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Showing posts with label Conflict of interest. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Conflict of interest. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 11, 2019

How do you determine prospective contractor responsibility if you don't know who the contractor really is?

The ABA Model Procurement Code, as do most other procurement regimes, require the government to know who it is doing business with.  "It is important that the bidder of offeror will be a responsible contractor -- that the contractor has the financial ability, resources, skills, capability, and business integrity necessary to perform the contract."  (MPC 3-401, Comment 1)

"The unreasonable failure of a bidder or offeror to promptly supply information in connection with an inquiry with respect to responsibility may be grounds for a determination of nonresponsibility with respect to such bidder or offeror".  (MPC 3-401(1))

Since the time the MPC was enacted in 1979, other laws were being developed to facilitate cloaks of invisibility for entities to hide the identities of the money, ownership, assets and control of  businesses organized under such laws.  The most recent has been the promulgation of a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) in 1995.  Use of LLCs to provide ownership anonymity of assets, and businesses, is easy (see "How to Hide Ownership of a Company?") and notorious (see, "Anonymous Owner, L.L.C.: Why It Has Become So Easy to Hide in the Housing Market").  The ULLCA, both in original form and in a revised 2006 Model, has been adopted on Guam and many U.S states.

This is becoming a problem, both in the U.S. and Europe, and presumably elsewhere, as indicated in the following article published by the Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists (ACFCS):

Report roundup: EU calls U.S. a ‘secrecy haven,’ GAO highlights commercial owner opacity, and more, posted March 16, 2017.
This week’s Report Roundup has a common theme running through hundreds of pages of reports: the risk of opaque ownership structures and how, in the United States and beyond, the inability for countries to collect beneficial ownership information is a magnet for bad actors.

In the U.S., that means a major ally in the European Union (EU) calling out a longstanding gap in the country’s anti-money laundering (AML) defenses: the federal government allowing certain states like Delaware to sell corporate secrecy as a service – an ultimate irony as this country aggressively chases and chastises other jurisdictions for doing the same thing, according to the report.

That vulnerability is made doubly dangerous when it intersects the international trading sector due to the knowledge that organized criminal groups, corrupt kleptocrats and terror financiers currently hide, funnel and legitimize trillions of dollars in illicit gains, per estimates, through a myriad of trade trickery, including under and over-invoicing items, falsifying documents and other tactics.

In that same vein, U.S. government watchdog group the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted in a report that because this country doesn’t broadly require ownership information to be made available, that can open the door to national security risks when government operations are housed in buildings owned by foreign entities who may or may not be a shell for prying, spying eyes bent on espionage.

Lastly, another report by United Nations Security Council highlighted that the issue of anonymous shell companies globally allows rogue regimes like North Korea to flout international sanctions and get access, as analysts prognosticate, to banned technology and weapons systems on its path to wreak worldwide havoc by creating weapons of mass destruction.
The article goes on to elaborate on some of those reports.

It is interesting that the article mentioned a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), being critical of lack of ownership information in the national security context, because the GAO has now, again, turned its eyes to the subject, in the context of procurement, in its November 2019 report below.  In its letter to Congress transmitting the report, it noted, 
DOD awards contracts to companies in the private sector to provide a wide variety of services for U.S. military forces. Of the thousands of contractors doing business with DOD, some companies are what are known as shell companies — that is, companies that exist but conduct either no business or minimal business. Shell companies can be used for legitimate purposes; for example, they may be formed to obtain financing before starting operations. However, companies sometimes use shell companies to form opaque ownership structures designed to disguise the beneficial owner — the natural person or persons who directly or indirectly own and control, or receive substantial economic benefit from, a company.

These opaque ownership structures can be used to facilitate fraud and other unlawful activity in commerce, including contracts with DOD. For this report, we define opaque ownership as structures of business governance that may conceal or obfuscate entities or individuals who own, control, or benefit financially from a business.
Ongoing DOD Fraud Risk Assessment Efforts Should Include Contractor Ownership  (some excerpts of the letter an other parts of the report, sliced and diced to meet the didactic goal and limited space of this blog; you should read the whole report for original meaning and intent):  In the letter mentioned above, it further noted:
We researched legal databases and news articles involving DOD contractors to identify federal court cases and agency decisions. We reviewed GAO bid-protest decisions to identify cases in which contractors may have failed to disclose foreign ownership or concealed beneficial-owner information to obtain contracts that they were not eligible to receive.  We examined known risks identified through our case-study research and interviews with DOD officials.  We further examined the risk that contractors could be disguising their ownership to create the appearance of competition.

We contacted several government contractors’ associations to gain members’ perspectives on reporting beneficial ownership information and received feedback from 16 members of three government contractors’ associations. The perspectives gained from our queries are not generalizable to all contractors.
In the body of the report, GAO found:  
As the number of layers of ownership increases, ownership information becomes more opaque. This opacity can make it difficult for DOD to determine which entities and individuals ultimately own or control its contractors.

In the United States, no centralized information source or national registry maintains company ownership information. In 2014, the National Association of Secretaries of State found that most states collect minimal ownership data. The association reviewed key information collected by the 50 states and the District of Columbia during the entity-formation process and in annual or periodic reports. During both the entity-formation process and in annual or periodic reporting, the association found that very few states collect some form of entity ownership or control information from limited liability companies or corporations.  The Securities and Exchange Commission collects some ownership information on publicly traded companies. Any person or group of persons that acquires beneficial ownership of more than 5 percent of a publicly traded company’s registered voting securities must register.

GSA’s System for Award Management (SAM) is a federal government-wide database for vendor data that is used across all federal agencies. Any entity that wishes to do business with the government must register in SAM to be eligible to receive a contract award, except in specific circumstances. To increase procurement transparency and traceability, entities that wish to do business with the federal government are now required to provide additional ownership information through the annual registration process in SAM. The required ownership information includes the “immediate” and “highest” level ownership of an offeror.

Responsibility Determination

Contract award decisions are based on evaluation factors and significant subfactors that are tailored to the procurement, at the discretion of procurement officials. At a minimum, these factors must include: price/cost, quality, and past performance. A prospective contractor must affirmatively demonstrate its responsibility, including, when necessary, the responsibility of its proposed subcontractors. Contracting officers must then determine the responsibility of prospective contractors, including whether prospective contractors can perform the terms of a contract. To be determined responsible, a prospective contractor must have adequate financial resources to perform the contract (or the ability to obtain them); be able to comply with the required delivery or performance schedule; have a satisfactory performance, integrity, and ethics record; have the necessary organization, experience, accounting and operational controls, and facilities to carry out the contract (or the ability to obtain them); and be otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under applicable laws and regulations.

Before awarding a contract over the simplified acquisition threshold, a contracting officer must review the prospective contractor’s performance and integrity information available in the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS). FAPIIS is a federal government-wide database designed to assist contracting officers with making a responsibility determination by providing integrity and performance information of covered federal agency contractors and grantees. FAPIIS provides a prospective contractor “Report Card” that includes information pertaining to the prospective contractor’s past performance (if applicable), such as any administrative agreements, contract terminations, nonresponsibility determinations, and exclusions, among other things. It also includes the ability to view the company relationship information, which details the ownership information that prospective contractors are required to report in SAM. When making a responsibility determination, the contracting officer must consider all the information available through FAPIIS with regard to the prospective contractor and any immediate owner, predecessor (an entity that the prospective contractor replaced by acquiring assets and carrying out affairs under a new name), or subsidiary identified for that prospective contractor in FAPIIS. The contracting officer must document in the contract file how the information in FAPIIS was considered in any responsibility determination, as well as the action that was taken as a result of the information.

Contractors with Opaque Ownership Pose Financial Fraud Risks Including Price Inflation

Concealing relationship with subcontractor to inflate prices. Contractors can subcontract with companies they own or control to inflate prices for financial benefit. For example, in one case the contractor purchased goods from a company that its owners created, controlled, and used to make fraudulent markups appear legitimate. Contractors or subcontractors can also bill for work not performed by creating fictitious invoices that add costs to a contract. For example, in four court cases we examined, multiple DOD subcontractors were actually shell companies that did not have the inventory they purported to ultimately provide to the government or perform the work indicated in the contract requirements. Contractors or subcontractors can conceal conflicts of interest for financial benefits. For instance, in one case a DOD contractor employee and his spouse formed a company and concealed their interests by not listing their names but listing the names of family members on formation documents. This company became a subcontractor to the company that employed the DOD contractor. The contractor employee, in his official position, wrote letters justifying awards of purchase orders to the subcontractor he owned and approving recommendations that the awards be made to the subcontractor. The co-owner of the subcontractor concealed her involvement by signing contracts using a different name. We also identified the potential risk of companies creating the appearance of competition by submitting bids from fictitious companies. We identified one case that involved a DOD contractor whose executives admitted as part of their plea agreements to creating fictitious, inflated bids that were not from actual businesses to ensure that the contractor’s own bid would be selected by DOD as the supposed lowest.

Contractors with Opaque Ownership Can Also Pose Nonfinancial Fraud Risks


Contractors can pose nonfinancial fraud risks to DOD by concealing their ownership structure to bid on and obtain contracts that they are not eligible to receive. These nonfinancial risks may not pose a direct financial cost to DOD, but they can allow ineligible companies to contract with DOD while potentially denying eligible companies from contracting with DOD. These risks can also lead to additional vulnerabilities. One contractor that fraudulently obtained set-aside contracts claimed it was owned by a service-disabled veteran; however, that veteran had virtually no involvement with the contractor. Some contractors have been found not eligible to receive the set-aside contracts because they were not at least 51 percent controlled by the eligible individuals and the eligible individuals did not make long-term decisions for the companies. Rather, the contractors were controlled by an ineligible individual who owned and controlled a separate company that actually performed work on the set-aside contracts.

Contractors with opaque ownership structures can also pose the risk of circumventing eligibility requirements for contracts that are only designated for domestic companies, which can lead to other vulnerabilities that affect warfighter readiness. We identified four cases in which individuals created domestic shell companies for foreign manufacturers and bid on contracts designated for domestic companies. In three of the four cases, the individuals behind the shell companies also had ownership interests in the foreign manufacturing companies. Foreign manufacturers received payments from the contracts, despite the contracts only allowing domestic manufacturers to be eligible, and one such manufacturer ultimately supplied DOD with defective and nonconforming parts that led to the grounding of at least 47 fighter aircraft.
I'm sure you get the drift here. There's much more in the GAO report, much more. Have a look. Of particular importance is the lengthy discussion of things that are needed to improve the system of contractor selection. In brief, in its conclusions, the report summarizes,
We recognize that collecting additional ownership information, including beneficial-ownership information, could pose compliance burdens for contractors; and regulatory trends have generally focused on easing the burden to do business. Additionally, verifying contractor ownership can be challenging and time-consuming. Nevertheless, having a thorough assessment of contractor-ownership risks will better position DOD to make informed decisions on how best to use its resources and help ensure that the department’s fraud risk management program is organized and targeted to manage risks in a prioritized manner.

POST SCRIPT: In another new development along the lines of tracking who is whom, note the following article reprinted in Lexology:

Government Contractors Beware: DOJ Announces Creation of Interagency Procurement Collusion Strike Force
On November 5th, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division doubled down and announced the formal launch of the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (“PCSF”), an interagency partnership consisting of prosecutors and investigators focused on deterring, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting antitrust crimes, such as bid-rigging conspiracies and related fraudulent schemes in government procurement, grant, and program funding.





Thursday, July 12, 2018

He spoke proocurement reform, but got bespoke procurement

It looked good on paper, and, of course, after the horse had bolted:
• Watchdog groups are calling on the Legislature to pass, and for Governor Cuomo to sign, comprehensive “clean contracting” legislation
In 2016, an investigation into a sprawling alleged pay-to-play scheme connected to the Governor Cuomo’s Buffalo Billion economic development program resulted in charges against nine men, including a former top aide to Cuomo, Joe Percoco, and the former president of SUNY Polytechnic Institute, Alain Kaloyeros, a close government partner of Cuomo’s, on bid-rigging, bribery, and other charges.

The organizations -- including Reinvent Albany, New York Public Interest Group, Citizens Union, League of Women Voters, Fiscal Policy Institute, Common Cause, and Citizens Budget Commission -- are also urging state leaders to reduce the potential for conflicts of interest by exploring options to limit campaign contributions from anyone seeking a state contract. Nineteen states and New York City -- but not the state -- already have these anti-pay-to-play laws in place.

“The moment of truth has arrived. State and federal prosecutors say $800 million in state economic development contracts were rigged, but so far, the Legislature and governor have yet to act,” said John Kaehny, executive director of Reinvent Albany, standing in the state Capitol. “It’s time they pass common sense legislation that includes independent oversight over state contracts, uniform contracting rules, and transparency that will prevent corruption and abuse before it happens.”
• Governor Cuomo Announces 35th Proposal of the 2017 State of the State: Restoring the Integrity and Accountability of State Government Through Comprehensive Ethics Reform
The comprehensive package of reforms includes:

Advancing a constitutional amendment limiting outside income and creating a full-time legislature;
Advancing a constitutional amendment imposing term limits for elected officials;
Requiring members of the Legislature to obtain an advisory opinion before earning outside income;
Advancing legislation to close the “LLC Loophole;”
Instituting Public Financing and enacting a number of other campaign finance reforms;
Subjecting local elected officials to financial disclosure requirements;
Promoting Increased Transparency Through Comprehensive Reforms to the State Freedom of Information Law;
Expanding the State Inspector General's authority to SUNY and CUNY not-for-profits;
Creating new Inspectors General for the Port Authority and the State Education Department; and
Ensuring greater oversight of the state's procurement process.
• Statement from Governor Andrew M. Cuomo on Proposed Ethics Reforms Scandal seldom begins with evil, but with temptation, and temptation usually begins with a lack of watchfulness. I will create and appoint separate Inspector Generals for both SUNY and CUNY. They will be charged with identifying and investigating conflicts of interest, fraud, corruption and abuse. They will review contracts and hiring for both improper and illegal actions. They will look for personal benefit to any executive or legislative employee or improper actions with a third party. They will review all campuses and all affiliated entities. The IGs will have the authority to bring any report of improper conduct directly to law enforcement.

I will also appoint a Chief Procurement Officer for the Executive branch. That person will be charged with reviewing all state contracts, with an eye towards eliminating any wrongdoing, conflicts of interest or collusion. And just so there is no confusion, I do mean all contracts. Any contract or agreement that entails the disbursement of state funds will be subject to review. Any question of collusion, political benefit or personal connections will be thoroughly examined. The Chief Procurement Officer will have investigative and prosecutorial experience, and will be authorized to refer problematic issues directly to law enforcement for further action.
Alas, "Procurement reform became a hot-button issue following the arrest of several Cuomo allies on bid-rigging charges."

The rig was up, but not that many dominoes seemed to fall.

N.Y. developer pleads guilty ahead of 'Buffalo Billion' corruption trial
Kevin Schuler, formerly an executive at Buffalo-based LPCiminelli, admitted on Friday to wire fraud and conspiracy charges before U.S. District Judge Valerie Caproni in Manhattan, less than a month before a scheduled trial. Schuler said he was involved in a bid-rigging scheme that allowed his company to win a lucrative contract as part of “Buffalo Billion,” a signature economic development project of New York Governor Andrew Cuomo to revitalize the region around Buffalo, New York.
And then: Architect of Cuomo’s Buffalo Billion Project Is Convicted in Bid-Rigging Scheme
Alain E. Kaloyeros, a principal architect of Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo’s signature economic development initiative, was convicted on Thursday in a bid-rigging scheme that steered hundreds of millions of dollars in state contracts to favored companies in Buffalo and Syracuse. Dr. Kaloyeros, 62, was found guilty of wire fraud and conspiracy in the fourth week of a federal trial in Manhattan that invited harsh scrutiny of Mr. Cuomo’s ambitious plan to revitalize upstate and western New York, known as the Buffalo Billion. Dr. Kaloyeros, the former president of SUNY Polytechnic Institute, had been credited with helping to create a high-tech industry in the capital region, which led Mr. Cuomo, a Democrat, to place him in charge of the Buffalo Billion project. The governor had praised Dr. Kaloyeros as a genius and “New York’s secret weapon.” Soon, the money began to flow to Buffalo; waterfront parks, gleaming modern factories and a cluster of medical and technology facilities were built.

Mr. Cuomo, who has not been accused by prosecutors of any wrongdoing, said after the verdict that he had “no tolerance for those who seek to defraud the system to advance their own personal interests. Anyone who has committed such an egregious act should be punished to the full extent of the law.”

But at the trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Dr. Kaloyeros and Todd R. Howe, a former lobbyist with ties to Mr. Cuomo, conspired to defraud Fort Schuyler Management Corporation, a nonprofit real estate arm of SUNY Polytechnic, by steering lucrative contracts to two firms whose executives were significant donors to Mr. Cuomo’s campaign. As part of the scheme, Dr. Kaloyeros and Mr. Howe tailored requests for proposals, or RFPs, to fit the specific qualifications possessed by the two companies — LPCiminelli, a Buffalo construction management firm, and COR Development, a Syracuse-area firm — and ensure that they be chosen by Fort Schuyler for the projects. LPCiminelli, for example, received a contract to build what became a $750 million solar-panel plant on the banks of the Buffalo River, while COR received contracts worth more than $100 million for other projects. Both firms were clients of Mr. Howe’s.

Michael C. Miller, a lawyer for Dr. Kaloyeros, said after the verdict that his client would appeal. “Alain Kaloyeros is innocent,” Mr. Miller said. “He did not rig bids. Not a penny was lost. Not a bribe was paid. He did the best job that he could for the State of New York and for Fort Schuyler, and we’re just utterly disappointed with the outcome of this case.”

Government watchdog groups said that the verdict, like dozens of previous cases touching on corruption in the state capital, was the result of a lack of strong ethics laws and enforcement.
Jury convicts Ciminelli, Kaloyeros in Buffalo Billion bid-rigging scheme
The jury obviously agreed with the government's key witness, former LPCiminelli vice president Kevin Schuler, who took a plea deal and testified against his former boss early in the trial. Prosecutors dropped their charges against former LPCiminelli executive Michael Laipple.

Schuler spelled out for the jury how he, Ciminelli and Kaloyeros conspired to make sure that LPCiminelli emerged as the winning bidder by designing the request for proposals, or RFP, to favor Ciminelli's company. "We had significant influence over the project, influence over the RFP and influence over the process that was going to select a winner," Schuler told the jury.

Most notably, potential bidders were told in 2013 that they had to have 50 years' worth of construction experience in the Buffalo area in order to qualify for the project. That prompted Schuler to show the jury a shirt, produced in 2011 celebrating LPCiminelli's 50th anniversary. "I think someone put this in to help us ... and I'd never seen a requirement like that," Schuler testified. State officials later shrank the requirement to 15 years of Buffalo experience, saying that the 50-year provision was a typographical error.
Of course, it's another election season, when procurement reform is a can to be kicked through a political goal post.  When procurement reformation is the lipstick slapped on political deformation.

As Governor Cuomo himself said in his Statement quoted above, "Democrats, Republicans, Conservatives, Liberals, Independents – no party or group is immune."

Monday, May 14, 2018

Reigning in the cozy relationships

The following article is interesting for the revelation of a statewide undeveloped procurement system that is finally seeing the light. It heralds new procurement reforms in the State of Arizona, "massive changes to how public schools will be allowed to hire builders for large construction projects, as well as harsh new penalties for malfeasance that occurs during the selection process". 

The things discussed in this article were mostly already dealt with long ago under Guam's procurement laws, taken from the ABA Model Procurement Code.

I only make reference to parts of this for its procurement lessons, so you should read the full article at the link.

Arizona upends school procurement laws in effort to cool cozy relationships with builders
Some in the construction industry, which was not consulted on the changes and fears a return to a system that prioritizes cost above outcomes, say the changes are a legislative overreaction to scandals that have roiled the Scottsdale Unified School District since late 2017.

The most significant change involves how construction companies will be selected. Beginning July 2019, instead of using a process that allows districts to subjectively score and select a construction manager to manage the entire project, builders will be selected based solely on who promises the lowest cost.
Comment: The new system can provide a lot of the accommodations allowed by the old one by use of the "multi-step" competitive sealed bid procurement method. It has been used extensively in recent times (some say too much so), which is known as the LPTA (Lowest Price, Technically Acceptable) source selection method. It involves two phases, the first of which is to assess the offers of the bidders to determine which qualify, followed by opening of sealed price bids. The first phase allows discussion to enable "potentially acceptable" bidders submit an acceptable bid.
Other provisions aim to prevent undue influence over the procurement process by restricting who gets to be part of the selection process and banning gifts given by contractors to district officials. Gifts from contractors to district procurement officials will be prohibited. “It was all aimed at trying to address corruption in financial management and procurement practices,” said House Speaker J.D. Mesnard, R-Chandler.
Comment: Guam law's ethics provisions prohibit the giving of gifts, gratuities and even "favors", deminimus benefits that may not even benefit a person but the organization. It is meant to stem paying to play relationships.
•Contracts will be awarded based on lowest price from a qualified bidder
•No contractor or subcontractor providing services to a district will be allowed to serve on a procurement selection committee
•Procurement officials will be prohibited from receiving a benefit to create a procurement specification in a particular way, such as to benefit a single company
•School districts must keep records that prove construction vendors are properly licensed.
The competitive sealed bid method is the preferred source selection model. Conflicts such as this are prohibited by ethics rules, and rules preventing non-government who consult in the preparation of specifications from being allowed to bid or have an interest in the bid. Procurement officials are required to keep extensive records related to procurements, which are public documents.
The Guam Supreme Court just published today a decision that held a solicitation had to be cancelled for failure to keep a the required record, thereby impeding a proper review of the conduct of the solicitation. Teleguam Holdings LLC v. Guam, 2018 Guam 5.
Charter schools will be exempt from the new rules.
Not on Guam, where the bulk of their money comes from public funds. Guam professes its purposes and policies of procurement to include to provide for increased public confidence in the procedures followed in public procurement; to ensure the fair and equitable treatment of all persons who deal with the procurement system; to provide increased economy in territorial activities and to maximize to the fullest extent practicable the purchasing value of public funds of the Territory; to foster effective broad-based competition within the free enterprise system; and, to provide safeguards for the maintenance of a procurement system of quality and integrity.

Monday, December 25, 2017

Crikey! Wot a rort!

I remind my reader to click the links to the articles presented and read the originals, as I slice and dice the material for didactic purposes in order to try to present a "teachable moment". These posts are mostly to be considered as hypothetical procurement case studies, not news or other literary content, and omit, paraphrase and rearrange a lot of original material. You've been warned, again.

Allegations of systemic fraud sparked Defence Department internal audit
Confidential documents drafted by a senior defence department investigator reveal allegations of systemic fraud spanning several years inside the government's biggest spender. The 10-month investigation, which finished in February this year, was prompted by an anonymous disclosure about fraud and corruption made to the department in April 2016.

One of the most concerning aspects involved the department awarding companies contracts without a competitive tender process and only a flimsy justification they met "value for money" requirements. In other cases the department was unable to tell whether a contract breached procurement rules or not because important paper work could not be found.

In 2015-16 the Department of Defence reported the largest yearly contract spend of any agency within the public service. The department dialled-up a bill of $30.5 billion on contracts, amounting to 54 per cent of total government contractor spending.

The investigation raised serious questions about the department's use of "single source" tenders, where a single company is awarded a contract without having to compete against other providers. "It is questionable whether true value for money is achieved when [redacted] continually conduct single source limited tenders," Dr Clarke wrote. "Whilst there is less administration and quicker decision making with this approach, it provides limited opportunity for Defence to achieve the best possible outcome. "Single source limited tenders increase the risk of contractor underperformance and corruption."
Defence spending data unreliable, incomplete, national audit office says
Transparency and accountability for billions of dollars of annual defence spending remains suspect despite recent reforms, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) has found.

Last year, the Defence Department spent $8.3 billion on keeping its equipment in working order, known as "sustainment" in military jargon. Yet, the audit office found that despite small recent improvements, information about where that money went and whether it was being spent wisely was often unreliable or not available.

The report also questions a claim from Defence that reforms to its sustainment policies had saved $2 billion. "Defence has not been able to provide the ANAO with adequate evidence to support this claim, nor an account of how $360 million allocated as 'seed funding' for Smart Sustainment initiatives was used," it read.

Auditors were also critical of inconsistencies between figures given to the Government during the budget process and those provided in the department's annual report. "It's absolutely not good enough," Andrew Davies, director of defence and strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, told AM.
Oz military megahack
An Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) presentation to the Australian Information Security Association (AISA) conference yesterday detailed the hack. Suffice to say that a medium-sized defence contractor was breached and gigabytes of aerospace data and commercial arrangements for military aircraft and naval vessels were delivered into the hands of the attackers. The ASD used it as a case study for the AISA conference yesterday.

The government has since said the information was commercial-in-confidence, but not classified. This is not an isolated incident: in Australia, as elsewhere, attackers thwarted by a network's defences then seek out third-party contractors as an easier mark.

This suggests a problem in sub-contractor oversight – you can win a government contract without proving you have adequate network security.

Minister for Defence Industry Christopher Pyne seems to agree. This morning, he told Radio National's Breakfast programme that the government can't be held responsible for a contractor's lax security.
Fat and mismanaged public sector is eating us alive
In a Crikey article, carried by the Community and Public Services Union, Eric Beecher chronicles appalling mismanagement in service delivery.

Then there’s the $11 billion spent by the Defence Department managing 119 bases around Australia which the ANAO says is well in excess of the $9.3bn “expected value” of the 10 services contracts, signed in 2014, to do the work. The department has defended its performance, saying the vast project to renegotiate the contracts has delivered value for money, when considered against increased service demands and changing expectations of the ADF. Yet a new $120 million IT system, meant to manage contracts ­between Defence and the private companies servicing the bases, was $39m over budget and five years late.

There’s also the flawed tendering and contracting processes overseen by the Immigration ­Department, which resulted in the waste of “tens and possibly, hundreds of millions of dollars”. Given these practices were subject to a scathing ANAO report, they could hardly be ignored.

We’re reminded of last year’s Australian Bureau of Statistics census “stuff-up”, the Australian Taxation Office’s massive and damaging IT outage, the Department of Health’s decade-long mismanagement of e-health records, and the embarrassing release of identifiable Medicare information. There’s also the Department of Finance’s lax oversight of ministerial travel arrangements. But not raised is the $576m public service travel bill — a blowout of $75m in just four years.

While this shocking record is acknowledged, Beecher argues the blame lies mainly with outsourcing to powerful private contractors.
Outsourcing failures expose weaknesses in both government and business
The problems of dealing with private sector providers and contractors are a persistent theme in the analysis of government shortcomings. For example, recent Australian National Audit Office reports highlighted contracting problems in Air Services Australia, the Defence Department and the Immigration Department. Contract management issues were at the heart of last year's failed online census and have been a constant factor in the turbulent administration of Australia's controversial offshore detention centres. Over-reliance on contracted consultants was a major cause of the botched home insulation scheme.

Given the extent to which governments rely on private contractors for a large range of goods and services, it is unsurprising that contractors are often in the frame when things go wrong. But many of the recurring issues arise out of factors specific to the contracting process.

A common complaint is that the use of contractors has caused agencies to run down their in-house expertise and technical resources. As a result, it can be argued, agencies lack the capacity to assess whether the contracts they are agreeing to give the government and taxpayer adequate value for money. Without their own professional judgment, grounded in technical knowledge and practical experience of the area in question, public service managers are ill-equipped to decide matters of all-round quality. Instead, they tend to fall back on generic checklists of assessment criteria that emphasise easily specifiable factors, such as cost and timeliness.

Alternatively, if funds allow and time permits, they may contract in an external consultant or commissioner to give an expert opinion on a proposed contract. But such advice carries the risks of perverse incentives attached to all forms of external contracting and consulting. The consultants' objective is to gain future contracts, which encourages them to say what they think governments want to hear in preference to what they ought to hear. Once again, without the professional judgment to tell the difference and without their own in-house, trusted staff to advise them, public service managers are at the mercy of self-interested outsiders. This vulnerability is compounded by the lack of transparency that surrounds contracting. Overuse of commercial-in-confidence provisions has shielded public servants from the bracing effects of public scrutiny.

The lack of in-house capacity can affect not only the initial process of drawing up contracts but also the oversight of how contracts are implemented. However, as the constant stream of scandals illustrates, many commercial providers are more interested in profit than in good service and cannot be trusted to do the right thing. As a result, governments are being driven to impose tighter controls and regulations. Even then, in the face of determined rorting and corner-cutting, most government agencies lack the resources to prevent opportunistic contractors from wrongfully expropriating public funds.

After two decades of wholesale outsourcing, some general conclusions are clear. Contracting out is an efficient and effective alternative to in-house provision where the objectives are clear and easily monitored, and where there is a competitive market of alternative providers. It also works well for more complex services where providers can be trusted to pursue public-interest objectives for their own reasons. However, where these conditions of either simplicity or trust do not apply, the risks that governments will not receive value for money start to build. Moreover, extensive experience with outsourcing has itself compounded these risks by reducing governments' capacity to effectively draw up and monitor outsourcing contracts. Some complex service contracts that could have been safely contemplated a generation ago are now beyond the professional expertise of public servants to administer.

politicians need to recognise that outsourcing complex government services requires the development of trust between the parties, which means looking beyond the short-term bottom line and not always preferring the cheapest option. In addition, successful contracting depends on well-resourced government agencies with the skills and experience necessary to manage ongoing relationships with contractors. Running down government staffing levels while relying more on private contractors is a recipe for continuing policy failure.

Contractors, for their part, must earn the right to be treated as trusted partners. They must be prepared for the long haul and willing to learn from experience. They must also be ready to submit to the level of public scrutiny and accountability that public servants take for granted. Indeed, given that the commercial private sector is not imbued with the same commitment to serving the public interest, there is a case for subjecting private contractors to more scrutiny than the public service, not less.

Tuesday, April 4, 2017

Procurement controversies series: Ohio. Time after time...

Ohio awards millions in unbid IT contracts, sidestepping state policy, analysts’ protests
Time after time, state purchasing analysts warned that the pricey pending contracts were improper. “This position was unbid” ... ”No competitive procurement was issued” ... “The rates seem to be excessive” ... “The agency did not complete any competitive process” ... ”This position could have been filled ... with rates at least $63 less per hour.” The supervisors also repeatedly disregarded the agency’s own purchasing policy and sidestepped approval of the bipartisan state Controlling Board that serves as a check on spending on non-competitive contracts.

And, time after time, their superiors at the Ohio Department of Administrative Services overrode those concerns to award millions of dollars in no-bid, information-technology contracts, frequently paying more than $200 an hour — often to a company employing one-time Administrative Services executives, a Dispatch investigation found. As a result, Ohioans likely have paid much more than if routine competitive purchasing procedures had been used by the agency with the responsibility to “guide the use of resources on behalf of the public trust.”

Revolving door in reverse:

The high cost of contracting consultants' employees is underscored by a pair of instances in which the consultants later were hired by the state to perform similar duties — but at a sharply lower cost to taxpayers.

Gregory Jackson, one of Davis’ predecessors as the state’s chief information officer for five years (Davis was a 20-year agency employee who was named chief information officer in 2009 and became a deputy director two years later), left his state job in 2005. He was employed by Advocate beginning in September 2012, and through an unbid contract approved by Administrative Services, immediately became interim chief information officer at the Ohio Department of Medicaid. The company received more than $913,000, charging $218 an hour for Jackson’s full-time services until May 2015, when he departed both Advocate and the Medicaid department.

Jackson then returned to the state 10 months later as a full-time state employee in a similar job as head of information services at the Department of Job and Family Services. His hourly state salary of $67.31 — which yields $140,000 a year — represents less than a third of what Advocate was paid for his services. Advocate was paid $453,400 in its last contract for the services of Jackson, who listed a salary of $180,000 a year at Advocate on his state employment application. Jackson declined a request for an interview.

Peter McGeoch, Administrative Services’ IT director in the 1990s and an Advocate employee, worked at the Ohio Department of Higher Education through an unbid contract. His duties included advising Chancellor John Carey on IT issues. Records show McGeoch was hired for $150 an hour, for a total of $77,400, to work for three months ending in September 2016. A spokesman for Carey said McGeoch continued his work at $150 an hour under an extension with Advocate before departing in January. Advocate also was paid $456,000 in 2014 and 2015 for general consulting services provided by McGeoch.

A spokesman for the agency said that it did nothing wrong because its awarding of no-bid contracts is lawful under a waiver of competitive selection granted by the Controlling Board for the past 45 years. But the spokesman could not point to any law or another written policy permitting the awarding of contracts, even with the waiver, without first obtaining at least three price quotes from competing suppliers, as required by the department’s own policy.

The Department of Administrative Services oversees or handles most state purchasing. It also serves as the state property manager and human-resources and payroll office. Its Office of Information Technology handles most software and computer-system contracts for state agencies. The state spends more than $930 million a year on those agencies’ computer and information-technology needs. State agencies generally are required to obtain Controlling Board approval of no-bid or single-source contracts in excess of $50,000 per vendor per year. Last year, a department purchasing analyst pointed out a need to “help reduce the $75 million spent on consultants ... who have since 2006 received several million dollars in unbid work,” writing that some tasks could have been done at lower cost by other companies.

Administrative Services has not submitted any no-bid information-technology contracts for board approval during the past four years, records show. Top agency officials, such as Director Robert Blair and Chief Information Officer Stuart Davis, were not made available for interviews requested by The Dispatch. “The complexity of this subject matter does not lend itself to an interview,” wrote department spokesman Tom Hoyt.

“The majority of the identified (no-bid) contracts are for managing large-scale, complex IT projects and programs that span several years,” Hoyt said. “Items such as a pen or pencil can be compared or purchased in a like manner, apples-to-apples, while IT consulting involving specialized skills, knowledge and experience is difficult to compare in the same way.”

Among the findings from The Dispatch’s seven-month investigation:
‒ Advocate, a Columbus family of companies that has received in excess of $14 million in multiple unbid contracts since mid-2011, employs several former Department of Administrative Services IT executives who once worked closely with the state’s current highest-ranking IT officials.

‒ Stonyhurst Consulting, based in the Washington, D.C., exurb of Middleburg, Virginia, was handed more than $3 million in unbid IT contracts — again, many over the protest of Administrative Service analysts — that included pay rates of up to $250 an hour.

‒ Advocate also charged hourly rates exceeding $200 an hour. In fact, when a couple of its employees transferred to the state payroll, their wages were less than a third of what Advocate had charged the state for similar services.

‒ Despite insisting the no-bid contracts were proper, agency officials canceled some and sought price quotes following the protests of purchasing analysts. However, department leaders gave some contracts to Advocate and Stonyhurst anyway — even though they were the highest-priced.
The unbid contracts uncovered by The Dispatch were awarded without complying with an Administrative Services policy that since 2008 has required the agency to obtain at least three price quotes from competing suppliers, a process intended to save tax dollars by yielding lower prices through competition. The quotes are to come from pre-negotiated and pre-approved “state term schedules” that would-be contractors file with the state.

Hoyt said that policy is overridden by the agency’s receipt of a waiver of competitive selection each biennium from the Controlling Board, which consists of six legislators and a Kasich appointee. The waiver permits the granting of unbid contracts for specialized work and “to provide continuity of services,” Hoyt said. “It allows for a judgment call to be made by DAS.”

Addressing the purchasing analysts’ objections to sole-source contracts, Hoyt said they did not understand that the work was so specialized that it could not be obtained through the so-called staff augmentation contract at lower hourly rates. Analysts periodically have questioned supervisor justifications for some no-bid contracts, disagreeing that the work called for specialized expertise.

On June 4, 2015, acquisition analyst Andrew Miller flagged a $56,250 contract for Stonyhurst. “No competitive process has been completed,” he wrote. “I would recommend that the requester seek Controlling Board approval.” Davis responded that it was “not realistic” to seek the Controlling Board’s OK because the state fiscal year was ending June 30. Davis noted that the contract request was submitted in late April, but documents show the contract did not enter the state-vetting system until June 3. The contract called for one consultant to work 250 hours, at $225 an hour, during June, an average of 62.5 hours a week.

The Controlling Board waiver contains no language overriding Administrative Services’ three-price-quotes policy, which its own employees have written must be followed. The agency’s 127-page state procurement manual does not list any process for directly hiring “specialized” consultants through no-bid contracts. An internal department document also states that sole-source and no-quote contracts cannot be awarded in the manner used by the agency.

Opaque "transparency"

Most of the documents about the transactions are not easily accessible by the public. Administrative Services officials took more than four months to fulfill much of The Dispatch’s request for public records concerning vendors’ contracts. Some records still were being turned over last week — after nearly seven months.

A spokesperson for Kasich, who appoints the head of the Department of Administrative Services, referred questions to the agency.

The husband-and-wife team of Steven Zielenski and Jonelle St. John worked for a state IT contractor called Top5 before forming their own company, Stonyhurst Consulting. State purchasing analysts complained that the company’s first contract in 2015 for $128,100 to help with IT optimization efforts was unbid. Most of the company’s subsequent contracts also were flagged as “unbid” — a total of nearly $3.2 million in all.

Asked for comment, Zielenski responded in an email: “Stonyhurst LLC maintains strict confidentiality with respect to all our clients and our business relationships with them.”

See related article, It can be a tortured path to get state records.
Note that almost every article I reference in this blog gets sliced and diced. Here, for instance, there is much detail that has been left out and many bits of the article have been re-arranged to suit a didactic, rather than newsworthy, intent, as a case study of procurement law and (mal)practice.  

You are advised, therefore, always to go to the article at the provided link for the straight scoop.

Friday, August 19, 2016

The art of the protest - Procurement controversy series, Miami, Florida

Art dealer files protest in Miami Dade College project
Miami art dealer Gary Nader has filed a bid protest against Miami Dade College after losing out on a multi-million dollar development project on campus, according to paperwork obtained by FloridaPolitics.com on Sunday. The college, which wouldn’t front any money, would give away the development rights and later get to operate the “cultural centers.”

The idea for the project began as Nader’s own unsolicited pitch to the school last May: To build a world-class Latin American art museum with his family’s name on it, which he would start up with $60 million worth of pieces from his own collection. The project has since grown into a mélange of uses because the college soon grew more interested in having a theater and conference center. Related’s plan more than halves the size of the museum that Nader had first proposed. All of the proposals include luxury residential condo towers to be sold to offset the costs of the cultural parts of the development.

Among its many allegations, the 49-page protest says winning bidder and Nader’s nemesis—developer Jorge Pérez, CEO of Related Group—lowballed the college more than $100 million in an “exceedingly low valuation” of the eventual development, which would be a public-private partnership. Nader’s protest also says the college has so far failed to respond to his lawyers’ public records requests for documents related to the review and selection process.

The protest also alleges a conflict of interest by attorney Al Dotson with the South Florida law firm of Bilzin Sumberg. Dotson, it says, advised Miami Dade College during the development bidding process but also worked for Related on a separate affordable housing project before the Miami-Dade County Commission.

The document also complains of inappropriate contacts between a Related executive and a lawyer advising the college despite a communications blackout between bidders and school officials, known as a “cone of silence.” “The evidence shows that the college promoted favoritism throughout the solicitation process,” it says. “…The ‘cone of silence’ was a moving target that continued to change, for no other reason, than to support favoritism.”

The protest document asks that all action toward the project stop until the dispute is resolved. It seeks a re-evaluation of all proposals by an “impartial evaluation committee.”
Fight over Miami Dade College’s cultural center takes more legal twists
Friday’s challenge came after weeks of legal wrangling over the price of a required protest bond and public records related to an internal college investigation.

(See prior post)
Art Dealer Gary Nader Butts Heads With ‘Condo King’ Jorge Perez Over Bid for New Miami Museum
It's a heated and highly personal battle.

It’s safe to assume that Miami art dealer Gary Nader thought his pitch to Miami Dade College for a multi-million-dollar campus development, including a 90,000-square-foot museum of Latin American art with $60 million worth of work from his own collection, would be welcomed with open arms. The proposal reportedly didn’t even require the school to put up any money; it would take ownership of the culture center in exchange for giving over a parking lot.

But when college officials—citing their status as a public institution—opened up the potential development to other proposals, and then gave top ranking to a rival bid from real estate firm Related, run by Miami “condo king” Jorge Perez of the Perez Art Museum Miami, Nader struck back. His limited partnership Nader + Museu filed a detailed 49-page formal “protest bid” on August 12, which contains nearly 400 pages of accompanying exhibits directed at Miami Dade College purchasing department, opposing an agreement with Related.

The papers claim that the agreement “failed to comply with requirements for a public-private partnership, repeatedly violated the express terms and conditions of this solicitation and offered an exceeding low valuation for the right to develop private improvements on College owned land…” It notes a $158.5 million difference between “the first and second highest ranked proposers,” calling it “astounding.” (See, Abnormally low vs unreasonably low bid)

William Riley, an attorney for Nader, told artnet News via email that there is “a statutorily prescribed opportunity to resolve the protest by mutual agreement between the parties within 7 business days after receipt of the formal written protest” filed on August 12. “We have notified the college that we are available to speak and/or meet within this timeframe. They have not responded to us.”




Monday, November 9, 2015

US States mostly flunk transparency and integrity audit: no political will, not a voter issue

Secrecy, corruption and conflicts of interest pervade state governments
The comprehensive probe reported in the 2015 State Integrity Investigation, a data-driven assessment of state government by the Center for Public Integrity and Global Integrity, found that in state after state, open records laws are laced with exemptions, and part-time legislators and agency officials engage in glaring conflicts of interests and cozy relationships with lobbyists while feckless, understaffed watchdogs struggle to enforce laws as porous as honeycombs.

When first conducted in 2011-2012, the State Integrity Investigation was an unprecedented look at the systems that state governments use to prevent corruption and expose it when it does occur. The 2015 grades are based on 245 questions that ask about key indicators of transparency and accountability, looking not only at what the laws say, but also how well they’re enforced or implemented. The “indicators” are divided into 13 categories: public access to information, political financing, electoral oversight, executive accountability, legislative accountability, judicial accountability, state budget processes, state civil service management, procurement, internal auditing, lobbying disclosure, state pension fund management and ethics enforcement agencies.

The results are “disappointing but not surprising,” said Paula A. Franzese, an expert in state and local government ethics at Seton Hall University School of Law and former chairwoman of the New Jersey State Ethics Commission. “It’s not the sort of issue that commands voters,” she said.

Aside from a few exceptions, there has been little progress on these issues since the State Integrity Investigation was first carried out in 2012. In fact, most scores have dropped since then, though some of that is attributable to changes made to improve and update the project and its methodology.

Since State Integrity’s first go-round, at least 12 states have seen their legislative leaders or top Cabinet-level officials charged, convicted or resign as a result of ethics or corruption-related scandal. Five House or Assembly leaders have fallen. No state has outdone New York, where 14 lawmakers have left office since the beginning of 2012 because of ethical or criminal issues, according to a count by Citizens Union, an advocacy group. That does not include the former leaders of both the Assembly and the Senate, who were charged in unrelated corruption schemes this year but remain in office while they await trial.

Though every state in the nation has open records and meetings laws, they’re typically shot through with holes and exemptions and usually have essentially no enforcement mechanisms, beyond the court system, when agencies refuse to comply. In most states, at least one entire branch of government or agency claims exemptions from the laws. Many agencies routinely fail to explain why they they’ve denied requests. Public officials charge excessive fees to discourage requestors. In the vast majority of states, citizens are unable to quickly and affordably resolve appeals when their records are denied. Only one state — Missouri — received a perfect score on a question asking whether citizens actually receive responses to their requests swiftly and at reasonable cost.

“We’re seeing increased secrecy throughout the country at the state and federal level,” said David Cuillier, director of the University of Arizona’s School of Journalism and an expert on open records laws. He said substantial research shows that the nation’s open records laws have been poked and prodded to include a sprawling list of exemptions and impediments and that public officials increasingly use those statutes to deny access to records. “It’s getting worse every year,” he said.
Florida bombs public integrity test

How Missouri got a D-minus in national ethics report

Kentucky gets D+ grade in 2015 State Integrity Investigation: yawning gaps in oversight remain


Texas Gets a D- in 2015 State Integrity Investigation

Maryland receives ‘F’ grade in public access to information

Hawaii gets D+ grade in 2015 State Integrity Investigation: Lobbyists thrive in land of sunshine

How does your state rank for integrity?
The investigation shows that states have their work cut out for them:

>>  Most states are still grappling with the provision of meaningful and responsive implementation mechanisms to provide citizens and journalists with access to public information. Some — if not most of these barriers — seem to be rooted in the lack of political will, rather than genuinely technical hurdles.
>>  ‘Open data’ is not yet a reality across state governments. While many governments do not make available any open data in particular sectors, electoral data and campaign finance data make a noticeable exception with a few state governments making data sets available in open formats.
>>  Many states fail to ensure their accountability institutions are truly independent. In other cases states reverse hard won gains. Instead, institutions such as independent ethics entities, audit institutions or access-to-information monitoring agencies regularly lack resources and/or their mandates are curtailed.

Unfortunately, the report does not look at US Territories, such as Guam. It would be interesting to see how the whole USA stacks up.

FOLLOW UP:

There is and will be more to this story, as it travels around the states, such as:

Michigan ranks last in laws on ethics, transparency
Michigan, which already had a distinction as one of only two states where both the governor and the Legislature are exempted from state open records laws, has moved backward since 2012.... Of the 245 "corruption risk indicators" in 13 categories examined in the study, Michigan ranked last for laws and systems related to executive accountability, legislative accountability, judicial accountability and management of pension funds. Michigan also received grades of F, but did not get ranked last in the nation, in categories related to public access to information, political finance, civil service oversight, procurement, lobbying oversight and ethics oversight.
EDITORIAL: Massachusetts public records reform can't wait

Trouble at the Statehouse: secrecy, questionable ethics and conflicts of interest

Ohio graded D+ in report on integrity — but that was 6th best among 50 states
“While Ohio has many appropriate ethics rules and a strong Sunshine Law, there are simply too many loopholes,” Catherine Turcer, a veteran government watchdog with Common Cause-Ohio, said in the report.

New report a blow to ethics reform in Georgia
The Georgia Legislature has done very little to improve our ethics laws in the past three years, enforcement of open meetings and records laws is non-existent, and we have experienced unprecedented scandals with our state ethics commission that included interference with ethics investigations by the Office of the Governor.

Meaningful ethics reform has not happened in our state in decades, and this 2015 State Integrity Investigation will be the death knell to ethics reform for many more years to come.


Thursday, August 20, 2015

Procurement controversies --Sheepish in New Zealand, Policing training in Nigeria

Saudi tender process reeks of SkyCity approach
"The $6m contract for the Saudi sheep farm was awarded to Brownrigg Agriculture - long-time business associates and now partners of the Saudi businessman Hmood Al-Khalaf. This is separate to the $4 million cash payment to the Al Khalaf Group.

"During the contracting process Brownrigg Agriculture was paid to provide advice on the so-called business case and was paid by MFAT to travel to Saudi Arabia as part of a team to develop it. The planned second phase of the competitive contracting process was then cancelled and Brownrigg Agriculture was awarded the contract.

"This directly contravenes Rule 21 of the Government Rules of Sourcing that states: ‘an agency should not purchase procurement advice from a supplier that has a commercial interest in the contract opportunity, because to do so would prejudice fair competition’.
Saudi sheep deal 'broke Govt's own rules'
The controversial Saudi sheep deal contravened the Government's own procurement rules for fair competition when the contract was given to a company that was paid to provide advice on the business case, Labour says.

Brownrigg, as the lead provider of sheep, was previously revealed to have been responsible for nearly 200 of the ewes sent to Saudi Arabia coming from Awassi NZ's Hawke's Bay farm. Parker said Brownrigg Agriculture was paid by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to provide advice on the business case and was paid to travel to Saudi Arabia as part of a team to develop it.

The competitive contracting process was then cancelled and Brownrigg was awarded the $6m contract for the sheep farm.

McCully on Tuesday said the Government was "comfortable with the process that was followed in relation to the Agrihub.
Staff Training Contract: Police Commission Circumvented The Rules-BPP
According to a letter by the Bureau of public procurement (BPP) to the chairman of the police service commission (PSC), Mr Okiro, deliberate attempts were made by the commission to circumvent the process of approval of the training programme. The BPP said that the PSC adopted restrictive tender method and invited only three firms to organise the training for its workers in violation of procurement rules and regulations. It further stated that the PSC method of requesting and obtaining proposals from the shortlisted firms for the procurement, without the explicit approval of the BPP, violated Section 40(i) of the Public Procurement Act 2007.

“The commission considered that due to the limited time frame available to which to utilize the funds till the elections, it became impracticable to embark on a Competitive Bidding exercise. The bureau opines that this delay might have been deliberate, given that the Nigerian General elections is an every four years event which permits more than ample time to plan, prepare and perform all procurement procedures associated with the elections. “Therefore the Commission’s assertion that it was impracticable to embark on Competitive Bidding due to the insufficient time before the 2015 elections’ indicates a dilatory conduct on the part of the procuring entity.”

The BPP also picked holes over the non-disclosure of the source of funds for the training, affirming that the quoted figures by the commission were inconsistent with what the contractors demanded. “The provision of N53 million for consultancy fee for the Abuja training programme is rather excessive, as similar training programmes recently certified by the bureau show that Consultancy fees were charged within 10 – 15 per cent of the training cost.
Read the full stories at the links.

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

"Same old story ... failure to follow the rules"

Too many people blame the rules. They'd rather do without them. This is (another) story of how that works out for you.  Not surprisingly, this comes from Texas.

State auditors find problems with Land Office contracts
The Texas General Land Office had a conflict of interest when hiring the firm Grant Thornton LLP for oil and gas royalty audits. The July 2015 report said the land office’s former director of financial subsidiary operations had a “personal and professional association with her former supervisor,” who now works as a subcontractor to Grant Thornton. The land office employee served as a liaison between the two offices.

State Auditor Terry Keel’s office launched its audit in December 2014 after the three contracts were procured. The land office agreed with the state’s recommendations, which called for a cost analysis, a needs assessment and addressing any conflicts of interests prior to each procurement.

State procurement requirements call for agencies to disclose conflicts of interests during contract planning but the office failed to do so. [Some go further: disclosure only works when someone somewhere cares and pays attention. Some jurisdictions require recusal, and some fewer add bite to the requirement.]

Tom “Smitty” Smith of the group Public Citizen said, “It is the same old story of allegations of conflict of interest and failure to follow the rules for contracting.”

The state also found that the land office did not compare the cost of hiring full-time employees to conduct oil and gas royalty audits with the cost of contracting Grant Thornton LLP. According to the report, the office could have hired four employees to complete four audits for $426,813, but the Grant Thornton contract totaled more than $1 million.

A separate contract with IDEA Integration Corporation for information technology services was also not planned and monitored correctly, the audit found. The state’s Quality Assurance Team, which monitors major information resources projects for agencies, was not involved with the $1.9 million contract. Normally, if contract expenditures exceed $1 million it must be reviewed by the group.

In addition, the office assigned contract managers that had not obtained contract management training that is required by law.

This is not the first time state contracting practices have been under scrutiny, but Gov. Greg Abbott recently signed approved legislation that will strengthen state contracting regulations. The approval came after it was discovered that the Health and Human Services Commission handed a $110 million contract to Austin technology company 21CT. “It just goes to show you can’t trust the state agencies to do it without an outside agency to supervise their work,” Smith said. “This is the same story here — agency after agency failing to follow basic contracting provisions.”

Audit Finds "Significant Weaknesses" in GLO Contracting
The General Land Office’s contracting procedures are riddled with “significant weaknesses” that threaten the agency’s ability to ensure it is wisely spending its dollars, State Auditor John Keel said in a report made public Tuesday. “Due to significant weaknesses in its processes,” the audit said, the General Land Office “did not always plan, procure, form, and monitor” the contracts according to state rules and the agency’s own policies.

The GLO has a wide range of duties, including managing the rights to millions of acres of state-owned minerals, protecting the state’s coastline, handling billions of dollars for disaster recovery, preserving the Alamo and administering loans and other benefits to veterans.

For the nearly $2 million Grant Thornton contract, signed in 2013 and renewed in 2014, the auditor identified “significant deficiencies,” such as failing to study whether it needed to hire the firm in the first place. “The Office did not assess the need to hire Grant Thornton to provide supplemental staffing for the Office’s existing minerals audit department,” the report said. The agency researched rates at other firms, but only after it decided to hire Grant Thornton.

The agency initially told the state auditor that it removed the employee from the Grant Thornton contract, but it downplayed her involvement in brokering the contract. The auditor, however, concluded that the employee “had a significant role in the procurement,” including attending a relevant meeting, preparing a proposal for staffing mineral audits with Grant Thornton personnel and helping approve contracts with the company in 2013 and 2014.

The audit found other problems with the information technology contract with IDEA Integration Corporation. In that case, the report said, the GLO prepared an incomplete “statement of work,” and underestimated the roughly $1.9 million cost. The agency initially pegged the cost at about $93,000. While planning the deal, the agency "did not include key information, such as project time lines and applicable Texas Administrative Code information technology requirements," the report said.

Because of that error, the auditor said, agency staff did not complete disclosure forms designed to ward off nepotism, as required for contracts over $1 million.

In contrast, this:

UK: How To Guard Against Bribery And Corruption In The Tender Process
Any company caught paying bribes faces the prospect of a criminal conviction, an unlimited fine and terrible publicity. A further consequence for those supplying the public sector, is a discretionary ban from bidding for government contracts across the EU if the company is convicted of the offence of failing to prevent bribery under section seven of the Bribery Act 2010. The ban would be mandatory if one of the directors (or any person who has powers of representation, decision or control of the company) is involved and is convicted of bribing another person or a foreign public official under sections one or six of the Act. The stakes are high so it is important to have policies to prevent bribes being paid on your behalf.

For example taking a procurement manager for an expensive day out shortly before they decide on a tender. This could be unlawful if the intention was to influence their decision to favour your bid for reasons other than the relative merits of your tender. Timing is everything. The closer in time the hospitality is to a contract award the greater the likelihood that there will be an inference of impropriety.

What is required is a culture in which bribery is not tolerated at any level.

In a procurement setting you must understand the rules and stick to them.

Thursday, July 23, 2015

Procurement controversies -- Australia

Another useful article from Lexology. Useful because it speaks in general principles that we see played out in different costumes in different places but with similar themes and morals.  As usual, don't rely on this rendition as a full and complete account.  Refer to the original at the link for references and other essential material.

Is a perceived conflict of interest enough to derail a tender process? by Australian lawyer Liana Westcott of the firm Russell Kennedy (see original published article here).
Beech-Jones J of the NSW Supreme Court has just finished grappling with procedural fairness, process contracts, bases for judicial review and LinkedIn profile updates in order to hand down his ex tempore judgment in Karimbla Properties (No 50) Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales & Anor.

The matter arose out of a tender for the sale of land at Macquarie Park by UrbanGrowth, a NSW corporate body established by legislation. UrbanGrowth planned a two-stage process commencing with an Expression of Interest and then proceeding to an Invitation to Tender with shortlisted entities.

One of the potential tenderers hoping to develop the site was Karimbla, part of a group of companies known as the Meriton Group.

Unfortunately, one of UrbanGrowth’s officials running the tender process was on both sides of the fence – simultaneously conducting the shortlisting process for UrbanGrowth and applying for a job with Meriton. Predictably, he neglected to declare this conflict of interests to UrbanGrowth or, it seems, to the independent probity adviser appointed to oversee the process.

Karimbla was shortlisted for participation in the second stage of the process, but things came unstuck when the gentleman’s UrbanGrowth colleagues noticed he had updated his LinkedIn profile with his new job – at Meriton.

A series of meetings followed and, after an exchange of correspondence on the issue, UrbanGrowth determined that the defensibility of the tender process had been tainted sufficiently that Karimbla / Meriton should be excluded from further participation. Although there was no evidence that confidential information had actually been leaked to Karimbla / Meriton, or that any favouritism had actually been afforded to Karimbla / Meriton in the shortlisting process, UrbanGrowth argued that the perception created by the circumstances was such that other tenderers could not be confident in the transparency and fairness of the process, and may withdraw if the issue was not resolved.

Meriton sought an injunction to prevent UrbanGrowth from continuing with the tender process or, alternately, to prevent an exchange of contracts flowing from the tender process. Counsel for Meriton raised a number of arguments around the amenability of the tender process to judicial review, the source of UrbanGrowth’s power to exclude a tender and the existence of a process contract requiring fair dealing by UrbanGrowth.

The Court (rightly in our view) dismissed the application, and in doing so made a number of useful observations drawing on existing case law:

• The right to exclude a tender does not generally have a statutory basis, and accordingly will not be subject to judicial review.
• While it is possible for a process contract to be formed by the issue of an approach to market, a properly drafted exclusion of legal relations in that document will generally be effective to negate a process contract.
• The fact that UrbanGrowth’s decision to exclude was based on perception only and not actual wrongdoing by the tenderer did not undermine its validity.

Ultimately, the application for injunction was dismissed and UrbanGrowth was able to proceed with the second stage of the tender process – without Karimbla / Meriton. While the outcome was largely positive for

UrbanGrowth, it was unfortunate for Karimbla / Meriton. By failing to identify the clear conflict inherent in employing a member of the UrbanGrowth tender team and declaring it proactively to UrbanGrowth, they lost the opportunity to win an attractive development opportunity.

With any luck, the case will prompt government entities to look more closely at their conflict of interest policies and practices, to ensure that employees and potential tenderers understand precisely what is expected of them, and are held accountable when those obligations are not met.
For a story that is not a repetition but does rhyme with this theme, see another recent conflicts case from Lexology, this one in the US:

Access to pre-solicitation information without mitigation plan: a recipe for rescission
The Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”) recently made clear that mere access to pre-solicitation information creates a potential Organizational Conflict of Interest (“OCI”) that can invalidate an award.

Saturday, April 18, 2015

Apples don't fall far from the tree

Mexico awards road project to sons of banned contractor (Read the whole story at the link.)
Mexico has awarded a $75mn highway contract to a company closely linked to a contractor that was banned from government work after botching two projects, including a job on the same highway.

Mexico’s Federal Audit Office in 2012 found that Gutsa bungled a $30mn Pemex contract to build a monument to mark the bicentennial of Mexican independence. Gutsa did not finish the monument, known as the Estela de Luz, in time for the anniversary, and the costs ballooned to more than $90mn, the office found. Investigators later found that Gutsa won the monument contract by taking advantage of a regulatory loophole. The company received that contract while it was appealing a previous ban over shoddy work on the Mexico City-Acapulco highway.

Epccor is owned by the sons of Juan Diego Gutierrez Cortina, who controls a company that is on the government’s list of banned businesses. Among the ties between the two companies, one of the sons serves as a director of both firms, a public filing shows. Epccor itself hasn’t been banned.

Gutsa and Epccor “are completely different companies,” said Epccor vice president Adolfo Gomez. He said Gutsa was a major construction firm with many employees, and it is only natural that some should have joined Epccor. Gomez himself once worked at Gutsa.

One of Gutierrez Cortina’s sons, Ignacio Gutierrez Sainz, is a director of both Epccor and Gutsa, according to a public financial document from last year. Gutierrez Sainz and two of Gutierrez Cortina’s other sons are shareholders in Epccor.
Epccor has shared an office address and a legal representative with Gutsa, according to documents reviewed by Reuters. Six Epccor employees on the website LinkedIn list Gutsa as their previous employer.

A Reuters investigation earlier this year found Gutierrez Cortina’s company, Gutsa Infraestructura, is among dozens of contractors that have won work with state oil company Pemex even after being barred from contracting by the public administration ministry. Some banned companies have changed their names and shareholders in order to win new contracts.

Mexican law prohibits government entities from contracting with companies that have shareholders directly or indirectly in common with banned contractors. A spokesman for the transport ministry said it does not sign contracts with banned companies.

Mexico’s public administration ministry, which maintains the list of banned contractors, said in a written statement that an independent auditor oversaw the bid process for the Cuernavaca bypass. The independent auditor who reviewed the highway contract recently won by Epccor did not find any irregularities in the process of awarding the deal. But he warned the transport ministry of potential problems, noting that there was confusion in the contract proposal over the degree to which the road was to be widened.

“This bid process is happening without the certainty that it can be completed in the time and within the originally considered budget,” he added.
This case does not illustrate a conflict of interest, as that is defined in the usual US law. See, Organizational Conflicts of Interest: A Growing Integrity Challenge.

Rather, this illustrates the requirement that a government should not do business with a non-responsible contractor. See, Agility Defense & Government Services v. U.S. Department of Defense, No. 13-10757 (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 2013); also, GAO Decision in Matter of: USS Chartering, LLC, B-407601 January 15, 2013.

Stefani Bonato provides a useful discussion of this topic in Death by Affiliation: The FAR Reach of Suspension and Debarment.

Saturday, March 28, 2015

The unmitigated gall of unmitigated conflicts of interest

Hattip to the lawfirm Venable LLP for pointing out this new case. You may prefer to read their explanation of the case here rather than the rendition of the decision below.

MONTEREY CONSULTANTS, INC., vs USA, US Court of Federal Claims, No.14-1164C, Re-filed: March 26, 2015 Read the full decision at the link; this is a capriciously selected and edited version of it.
This is a protest of the Department of Veteran Affair’s recision of a task order to Monterey Consultants, Inc. for services in support of the agency’s program to verify the status of small and veteran-owned businesses. The task order to Monterey was cancelled as a corrective action because the agency concluded that Monterey had a potential or actual organizational conflict of interest. Plaintiff alleges that neither is true.

Monterey Consultants, Inc. (“Monterey”), held a blanket purchase agreement (“BPA”) with the Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”) under which it provided support services to the VA’s Center for Verification and Evaluation (“CVE”) and Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (“OSDBU”). This BPA, called the “IPT”,was the agency’s long-standing contract vehicle for procuring a wide variety of services in support of all of OSDBU’s various missions (e.g., research, verification, analysis, outreach, and training). Monterey was awarded the BPA in February 2013. It did work under a variety of call orders, including processing and verification services for the CVE and administrative support of the OSDBU’s acquisition efforts.

In an effort to reduce the scope of the work procured with a single contracting vehicle, the IPT BPA, the agency let the BPA expire on its terms and sought to replace its acquisition of some of those services through two separate contracts placed as task orders under the GSA’s Federal Supply Schedule (“FSS”). The solicitation at issue in this protest was identified by the agency as a follow-on for two specific BPA call orders, 18 and 19. Call orders 18 and 19 were for support services related to the CVE’s verification of small business status. Monterey had performed under both of those orders pursuant to the BPA. Monterey also provided support for other OSDBU work, including acquisition support under call order 17.

The VA issued a Request for Quote (“RFQ” or “solicitation”) on June 13, 2014, as a 100 percent set-aside for service-disabled veteran owned small businesses holding one or both of two GSA FSS contracts for support services. The RFQ sought “administrative, paralegal, project management, and professional support” for the CVE. Specifically, these services were to be in support of the CVE’s verification processing and management of that processing.


The RFQ addressed Organizational Conflicts of Interest (“OCIs”) in section 18:
It is recognized by the parties that the efforts to be performed by the contractor under this contract are of such a nature that they may create a potential Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI) as contemplated by Subpart 9.5 of the FAR. It is the intention of the parties that the contractor shall not engage in any contractual activities which may impair its ability to render unbiased advice and recommendations, or in which it may gain an unfair competitive advantage as a result of the knowledge, information and experience gained during the performance of this contract. It does not include the normal flow of benefits from incumbency. Contractors performing on other contracts in support of Verification shall be presumed to have an OCI with respect to this contract and are ineligible to quote on this requirement, due to the integrated nature of work perform[ed] under this solicitation and existing contracts. (emphasis supplied).
A further condition for bidding on the RFQ was that offerors were required to “agree not to participate . . . in any acquisition wherein: (1) The contractor has participated in the analysis and recommendation leading to the acquisition decision to acquire such services; or (2) the Contractor may have an unfair competitive advantage resulting from information gained during the performance of this contract.”

The solicitation went on to instruct offerors who believed that their participation would cause an OCI to “include in [their] proposal[s] an appropriate discussion and mitigation plan.” The VA would review such materials, make a determination of whether there was an OCI, and, if so, determine whether the mitigation plan was sufficient to allow the offeror to participate.

Three offerors submitted proposals. Monterey was initially awarded the contract on September 8, 2014, based on its higher technical scores, which, in the agency’s eyes, made it a better value despite its higher price.

Loch Harbour filed a protest in this court, the principal ground of which was that Monterey was ineligible for award because it had an OCI stemming from its prior work under the BPA. Upon reviewing the complaint, the Contracting Officer (“CO”), James Boughner, began an investigation into the possible OCI based on Monterey’s prior work for OSDBU and CVE.

The CO recorded his initial findings in a letter to Monterey.  In the letter, he stated his finding that, prior to the solicitation’s public release, all of Monterey’s and its subcontractor’s personnel had access to documents relating to the solicitation, including the requirements, independent government cost estimates, acquisition plan, market research, and evaluation criteria. The CO also found that Monterey personnel provided services directly relating to the preparation of the solicitation. AR 1569. The letter also detailed Mr. Boughner’s communication with Mr. Skinner of OSDBU and Zachary Wilcox of the VA’s Strategic Acquisition Center. Both of those gentlemen informed Mr. Boughner that Monterey did not have, or did not provide, an OCI mitigation plan for its work under the BPA.

Mr. Boughner sent another letter to Monterey informing it of his final conclusions regarding the OCI investigation and the agency’s intent to take corrective action. He found a potential OCI resulting from Monterey employee access to solicitation documents and a lack of mitigation plan in place for Monterey. The CO’s letter stated that Monterey had a potential OCI “at the time [it] submitted its offer and that no efforts were made by either OSDBU or Monterey to avoid or mitigate the conflict of interest prior to award to Monterey.”

The CO also pointed out that Monterey’s technical proposal in response to the RFQ represented that neither Monterey nor its subcontractors had an OCI. The CO found this to be further support for
his conclusion that Monterey did not have an mitigation plan in place (because one would not have been needed if the bidder felt it had no OCI). Although Monterey employees “signed Non-Disclosure Agreements in the course of their duties in accessing these documents, this was inadequate, because there was no Mitigation Plan . . . to show how their organizational and/or management system or other actions would avoid or mitigation any actual or potential [OCIs]”.

As a result, Monterey’s task order award was rescinded.

Monterey responded to the two letters from the CO with a series of phone calls, emails, and letters over a three week span. Monterey represented to Mr. Boughner both that it had a mitigation plan, dating back to its BPA proposal, and that any solicitation information to which it had access would not have conferred on it any competitive advantage because all the information was eventually released to the other offerors. Monterey and CACI employees claimed in declarations not to have had access to “any information” or “any non-public documents” relating to the solicitation.

During the course of the OCI investigation, OSDBU’s Director of Acquisition Support, Jules Tchoujan became aware of an email exchange between CACI employees Daniel Swart and Kathleen Wilson, both of whom worked under the BPA. From this correspondence it is clear that one of them is advising the other on drafting Monterey/CACI’s proposal in response to the other solicitation for the OSDBU work. As a result, the CO made an additional finding that Monterey had an actual OCI as a result of the involvement of Mr. Swart in both the preparation of Monterey’s proposal for the follow-on work and his work under the BPA in preparing pre-solicitation acquisition documents. The CO noted that this was a violation of Mr. Swart’s NDA, and cited that fact as evidence of the lack of force and effect of the purported mitigation plans in place for Monterey and CACI, in a further letter to Montery.

In the context of an organizational conflict of interest, the Federal Circuit has explained that each situation should be examined “on the basis of its particular facts and the nature of the proposed contract,” and that, “the identification of OCIs . . . requires the exercise of considerable discretion on the part of the agency.” This means that contracting officers must be afforded “great latitude in handling OCIs,” and thus their decisions will not be reversed absent irrationality. It is important also to recognize that the CO need not find an actual organizational conflict. All that is necessary to support agency action in response to an OCI is the potential for impropriety: even one based solely on the appearance of impropriety.

Plaintiff argues that the CO’s decision regarding Monterey’s OCI was irrational because it was both factually unsupported and wrong in the particulars. We examine each of the CO’s findings in turn.

Although the CO's first letter is not specific as to which of the documents investigate were accessed, edited, or otherwise only available for access by plaintiff’s personnel, the problem is clear: prior to public availability, Monterey had access to information that could give it a competitive edge in crafting its proposal for the follow-on procurement.

The CO then identified a compounding problem–that Monterey did not have an OCI risk mitigation plan to alleviate the problem of access to documents. The CO quoted Monterey’s proposal for the IPT BPA in which Monterey represented that it was not aware of any OCI related to the work under that solicitation. The CO recognized that Monterey, and presumably CACI, employees had signed nondisclosure agreements during their work on the BPA and in support of the acquisition, but found this fact to be unavailing for Monterey because of the absence of a risk mitigation plan. He found these measures to be inadequate because Monterey had not shown how the NDAs themselves would “avoid or mitigate any actual or potential [OCIs].”

Plaintiff attacks those findings as unfounded. First, as to the unequal access to information, plaintiff argues that Monterey’s work on the BPA “did not involve the development of requirements/performance work statements.” This is critical in its view because it shows a lack of prejudice to the agency and other offerors from Monterey’s access to information prior to the solicitation’s release. In essence, “no harm, no foul” is plaintiff’s view of the situation.

Plaintiff further directs our attention to evidence provided by the Director of CVE, that CVE “fire walled Monterey from every activity in the requirements preparation” and that Monterey had no role in formulating the performance work statement, costing, or any other contract documents. Plaintiff’s point is that, a CO’s finding of mere access to pre-solicitation documents is not enough to disqualify it here.

Second, plaintiff argues that any document it might have had access to eventually became public anyway, further supporting its notion of lack of prejudice to other offerors.

Third, plaintiff points to the NDAs signed by its employees as evidence of the fire wall maintained by Monterey pursuant to its mitigation plan. It avers that none of its employees with access to the server on which solicitation and other acquisition documents were stored were allowed to work on its proposal for this RFQ. Instead, according to plaintiff, only government employees had a hand in preparing acquisition documents such as the statement of work and other requirements documents. Thus, despite access, Monterey gained no competitive advantage from its incumbency.

Defendant responds by relying on the undisputed facts that 1) Monterey and/or CACI did acquisition support work under several BPA call orders, 2) the RFQ was a follow-on from two BPA call orders performed by Monterey, 3) Monterey personnel had access to all solicitation documents, including confidential documents never shared with other offerors, and 4) Monterey was required by the RFQ to identify any potential OCIs but failed to do so. This, in combination with the RFQ’s stated assumption that anyone who had previously performed CVE verification work was presumed to be ineligible,
provided the necessary backdrop to support the CO’s investigation and conclusion.

In light of the government’s interest in safeguarding the integrity of the procurement process, the facts on this record establish the rationality of the CO’s conclusion. We begin with the undisputed
facts. Plaintiff had access to all of the acquisition documents, and at least one or two Monterey/CACI employees did access them when providing editing and other quality control services in support of the acquisition efforts of OSDBU/CVE. Plaintiff admitted at oral argument that it did have access to some documents never released to the public, such as the internal government cost estimates.
With regard to other documents, regardless of whether they later became public, it is not disputed that Monterey had access to them first. This creates, on its face, the potential for an OCI.

Monterey therefore had a duty to mitigate that conflict or face ineligibility to bid on the follow-on solicitation. The solicitation stated a presumption that offerors who had performed support of CVE verification in the past would be ineligible for award and also required any offeror who identified a potential OCI to provide and implement a mitigation plan to alleviate the possibility of unfair competitive advantage.

The CO found Monterey not to have had a mitigation plan in place during its performance of the BPA. Several agency officials told the CO that they were unaware of any mitigation plan during Monterey’s performance under the BPA. The CO took into account the representation by Monterey in its BPA proposal that it had no actual or potential OCIs as evidence that it did not have a mitigation plan in place, along with the fact that it did not present a plan with its bid for the follow-on RFQ. He took both of those facts at face value as indications of plaintiff’s then-belief that it had nothing to mitigate. He thus gave no credit to the after-the-fact plan provided by Monterey.   Our own examination of the plan provided to the CO provides us with little confidence that it was related specifically to the work performed by Monterey under the BPA.

The CO reasonably concluded that the NDAs signed by Montery employees were insufficient mitigation measures without a working mitigation plan. He was unprepared to supply, by force of imagination or otherwise, the details of how non-disclosure agreements would actually operate to prevent, at a minimum, the appearance of impropriety.

Given the discretion we afford on review of agency action in this regard, we cannot say that the CO acted arbitrarily and capriciously with regard to his conclusion of a potential, unmitigated OCI. Here, the CO found very recent potential access to presolicitation documents and no plan for mitigation. The information that might have been gleaned was neither stale nor irrelevant. The CO’s finding of an unmitigated potential conflict of interest was thus neither arbitrary, capricious, nor contrary to law.

Lastly, the CO sent an additional letter to Monterey, informing it of a further basis for the recision of Monterey’s award. In this letter, he found an actual OCI existed. He relied on emails between Mr. Swart and Ms. Wilson, two CACI employees working under Monterey’s BPA. The CO found in these email exchanges a violation of Mr. Swart’s NDA. This is then cited by the CO as evidence that any mitigation plan alleged by plaintiff to have been in place by Monterey or CACI was either not implemented or not followed by their employees.

It is important to understand that the solicitation referenced by the CO in this letter is not the present solicitation. It instead relates to other work in support of OSDBU, separately solicited. This work for OSDBU was, however, previously consolidated under the single BPA held by plaintiff prior to the solicitation at issue. Plaintiff’s primary argument in this regard is thus that the actual OCI is irrelevant to the issues at bar and could not have presented a reasonable basis for the CO’s conclusion to rescind Monterey’s task order award. Plaintiff also presents the three unsworn statements of Mr. Swart to argue that the CO was factually incorrect in his findings of an actual OCI.

Defendant answers that the OCI resulted from related work under the same prior contract and thus is highly relevant to Monterey’s eligibility to bid on the solicitation at issue here. The fact that the same alleged mitigation plan should have prevented Mr. Swart’s disclosure of pre-solicitation information is important, asserts defendant, because it shows the irrelevance of that plan to Monterey’s OCI. Although the CO’s conclusion was reasonable even absent this evidence of actual impropriety, we agree that it provides further support for his conclusion and recision of Monterey’s award. Plaintiff reads too much into the letter and relies too heavily on an arbitrary division of the two solicitations. The CO cited this information as illustrative of what it identified as the primary problem he found with regard to Monterey’s potential OCI for the CVE solicitation: "[whatever] Mitigation Plans were in place by Monterey and CACI to avoid OCI is unfounded, as the mplementation of any alleged plan was clearly not followed by Monterey employees.”

He found the disclosure to be evidence of the lack of an effective mitigation plan. The mitigation plan alleged to have been in place for this solicitation is the same as that which should have prevented the actions of Mr. Swart with regard to the OSDBU work solicitation. Because it was the same purported mitigation plan at issue in both instances, it was proper for the CO to have considered the actions of Mr. Swart regarding the related solicitation. The CO’s conclusion was thus not irrational in this regard.

Conclusion

We find that the contracting officer’s decision to rescind the award to Monterey was rational and supported by the record. The CO correctly identified a potential OCI on the part of plaintiff as the incumbent contractor and a bidder for the follow-on procurement. The CO further found that plaintiff had no effective, implemented risk mitigation plan, leading him to conclude that Monterey should not have been awarded the contract. We find no irrationality in his conclusion.