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Saturday, December 25, 2010

Blanket purchasing pulling the wool over our eyes?

Fair and equitable treatment of buyers and sellers is not a concern of free market economics, except, perhaps, to the extent that competition for demand and supply is externally disrupted. Fair and equitable treatment of buyers and sellers is, however, a democratic philosophy of due process.

It is the purpose of procurement philosophy in practice to balance the constantly shifting tensions between the invisible hand of Adam Smith and the democratic goals of the community. I am not, by the way, demeaning Adam Smith's vision of the pursuit of profit; indeed, I'm a great believer in almost free markets -- markets not so devoid of control that they become manipulated by powerful economic interests, but not so politically controlled that they become manipulated by powerful interests, either. It's a matter of degree in a democratic society, and not an absolute freedom, as even Adam Smith acknowledged:
"All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man or order of men. The sovereign [politician] is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient: the duty of superintending the industry of private people." (The Wealth of Nations, vol. II, bk. IV, ch. 9.)"
There are thus various tensions that must be accommodated for a fair and effective public procurement regime. The root of these tensions is found in the competition of economic theories of pricing and political theories of justice and governance; the balancing of the need to get bang for buck and of the need to maximize fair use of pubic funds for the overall best interests of taxpayers. See, for instance, prior posts here and here.

When, for instance, small purchases for things like office supplies become too frequent and involves "petty cash", the need for precise accountability gives way to a more fungible means of acquisition and accountability, to the law of averages and other sampling statistics.

Under Guam/ABA Model code law, one means of accommodating small purchases is the "blanket purchase agreement" (BPA) See 2 GAR § 3112.1. A similar regime exists for "credit card" type purchases under the US federal GSA regulations.

The BPA is essentially a pre-approved charge account. It is described as

"a simplified method of filling anticipated repetitive needs for supplies or services by establishing “charge accounts” with qualified sources of supply and is to be used only if the services or supplies cannot be properly identified as to the quantity and the type of services or supplies required."
BPAs are appropriate when
"there is a wide variety of items in a broad class of goods (e.g. hardware) that are generally purchased but the exact items, quantities, and delivery requirements are not known in advance and may vary considerably."
"BPAs should be made with firms from which numerous individual purchases will likely be made in the given period. For example, if past experience has shown that certain firms are dependable and have prices considerably lower than other firm as dealing in the same commodities, and if numerous purchases at or below the small purchase amount limitations are usually made from such suppliers, it would be advantageous to establish BPAs with those firms."

"If it is determined that BPAs would be advantageous, suppliers should be contacted to make the necessary arrangements for securing maximum discounts, documenting the individual purchase transactions, periodic billing, and other necessary details. However, quotations for the price of the supplies or services themselves are generally unnecessary."
This is intended to result in something like the GSA Schedules system whereby the government uses its purchasing power to get, in the GSA context, "best customer pricing", or, in the BPA context, "maximum discounts".

These requirements address the "bang for buck" element of government purchasing.

One part of the governance element is addressed by introduction of a competitive context:

"All competitive sources should be given an equal opportunity to furnish supplies or services under BPAs. Therefore, if not impossible, then to the extent practical, BPAs for items of the same type should be placed concurrently with at least three separate suppliers to assure equal opportunity."
"The existence of a BPA does not justify purchasing from only one source. Whenever possible, the Chief Procurement Officer, the Director of Public Works, or the head of a purchasing agency must provide for equal distribution of the blanket purchase to at least three separate vendors."
The accountability aspect of the governance element is established by the prescription of invoicing and monthly accounting and other review and auditing requirements.

The implementation of BPAs in an isolated place like Guam may also benefit local economies and return government funds to the taxpayers where BPAs are established with local providers.

Where this last element of political philosophy begins to run off that rail and head down the pure economic track is when bang for buck completely ignores the political needs. If bang for buck were the ideal, every government, indeed every citizen, would acquire needs in an online controlled auction from the likes of Wall-Mart, Amazon and Office Depot. Government would be operated just like a business.

This consequence becomes even more exaggerated when local governments "piggy-back" on other jurisdiction purchasing regimes, as is the recent trend in municipal purchasing in the US.

Under this "piggy-back" process, a local government is (and many non-profit organizations are) empowered to purchase from vendors selected under source selection methods and procedures approved by another government, local or otherwise, in a region, or within an entire country. This is an abdication of procurement responsibility to a big or better government brother.

A "piggy-back" method would, for instance, allow the Guam government to purchase under the local procurement regime, and from the vendors doing business in, say, North Dakota, without any consideration at all for local Guam providers and the boost they provide to the local economy.

Some of these consequences are illustrated in the following article from Florida, USA.

State official's profitable deal with Office Depot may cost governments and nonprofits nationally

Office Depot now will be allowed to lure government agencies and nonprofits nationwide to the 16,000 products the state competitively bid at low prices without telling those agencies their contract purchasing website will be blended by default with potentially more than 44,000 so-called “non-contract” products priced as the company chooses.

A Brentwood, Tenn., company, National Intergovernmental Purchasing Alliance (NIPA), will market the contract nationwide to governments and nonprofits, which can share it through a process known as “piggybacking.” The purchasing alliance will profit from the amendment, as will the state agency, which came under fire this year from legislators critical of South’s leadership.

The Daily News examined some of the non-contract products listed on the state contract’s purchasing website provided to the city of Naples. The Daily News found Office Depot is selling some of the products at prices higher than it charges the general public, as it has done in the past.

“The offering of our retail website assortment as non-contract items in this instance is not outside of the ordinary and provides a tremendous benefit to agencies that piggyback off of the state of Florida contract,” Office Depot spokesman Jason Shockley said of the amendment.

Office Depot won’t be required to provide a list of the non-contract products, and state purchasing officials haven’t yet released a list of the on-contract products, making it impossible to independently verify which category each product falls under.

For nearly two years, the Daily News has been investigating the contracting practices of Office Depot, spurred by Fort Myers resident David Sherwin, a former government auditor and Office Depot employee. Sherwin launched a nationwide campaign to inform government agencies of the company’s tactics after being fired from his job as an Office Depot account manager in April 2008.

“This lays the groundwork for a bait-and-switch,” Sherwin said of the recent amendment to the state contract.

Since 2007, Office Depot has been accused of selling items without a competitively bid price in an unauthorized manner by the Florida Attorney General’s Office, by auditors with the states of Georgia, Nebraska, California, and North Carolina, and by auditors with Fresno County, Calif., Los Angeles, Calif., Clearwater, Fla., and San Francisco, Calif.

The head of the National Association of State Procurement Officials (NASPO) said it is unusual for a government agency to allow non-contract items to be purchased, and called the Florida purchasing deal a good example of “price shopping.”

“Sounds like from this amendment that they’ve really modified the intent of this contract to allow it to become a nationwide contract,” association director Jack Gallt said. “Certainly, it’s something NASPO would not support.”

The whole story, which contains links to a wider investigation, is required reading if you want the whole "morality play".

Tuesday, December 21, 2010

Lost bid? Out of luck? Not if out of scope changes

I briefly introduced this subject from the Government Contracts Blog a week or so back but did not have time then to report much about it. It is worth taking the time, so here it is:

Let Bygones Be Bygones - Except When It Comes To "Out of Scope" Modifications
As a general matter, the GAO does not review matters pertaining to an agency’s contract administration decisions. 4 C.F.R. § 21.5(a). Contract modifications and changes fall into this category and bid protests raising issues related to the issuance of modifications or changes generally will not be considered by the GAO.

At other times, however, it may be to a contractor’s benefit to have a long memory and a watchful eye.

The Competition in Contracting Act (“CICA”) requires agencies to use full and open competition when acquiring goods or services. 10 U.S.C. § 2304.

Unless an agency invokes an exception, an “out of scope” modification or change is essentially an improper sole-source award that circumvents CICA’s competition requirements. The GAO will thus entertain a protest challenging a contract modification or change when the contractor alleges that the modification or change is “out of scope” of the awarded contract.

If the GAO sustains the protest, it may order the agency to terminate the contract and re-solicit its modified requirements on a competitive basis, as it should have done in the first place. This remedy may afford a contractor another opportunity to compete for the agency’s requirements. A contractor should thus keep a watchful eye on its competitor’s contract to ensure that the work its competitor is being asked to perform falls within the scope of the contract as awarded and that it preserves its right to file a timely challenge at the GAO.

To prevail on a protest alleging an “out of scope” modification, a contractor must show that the contract as modified is materially different from the contract as awarded.

While no one factor is dispositive, the contract type and changes to the nature and type of work have received heightened attention in bid protest decisions. A contractor’s chances for success increase based on the number of factors that support the conclusion that the modification or change was “out of scope.”

Despite the lack of a bright-line rule, one thing remains certain. A contractor that lets bygones be bygones and ignores the manner in which its competitor’s contract is proceeding may never have an opportunity to make this showing and may be deprived of an opportunity to compete for a requirement that should have been subject to competition. Maintaining a vigilant guard could thus provide a piece of the pie that had appeared previously to be out of reach.

Monday, December 20, 2010

Pressing "play" after hitting the "pause button"

Among the material I subscribe to for procurement law developments is the excellent "Law-Now" series available by registration from CMS Cameron McKenna LLP, a UK-registered law firm.

A recent CMS Cameron McKenna Law-Now article deals with the "pause button" mentioned in this prior post: Hitting the pause button on procurerment. This concerns the mechanisms by which various procurement regimes try to maintain an interim status quo to allow a review of a procurement controversy.

As with other posts in this blawg, I quote from the article in excerpts, often re-arranging and editing the content; you should always click the link and read the source article in full for a complete and authentic understanding.

The procurement in issue in this case discussion involved the provision of cleaning services to a large vocational educational institution.

High Court lifts automatic suspension in procurement case

In the first case of its kind under the new public procurement remedies rules, the Public Contracts Regulations 2006, as amended by the Public Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 2009, the High Court has lifted an automatic suspension of entry into a contract. Under the new rules when a disgruntled bidder issues and serves a claim form prior to contract signature, the contracting authority is automatically prevented from entering into the contract. It is then incumbent on the contracting authority to apply to court to lift the automatic suspension.

The Court treated the application as though it were an application for an injunction and applied the American Cyanamid test. The Court looked at whether: (i) there was a serious issue to be tried; (ii) damages would be an adequate remedy; and (iii) the balance of convenience lay in keeping the suspension in place.

Based on the balance of convenience (or the balance of “irremediable prejudice”), the suspension was lifted. The judgment is interesting in a number of respects.

The Court concluded that it would “substantially emasculate” the effect of the new regulations if they required the claimant challenging the award to establish that it would have been awarded the contract, but for the defects in the procurement process. The Court therefore concluded that the proper test was whether, by reason of the defects in the process, the claimant has lost a “more than fanciful” chance of obtaining the contract.

The Court accepted that there were defects in the process and that there was a serious issue to be tried. However, whilst conceding that Indigo had a “more than fanciful chance” of obtaining the contract if it were re-run according to the rules, the Court concluded that the College’s case on causation would be more likely to be accepted at full trial, and that, in any event, there was only a low likelihood that the Court at trial would assess that chance of a loss as much more than the minimum threshold level of non-fanciful.

The Court found that quantification of the profits that could be earned by Indigo would be difficult (although the Court could, if required, carry out a quantification) and that damages would not be intrinsically an adequate remedy.

The Court then considered the balance of convenience, by assessing which course seemed likely to cause the least irremediable prejudice, taking into account, not only each of the parties, but also irremediable prejudice to third parties and the wider general public, as is important in the context of public procurement. In this respect, the Court found that the continuation of the suspension would result in the forced closure of the Colchester site, if only because of the impact of the health and safety regulations. The current cleaning contract was due to expire on 31 December 2010 and the suspension would mean that no contract could be put in place on expiry. Closure would affect both students and staff at the site. The Court rejected Indigo’s argument that the present contract could be simply extended for three months. As far as the Court was concerned this was not a solution because it ignored the possibility of appeal and further delay while the tender process was re-run. Moreover, although the contract provided for a possible extension, the Court concluded that this was for only one extension, which had already been granted, and did not provide for any further extension.

In conclusion, the Court found that the prejudicial impact on the College and the wider public of leaving the suspension in place far outweighed any prejudice which may be caused to Indigo by lifting it.

COMMENT: In terms of comparing this to Guam law (which, as often mentioned, is based on the American Bar Association Model Procurement Code), the first fact of importance is that this case involved a pre-contract protest. Under Guam law, the legislative automatic stay is only available pre-award/contract (although injunctive relief in a court is not foreclosed). It is not clear from this discussion if the automatic suspension is also likewise limited to pre-contract situations.

Under US federal law, as pointed out in my prior post mentioned above, an injunction would also be available (not automatically) in a post-award situation.

The second aspect of this case which is similar to Guam law, is that the court "lifted" the automatic suspension . Under Guam law, the automatic stay can be lifted upon application and adequate showing of necessity and public interest.

A factual item I think may have been critical to the balancing outcome in this case is that the protestor "came third, a considerable way behind the winner", a characterization which suggests there was little likelihood of it prevailing on the merits of its claim. Likelihood of prevailing on the merits is a significant requirement of injunctive/stay relief in the usual Guam situation.

Finally, I was particularly interested to read that the applicable regulations there apply a "standstill period" after the announcement of the preferred tenderer and before the contract was made.

I have been critical of the "gap" that exists between the rendition of a protest decision and the institution of a administrative appeal, and the lack of any "gap" that exists between the time the best offeror is chosen in an RFP and the announcement of the contract: in both cases there is insufficient coverage of the automatic stay effect to allow an aggrieved bidder or offeror to perfect a protest or appeal, which is quite prejudicial considering the significant damages available under a pre-award protest to those available post-award.

I believe Guam law would benefit from a similar "standstill period".

Sunday, December 19, 2010

Outsourced quasi-public-private partnerships subject to public procurement rules?

HRT skirted contracting and bidding laws, audit finds (Virginia, USA)
State investigators say Hampton Roads Transit's former leaders flouted federal and state contracting laws, steering millions of dollars of publicly funded consulting work to "preferred individuals" over about four years.

HRT manipulated some contracts to prevent them from coming before the agency's governing board and failed to seek competition in nearly 70 percent of procurements reviewed by the Virginia Department of Transportation Inspector General's office, that office says.

Additionally, consultant work at times was "improperly" arranged without the knowledge of HRT's procurement office or was secured under expired contracts, says the inspector general's "special review," which was released last week.

"HRT did not comply with applicable procurement laws," the report concludes.

"As far as I'm concerned, it's the same thing as stealing money," said Jim Wood, a Virginia Beach city councilman and past chairman of the HRT board. "If anybody who worked for HRT or works for HRT knowingly violated procurement laws, they should be prosecuted. Period."

The report states that HRT: improperly hired consultants without seeking competition in 16 of 24 contracts; failed to establish an "impartial and comprehensive evaluation" in eight of nine contracts competitively bid; produced no documents to show price was considered in five of seven competitive bids; awarded five consulting jobs under expired contracts; and twice hired consultants as temporary employees to avoid seeking competition.

The report cited examples including,

n When a recruiter was hired to fill an executive position, there was no documentation that the job was competitively bid or that the procurement department knew of the hiring. E-mails among senior staff admit that the hiring violated federal law and indicate Townes instructed staff not to use federal money to pay the contractor because rules were not followed.

n HRT policy stated that contracts over $50,000 must be approved by the HRT board. However, the board had no knowledge of payments of $485,000 over 2-1/2 years to one light-rail consultant. The consultant was hired as a temporary employee in five-month periods, for less than $50,000 each period, "in order to keep it within the President/CEO's signatory authority."

"HRT staff took deliberate steps to avoid obtaining Board approval of these services." And by contracting as a temporary employee, HRT avoided the need to seek competitive bids.

n HRT awarded a $9.5 million contract to Williams Mullen for legal services. Although pricing was listed as part of the selection criteria, the law firm was chosen before HRT's evaluation panel even considered the fee schedule.

Additionally, bias was introduced in the process when HRT's technical evaluation included the statements that Williams Mullen "has unequalled knowledge of HRT, its history and its needs" and "has demonstrated excellence in representing HRT... for many years."

n When HRT was selecting a firm to conduct a study for extending light rail into Virginia Beach, Townes, who was not part of the evaluation panel, attended a meeting to tell panel members that HRT might sue one of the proposers for other work it had done for the agency and therefore the firm's hiring could harm HRT's case. Prior to that, the firm received scores that were equal to or higher than the company that was eventually selected.

n A consultant's contract for light-rail construction and management was altered several times when costs started exceeding the contract limits. Early on, the contract with PBS&J Inc. was doubled to nearly $17 million by Townes, without approval from the board, which had authorized a $10 million limit for the work. Townes did not have authority to approve such a large change, so the contract increase was rescinded and replaced with one that brought the contract to the $10 million limit.

About six months later, the company wrote HRT indicating that it still needed the extra money, plus more, for a total increase of $10 million. About six months later, the HRT board authorized $2.8 million.

Then several months later, HRT staff had the board approve an additional $8.1 million. Meanwhile, during the lag, the consultant performed $2.4 million worth of work "without approved funding."

Donors profit from Myrtle Beach sales tax (South Carolina, USA)
(As a background note, this article suggests that the Myrtle Beach Chamber of Commerce was given public funds to promote the area's tourism industry. On Guam, the Guam Visitors Bureau is an autonomous government agency, part of the Executive Branch, and its affairs are expressly covered by the government Procurement Act.)
"Any time you're spending taxpayers' money, there should be some checks and balances," said state Sen. Ray Cleary, R-Murrells Inlet.

Although public money makes up 70 percent of the chamber's revenue - a projected $18.7 million for 2011 - state law does not require the chamber to solicit competitive bids or follow any other procurement rules for projects that are paid with taxpayer dollars.

The chamber is required to submit regular reports to governing bodies and the public showing how much tourism grant, accommodations tax and sales tax money it spends and where it spends it, but those reports have no impact on the vendors chosen to do that work.

Some businesses that made campaign donations to politicians who approved a sales tax increase for the Myrtle Beach Area Chamber of Commerce now are among the biggest beneficiaries of that tax increase.

The chamber has paid those businesses and others that donate to a political action committee supporting those politicians at least $5.9 million in public money - including sales tax revenue - during the first nine months of this year for marketing work without any competitive bidding and little public oversight.

Most of the sales tax money - charged on retail sales within the Myrtle Beach city limits - goes to the chamber of commerce for advertising to out-of-state residents. The city gets about 20 percent of the funds for property tax breaks and tourism infrastructure projects.

The tax is expected to generate up to $18 million per year over the 10-year life of the legislation.

Myrtle Beach, which passes the sales tax money along to the chamber, does not require the chamber to follow any procurement rules, according to city spokesman Mark Kruea.

"The chamber is interested in getting the biggest bang for its buck, so I'm sure they are being responsible with that money," Kruea said.

Myrtle Beach Mayor John Rhodes said the chamber's quarterly reports and regular updates to council provide enough accountability.

"It's all there - what they are spending and what they are spending it for," Rhodes said. "There are always going to be questions with anything that has to do with public money, but I think it's fine the way it is."

John Crangle, director of Columbia-based Common Cause of South Carolina, said giving public money to the chamber without oversight "is an open invitation to abuse."

Read more: http://www.thesunnews.com/2010/12/19/1877146/donors-profit-from-sales-tax.html#ixzz18aDv1w00

Friday, December 17, 2010

Personal liability for wrongful expenditure of government funds

This post discusses a specific Guam law that allows a taxpayer lawsuit against an Executive Branch employee who has expended government funds "contrary to law". Such action, if successful, holds the employee personally liable for the mis-spent funds, which are to be collected by the Attorney General for return to the Guam treasury. The taxpayer gets satisfaction and payment of legal fees.

But prior to discussing this law, it is worth pointing out a prior post dealing with similar liability.

On May 16, 2010, I shared a news item about JAMES WEED et al. vs BACHNER COMPANY INC., and BOWERS INVESTMENT COMPANY, an Alaska Supreme Court Opinion (No. 6475 - May 14, 2010; see, Weed v. Bachner Company Inc. sp-6475, 230 P3d 697. Note that the link in the original post has expired. There is a recent link to the opinion here, but it may also expire in time: it's reliability is touch and go).

The Alaska Supreme Court framed the question:
This case presents a single, discrete question: Are the procurement officials entitled to absolute or qualified immunity for allegedly tortious conduct arising out of actions they took in the course of the bid evaluation process? ... If the immunity is qualified, Bachner will be able to proceed with its claims that the procurement officers acted maliciously and in bad faith.
The Court then explained its reasoning:
We also agree with Bachner that an important purpose of the bidding process is to create transparency in the states procurement system, and to avoid awarding contracts based on improper considerations, and that this purpose weighs in favor of applying qualified immunity to procurement officers. Finally, we conclude that the highly restricted nature of a procurement officers discretion also makes this factor weigh in favor of qualified immunity.

Unlike the governor's function in supervising his or her subordinates which requires that the governor's discretion and judgment remain largely unfettered the role of a procurement officer in selecting bids involves a brand of discretion that is extraordinarily limited: Procurement officers are only allowed to consider those factors that the Procurement Code specifically lays out. We conclude that these statutory limitations on the officials' discretion also weigh in favor of qualified immunity.
The Court held that, under common law principles, procurement officials do not have absolute immunity but only qualified immunity:
This is not a situation where unfettered discretion is crucial to the best interests of the public; indeed, the procurement officers discretion is designed to be highly restricted. ... Thus, we conclude that, in defending against common law claims arising out of actions taken in the bidding process, procurement officers are entitled only to qualified immunity.

We take this opportunity to reiterate that qualified immunity still provides the officials with substantial protection from liability. Qualified immunity protects an official who has merely acted negligently, and it might even protect an official for liability arising out of a knowing violation where that official lacked the requisite degree of bad faith. The standard is similar to he one our legislature has articulated in the punitive damages context:
For an official with qualified immunity to be held liable, his conduct must have been outrageous or evidenced reckless indifference to the interest of another person.

Guam's law expressly does away with the question of immunity. It makes dealing with government money a fiduciary obligation, not simply an administrative discretion:
"Any officer, agent, contractor, or employee of the Executive Branch of the government of Guam who is charged with or assumes responsibility for the certification of availability of funds or the spending of money belonging to the territory of Guam, including the Governor and Lt. Governor of Guam, stands in a fiduciary relationship to the people of Guam in regard to the management of public money." (§ 7102.)
The law is found in 5 GCA §, Chapter 7, entitled "Enforcement of Proper Government Spending". The operative language is found in § 7103:
"Any taxpayer who is a resident of Guam shall have standing to sue the government of Guam and any officer, agent, contractor, or employee of the Executive Branch of the government of Guam for the purpose of enjoining any officer, agent, contractor, or employee of the Executive Branch of the government of Guam from expending money without proper appropriation, without proper authority, illegally, or contrary to law, and to obtain a personal judgment in the courts of Guam against such officers, agents, contractors, or employees of the government of Guam and in favor of the Government of Guam for the return to the Government of Guam of any money which has been expended without proper appropriation, without proper authority, illegally, or contrary to law."
It may have happened, but I am not aware of any action taken by any taxpayer to use this section in the context of alleged violations of procurement law, ... until now:



The ability to bring action under § 7103 can be particularly satisfying, and simple, when the government chooses to ratify an illegally procured contract. (See this post.) When the government ratifies a contract illegally procured, the protesting bidder has a bittersweet victory. He has proven the illegal act, but he nevertheless has no chance to get the contract.

He could, however, get some degree of vindication under this law. And, in bringing the action, unlike other instances, he would not have to prove illegal behavior since that would have already been a necessary finding before the ratification remedy is applied. That finding should be collateral estoppel in any § 7103 action. In that case, although he is not made whole economically, he can at least have the satisfaction of knowing that those responsible for denying his contract illegally will pay the price.


Follow Up:

DOE Settles Taxpayer Lawsuit With IBSS; Admits Improper Renewal of Copier Contract

Thursday, December 9, 2010

Some government contracting blogs

I've run out of room in my links section to add any further references, so you can look for additional sources by clicking on the "Other procurement links" label above.

Here are a couple of government contracting blogs I've run across today:
Government Contracts Law Blog by law firm Sheppard Mullin (USA)
Interesting recent post on contract modifications as improper sole source procurements: Let Bygones Be Bygones - Except When It Comes To "Out of Scope" Modifications

ContractsProf (Government Contracts) Blog (USA)
Interesting recent posts on oral change orders:

"No oral modification" clause dooms claim under public contract


Feldman on oral change orders

Oral change orders and the NOM clause, part III


Also this post on recent decisions regarding whether personal service government contractors can be treated as "employees": More claims by "contract employees" against Feds
As always, if you know of a good resource for public procurement law and advice, let me know by email or comment.