several months. The Court’s approach to the issue of delay is particularly noteworthy.

Galway County Local Community Development Committee (the ‘Committee’), a statutory body, made a decision on 30 September 2014 to treat all of County Galway as a single lot for the purposes of a tender for a contract to distribute more than €1m of Government funds. From that date, Forum Connemara objected to both the decision itself and the manner in which it was made by a sub-group of the Committee. It argued that it made little sense for funds to be centrally distributed in Galway and that local distribution mechanisms were necessary in the west of the County, but its objections to the Committee were in vain.

Forum Connemara subsequently tendered for the contract to distribute the funds following the issue of an invitation to tender on 20 October 2014. It was notified that it was unsuccessful in March 2015, which prompted it to commence legal action in the High Court challenging the decision of 30 September 2014 to award the contract by way of a single lot.

The Committee sought to strike out the action on the ground that the statutory limitation period for challenging procurement decisions (generally 30 days) had long expired. Under Irish procurement law, procurement challenges must generally be brought within 30 days of the challenger being notified of a decision or within 30 days of the date the challenger knew or ought to have known of the infringement, although the Court has a discretion to extend this limitation period where it considers that there is ‘good reason’ to do so.

The Court accepted that this was a case in which the claim was brought well out of time. However, it considered that there were good reasons to allow the litigation to proceed.

The Court clearly had sympathy for Forum Connemara’s predicament and did not criticise it for failing to bring proceedings within 30 days of the decision on 30 September 2014. It took into account that Forum Connemara was a communitybased organisation, which had a ‘genuine fear’ of incurring significant legal costs in the High Court.

In taking a such an approach, the Court was aware that it could be accused of opening “a Pandora’s Box in which all manner of miseries will now be visited on contracting authorities in the form of challenges to their decisions”. However, it sought to distinguish the case on its facts, judging that it was unique and presenting characteristics which were unlikely to be present together in many (if any) other procurement cases. The Court pointed to the following in particular:

>There were governance issues arising in relation to the making of the decision on 30 September which the Court considered were unlikely to present in other procurement cases.
>It was alleged that Forum Connemara received assurances from central Government that the funds would be distributed on a different basis from that decided upon on 30 September, which gave rise to arguments as to legitimate expectation.
>The Court found that the case gave rise to ‘genuine public and political’ concern in Galway, to an extent which was not common in procurement cases.
>The contract concerned the disbursement of limited funds to vulnerable persons and the need for the affected public to ‘buy into’ the grant or refusal of funds was an important consideration.

All of these factors, when present together, persuaded the Court that there was good reason to allow Forum Connemara’s challenge to the decision of 30 September to proceed despite that challenge being initiated months later and only after Forum Connemara had been unsuccessful in the competition.

There is undoubtedly a balancing exercise to be conducted between the ‘need for speed’ in procurement cases and the need to protect fair procedures. In this particular case, the latter appears to have taken precedence.

The Court was at pains to explain that the circumstances of this case were ‘entirely unique’, however it does seem inevitable that the decision will be relied upon in the future by unsuccessful bidders who do not commence their procurement litigation within the standard 30 day limitation period. This will result in significant uncertainty for awarding authorities who may have previously considered they were relatively safe once the 30 day period expired.

This is an important decision in the Irish procurement context. It seems that, despite the endeavours of the Court to distinguish it on its own facts, this case is bound to lead to considerable uncertainty among awarding authorities as to when potential claims can be safely judged ‘out of time’. Pandora’s Box may well have been opened and it will be interesting to observe the extent to which disappointed bidders seek to exploit the uncertainty going forward.

Wednesday, May 13, 2015

Protest of too little time to submit offer after amendments

Matter of: Financial Asset Management Systems, Inc., B-409722.9, April 24, 2015
Financial Asset Management Systems, Inc. (FAMS), of Atlanta, Georgia, protests a request for proposals (RFP) issued by the Department of Education for student loan debt collection and administrative resolution services. FAMS contends that the agency failed to provide sufficient time to prepare proposals. [There was another more substantive issue raised, but this is the one considered important for this post.]

The solicitation, issued on July 30, 2013, provided for a 2-phase procurement for the award of multiple indefinite‑delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts for a 5-year base period and a 5-year option period for student debt collection and administrative services. Phase I was completed in April 2014; 42 firms were selected to submit phase II proposals. This protest concerns phase II of the procurement. As relevant, the agency issued amendment No. 17 to the solicitation on December 19, 2014, which revised the evaluation criteria. At that time, the closing date for receipt of proposals was January 16, 2015. On January 13, the agency issued amendment 20, which provided answers to 359 questions submitted by the offerors; the January 16 closing date, however, remained unchanged.

Thirty-seven firms, including FAMS, an incumbent contractor, submitted timely proposals.

The protester contends that the agency was required to extend the closing date for the receipt of proposals in order to afford offerors adequate time to prepare their proposals, but failed to do so. In this regard, the protester points to the fact that amendment No. 20 included agency answers to 359 offeror questions only 3 days before the RFP’s closing date, and that the agency provided incumbent contractors with completed past performance questionnaires for their incumbent contracts with the agency only 2 days before the closing date.

The determination of what constitutes a sufficient amount of time for proposal preparation is a matter committed to the discretion of the contracting officer; we will not object to that determination unless it is shown to be unreasonable.

FAMS generally suggests that the “type and quantity of questions” that were answered in amendment No. 20 required additional proposal preparation time. Comments at 10. The protester, however, has not identified specific questions or answers that required additional proposal response time, nor has it identified any change to the solicitation’s terms effected by the amendment. Moreover, we fail to find the sheer number of questions and answers alone to be persuasive proof of a need for more than 3 days of proposal preparation time, especially where, as here, the answers did not revise solicitation terms and several questions were repetitious.

Similarly, regarding the fact that FAMS--along with all other incumbent contractors--received its completed past performance questionnaire from the agency only 2 days prior to the closing date, the protester fails to identify information in that questionnaire that the firm did not already have from the agency and its CPCS data months earlier. The protester has failed to show that it could not have reasonably prepared its proposal, including an explanatory narrative of its past performance, within the 28 days between amendment No. 17’s provision of the revised past performance evaluation terms and the closing date for the receipt of proposals. In sum, the protester has provided no basis to establish that the agency acted unreasonably by not extending the solicitation closing date due to the issuance of answers to offeror questions or the release of past performance questionnaires to the incumbent contractors.

The protest is denied.
The protestor simply did not convince GAO, or provide convincing evidence, that it was prejudiced in its preparation of its proposal, since 36 other offerors had no trouble adequately meeting the deadline, and FAMS did also submit a timely proposal, if one shown to be deficient when the submissions were opened and evaluated. 

It might have helped the protestor's cause had it protested the timing issue rather than submit a proposal, since GAO generally rejects protests about the nature of the solicitation after submission of offers or bids when the protester also submitted one; it seems to feel that gives the protester two bites at the apple.

Further, the solicitation had already dragged out almost two years from issuance, no doubt due to the multiple questions and amendments necessitated from the crowd of interested parties.

It may have been a factor in the result that there was more than ample competition from numerous other offerors; thus, the admonishment to foster competition was not pertinent.

And, the result may have been influenced by the fact that the substantive reason given to protest had no traction. It's hard to win a protest if you don't have something going for you that invites the compassion of the adjudicator that you've been unfairly dealt with.

Wednesday, April 1, 2015

Protests are meant to be pushy, not polite

Hattip to Federal Circuit Invokes Blue & Gold to Affirm Dismissal of Two Protests re: Government Contracts written by attorneys Lily Rudy and Scott A. Freling of the firm Covington & Burling LLP, published online by The National Law Review, for pointing out the following case from the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 

This case decides an appeal from a protest in the Court of Federal Claims trial court, and is interesting for its split of the hairs: it reached the same result but on different grounds. 

As usual, when cases or articles or other sources are cited, do not rely on my version as authoritative or accurate; I cut, paste, rearrange, edit, paraphrase, leave out essential information and otherwise adapt the subject matter to suit myself, and that may not suit you or the original author(s) at all. Read all sources at their link.

Bannum, Inc. v U.S., March 12, 2015, No. 2014-5085
Bannum, Inc. protests decisions of the Bureau of Prisons of the United States Department of Justice to award two contracts to other bidders. In two actions brought in the Court of Federal Claims, Bannum complained that the awards were improper, alleging a common defect in the terms of the solicitations and, also, problems in the evaluation of competing bids. In each case, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed Bannum’s suit.

Finding that Bannum’s proposal, by failing to commit Bannum to a fixed price, was materially out of compliance with the terms of the solicitation, the court concluded that Bannum was not an “interested party” entitled to bring its protest.

We affirm the dismissals of Bannum’s suits, but on a different basis. We conclude that, because Bannum did not adequately present its objection to the solicitations before the awards, Bannum waived its ability to challenge the solicitations in the Court of Federal Claims. We also conclude that, on appeal, Bannum failed to preserve its separate challenges to the bid evaluations.

We do not reach the “interested party” ground of the Court of Federal Claims’ decisions.

After the RFP was issued and attracted two bidders, the government sent notices to the two bidders altering the contract requirements and requesting updated proposals, adding a requirement that the facility be operated in compliance with the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA). The government asked both bidders to sign the amendment and submit a final proposal revision, including any necessary changes in price.

Bannum responded with a six-page letter labeled “Final Proposal Revision #3 and AGENCY PROTEST,” in which it restated its earlier price proposal and noted that those prices “do not, and cannot, reflect any consideration for the effects of Amendment 5” because of the “enormous amount of information [that] is required prior to pricing this new contract requirement.” Bannum attached a signed copy of Amendment No. 5, placing an asterisk next to the term requiring PREA compliance and stating: “Subject to and limited by Bannum’s response to [Final Proposal] #3 . . . submitted herewith; also, subject to Bannum’s reservation of all rights and protests.”

Bannum did not get the award. After the award, Bannum filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), alleging defects in the government’s evaluation of the proposals. When its GAO protest failed, Bannum filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims. When its Court of Federal Claims appeal failed, it filed this appeal.

In the courts, Bannum challenged the bid evaluation as flawed and added a new allegation that the solicitation itself was “materially defective” because of the PREA-compliance requirement and the government’s refusal to provide pricing guidance. The Claims Court dismissed that appeal, concluding that Bannum was not an “interested party” under § 1491(b) because it submitted a bid that was materially out of compliance with the terms of the solicitation, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Because Bannum’s two distinct grounds for protesting the awards — (a) a defect in the solicitations and (b) defects in the bid-evaluation process — entail different remedies and are subject to different legal standards, we address them separately.

A bidder that challenges the terms of a solicitation in the Court of Federal Claims generally must demonstrate that it objected to those terms “prior to the close of the bidding process.” It is undisputed that the government received notice of Bannum’s dissatisfaction with the PREA-compliance requirement before awards were made. We conclude, however, that mere notice of dissatisfaction or objection is insufficient to preserve Bannum’s defective-solicitation challenge.

The solicitations at issue and the governing regulations put Bannum on notice of the formal requirements for filing a “protest” that would trigger an agency obligation of response and prompt resolution. Bannum did not comply with those requirements; nor did it pursue other available means of formal protest (e.g., to the GAO or the Court of Federal Claims) until after the awards. In these circumstances, it waived its solicitation challenges.

A waiver rule implements this statutory mandate by reducing the need for the “inefficient and costly” process of agency rebidding “after offerors and the agency ha[ve] expended considerable time and effort submitting or evaluating proposals in response to a defective solicitation.”

We have previously suggested that filing a formal, agency- level protest before the award would likely preserve a protestor’s post-award challenge to a solicitation as might a pre-award protest filed with the GAO.

Bidders that file a formal protest are entitled to a scheduling conference within five days of filing, an automatic stay of the award pending disposition of the dispute, and a guarantee of prompt resolution of the protest. The Justice Department’s acquisition regulations, promulgated in 1998 after an executive order directed agency heads to “provide for inexpensive, informal, procedurally simple, and expeditious resolution of protests,” Exec. Order No. 12979, 60 Fed. Reg. 55171 (Oct. 25, 1995). In the GAO, the act of filing a protest generally triggers an automatic stay of any award of the contract and requires the GAO to issue a decision within 100 days.

Bannum does not contend that its objections amounted to a formal protest. Bannum also has not asserted that there was good cause for excusing its failure to comply with them. See COMINT, 700 F.3d at 1382 (failure to mount a pre-award protest may be excusable where doing so “is not practicable”).

We therefore need not address whether, regarding its solicitation challenge, Bannum is an “interested party” under our case law, which itself has taken into account, in certain circumstances, whether a party has timely presented and diligently pressed its protest.

In its complaints, Bannum pleaded grounds for protest that fall into two categories: a defect in the solicitations; and defects in the bid-evaluation processes. As the government agreed at oral argument, at least as a general matter, a bidder cannot be expected to challenge an agency’s evaluation of bids, in contrast to the terms of solicitation, until the evaluation occurs. Nevertheless, we need not address Bannum’s bid-evaluation challenges, because we conclude that Bannum has failed to preserve those challenges on appeal.

In its arguments and briefs before this court, Bannum has not contended that it has standing independent of the resolicitation remedy it seeks or that resolicitation would be the result of a successful challenge to the evaluation processes. It has focused entirely on the solicitation challenge and has not asserted that, even if it cannot press that challenge, it nevertheless is entitled to reversal of the denial of standing to press its evaluation challenges. “An issue that falls within the scope of the judgment appealed from but is not raised by the appellant in its opening brief on appeal” may properly be deemed waived. We see no reason to depart from that practice here.
See also Firstdigital Telecom LLC v. Procurement Policy Board, Court of Appeals of Utah, No. 20130899–CA February 26, 2015, as another illustration of the failure of a putative protestor to step up to the plate with a formal protest. There, by
email, the subject of which was identified as “Proposed meeting to discuss.” McDougal stated, “We configured our proposal based on your current set up and usage. We are not sure you or other competitors fully understood the services you are receiving,” and complained that the Board did not correctly compare certain technical areas in evaluating the proposals. Finally, McDougal proposed to meet with McRae and Jex to discuss the evaluation comparisons. After this meeting, McDougal on August 30 emailed the Board representative Richard Davis to reiterate flaws McDougal perceived in the proposal evaluations. McDougal stated, “[W]e are weighing whether we will file a formal protest to the bid.” He added, “[W]e don't believe, among other things, that our network architecture, service nor pricing were evaluated correctly,”
Although the initial email was timely, this communication did not pass muster as a "protest", and was therefore rejected. The Board
disputed McDougal's characterization of the August 14 email as a protest because the subject line merely stated “[p]roposed meeting to discuss” and “nowhere in the email was there a statement indicating a protest was being made.” McRae pointed out that in a conversation with Davis on August 29, and in McDougal's August 30 email to Davis, McDougal mentioned that FirstDigital was still considering filing a protest, and therefore “your 8/14/13 email did not initiate the protest process.”

The authors of the article first cited above offer this salient take-away: "While contractors often prefer to express their dissatisfaction over a solicitation provision with a softer touch, as Bannum did here with its written objections, a decision not to file a pre-award protest can leave an unsuccessful offeror without an opportunity to be heard at the Court of Federal Claims." 

The culture on Guam, as is also practiced in much of the Pacific and indeed around the world, especially in non-Western societies, is to be non-confrontational, especially to authorities; a more deferential and circuitous approach is deemed respectful and proper.

Thus, when faced with a regulation expressing the requirement that, "Complainants should seek resolution of their complaints initially with the Procurement Officer or the office that issued the solicitation. Such complaints may be made verbally or in writing" (see, ABA MPC § R9-101.02; 2 GAR § 9101(b), persons with objections to a solicitation tend to do as told; that is, complain. They do so at their peril. 

This "softer touch" complaint process, demanded by regulation, is way too polite to constitute a protest, and without proof of diligently pressing the objection, the protest may fail on technical timing rules (see, decision statement above, "Bannum also has not asserted that there was good cause").

It should be first pointed out that the COMINT case cited in the decision above states: "To be sure, where bringing the challenge prior to the award is not practicable, it may be brought thereafter."

Further, if there is "good cause" justifying why a complainant or other objector did not timely formally protest, the doctrines of equitable tolling or estoppel may be relied on.  See, How Draconian are those time limits, really?

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 US 89 (1990), a case affording "an opportunity to adopt a more general rule to govern the applicability of equitable tolling in suits against the Government", noted,  "Time requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily subject to "equitable tolling"."

The Court then alluded, unlike private affairs, the government, as a sovereign, is immune from suit, except where it waives sovereign immunity.   But:
"Once Congress has made such a waiver, we think that making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver. ... We therefore hold that the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States."
On Guam, the Guam Supreme Court has also recognized the application of equitable estoppel (in a private commercial context*, but one very analogous to the timing issues arising from the resolution of procurement disputes).  In GHURA v Dongbu, 2001 Guam 24, ¶ 1,the Court plainly said: “We adopt the doctrine of equitable tolling...."

In explaining the rationale for the doctrine, the Guam Supreme Court said (see, ¶¶ 11-13):
"The purpose of equitable tolling is to protect an insured’s claim during the time an insurer is conducting its investigation, thereby avoiding the premature filing of a suit before an insurer has even denied the claim. ... In order to prevent excess litigation, the time a claimant has to bring a claim is tolled. This practice encourages the settlement of claims by requiring an insurer to investigate claims diligently before denying liability and simultaneously securing an insured’s rights.

"Safeguarding the claim during this interim period also prevents an insurer from stalling the processing of a claim in order to invoke a technical forfeiture of the policy’s benefits. Without equitable tolling, an insurer may wait until the statute of limitations has expired before denying coverage. An insurer may also purposely conduct a lengthy investigation, hoping to lull the policy holder into thinking the claim will be settled, and then deny coverage after the twelve months have expired. The doctrine of equitable tolling protects the reasonable expectations of the insured by demanding good faith and fair dealing on behalf of the insurer.

"Finally, the doctrine of equitable tolling remains consistent with the policies underlying the imposition of a limitations period. A statute of limitations prevents unfair surprise and promotes justice by leaving stale claims in slumber. An insurer must receive prompt notice of a claim in order to properly adjust valid claims and guard against invalid ones. However, an insured is likewise entitled to the time necessary to initially prepare a claim and later pursue legal remedies."
Although the Guam Supreme Court has not expressly applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to procurement cases, the Guam Superior Court has, on at least two separate occasions.

Furthermore, since the Guam procurement law (5 GCA § 5480), following the ABA Model Code (§ 9-401) expressly provides for waiver of sovereign immunity in procurement disputes, separate from the provision (5 GCA § 5425) dealing with the process, and time limits, for determining such disputes, it might reasonably be expected that the Guam Supreme Court would be guided by the Irwin decision, noted above:
"Once Congress has made such a waiver, we think that making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver."

* But note, the Guam Supreme Court has also adopted the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the government, in a civil service administrative remedy context: "we adopt with approval the Appellate Division's use of estoppel against the Government." See, Limtiaco v. Guam Fire Department, 2007 Guam 10, at paragraphs 57 et seq.







Friday, August 8, 2014

Protest busting solicitation busted on technicallity -- and a short history of bid protesting

The following story is very roughly related to a prior recent post, Open sourcing sole sourced contracts. It is a very readable column, and you should take the short time needed to click the link and read it. I've only provided a taste teaser for the whole piece.

When it comes to GAO bid protests, pay careful attention to the web of procedure

Bid protests, especially at the Government Accountability Office, can involve many procedural, non-substantive issues — the timing of the protest, the content of the protest, and the like. Sometimes, if you are not careful, you can find yourself caught up in this web of procedure and get bounced out of the protest before the GAO can ever consider the merits of the protest. That’s what happened to Harris Corp. in this case.

In this case, Harris proposed to provide a Motorola radio and, during the first protest, Motorola proved that it did not and would not provide Harris with permission to offer its radio on the procurement. The GAO recommended the existing proposals be re-evaluated, which the Army did. The Army found the Harris proposal to be non-compliant and awarded the contract to Motorola. Harris then filed this new protest.

Harris first argued that the RFP requirement to include an explicit agreement with the manufacturer was overly restrictive and not necessary to meet the agency’s needs. Harris also alleged that it believed the Motorola proposal also failed to meet the RFP requirements. The GAO dismissed both protest claims on procedural grounds.

First, the Harris allegation that the RFP is overly restrictive of the needs of the agency relates to the terms of the RFP itself. The GAO rules clearly state that any challenge to the terms of the RFP must be filed prior to the time for proposal submissions. Since the Harris protest was well after that fact, Harris failed to meet the procedural requirement for challenging the terms of the RFP.

The remaining allegation, that Harris thought the Motorola proposal failed to include sufficient agreements to document the parts of the radio system that Motorola did not manufacture, is more interesting and more frustrating for the protester. The GAO dismissed this allegation as mere speculation and not sufficient to meet the requirements of a well-founded protest. In particular, the GAO held that “speculation, without more, does not meet the requirements of our Bid Protest Regulations that a protest include a detailed statement of the legal and factual grounds for protest.”

More interestingly, the GAO noted that Harris, as the awardee, had failed to participate as an intervenor under the GAO rules in the first protest. An awardee is always allowed to participate in a protest against its award, to protect its own interests during the protest. The GAO noted that “while Harris was not required to intervene in the earlier protest, if Harris had participated, it would have had an opportunity to review the Motorola proposal as part of the record, and could have advanced any and all challenges to the acceptability of the Motorola proposal at that time.” In other words, had they participated in the first protest and reviewed the Motorola proposal, they would have had a reasonable basis to raise the issue in the second protest.
You can read the whole GAO opinion here.

The protest procedure was begun less than 100 years ago with an eye to facilitate government expenditure accountability (more on that in a moment). But, the government also has a blind eye. Whether your protest gets the careful, prophylactic gaze of the good eye, or the short shrift of the blind eye, depends on your understanding and compliance with the technicalities required to place your problem before the reviewing agency or court, be that GAO or any other reviewing authority. The represents a balancing of the need to police government expenditures in real time before badly spent money flies out the door, and the need to make sure that the government wheels keep turning however poorly the money has been spent. I would point out that this balance also depends on how well the government back-stops the protest process with critically meaningful audit review and enforcement procedures to make sure that those poorly spent dollars are uncovered and the error of those ways corrected, albeit after the fact.

The history of bid protests is outlined by Daniel I. Gordon, the Associate Dean for Government Procurement Law Studies at The George Washington University Law School and the former Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, in his paper, "Bid Protests: The Costs are Real, But the Benefits Outweigh Them", published in 42:3 Pub. Contract L.J., Spring 2013, and available through the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons online here. The history noted below and the paper from which is comes has been noted before on this blawg, but bears repeating. As usual, I selectively cut, rearrange, paraphrase and paste, including deleting footnotes and citations, to suit myself, so read the source.

He explains,
In 1924, a few companies began writing to the then relatively new General Accounting Office (GAO) to complain that agencies had improperly awarded contracts to their competitors. There was hesitation within the GAO about the appropriateness of considering complaints by private firms about the federal procurement process. Ultimately, the GAO decided to consider the complaints as part of its responsibility to ensure that funds appropriated by Congress are lawfully spent, which is also known as the Office’s account settlement function.

Then in 1925, a company wrote to the GAO alleging that Panama Canal officials had issued a solicitation with specifications for a truck that were “wired” to a particular brand name and that thereby unfairly precluded the complaining firm from fair consideration for the contract. The GAO requested the agency’s views on the matter, and, when the Canal authorities admitted that they had used the specifications of one company’s truck in the solicitation, the GAO issued the first published bid protest decision, ruling that the challenged solicitation was unlawful.

For many years, courts did not consider bid protests, so that the GAO (and the contracting agencies themselves) represented the only place to file a protest.14 Then, for three decades U.S. district courts had bid protest jurisdiction, beginning with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer.

Meanwhile, from the enactment of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) until its jurisdiction ended pursuant to section 5101 of the Clinger Cohen Act of 1996, there was another administrative forum with jurisdiction over bid protests that pertained to information technology: the General Services Administration’s Board of Contract Appeals. Finally, a statutory change in 1996 resulted in the Court of Federal Claims, which had only pre-award protest jurisdiction for many years, later gaining post-award jurisdiction as well.

Consequently, for more than a decade now, the only places outside the contracting agency where disappointed bidders have been able to file protests have been the GAO and the Court of Federal Claims. From time to time there are differences between the GAO and the Court of Federal Claims, with respect to both process and outcome. The author views occasional differences between the two fora as inevitable. That is particularly the case where, as here, one forum is administrative and the other is judicial. In any event, having two fora hear bid protests may be healthy for the procurement system.

The protest process has received substantial attention around the world in recent years. More than ever, a protest system has come to be seen as a required part of a good public procurement regime. As evidence of this trend, the U.S. includes a bid protest provision in the free trade agreements it negotiates. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) likewise includes a provision requiring that WTO members that accede to the GPA have a forum to hear protests (called a domestic review procedure). Finally, there is a protest provision in Chapter VIII of the model procurement law of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

Perhaps most interesting is the attention bid protests have received during the past twenty years in the European Union (EU). Not mentioned in the EU’s Public Procurement Directives, protests were first addressed by the European Commission in what is known as the Remedies Directive. Initially issued in 1989, the Remedies Directive was revised in 2007. The Remedies Directive has had an enormous impact, requiring all member states to have a forum that considers protests. Furthermore, the Court of Justice of the European Union has also issued decisions that have reshaped the protest process in the EU. Of particular importance was the Alcatel decision that led to the requirement (codified in Article 2a of the 2007 revision to the Remedies Directive) that there be a “standstill” period (typically ten days) between the announcement of a potential awardee and contract signing to allow a window for filing protests. Bid protest procedures have therefore received important consideration from the international community.
Many posts on this blawg have referred to the EU rules and the interplay of EU and Member State rules of procurement, e.g., here and here and here

As well, this blawg carries many procurement stories from elsewhere around the globe, including Canada, Caribbean nations, Africa, India and Southeast Asia. Procurement is a work in progress, and there is much to be learned from looking around.







Sunday, January 12, 2014

Unfair and reasonable price and ranking conditions in solicitations

It is one thing to carefully tailor specifications to meet minimum needs. Another to tailor competition. And yet another to tailor out any judgment or consideration process. The following is another from Lexology.com (reg. req'd.), in association with the Association of Corporate Counsel, and its excellent coterie of contributors. It involves US federal government contracts and its laws and regulations.

This is a selection of excerpts from the article. You will need to read the whole article for context, citations, sources, etc.

Beware of protest-proof procurements by Thomas P. Barletta , Peter L. Wellington, Paul R. Hurst , Michael J. Navarre and Anthony Rapa, of the firm Steptoe & Johnson LLP
Some federal government agencies are taking extraordinary steps to try to insulate their source selection decisions from the bid protest process. Below, we discuss three examples of this phenomenon: (1) solicitations that call for awarding the contract to the highest technically rated offeror who proposes a “fair and reasonable” price; (2) solicitations that prescribe specific point scores for various technical features and call for ranking the technical merits of the proposals based solely on the total points earned; and (3) solicitations that provide for very limited, highly circumscribed cost/price evaluations.

Occasionally solicitations will provide for award to the highest technically rated offeror who has proposed a “fair and reasonable” price. Under such an approach, all proposals are subject to a threshold determination as to whether their proposed prices are “fair and reasonable.” Proposals that clear this bar are then evaluated strictly according to their respective technical merits. Price does not otherwise factor into the agency’s analysis of which proposal offers the best value to the government. The solicitation may even explicitly assert that the agency will not engage in a price/technical tradeoff analysis in evaluating proposals. An offeror who waits until after award to file a protest asserting that its price advantage outweighed the awardee’s technical advantage will likely be met with a motion to dismiss the protest as an untimely challenge to the terms of the solicitation. Therefore, potential offerors who believe that their pricing is likely to provide them with a competitive advantage should consider filing pre-award protests on the ground that this approach is contrary to fundamental principles of procurement set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), statutes and case law.
[I point out here that this RFP format is specifically authorized in Guam procurement law (5 GCA §§ 5216, and 5121) for the procurement of professional services. Indeed, it is the form prescribed for the method of source selection for professional services first adopted, and later abandoned, by the ABA Model Procurement Code.]
It is well-established that source selection officials are required to meaningfully consider price in making source selection decisions. The FAR provides that "[w]hile the SSA may use reports and analyses prepared by others, the source selection decision shall represent the SSA’s independent judgment. The source selection decision shall be documented, and the documentation shall include the rationale for any business judgments and tradeoffs made or relied on by the SSA, including benefits associated with additional costs." See FAR § 15.308.

Furthermore, agencies are required by statute to make award “to the responsible source whose proposal is most advantageous to the United States, considering only cost or price and the other factors included in the solicitation.” See 41 U.S.C. § 3703(c) (formerly 41 U.S.C. § 253b(d)).

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has consistently upheld these principles in requiring agencies to consider price when making best value determinations, and has sustained protests where agencies have failed to engage in price/technical tradeoff analysis.

In Cyberdata, GAO sustained a protest where a solicitation provided for downselecting quotations based on technical factors only. Offerors were to be ranked strictly based on their technical scores without regard to price, and the top twelve were to be invited to give oral presentations. Price was to be considered only when a smaller number of quotations were chosen from among the top twelve as offering the best value. GAO sustained the protest, holding that
"a best value analysis necessarily encompasses consideration of an offeror’s price or cost since, to be meaningful, a best value determination requires a weighing of the value and benefits associated with a firm's approach against their associated cost to the government. In a best value procurement, it is the function of the source selection authority to perform a tradeoff between price and non-price factors, that is, to determine whether one proposal's superiority under the non-price factor is worth a higher price. Even where, as here, price is stated to be of less importance than the non-price factors, an agency must meaningfully consider cost or price to the government in making its selection decision. Thus, before an agency can select a higher-priced proposal that has been rated technically superior to a lower-priced but acceptable one, the decision must be supported by a rational explanation of why the higher-rated proposal is, in fact, superior, and explaining why its technical superiority warrants paying a price premium."
It is also noteworthy that GAO invoked the “significant issue” exception to its timeliness rules in the Cyberdata protest, which had been filed after award, because the subject was “one of widespread interest to the procurement community.” However, there can be no assurance that GAO would invoke this rarely-used exception again in a similar situation, so it would be prudent for potential offerors to file pre-award protests when faced with solicitations that provide for award to the highest technically rated offeror with a “fair and reasonable” price.

We have also seen examples of solicitations that prescribe specific point scores for various technical features and call for ranking the technical merits of the proposals based solely on the total points earned. Under such an approach, the agency will merely confirm the presence or absence of the prescribed technical features in each proposal, add up the prescribed points for each feature found to be present, and select the proposal(s) with the highest point total(s). In some cases, the offerors may even be instructed to score themselves by submitting self-scoring worksheets. In any event, under this approach, the technical evaluation consists merely of mechanically comparing offerors’ point scores, without any judgments or analyses regarding the actual qualitative differences between the technical proposals. An offeror who waits until after award to file a protest asserting that its technical proposal is qualitatively better than other proposals regardless of their respective point scores will likely be met with a motion to dismiss the protest as an untimely challenge to the terms of the solicitation. Therefore, potential offerors who believe that their technical proposals will contain qualitative advantages not adequately captured by the point scores should consider filing pre-award protests on the ground that this approach is contrary to fundamental principles of procurement law.

In a number of post-award protests, GAO has strongly criticized technical evaluations that relied exclusively on point scores. It has consistently held that “[a]n award decision is not reasonable . . . where the agency makes its award decision based strictly on a mechanical comparison of the offerors’ total point scores.”

Tuesday, August 20, 2013

A brief, practical guide to the Irish version of EU procurement protests

The Association of Corporate Counsel's associated Lexocology website has posted another handy reference for procurement students and practitioners. This one is posted by attorneys Cormac Little, Claire Waterson and Sheila Tormey from the law firm William Fry. The basic advice of the article is certainly good for Guam, and may be universal.

Public procurement - a practical guide to challenging public contract decisions
A disappointed bidder should know that challenging public sector contract decisions is not easy. The EU Remedies Directive, implemented into Irish law in 2010, governs how parties might challenge contract decisions. However, time limits are strict and the grounds on which challenges can be taken are relatively restricted.

If you suspect there has been a breach of the procurement rules, you should gather your resources quickly and efficiently.

However, it is imperative for aggrieved parties to act swiftly to protect their rights.

This guide is intended to help aggrieved bidders navigate the rules for challenging decisions regarding contracts procured under EU rules. Not all contracts are subject to the full force of the EU procurement rules. For example, certain “non-priority” services (such as legal services and training services) are not subject to detailed procedural requirements and time limits. A limited number of exceptional circumstances such as urgency may also justify a departure from the normal rules. However, whichever rules apply, contracting authorities must always respect the over-riding principles of transparency, equal treatment and observance of fair procedures.

The 2010 Remedies Regulations, which implement the EU Remedies Directive and the EU Utilities Remedies Directive, establish a special form of judicial review applying to contracts governed by the EU public procurement rules. High Court litigation is unfortunately the only serious option for disgruntled bidders seeking to protect their rights. There is no Irish procurement authority with powers to investigate complaints and resolve disputes outside litigation. While a complaint to the European Commission might assist in persuading the contracting authority to terminate the infringement, this falls outside the control of the challenger. Moreover, significant delays are common. In addition, any subsequent enforcement action by the Commission becomes more about the State’s responsibility for failure to fulfil its EU law obligations than obtaining a remedy for the complainant.

Contracts which fall outside the scope of the EU public procurement rules are normally awarded under more flexible national guidelines issued by the Department of Finance. Challenges to such procedures are subject to general principles of judicial review and contract law. This guide focuses on the special procedure for challenging decisions under the EU regime.

Challenging decisions of a public body in court is subject to judicial review principles. The proceedings are not a full appeal and the Courts have repeatedly stated that their role is not to ‘second guess’ the public body’s actions. Instead, the focus is on how the decision was reached. Were there procedural errors or bias? Was the action so unreasonable it could not be objectively sustained?

Circumstances that might constitute grounds for challenge include:

Failure to advertise a relevant contract
Wrongly determining that a candidate does not meet the pre-qualification criteria
Giving one bidder important information that is not provided to other bidders
Bias in favour of one party (or against another)
Incorrect application of the award criteria; or
Changing the award criteria or their relative weightings after receipt of bids.

The burden of proof usually lies on the disappointed bidder. However, this burden might switch to the public body in certain circumstances. For example, if the challenger can show that another bidder had access to additional information that it did not receive, the contracting authority will have to explain why the apparent inequality in treatment did not breach the procurement rules.

Participants in a tender process must be informed in writing of the outcome of the process and must be given a summary of the reasons for rejection of their pre-qualification submission or tender.

Contracting authorities are precluded from awarding a contract for a certain period after this information has been communicated to unsuccessful bidders. This “standstill” period must be at least fourteen calendar days, provided the information is issued by fax or email. In other cases, the authority must wait at least sixteen days before signing a contract with the successful bidder.

A participant may also use Freedom of Information rules to seek records relating to the award process. Records requested under this legislation are unlikely, given the short time limits, to arrive in time to inform a decision to take legal proceedings under the Remedies Regulations.

Timing is a key consideration and aggrieved bidders must not delay. A company usually has 30 days after it learned of the decision (or knew or ought to have known of the infringement) in which to issue proceedings, and must inform the public body before doing so. [So much time! Guam allows only 14 days and the Attorney General has repeatedly sought to narrow that to 7.]

Challenges may be made to any decision that produces legal effects, not just contract awards. The strict timing rules mean that if, for example, a bidder believes that the wrong procedure was used, it should issue proceedings within 30 days of publication of the contract notice. If it does not launch a legal challenge yet continues to participate in the process until its bid is rejected, any proceedings contesting the choice of procedure will be ruled ‘out of time’. Likewise, one can challenge a decision excluding a party from the award process at pre-qualification stage, but this must normally be done within 30 days of receiving notification of the exclusion. Each application will be looked at critically, although time limits may be extended at the discretion of the High Court.

There are a number of potential remedies available to an aggrieved bidder. The availability of a particular remedy primarily depends on which stage of the procedure it is sought. The High Court has broad powers to declare the contract ineffective, indeed is required to do so in a number of circumstances, for example, a contract was awarded without prior publication of a contract notice. The Court may also grant injunctions aimed at correcting the alleged infringement or avoiding further harm to the applicant’s interests. The High Court may also award damages to compensate for any loss caused by the breach of procurement rules. Finally, the Remedies Regulations have introduced the concept of a financial penalty payable by the relevant contracting authority, separate to any damages award.

The following practical steps should help:

Act swiftly. Time limits for taking action are short, so do not delay. Seek advice early if you suspect there has been a breach of the rules. Remember that you will need some time to obtain legal advice and to make an informed decision on the options open to you.
Ask questions. You are entitled to be given reasons for the rejection of your tender. If you are not satisfied, ask for a debriefing meeting to obtain further information. Although it may be difficult to accept, there may be a valid reason for rejecting your tender: it is better to find this out at an early stage than mid-way through costly litigation.
Create a paper trail. Keep notes of any conversations that could be relevant. Where possible, record your objections or concerns in relation to the process in writing (e.g., in an e-mail to the authority’s relevant contact person).
Consider your preferred result and be realistic. Do you believe you should have been awarded the contract? Are you seeking damages? In many cases, parties would be happy for the flawed process to be abandoned and started afresh, or even to know that the authority has learnt its lesson and will apply this to future processes.
Those last 4 tips cannot be more true in Ireland or the EU than they are on Guam or in any US jurisdiction I've reviewed. The procurement law tends to help those who help themselves. Indeed, as I often repeat, the whole integrity of the procurement system relies primarily on outsourcing the policing role to the private contracting sector. The public sector may train, audit and "tut tut", but only a vigilant, empowered private sector contracting party offers real time prophylactic remedial effect.

Aggrieved contracting parties do the community a service by keeping the system accountable and on track.

Monday, August 5, 2013

Another jurisdiction up in the procurement air over airport administration and blames prior government

Aviation Stakeholders Berate House over Airport Contracts
Stakeholders in Nigeria’s aviation industry have frowned on the position of the House of Representatives on the ongoing airport remodelling contracts being undertaken by the Ministry of Aviation. The legislators alleged that the contracts did not pass due process.

According to the stakeholders, the committee should have intervened at the beginning when the programme was started, instead of attempting to terminate the projects that were already at advanced stage. Captain Usman Balarabe said it was quite shocking for any person from Nigeria who has utilised the airports for the past 30 years and had noticed the rot in infrastructure to voice any protest given the magnitude of the rehabilitation that has so far been undertaken in just over two years.

President of Centre for Aviation Safety and Research (CASR), Sheri Kyari, told THISDAY that when the minister started the airports remodelling programme, the House did not raise issues with due process until now the ministry had reached advanced stage with the projects, stressing that the programme should not be aborted.

“As far as I am concerned, let them not do anything that will stop the on-going development in the aviation industry. They are talking about due process now, and we know that to them due process is what will enter their pockets. They were all there when the woman started the development programme and they want to stop it now that it has reached advanced stage. I don’t agree with them,” Kyari, an aircraft engineer said.

A senior official of the ministry explained that all contracts for the remodelling of the airports and other critical infrastructure/equipment followed all due processes prescribed by the relevant law of the Public Procurement Act 2007. “It has to be noted that Selective Tendering is a lawful procurement procedure as enunciated in the Act,” the official said.

He explained the ministry opted for the selective tendering option because, “The present administration met aviation infrastructure, especially the terminals in a terrible state of dilapidation. Understandably, a state of emergency of sorts with regard to rehabilitating the derelict and decrepit infrastructure required a lot of urgency which the selective tendering provision in the Act suited quite aptly.”

The official explained that security related contracts are not subject to open competitive bidding in order not to compromise the process. “Secondly, the security equipment required and ordered by the
ministry is not an off-the shelf item. The equipment is to be custom-made and manufactured specifically to suit our purposes."

Friday, April 13, 2012

The price of Standing is eternal vigilance

Vigilance and action. You don't get standing by standing around.

The facts of this case just feel so wrong. But the courts do not hear matters simply because they are wrong. They hear matters only when parties are wronged. And when you are a party that is late to the party, you aren't wronged.

The case is DIGITALIS EDUCATION SOLUTIONS, INC. v. US, Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit 2012.

I've provided the description of facts from the lower Court decision because the Court of Appeals, while neatly encapsulating the legal essentials, just does not create the bad taste in the mouth. Indeed, this is an excerpt; the whole recitation is worth the read. There's much more that depicts a rigged and rushed expenditure just to use funds before the end of the fiscal year. In other words, a rort .
For many years, the Department of Defense Educational Activity ("DODEA") schools have used the "Starlab" brand portable planetaria manufactured by one of Digitalis' competitors, Morris & Lee d/b/a Science First ("M&L"). In September of 2009, DODEA conducted an unadvertised, sole-source procurement of 15 Starlab planetaria.

An initial draft of the Justification and Approval ("J&A") for the 2009 sole source procurement noted that Digitalis manufactured a similar but more expensive product. The published J&A, however, made no mention of Digitalis. Rather, it stated that Starlab was the only known product to integrate science with other subject matter and that, because Starlab systems were already used in DODEA schools, lesson plans and curricula for that system were already in place.

A year later, in September of 2010, the agency again began the process of acquiring more Starlab planetaria, a process that eventually culminated in the purchase of approximately 50 digital Starlab systems. The acquisition occurred with astonishing rapidity, with the entire procurement, from conception to contract award, taking place in only 15 days.

The first record of any contemplation of this procurement came on [Friday] September 10, 2010, in an internal DO DEA email suggesting the possibility of ordering Starlab systems should funding become available. A reply email, dated September 13, noted that such purchases must be publicly posted and suggested that, if the purchase was a possibility, a posting could be done "for couple [sic] days, just in case we need to go this route."

In the early afternoon of [Friday] September 17, 2010, DODEA posted on the Federal Business Opportunities website a notice of its intent to award a sole source procurement to M&L. It further stated:
This notice is not a request for competitive proposals. However, any party that believes it is capable of meeting this requirement as stated herein must submit a written capability statement that clearly supports and demonstrates their ability to provide the items by [Wednesday] 22 September 2010, 1200 a.m., Eastern Standard Time.
Two days later, on Sunday, September 19, the notice was modified to delete the estimated price.

The J&A was approved on [Monday] September 20, 2010. Citing 10 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(1) (2006) and FAR Part 6.302-2—"Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements"—the agency justified the sole source procurement as follows:
STARLAB is the only known portable planetarium system that meets DoDEA's established educational requirements to integrate sciences with teaching of other curricular [sic] such as, English/Language Arts, Cultures (Native American, Greek, African), Geography, History and Math. DoDEA has standardized curricula developed exclusively for the STARLAB portable planetarium. Curriculum standards and specific lessons for the STARLAB components are already in place and there are teacher trainers for this product in all respective areas of operation. It is also emphasized that STARLAB is the only source that provides a planetarium system with all the resources needed to support the instruction required by current curriculum to teach the DoDEA Kindergarten through Grade 12 curricular standards.

... to cancel the curriculum predicated on the STARLAB product would create the necessity for a new curriculum to be selected, developed, procured and implemented, to include, materials, staff development, creations [sic] of standards and rubrics. Lost classroom instruction hours for teachers attending training for a new curriculum would adversely affect DoDEA's all too critical mission to effectively provide a quality education to its students.
[This is an unwarranted focus on the justification for sole source: it assumes a finding of actual need for the acquisition in the first place. See, for instance, FAR Subparts 7 and 11. Was there a need for 50 new pieces of the equipment? Maybe, maybe not, especially if it had plans to review the curriculum. The government should not be allowed to place itself in a perpetual sole source situation, especially where other competitors are known to exist.]

The J&A also describes the agency's ostensibly fruitless "Effort to Obtain Competition":
Multiple searches via the Internet, General Services Administration (GSA) Multiple Award Schedule (MAS), trade magazines and catalogs for products by technical and contracting personnel to satisfy the Government's requirement have been conducted; this market research, including attendance by technical personnel at relevant curriculum-based conferences have resulted in no known sources that could satisfy the Government's requirement. This requirement was also advertized last fiscal year as a sources sought notice yielding no other sources in response.

The J&A also states that at the next five-year curriculum review, DODEA would "conduct further market research using the Internet, catalogs, [and] trade magazines, including direct contact with potential sources at both regional and national education conferences in effort to increase competition for this requirement."
Also on that day, Sky-Skan, Inc., another planetaria maker, contacted DODEA in response to the published notice to express interest in bidding on the contract and requested DODEA's specifications and requirements. [This is critical on the issue of the reasonableness of the timing, an issue the Court refrained to decide. It is critical because the Court of Appeal decision characterized this act, not as a expression of interest, but of an actual filing of a statement of capability.]

DODEA promptly contacted M&L, requesting "immediate assistance in providing additional specification to add to the requirement." M&L replied with a lengthy email detailing its hardware, software, accessories, and warranty, highlighting several aspects it claimed to be superior to its competitors' systems.

The next day, September 21, DODEA modified the posted notice, adding the following language:
DoDEA has standardized curricula developed exclusively for the STARLAB portable planetarium. Curriculum standards and specific lessions [sic] for the STARLAB components are alredy [sic] in place and there are teacher trainers for this product in all respective areas of operation.
DODEA's contract specialist noted in this email that "this [procurement] does not fit into my standard sole source template."

On September 23, 2010, DODEA requested M&L to complete a Request For Quotations ("RFQ") and return it by 6:00 a.m. the next morning. M&L responded with a quote later that day. On Saturday, September 25, DODEA awarded a sole source contract for 50 digital planetaria to M&L in the amount of $2,292,498.21. The contract originally called for delivery of the planetaria on November 30, 2010. About a week later, a modification changed the delivery date to February 28, 2011.

On October 11, 2010, after becoming aware of the award to M&L, Digitalis sent a letter to Congressman Norm Dicks objecting to the manner in which the contract was awarded and expressing its interest in the contract. [Bad idea: procurement officials and the Courts bristle at bringing politicians into the game. Use the political process to try to correct future errors; not to try to influence a pending decision-making review process.]

On December 2, 2010, Digitalis submitted a letter directly to the DODEA contracting officer expressing concern over the sole source procurement and describing Digitalis' portable planetaria.

The trial court held,
Although the procurement was subject to multiple errors, ultimately none prevented Digitalis from submitting a capability statement or protesting the procurement in a timely manner. Accordingly, we cannot sustain Digitalis' protest.
The Court of Appeals affirmed:
Digitalis argues that the Court of Federal Claims should have first determined whether the Department was required to conduct a full competition for the contract rather than a sole-source notice. Then, if we find that the Department should have conducted a full competition, Digitalis argues that it is clear that it would have had a substantial chance of prevailing.

Digitalis also argues that its failure to submit a statement of capability is "irrelevant" to the analysis. It contends that the filing of a capability statement would have been futile based on the Department's response to Sky Skan that basically required it to emulate Science First. Further, Digitalis argues that the period for submitting statements of capability was unreasonably short.

The government argues that Digitalis was not an "actual or prospective bidder" because it failed to submit a capability statement. It analogizes to Rex Service where we held that if a party does not bid during the bid period, it does not have standing regardless of any illegalities by the government in the bid process. (citing Rex Serv., 448 F.3d at 1308).

The Court of Federal Claims held that Digitalis could not demonstrate prejudice, a prerequisite for standing, because it did not have a substantial chance of winning the contract. Id. at 93. Because Digitalis failed to review fedbizopps and submit a statement of capability during the prescribed period, the court explained that "[e]ven if the procurement had proceeded flawlessly, Digitalis's chances to get the contract would not have been any different." Id. The court reasoned that a longer response time would have led to the same result because Digitalis did not check fedbizopps for weeks.

In a sole-source award such as this one, the notice of intent issued by the government is analogous to a request for a proposal. Interested parties are invited to submit statements of capability in order to convince the government that it should hold a full competition for the contract rather than sole-source the contract to the proposed contractor. We therefore hold that in order to be an actual or prospective bidder, a party must submit a statement of capability during the prescribed period. Failure to do so also means that a party does not have the requisite direct economic interest because it cannot have a "substantial chance" of convincing the government to hold a formal competition and subsequently bid on the contract. Rex Serv., 448 F.3d at 1308.

It has to be emphasized that this is a POST-AWARD case. In critical contrast, in a PRE-AWARD context, a bidder should protest defects in the solicitation before bid opening and probably not bid. But if it has no notice of the defects, it should bid, because the standing test, in US Federal cases, require participation in the bid process absent some very compelling evidence that, as a potential bidder, it was deceived or misled into not bidding.

Getting back to the unsavory "vibe"* of the case above, the Court of Appeals said
As the Court of Federal Claims noted, "the administrative record lends credence to a number of Digitalis's allegations of hasty and shoddy contracting."

This holding should not be read, however, as foreclosing challenges to the reasonableness of the procurement time period. Digitalis attempts to do this by challenging the five-day period. Digitalis argues that the selected time period is unreasonably short and that therefore Digitalis should be permitted to challenge the procurement despite not having filed a statement of capability within the time period.

The government seemed to argue that a party who fails to submit a statement of capability during the prescribed period may only object to the reasonableness of the time period if it is so short that it was impossible for the contractor to bid. We do not agree.

Determining whether the time period is reasonable is necessarily a fact intensive analysis. In the context of commercial item procurement, regulations require that the government "establish a solicitation response time that will afford potential offerors a reasonable opportunity to respond . . . ." 48 C.F.R. § 5.203(b). Because commercial items are often readily available to the public, a brief time period for soliciting responses may be reasonable. See, e.g., Cal. Indus. Facilities Res., Inc. v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 633, 635-36 (2008) (holding that a period of six days was reasonable in a solicitation for commercial items).

Contrary to the government's argument, the proper inquiry is not whether it is possible for a party to submit a statement of capability during the time period, but whether it is reasonable to expect contractors to see a notice and respond.

Yet at least one potential offeror, Sky Skan, saw the notice and filed a statement of capability, which suggests that the time period was not unreasonably short.

We do not need to decide whether the posting time was unreasonable, however, because Digitalis did not check fedbizopps or otherwise notice the sole-source award to Science First for more than twenty days.

As the Court of Federal Claims held, a twenty-day period would have http://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifcertainly been reasonable and Digitalis would still hhttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifave failed to file a statement of capability. Because Digitalis did not even discover the procurement posting for more than twenty days, we conclude it was not an interested party.

This comes across as somewhat harsh on the protester, and it must have felt that way to Digitalis. After the all, after chronicling the many misfeasances of the Government, the Court penalized Digitalis for not pulling its Digitalis out.

It has to be remembered, that the Courts' role in procurement review is not to clean up procurement. Its standard of review very clearly is limited to "clearly erroneous" matters, to malfeasances, not misfeasances. Use politicians to help clean up the misfeasances that Courts cannot address.


* See this quote from a classic Australian movie, The Castle:
Dennis Denuto: It's the vibe of the thing, your Honour.