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Showing posts with label Procurement fraud. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Procurement fraud. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 14, 2020

Follow the money

With every disaster comes disastrous spending.  And attempts to stem the flow.  So many attempts.  Sad.

Here's an illustration of the money flow, from the source to the see (sic), all courtesy of Covington & Burling LLP.

GAO Report Reveals New Insights Into Lobbying Disclosure Act Compliance and Enforcement
:
"The 2020 annual report from the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) provides new details regarding the state of Lobbying Disclosure Act (“LDA”) compliance and enforcement. By statute, the GAO is charged with conducting random audits of LDA compliance and submitting reports reflecting the results to Congress. This year’s audit reviewed approximately 100 quarterly “LD-2” reports filed by lobbyist employers and lobbying firms and about 160 semi-annual “LD-203” reports that disclose political contributions and politically-related contributions.

"Many takeaways from this year’s review were consistent with past reports. Lobbying registrants still often neglect to round their lobbying expenses and lobbying income to the nearest $10,000. Many registrants also fail to disclose the prior covered government positions held by newly-registered lobbyists. And many LDA reports continue to be amended after a registrant learns of the audit — a fact that GAO believes “suggests that our contact may spur some lobbyists to more closely scrutinize their reports than they would have without our review.”

"But the 55-page report does include some interesting new nuggets:

     • "Missing Political Contributions. Almost half (45%) of audited registrants failed to report political contributions on their semi-annual LD-203 political contribution reports. GAO described this as a “statistically significant” increase over prior years. This is a preventable error. Prior to filing, registrants should consider cross-checking the LD-203 reports versus Federal Election Commission reports to ensure there are no missing contributions.
     • "JACK Act Certifications. Pursuant to a new statute, the JACK Act, lobbyists are now required to certify they have not been convicted of certain crimes. This year, GAO audited the accuracy of these reports, including by conducting criminal background checks on names listed in the reports. While it found no errors, GAO’s background checks underscore the importance of conducting due diligence to confirm the accuracy of these representations.
     • "Naming and Shaming. The report singles out, by name, two lobbying firms that “declined to meet with us following our initial letters.” The failure to meet led to GAO reporting the names of these firms to Congress.
     • "Low Enforcement Levels. While there has only been a trickle of LDA civil enforcement cases in the last decade, the trickle has begun to dry in recent years. Only one civil attorney now handles LDA enforcement part-time (down from two in 2017). Moreover, GAO announced that “no suits have been initiated or cases settled since our 2018 lobbying report.” Those prior cases, GAO emphasized, have all involved “chronic offenders”."

Whistleblowers Watch Stimulus Money From Inside from the firm Squire Patton Boggs.
"Whistleblowers, with their unique access to business operations, follow the money to learn whether the business abides by the strings attached to that money. Whistleblowers look for an opportunity to cash in on what they consider fraudulent conduct. What’s a business to do?

Strings Attached

"We recently advised about the many strings attached to the trillions of dollars available from the stimulus packages. Government watchdogs aggressively will scrutinize what happens to that money from the outside. If they find fraudulent conduct, they will seek recovery under the federal False Claims Act (FCA) not just for the amount of loss to the government but for up to three times that amount (known as treble damages).

Whistleblower Incentives

"Whistleblowers are employees on the inside who know what procedures are in place, what procedures they think should be in place, and the people to who make decisions about those procedures. The FCA incentivizes whistleblowers to capitalize on their invaluable insight by filing a lawsuit (a qui tam suit) reporting what appears to be fraudulent conduct to the government watchdogs. The rewards are great. Whistleblowers receive 15% to 30% of the amount of any recovery. In addition, the business is required to pay attorney’s fees to the whistleblower.

"Those incentives work. Whistleblowers are the source of most recoveries under the FCA. We reported that qui tam law suits in 2019 were being filed at the rate of more than 12 per week. Whistleblowers personally recovered more than $271 million in payments. The government itself recovered more than $2.2 billion in those qui tam suits. This far outstrips direct enforcement actions brought by the government without a whistleblower. Now that trillions of dollars are flowing, whistleblowers know the rewards are even greater.

Proactive Action

"A business that needs a recovery stimulus should obtain the relief that is available. From small businesses, nonprofits, venture-backed startups, higher education institutions, and healthcare to trade, supply chains and defense, and other regulated industries, Squire Patton Boggs attorneys are here to help you receive the much-needed assistance.

"But vigilance also is needed. Prepare to account for the money received by, for example, ensuring

     • Protocols are established to handle the money
     • Compliance programs are in place
     • Compliance programs operate effectively
     • Clear and readily available channels handle complaints remotely
     • Tone at the top encourages employees to report problems to leadership"

Past as Prologue: The Wave of Investigations to Follow the Pandemic Recovery and Actions that Companies Can Take Now to Prepare from, again, Covington & Burling LLP.  
"On March 30, 2020, the inspectors general of several major agencies selected the Department of Defense Inspector General, Glenn Fine, to lead a newly created federal oversight entity that will investigate waste, fraud, and abuse in connection with the massive new coronavirus economic relief legislation. The inspectors general were exercising new authority contained in the legislation, but these actions also echo Congress’s past approach to oversight of recovery efforts. This client alert examines the new investigative authorities in the legislation and provides advice for companies, based on past examples.

"Throughout American history, when Congress has confronted a national emergency and authorized a major government response, the economic recovery has almost always been accompanied by significant congressional, civil, or criminal investigations. This paradigm dates back at least to the Civil War, with Congress’s Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. In modern times, the savings and loan crisis and bailout of the late 1980s led to criminal convictions and the Keating Five lobbying scandal.

"Most recently, after the 2008 financial crisis, Congress sought to formalize and institutionalize the oversight and investigation of recovery efforts through the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“SIGTARP”) and other oversight bodies. A Congressional Oversight Panel held 26 hearings over more than two years on the causes, symptoms, and effects of the economic crisis and government response and reform efforts. Investigations by just one entity, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, resulted in 1,665 convictions, pleas, or judgments, along with more than $157 million in recoveries, forfeitures, seizures, and other savings.

"In the newly enacted Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), Congress again provided that oversight and investigations will accompany the $2 trillion relief program:

"The bill establishes a Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery within the Department of the Treasury. The Special Inspector General will be presidentially appointed, as was the SIGTARP. The Special Inspector General will be responsible for conducting, supervising, and coordinating audits and investigations of the making, purchase, management, and sale of loans, loan guarantees, and other investments by the Treasury under the CARES Act. Like the SIGTARP, the Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery will also be responsible for providing quarterly reports to Congress. Congress dedicated $25 million of new Treasury funds for the Special Inspector General to carry out these duties.

"The bill establishes a Pandemic Response Accountability Committee within the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement of funds and to mitigate risks across programs and agencies. Congress appropriated $80 million for the Committee. This new Committee appears to be modeled on the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board established by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which is generally viewed as having successfully protected against the misuse of recovery funds. Although the Recovery Board was required to coordinate its activities with various agency inspectors general, the new Pandemic Committee is created within the Inspectors General Council. This may mean that the Pandemic Committee will have a heightened degree of autonomy and a greater ability to act quickly and with better coordination than was the case for the Recovery Board. The Pandemic Committee is authorized to issue subpoenas to persons outside of the government.

"The bill authorizes the creation of a bipartisan Congressional Oversight Commission charged with oversight of the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve, as they work to provide economic stability in the wake of the coronavirus. Like the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel, the CARES Act’s Congressional Oversight Commission will consist of five members appointed by the leaders of Congress. Also like its predecessor, the Congressional Oversight Commission will have significant authority to conduct oversight and investigations, including holding hearings and taking testimony.

"In addition to these new entities, existing authorities are certain to continue to investigate. For example, the House Oversight and Reform Committee has already launched an investigation of travel insurance companies and their coverage decisions related to travel cancelled due to the coronavirus. It is likely that congressional committees will examine the administration’s preparedness and response to the crisis, along with the activities of deeply affected companies and industries, especially those that receive federal aid. If history is a guide, these investigations will continue for many years into the future. For example, as late as last year, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing that focused on bank accountability “10 years after the Financial Crisis.” The CEOs of Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, and others all testified.

"Criminal authorities will also continue to investigate. Attorney General William Barr has directed federal prosecutors to prioritize investigations and prosecutions of coronavirus fraud schemes, and Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen directed each U.S. Attorney’s Office to identify a prosecutor to serve as the lead coronavirus fraud coordinator. These developments mirror actions that were taken after the financial crisis. For example, SIGTARP investigations related to fraud involving TARP funds resulted in enforcement actions against nine financial institutions and in the successful criminal prosecutions of 51 bank officers and executives. The Department of Justice—including through a Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force and a Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Working Group—investigated fraud related to the financial crisis itself, ultimately resulting in several multi-billion dollar civil settlements with financial institutions.

"Of course, the investigations that will follow the coronavirus recovery will not be exactly the same as the investigations of the financial crisis or the savings and loan bailout. Each new crisis has its own unique attributes and characteristics. Nonetheless, based on our experience defending companies and individuals involved in similar investigations, we can offer the following five tips for being prepared:

     1. Invest in compliance now to avoid problems in the future. Companies need to understand the implications of taking federal money and establish systems that ensure compliance. For example, companies that benefit from increased federal investment in pandemic responses may have increased compliance obligations as a result of contracting with the government. Certain of the federal relief programs contain restrictions on executive compensation. Even the process of seeking federal assistance may implicate laws that regulate lobbying, depending on the agencies or officials contacted.
     2. Consider the public and political dynamics of corporate actions. Congressional investigators often follow where the press leads, and investigative reporters will be looking for juicy stories to highlight. Some recipients of prior federal funds were criticized for paying bonuses, moving jobs overseas, or even for their executives’ vacation arrangements. By seeking and accepting public funds, companies will often be held by the public and Congress to a higher standard.
     3. Understand your company’s areas of vulnerability. Companies in certain industries already face a high risk of investigation. Industries involved in the response to the crisis—including the biopharmaceutical, technology, consumer goods, and medical device industries—could have their actions scrutinized closely. Sometimes companies with the best intentions, such as rushing to respond to a pandemic, will take risks that would not be warranted upon reflection. Companies should have a clear understanding of these vulnerabilities and a clear and compelling answer to after-the-fact criticisms.
     4. Involve your legal department in business decisions. With the vast majority of employees working from home, and business situations moving rapidly, there are significant risks that business decisions can be made in “silos” without proper examination by all relevant parts of the company, including the legal department. The coronavirus pandemic has placed pressure on government regulators, including the Food and Drug Administration and others, to relax tightly controlled regulatory regimes. This dynamic also creates opportunities for industry, including for companies that may seek to develop new product lines or otherwise re-tool their manufacturing processes to meet current demand for hand sanitizers, facial masks, and other products and supplies needed during the pandemic. It is critical to involve the legal and compliance functions in these business decisions in order to mitigate a host of risks, including missteps with the federal government that could lead to regulatory or criminal exposure.
     5. Carefully vet all applications for assistance and other submissions to the federal government. In order to review applications and other submissions quickly and exercise judgment about the suitability of individual institutions to receive funds, the government will need to rely on representations, attestations, and certifications made by applicants. Companies and their counsel should carefully vet such statements with an eye toward the potential civil and criminal risks associated with submissions to the government. Civil and criminal authorities will focus on such submissions and other disclosures in any eventual investigations, and companies should seek to mitigate this risk with proper planning and legal review processes on the front-end."

UPDATE TO THIS STORY:
As reported in the final article above,"The [Congress']bill establishes a Pandemic Response Accountability Committee within the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement of funds and to mitigate risks across programs and agencies. ... This new Committee appears to be modeled on the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board established by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which is generally viewed as having successfully protected against the misuse of recovery funds. ... the new Pandemic Committee is created within the Inspectors General Council. This may mean that the Pandemic Committee will have a heightened degree of autonomy...."
NOT SO FAST. Fine, but...
Trump Removes Acting Pentagon IG Slated to Lead Pandemic Oversight Last week, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency tapped Fine to chair the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, an oversight body created by the $2.2 trillion CARES Act to ensure taxpayer money is spent wisely. The law empowered CIGIE to name the committee chair, but stipulates that only current IGs can hold the position, so Trump’s removal of Fine from his acting position prevents the well-regarded watchdog from leading the oversight committee.

Over the course of his presidency, Trump has flouted transparency precedents and bristled at the role of IGs, whose work is critically important to holding agencies and the administration accountable for protecting the public’s health, among other things. Fine’s removal is part of a larger shakeup to the IG community.

Trump signaled in a signing statement on March 27 that he would not enforce some of the oversight provisions in the $2.2 trillion CARES Act. He specifically objected to the creation of a special IG for pandemic recovery at Treasury empowered to request information from other agencies and report to Congress any delays in receiving that information: “I do not understand, and my administration will not treat, this provision as permitting the SIGPR to issue reports to the Congress without the presidential supervision required by the Take Care Clause, Article II, section 3,” the statement said."
The Constitutional "authority" the President of the United States cited doesn't appear to quite fit this particular Bill which, remember, was intended "to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement of funds." Article II, Section It says, the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed...." Instead, the President seems more interested in taking care that no independent voice is heard, and no such Inspector seen.

Tuesday, January 28, 2020

Of smoke and mirrors; nonresponsibility and invisibility

This post is prompted by a November 2019 GOA report about defense procurement, specifically posing the proposition that "Ongoing DOD Fraud Risk Assessment Efforts Should Include Contractor Ownership".

In explaining why GAO did the report, it says, "DOD generally accounts for about two-thirds of federal contracting activity. Some companies doing business with DOD may have an opaque ownership structure that conceals other entities or individuals who own, control, or financially benefit from the company. Opaque ownership could be used to facilitate fraud and other unlawful activity." GAO describes "opague" in the context: opaque ownership is a structure of business form or governance that may conceal or obfuscate entities or individuals who own, control, or benefit financially from a business. (See also, e.g., in other contexts, this and this and this.)

The report recalled the impetus for the report came out of "the committee report on the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018,[in which] the House Armed Services Committee expressed concerns that DOD contractors may disguise their identities and cost structures from procurement officers, in effect acting as hidden monopolies with unreasonable prices or establishing opaque ownership structures for benefits that are contrary to the government’s interest. The committee report included a provision that GAO examine DOD’s processes to identify contractors’ ownership structures and the risks posed to DOD by contractors with opaque ownership structures. As a general finding in this GAO report, GAO noted, "DOD has also begun a department-wide fraud risk management program, but it has neither assessed risks of contractor ownership across the department nor identified risks posed by contractor ownership as a specific area for assessment."

In undertaking the study leading to this report, GAO "reviewed GAO bid-protest decisions to identify cases in which contractors may have failed to disclose foreign ownership or concealed beneficial-owner information to obtain contracts that they were not eligible to receive"; also studying cases where there appeared "the risk that contractors could be disguising their ownership to create the appearance of competition.

Paraphrasing, GAO explains that real ownership of an entity includes the ostensible ownership disclosed to regulators and the beneficial ownership by the persons who directly or indirectly pull the levers of control and management or reap the substantial rewards of ownership of the entity. The more layers of ownership there are, the difficult it is to determine who really owns the entity. This is compounded by the observation that "In the United States, no centralized information source or national registry maintains company ownership information. In 2014, the National Association of Secretaries of State found that most states collect minimal ownership data. ... During both the entity-formation process and in annual or periodic reporting, the association found that very few states collect some form of entity ownership or control information from limited liability companies or corporations." It conceded that "the Securities and Exchange Commission collects some ownership information on publicly traded companies"; that is, the relatively few, but relatively large, businesses in the USA. The Securities and Exchange Commission collects [only] some ownership information on publicly traded companies.

This limited view from the business world has implications for procurement.
"The FAR contains several provisions governing the selection of an offeror. Provisions such as price and past performance of the offeror are generally applicable in determining which offeror should win a contract. ... A prospective contractor must affirmatively demonstrate its responsibility, including, when necessary, the responsibility of its proposed subcontractors. Contracting officers must then determine the responsibility of prospective contractors, including whether prospective contractors can perform the terms of a contract. To be determined responsible, a prospective contractor must have adequate financial resources to perform the contract (or the ability to obtain them); be able to comply with the required delivery or performance schedule; have a satisfactory performance, integrity, and ethics record; have the necessary organization, experience, accounting and operational controls, and facilities to carry out the contract (or the ability to obtain them); and be otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under applicable laws and regulations.

Before awarding a contract over the simplified acquisition threshold, a contracting officer must review the prospective contractor’s performance and integrity information available in the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS). FAPIIS is a federal government-wide database designed to assist contracting officers with making a responsibility determination by providing integrity and performance information of covered federal agency contractors and grantees. FAPIIS provides a prospective contractor “Report Card” that includes information pertaining to the prospective contractor’s past performance (if applicable), such as any administrative agreements, contract terminations, nonresponsibility determinations, and exclusions, among other things. It also includes the ability to view the company relationship information, which details the ownership information that prospective contractors are required to report in SAM. [The System for Award Management, or SAM, is a government-wide portal that is consolidating the capabilities of multiple systems and information sources used by the Federal government in conducting acquisitions. In order to contract with the federal government businesses and agencies must complete the required registration with SAM.] When making a responsibility determination, the contracting officer must consider all the information available through FAPIIS with regard to the prospective contractor and any immediate owner, predecessor (an entity that the prospective contractor replaced by acquiring assets and carrying out affairs under a new name), or subsidiary identified for that prospective contractor in FAPIIS. The contracting officer must document in the contract file how the information in FAPIIS was considered in any responsibility determination, as well as the action that was taken as a result of the information.
There is much more to the report, and the need for knowledge about the person or entity with who the government is, or may be, engaging in business. But this post is concentrating on the responsibility factor, and that is only part of the report. I really want to encourage you to read the whole report and how entity information is critical to matters national security and the mitigation of fraud.

GAO notes that, although DOD and other agencies have taken some baby steps to shed light on the issue of contractor ownership (e.g., "DOD, GSA, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration amended the FAR in May 2014 to require prospective contractors to self-report their immediate and highest-level entity owner, but not their beneficial owner, as part of contractors’ annual registration process in SAM), DOD "faces a number of challenges in identifying and verifying" it. Because "the scope and scale of this activity makes DOD procurement inherently susceptible to fraud", GAO recommended "The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) should include an assessment of risks related to contractor ownership as part of its ongoing efforts to plan and conduct a department-wide fraud risk assessment."

Guam law follows the ABA Model Procurement Code when it comes to issues of responsibility, which is also the framework of the federal government as described above. I also has a (problematic) requirement (5 GCA § 5233) that, in some procurement methods, a bidder, "as a condition of bidding" must disclose "the name and address of any person who has held more than ten percent (10%) of the outstanding interest or shares of [a] partnership, sole proprietorship or corporation at any time during the twelve (12) month period immediately preceding submission of a bid." The "wild wild West" current darling of business entities is an LLC, but this law, written before Guam adopted an LLC law, does not make any disclosure requirement for that form of entity. Nor does it include trusts within the prophylactic disclosure requirement.

It is interesting to know that trusts have also been used to create invisibility in the procurement context. The following article discussing this issue in light of the trend described in the GAO report above.

Trust but Verify: Disclosure of Trust Ownership May Be Required for Family-Owned Government Contractors
Family-owned businesses are often owned and controlled by family trusts. Trusts are used by families for estate planning, tax planning and asset protection. Family-owned government contractors with trust ownership structures should be mindful of ownership
disclosures required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Failure to comply with the required disclosures could result in False Claims Act or false statement allegations, loss of Facility Security Clearances, rejections of bids and proposals, and loss of bid protests.

Under rules adopted in 2014, a government contractor or offeror owned by another entity must disclose its own Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code and the CAGE codes of its “immediate owner” and “highest level owner” both in the System for Award Management (SAM) and to the contracting officer before contract award. Under FAR 52.204-17 (Ownership or Control of Offeror), “immediate owners” and “highest-level owners” are required to obtain their own CAGE codes even if they will not be directly contracting with the government. “Immediate owner” means an entity, other than the offeror, that has direct control of the offeror. “Highest-level owner” means the entity that owns or controls the
immediate owner of the offeror, or that owns or controls one or more entities that control an immediate owner of the offeror. No entity owns or exercises control of the highest-level owner.

If an offeror is owned directly by individuals, the offeror does not have an “immediate owner” or a “highest-level owner.” If an offeror is directly owned by another entity, the ownership entity is the “immediate owner” of the offeror. If an offeror’s immediate owner is, in turn, owned by another entity or series of entities, the last entity at the top of the offeror’s organizational chart is the “highest-level owner.” An offeror is required to certify its ownership disclosures in the “Representations and Certifications” section of its registration on SAM.gov.

The term “entity” is not defined in the FAR, [but is described at the Commercial and Government Entity webpage: "In business, an entity is a person, department, corporation, cooperative, partnership, business, manufacturer, organization, or other groups with whom it is possible to conduct business", and a trust can fall within that description.] The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the agency responsible for assigning CAGE codes, suggest that trusts are considered entities under the FAR and should have their own CAGE codes and be disclosed on SAM.gov." Trusts are commonly referenced in state business entity statutes. Trusts also have certain characteristics that are similar to other business entities such as corporations and limited liability companies. Namely, trusts can buy, sell and own personal property and real property; own equity in other business entities; and enter into contracts. Trusts may also shield their beneficiaries from the claims of creditors.

The author of that article warns, "In order to avoid possible False Claims Act or false statement allegations, loss of security clearances, rejections of bids and proposals, and adverse bid protest decisions, family-owned government contractors with trust ownership structures should review their SAM.gov registration to ensure that disclosures about their “immediate owner” and “highest-level owner” are accurate."

The interests of the government, be it state, local or federal, in good governance principles of transparency and responsibility are antithetical to the interests of private sector contractors. There may be some giving and taking, but the government must always heed those principles. History has shown there are many other structures that provide the flexibility commerce requires to carry on,but government, and the broader community must stay vigilant to any "Houdini factor" that jeopardizes the foundation of principles which good governance, and good procurement, that our democratic society depends on.

Wednesday, December 11, 2019

How do you determine prospective contractor responsibility if you don't know who the contractor really is?

The ABA Model Procurement Code, as do most other procurement regimes, require the government to know who it is doing business with.  "It is important that the bidder of offeror will be a responsible contractor -- that the contractor has the financial ability, resources, skills, capability, and business integrity necessary to perform the contract."  (MPC 3-401, Comment 1)

"The unreasonable failure of a bidder or offeror to promptly supply information in connection with an inquiry with respect to responsibility may be grounds for a determination of nonresponsibility with respect to such bidder or offeror".  (MPC 3-401(1))

Since the time the MPC was enacted in 1979, other laws were being developed to facilitate cloaks of invisibility for entities to hide the identities of the money, ownership, assets and control of  businesses organized under such laws.  The most recent has been the promulgation of a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) in 1995.  Use of LLCs to provide ownership anonymity of assets, and businesses, is easy (see "How to Hide Ownership of a Company?") and notorious (see, "Anonymous Owner, L.L.C.: Why It Has Become So Easy to Hide in the Housing Market").  The ULLCA, both in original form and in a revised 2006 Model, has been adopted on Guam and many U.S states.

This is becoming a problem, both in the U.S. and Europe, and presumably elsewhere, as indicated in the following article published by the Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists (ACFCS):

Report roundup: EU calls U.S. a ‘secrecy haven,’ GAO highlights commercial owner opacity, and more, posted March 16, 2017.
This week’s Report Roundup has a common theme running through hundreds of pages of reports: the risk of opaque ownership structures and how, in the United States and beyond, the inability for countries to collect beneficial ownership information is a magnet for bad actors.

In the U.S., that means a major ally in the European Union (EU) calling out a longstanding gap in the country’s anti-money laundering (AML) defenses: the federal government allowing certain states like Delaware to sell corporate secrecy as a service – an ultimate irony as this country aggressively chases and chastises other jurisdictions for doing the same thing, according to the report.

That vulnerability is made doubly dangerous when it intersects the international trading sector due to the knowledge that organized criminal groups, corrupt kleptocrats and terror financiers currently hide, funnel and legitimize trillions of dollars in illicit gains, per estimates, through a myriad of trade trickery, including under and over-invoicing items, falsifying documents and other tactics.

In that same vein, U.S. government watchdog group the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted in a report that because this country doesn’t broadly require ownership information to be made available, that can open the door to national security risks when government operations are housed in buildings owned by foreign entities who may or may not be a shell for prying, spying eyes bent on espionage.

Lastly, another report by United Nations Security Council highlighted that the issue of anonymous shell companies globally allows rogue regimes like North Korea to flout international sanctions and get access, as analysts prognosticate, to banned technology and weapons systems on its path to wreak worldwide havoc by creating weapons of mass destruction.
The article goes on to elaborate on some of those reports.

It is interesting that the article mentioned a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), being critical of lack of ownership information in the national security context, because the GAO has now, again, turned its eyes to the subject, in the context of procurement, in its November 2019 report below.  In its letter to Congress transmitting the report, it noted, 
DOD awards contracts to companies in the private sector to provide a wide variety of services for U.S. military forces. Of the thousands of contractors doing business with DOD, some companies are what are known as shell companies — that is, companies that exist but conduct either no business or minimal business. Shell companies can be used for legitimate purposes; for example, they may be formed to obtain financing before starting operations. However, companies sometimes use shell companies to form opaque ownership structures designed to disguise the beneficial owner — the natural person or persons who directly or indirectly own and control, or receive substantial economic benefit from, a company.

These opaque ownership structures can be used to facilitate fraud and other unlawful activity in commerce, including contracts with DOD. For this report, we define opaque ownership as structures of business governance that may conceal or obfuscate entities or individuals who own, control, or benefit financially from a business.
Ongoing DOD Fraud Risk Assessment Efforts Should Include Contractor Ownership  (some excerpts of the letter an other parts of the report, sliced and diced to meet the didactic goal and limited space of this blog; you should read the whole report for original meaning and intent):  In the letter mentioned above, it further noted:
We researched legal databases and news articles involving DOD contractors to identify federal court cases and agency decisions. We reviewed GAO bid-protest decisions to identify cases in which contractors may have failed to disclose foreign ownership or concealed beneficial-owner information to obtain contracts that they were not eligible to receive.  We examined known risks identified through our case-study research and interviews with DOD officials.  We further examined the risk that contractors could be disguising their ownership to create the appearance of competition.

We contacted several government contractors’ associations to gain members’ perspectives on reporting beneficial ownership information and received feedback from 16 members of three government contractors’ associations. The perspectives gained from our queries are not generalizable to all contractors.
In the body of the report, GAO found:  
As the number of layers of ownership increases, ownership information becomes more opaque. This opacity can make it difficult for DOD to determine which entities and individuals ultimately own or control its contractors.

In the United States, no centralized information source or national registry maintains company ownership information. In 2014, the National Association of Secretaries of State found that most states collect minimal ownership data. The association reviewed key information collected by the 50 states and the District of Columbia during the entity-formation process and in annual or periodic reports. During both the entity-formation process and in annual or periodic reporting, the association found that very few states collect some form of entity ownership or control information from limited liability companies or corporations.  The Securities and Exchange Commission collects some ownership information on publicly traded companies. Any person or group of persons that acquires beneficial ownership of more than 5 percent of a publicly traded company’s registered voting securities must register.

GSA’s System for Award Management (SAM) is a federal government-wide database for vendor data that is used across all federal agencies. Any entity that wishes to do business with the government must register in SAM to be eligible to receive a contract award, except in specific circumstances. To increase procurement transparency and traceability, entities that wish to do business with the federal government are now required to provide additional ownership information through the annual registration process in SAM. The required ownership information includes the “immediate” and “highest” level ownership of an offeror.

Responsibility Determination

Contract award decisions are based on evaluation factors and significant subfactors that are tailored to the procurement, at the discretion of procurement officials. At a minimum, these factors must include: price/cost, quality, and past performance. A prospective contractor must affirmatively demonstrate its responsibility, including, when necessary, the responsibility of its proposed subcontractors. Contracting officers must then determine the responsibility of prospective contractors, including whether prospective contractors can perform the terms of a contract. To be determined responsible, a prospective contractor must have adequate financial resources to perform the contract (or the ability to obtain them); be able to comply with the required delivery or performance schedule; have a satisfactory performance, integrity, and ethics record; have the necessary organization, experience, accounting and operational controls, and facilities to carry out the contract (or the ability to obtain them); and be otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under applicable laws and regulations.

Before awarding a contract over the simplified acquisition threshold, a contracting officer must review the prospective contractor’s performance and integrity information available in the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS). FAPIIS is a federal government-wide database designed to assist contracting officers with making a responsibility determination by providing integrity and performance information of covered federal agency contractors and grantees. FAPIIS provides a prospective contractor “Report Card” that includes information pertaining to the prospective contractor’s past performance (if applicable), such as any administrative agreements, contract terminations, nonresponsibility determinations, and exclusions, among other things. It also includes the ability to view the company relationship information, which details the ownership information that prospective contractors are required to report in SAM. When making a responsibility determination, the contracting officer must consider all the information available through FAPIIS with regard to the prospective contractor and any immediate owner, predecessor (an entity that the prospective contractor replaced by acquiring assets and carrying out affairs under a new name), or subsidiary identified for that prospective contractor in FAPIIS. The contracting officer must document in the contract file how the information in FAPIIS was considered in any responsibility determination, as well as the action that was taken as a result of the information.

Contractors with Opaque Ownership Pose Financial Fraud Risks Including Price Inflation

Concealing relationship with subcontractor to inflate prices. Contractors can subcontract with companies they own or control to inflate prices for financial benefit. For example, in one case the contractor purchased goods from a company that its owners created, controlled, and used to make fraudulent markups appear legitimate. Contractors or subcontractors can also bill for work not performed by creating fictitious invoices that add costs to a contract. For example, in four court cases we examined, multiple DOD subcontractors were actually shell companies that did not have the inventory they purported to ultimately provide to the government or perform the work indicated in the contract requirements. Contractors or subcontractors can conceal conflicts of interest for financial benefits. For instance, in one case a DOD contractor employee and his spouse formed a company and concealed their interests by not listing their names but listing the names of family members on formation documents. This company became a subcontractor to the company that employed the DOD contractor. The contractor employee, in his official position, wrote letters justifying awards of purchase orders to the subcontractor he owned and approving recommendations that the awards be made to the subcontractor. The co-owner of the subcontractor concealed her involvement by signing contracts using a different name. We also identified the potential risk of companies creating the appearance of competition by submitting bids from fictitious companies. We identified one case that involved a DOD contractor whose executives admitted as part of their plea agreements to creating fictitious, inflated bids that were not from actual businesses to ensure that the contractor’s own bid would be selected by DOD as the supposed lowest.

Contractors with Opaque Ownership Can Also Pose Nonfinancial Fraud Risks


Contractors can pose nonfinancial fraud risks to DOD by concealing their ownership structure to bid on and obtain contracts that they are not eligible to receive. These nonfinancial risks may not pose a direct financial cost to DOD, but they can allow ineligible companies to contract with DOD while potentially denying eligible companies from contracting with DOD. These risks can also lead to additional vulnerabilities. One contractor that fraudulently obtained set-aside contracts claimed it was owned by a service-disabled veteran; however, that veteran had virtually no involvement with the contractor. Some contractors have been found not eligible to receive the set-aside contracts because they were not at least 51 percent controlled by the eligible individuals and the eligible individuals did not make long-term decisions for the companies. Rather, the contractors were controlled by an ineligible individual who owned and controlled a separate company that actually performed work on the set-aside contracts.

Contractors with opaque ownership structures can also pose the risk of circumventing eligibility requirements for contracts that are only designated for domestic companies, which can lead to other vulnerabilities that affect warfighter readiness. We identified four cases in which individuals created domestic shell companies for foreign manufacturers and bid on contracts designated for domestic companies. In three of the four cases, the individuals behind the shell companies also had ownership interests in the foreign manufacturing companies. Foreign manufacturers received payments from the contracts, despite the contracts only allowing domestic manufacturers to be eligible, and one such manufacturer ultimately supplied DOD with defective and nonconforming parts that led to the grounding of at least 47 fighter aircraft.
I'm sure you get the drift here. There's much more in the GAO report, much more. Have a look. Of particular importance is the lengthy discussion of things that are needed to improve the system of contractor selection. In brief, in its conclusions, the report summarizes,
We recognize that collecting additional ownership information, including beneficial-ownership information, could pose compliance burdens for contractors; and regulatory trends have generally focused on easing the burden to do business. Additionally, verifying contractor ownership can be challenging and time-consuming. Nevertheless, having a thorough assessment of contractor-ownership risks will better position DOD to make informed decisions on how best to use its resources and help ensure that the department’s fraud risk management program is organized and targeted to manage risks in a prioritized manner.

POST SCRIPT: In another new development along the lines of tracking who is whom, note the following article reprinted in Lexology:

Government Contractors Beware: DOJ Announces Creation of Interagency Procurement Collusion Strike Force
On November 5th, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division doubled down and announced the formal launch of the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (“PCSF”), an interagency partnership consisting of prosecutors and investigators focused on deterring, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting antitrust crimes, such as bid-rigging conspiracies and related fraudulent schemes in government procurement, grant, and program funding.





Friday, February 15, 2019

Sure, kid; first one's free

Some times procurement fraud is perpetrated by one party on the other. Other times, it takes two to tango. This is a story of the latter, and is so brazen as to become almost comedic.

Accepting that I often, very often, omit, rearrange, paraphrase and generally slice an dice articles presented (so you are advised and admonished to read the articles at the link provided and embedded in the article title), let's frame this story in the dry manner of the press release by government lawyers.
"Charges were unsealed yesterday against a Micronesian government official for his alleged participation in a money laundering scheme involving bribes made to corruptly secure engineering and project management contracts from the government of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). In a related matter, on Jan. 22, a U.S. executive pleaded guilty for his role in a scheme to, among other things, bribe the Micronesian official in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Master Halbert, 44, a Micronesian citizen, was charged in a criminal complaint filed in the District of Hawaii with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. Halbert was arrested yesterday, and had his initial court appearance before a U.S. Magistrate, is scheduled to have a pretrial detention hearing on Feb. 13, and a preliminary hearing on Feb. 22. [Then the fun begins].

As described in the complaint: Halbert was a government official in the FSM Department of Transportation, Communications and Infrastructure ("IT&C") who administered FSM’s aviation programs, including the management of its airports; between 2006 and 2016 a Hawaii-based engineering and consulting company owned by Frank James Lyon paid bribes to FSM officials, including Halbert, to obtain and retain contracts with the FSM government valued at nearly $8 million; Lyon entered into an agreement with Halbert to bribe Halbert in exchange for Halbert’s assistance in securing contracts for Lyon and his company; and that Lyon and Halbert allegedly agreed that these bribes would be transported from the United States to FSM. Of course, none of this has (as yet) been proved, and Halbert is not guilty until and unless proven guilty.

On the other hand, in the related matter, Lyon did plead guilty on Jan. 22 to a one-count information filed in the District of Hawaii charging him with conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA and to commit federal program fraud. Lyon is scheduled to be sentenced on May 13."
It should be noted that, the ITCT Dept handles its own procurements and is far broader than aviation.
The Department of Transportation, Communications and Infrastructure (DTC&I) is responsible for the delivery of national infrastructure projects. All infrastructure projects require defined project management processes from scope definition through funds release, design and construction to successful completion. The Program Management Unit (PMU) being part of the DTC&I, has the responsibility to provide overall coordination of amended compact matters for FSM’s Compact Management Division. The PMU has a strong program oversight and will ensure that standards are developed and shared, subsequent design and construction contracts are consistent with appropriate risk management and will provide peer review expertise as required.

As outlined in the National Infrastructure Development Plan (IDP), the PMU has been restructured to focus on program management and is accountable for project management, from initial planning through design to construction completion. The National Government, through the PMU, is responsible for program management systems, training of national and state personnel in these systems, review of project documentation to ensure compliance with funding agency requirements, preparation of consolidated annual FSM program reviews, as well as program management implementation assistance to the States as required. The establishment of the PMU along with the updated annual infrastructure plan is aimed at smoothing the FSM-US infrastructure relationship and ensure that all projects are implemented in a timely manner.

The PMU has engineering expertise and technical administration resource to collect and collate engineering and contractual data for use across the four states of the FSMas outlined in the National Infrastructure Development Plan (IDP), the PMU has been restructured to focus on program management and is accountable for project management, from initial planning through design to construction completion. The National Government, through the PMU, is responsible for program management systems, training of national and state personnel in these systems, review of project documentation to ensure compliance with funding agency requirements, preparation of consolidated annual FSM program reviews, as well as program management implementation assistance to the States as required. The establishment of the PMU along with the updated annual infrastructure plan is aimed at smoothing the FSM-US infrastructure relationship and ensure that all projects are implemented in a timely manner.

The PMU has engineering expertise and technical administration resource to collect and collate engineering and contractual data for use across the four states of the FSM

Adding more color and detail to this story, the Guam Daily Post reported (Feb 12, 2019) Bribery case against FSM official details cash, cars, trips This more comprehensive description shows how wrongful acts often lead to more wrongful acts, and keep spiraling down, like drug addiction.
It all began not so innocently enough:
• On May 3, 2010, Halbert sent an email to Lyon and "Co-Conspirator 1" regarding an FSM auditor's concerns about the purchase of a vehicle. Halbert wrote, "I know I should protect myself and [not] put this in writing or discuss this in e-mail or any form of communication that can provide as a concrete evident [sic] and come back and used against me but its ok, if you want to take me down no problem." Halbert wrote and threatened that if Lyon and Co-Conspirator 1 were not willing to back him up in confronting the auditor, then Halbert did "not think [they] should do business together again."

• On June 2, 2011, Halbert sent an email to Co-Conspirator 1, stating, "I am sorry to do this but I really your [sic] help again. We came with $3,000 and we have already used half of that in food and shopping. Can you and Jim [Lyon] give me $1,500.00 and this should last us for the rest of the trip."

• On Dec. 1, 2011, Halbert emailed Co-Conspirator 1, "Can you ask Jim for some money? I need $1,000 and if ok, you can give it to me when we get to Hawaii."

• On May 7, 2014, Halbert sent an email to Co-Conspirator 1, with the subject line, "Per dium," [sic] stating, "Please bring my money at home. Can you ask Jim if you can add another $1,000."

• In or around June 2015, Halbert and Lyon instructed Co-Conspirator 1 to draft a request for qualification document seeking bids for an FSM project management contract.

• In July 2015, the engineering company was awarded the contract by the FSM government.

• On Aug. 27, 2015, Halbert sent an email to Lyon with the subject line, "2014 Chevy Silverado," stating, "Please get this truck. It is my cash so when I need to pay back anyone, I can sell it or this will be my ride forever. If you can, lift it 6 in and put on black rims."

• In connection with his plea, Lyon admitted that in 2015, he and his co-conspirators purchased an additional vehicle for Halbert's personal use.

• On Sept. 1, 2015, Halbert sent an email to Co-Conspirator 1, asking Co-Conspirator I to talk to Lyon about loaning Halbert $2,500 to open an account.

• On Nov. 15, 2015, Halbert sent an email requesting that the engineering company book and pay for a hotel room for Halbert and members of his family for a trip to Guam. The engineering company executive responded that "at this time" the engineering company was approving "only project reimbursable travel requests."

• On or about Nov. 16, 2015, Halbert emailed three of the engineering company's employees, "This is to inform you that I am closing your office starting tomorrow until further notice."
The Hawai'i Free Press also followed the story. Lyon Bribery Micronesia: Arrests Start at the Top
Arrested over the weekend, Master Halbert, son-in-law of Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) President Peter Christian and son of FSM Senator Dohsis Halbert, appeared before Honolulu Federal Judge Richard L. Puglisi for arraignment Monday, February 11, 2019. A Federal source tells Hawai’i Free Press Halbert is charged with being the ‘Micronesian Official 1’ described in the January 16, 2019, indictment and January 22, 2019, guilty plea of corrupt Honolulu engineering contractor Frank James Lyon. Alleged bribes to ‘Micronesian Official 1’ include cash, a pickup truck, a trip to Las Vegas, and tuition at UH Manoa. These were only part of the total bribe package outlined in the Lyon indictment: 'From in or around 2006 through in or around 2016, Frank James Lyon, together with his co-conspirators, provided bribe payments to FSM officials totaling at least approximately $200,000 in order to obtain approximately $7.8 million in contract payments.'

The HFP article points to an online organization chart of the FSM Department of Transportation, Communications, and Infrastructure (TC&I) shows (or showed) nine (9) of 11 personnel under its Secretary to have email addresses for "@LYON.US.com".

In its practice of leaving no stone unturned, the HFP article also notes
In 2014 Halbert was tried in FSM courts for falsifying his academic record from the University of Washington in order to award himself a $173,614.56 ‘professional premium’ taken from FSM and FAA projects. '‘Crim. Case No. 2014-501; FSM v. Master Halbert” can be found on internet discussion board Micronesia Forum, and The Wayback Machine, but it has been stripped from the FSM Supreme Court website. An extensive 2016 discussion on Micronesia Forum titled, “Massy Halbert resigns from National Government...and then he goes on a trip funded by the government representing TC&I”, reveals the case was dropped as part of a plea agreement. Much of the federal indictment unsealed in Honolulu deals with Halbert soliciting bribe money from Lyon to pay the fine imposed in the FSM plea agreement.
Finding no dirt too deep to dig, the HFP article describes yet another scandal, in this case one that has been dragged around on Guam for decades. "The IT&C's PMU was previously managed by GMP Hawaii, Inc, a company owned by Wagdy Guirguis. Guirguis was convicted of tax evasion in Honolulu Federal Court, November, 2018. HFP has done a more extensive look into Guirguis also, complete with the Guam angle. For instance, it includes a link to an article from 1997, Guam Rubbish Piling Up,. The story goes way back near to the creation of the long-running trash incineration project, which was the brainchild of GRRP (Guam Resource Recovery Partners). It reports,
An overflowing landfill is causing a big stink on Guam, but the smell is not from the dump. It is from a contract for a $64 million waste-management project. The contract involves Guam Resource Recovery Partners, a Guam partnership with ties to GMP Associates Inc., a Hawaii-based engineering firm. In 1982, a company called IEEI of New York won a contract and a $250,000 loan from the Guam Economic Development Authority, or GEDA, to build an incinerator. In 1989, after years of legal wrangling with the Guam government, IEEI sold the license to G-Power Inc. G-Power is a Guam company whose principal shareholder is Wagdy Guirguis, G-Power allied itself with Wheelabrater to form GRRP. GEDA and GRRP then spent seven years negotiating a final contract."
That contract is still, contentiously, not finalized. Not sure about the smell. (I tend to hold my nose every time the subject comes up.)

Sunday, June 11, 2017

Procurement controversy du jour - PI seeks to expand emergency procurement before and after emergency

New purchase rules eyed during crises
Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez has filed a bill proposing to loosen restrictions on negotiated procurement in cases of “extreme urgency and necessity,” and allow the government to skip public bidding in purchasing cheaper goods. House Bill No. 5521 seeks to amend several provisions of Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act, which was enacted in 2003.

The (current) law considers negotiated procurement and direct contracting as alternative procurement methods to public bidding. The former (negotiated procurement) refers to the method used in extraordinary circumstances such as during the failure of bidding and in times of emergency.

Under Alvarez’ bill, negotiated procurement will be allowed “before, during, or after a calamity.” Currently, this mode is applicable “during a state of calamity,” which requires an actual declaration by the affected government unit.

Alvarez said that current regulations “unduly delay and hamstring the delivery of services” in times of calamity.

The proposed measure also provides for an additional criteria to resort to direct contracting, which currently sees the agency ask for a price quotation from the exclusive supplier of goods of critical or proprietary nature.

Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/904623/new-purchase-rules-eyed-during-crises#ixzz4jkiZKcEF
Sounds like a step onto a slippery slope to a procurement system without accountability, competition, transparency or integrity, as I've illustrated before: When corners are cut, even for great reasons (e.g., war), the way is opened for fraud. Also, refer to the tags/labels associated with this post, just below.

Sunday, March 26, 2017

Anomoly? Or Fraud?

An anomaly is an abnormality, a blip on the screen of life that doesn’t fit with the rest of the pattern. If you are a breeder of black dogs and one puppy comes out pink, that puppy is an anomaly. The noun anomaly comes from the Greek word anomolia, meaning "uneven” or “irregular.” When something is unusual compared to similar things around it, it’s the anomaly.


Fraud is the "wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in financial or personal gain.
"he was convicted of fraud"
synonyms: fraudulence, cheating, swindling, embezzlement, deceit, deception, double-dealing, chicanery, sharp practice.
"he was arrested for fraud"
swindle, racket, deception, trick, cheat, hoax;
informal scam, con, rip-off, sting, gyp, fiddle, bunco, hustle;
a person or thing intended to deceive others, typically by unjustifiably 
claiming or being credited with accomplishments or qualities.
synonyms: impostor, fake, sham, charlatan, quack

Ex-Palawan gov Reyes, 41 others charged in P1.53-B Malampaya scam
MANILA — Former Palawan Governor Mario Joel Reyes and 41 others have been charged at the Sandiganbayan for anomalies in 209 contracts funded by P1.53 billion in royalties from the Malampaya gas field in 2008 and 2009.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon filed 159 criminal charges, totaling 491 pages, for alleged procurement violations by the provincial government led by Reyes. State prosecutors also alleged that the engineering office faked the accomplishment and inspection reports and allowed the violation of the terms for 39 infrastructure contracts worth P461.37 million.

These projects from across the island province—which included roadworks, schools, day care centers, and even an airport development project in San Vicente town—were actually unfinished at the time when these were certified as completed in 2008 and 2009. Add to these the contracts with disadvantageous provisions, a total of 54 projects were singled out as riddled with irregularities

Prosecutors said Reyes conspired with seven other officials to award the 209 contractors to 11 construction firms sometime in 2008, despite the violation of several requirements under the Government Procurement Reform Act. These included the failure to post the bid invitation online at the Government Electronic Procurement System and the province’s website, and the non-submission of bidding documents.

Likewise, the infrastructure contracts were found not to contain a clause for the payment of liquidated damages in case of project delay.

There was also improper evaluation of bid proposals as one set of key personnel was allowed to supervise construction work in different municipal projects with overlapping timetables. This violated the rule that evaluators must stay in the job site and handle only one contract at a time, the charge sheet read.

Due to these alleged irregularities, Reyes was charged with 14 counts of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for causing undue injury to the government and 22 counts of violating Section 3(g) of the same law for entering into disadvantageous contracts.

Reyes was also accused, along with provincial accountant Orlando Colobong and provincial legal officer Elena Melchor Vergara-Rodriguez, of approving the payments to three contractors despite incomplete supporting documents.

Reyes was not involved in most of the 159 charges, which are related to the provincial engineering office’s alleged offenses regarding 39 individual contracts. Provincial engineer Charlie Factor has been charged with 50 counts of violating Section 3(e) of the graft law, 76 counts of falsification, and seven counts of violating Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1759, which penalizes violations of material provisions in government contracts.

Factor, Padua, Abrina, and Cabuigen, as well as assistant provincial engineer Federico Rubio Jr. and 10 resident engineers were accused of causing the government a total of P169.71 million in damages for faking the accomplishment reports to justify the payment for 39 unfinished projects priced at P461.37 million.

Egregious discrepancies allegedly attended seven of these projects, which were barely half-completed. A supposedly 100-percent completed road widening project in Coron, for one, turned out to be 13.81-percent finished only.

At the same time, state auditor Edwin Iglesia and senior technical audit specialist Ronelo del Socorro of the Commission on Audit regional office were slapped with one count each of graft, falsification, and violation of PD 1759.

Their charges pertained to the allegedly fabricated CoA inspection report for the San Vicente Airport Development Project dated Sept. 11, 2009. They stated that the project was 58.36 percent complete during ocular inspection, when it was only 8.8 percent finished.

Private individuals from inside and outside Palawan contractors were also charged.
Corruption and fraud are engineered by anomalies and irregularities.

The Six Signs of Internal Fraud
As executives, managers, internal auditors or rank and file employees, when it comes to internal fraud we may suspect it, suffer the consequences of it, or anticipate it. But we never see it, according to Steven Albrecht, associate dean at Brigham Young University's Marriott School of Management.

However, we can see the signs of fraud, Albrecht said in a speech at the 18th Annual ACFE Fraud Conference. There are six signs in all organizations. By understanding them and looking for them, we significantly improve our chances of detecting and reporting fraud.
Accounting anomalies—representing such countless red flags as inventory shortages, unrecorded transactions, unusual levels of returns, etc.

Internal control weaknesses. These equate to opportunities for insiders to commit fraud. If you identify a weakness, chances are that someone will exploit it if they haven’t already.

Analytical symptoms. When a business function occurs at the wrong time, or is conducted by the wrong person or a similar operational anomaly occurs, chances are it is a sign of fraud.

Lifestyle symptoms. Employees living beyond their means is the most common. Smart internal fraudsters would steal and save. But most steal and spend. When you notice signs of extravagant lifestyle, you’re most likely looking at a sign of fraud.

Behavioral symptoms. People who stop looking you in the eye, sweat more than usual, come in earlier than usual and/or stay late should be monitored as potential fraudsters.

Tips and complaints. When employees report actual or suspected incidents of fraud among their co-workers or bosses, you’ve got good reason to start following up with a search for hard evidence.
Look for the anomaly to find fraud
Businesses have spent megabucks on detection systems and controls to prevent fraud — and yet fraud still occurs. There are ways, however, that all individuals and businesses can recognize fraud.

People ask me continuously, “How do you find fraud?” The answer is simple: You look for the anomaly! I mean, look for the unusual. You must look for the anomaly, recognize it and not ignore it. In hindsight, people will tell you they saw the signs of their kids or spouse using drugs, but they ignored it.
There is actually a huge industry and body of knowledge built up around the detection of fraud through the careful collection and sifting of data, looking first for anomalies, things out of place. But mere deviation is not fraud.  Fraud is intentional deviation designed to unfairly or illegally dispossess someone of their property. 

But in cases like that reported here, when anomaly has been rendered the norm and in large proportions, which if proven would be an epic of collusion and corruption, all you need is to simply open your eyes to link anomaly to fraud and corruption. Here, no one, it appears, was prepared to do that, given that these deeds were done many years ago, and are only being exposed now.

Of course, crimes are not presumed and persons charged with crimes are innocent until proven guilty.  But, in some cases, "anomaly" or "irregularity" is simply a polite, legally judicious, and imprecise, way of saying "fraud" or "corruption".















Thursday, February 18, 2016

A(nother) contractor gets kicked back

Federal Government Contractor Sentenced To Prison For Accepting Kickbacks And Tax Evasion
An Enterprise, Alabama, resident was sentenced today in the Southern District of Florida to 48 months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release for accepting unlawful kickbacks and tax evasion, announced Acting Assistant Attorney General Caroline D. Ciraolo of the Justice Department’s Tax Division.

According to court documents and statements made in open court, Victor Villalobos, 47, worked for a federal prime contractor at Fort Rucker, Alabama. In 2009, Villalobos approached Maxim Silinsky, a Florida-based subcontractor for this company, and solicited illegal kickbacks on the federal subcontracts that Silinsky held in connection with the federal prime contractor. Villalobos agreed that in exchange for kickback payments he would refrain from conduct that would unfavorably affect Silinsky’s business relationship with the federal prime contractor and help ensure that he obtained additional business.

As part of his plea, Villalobos admitted that from June 2009 to December 2014, he received approximately 57 separate wire transfers totaling more than $1.9 million in kickback payments from various foreign and domestic bank accounts controlled by Silinsky. At two separate meetings in 2015, Villalobos accepted envelopes from Silinsky containing cash kickbacks totaling $60,000. Between June 2009 and February 2015, Villalobos attempted to conceal his receipt of the kickbacks by forming nominee entities and opening nominee bank accounts. Villalobos also admitted that he evaded paying income taxes on the kickback payments by causing false federal income tax returns to be filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

In addition to his prison sentence, U.S. District Judge Daniel T.K. Hurley ordered Villalobos to pay $542,562 in restitution to the IRS. As part of his plea agreement, Villalobos also agreed to be permanently debarred from federal government contracting.

Silinsky pleaded guilty to filing a false tax return in November 2015 and cooperated in the investigation and prosecution of Villalobos. Silinsky was sentenced to one year and one day in prison on Feb. 2. Silinsky also cooperated in the investigation and prosecution of Trevor Smith, a retired U.S. Air Force Master Sergeant who pleaded guilty in October 2015 to unlawfully disclosing confidential procurement information and filing a false tax return. On Jan. 28, Smith was sentenced to 18 months in prison.

Monday, June 15, 2015

Procurement controversies series -- Puerto Rico school buses

School bus company owners indicted for bid-rigging and fraud in Puerto Rico by attorneys Jennifer A. Dixon and Deirdre A. McEvoy
A federal grand jury in San Juan, Puerto Rico indicted five individuals for bid rigging and fraud conspiracies in connection with an auction for public school bus transportation contracts. The Justice Department filed a seven-count felony indictment in U.S. District Court of the District of Puerto Rico against the five school bus transportation company owners. The first count alleges that the bus owners conspired to rig bids and allocate the market for public school bus transportation services in Caguas municipality, a violation of Sherman Act § 1. Each defendant faces a maximum sentence of ten years in prison and a $1 million fine on this charge.

According to the Justice Department, the conspiracy occurred from around August 2013 until May 2015, and related to a 2013 auction to award four-year contracts for public school bus transportation. According to a statement by Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, “The defendants are charged with depriving taxpayers, the Municipality of Caguas and the Puerto Rico Department of Education of the benefits of a competitive bidding process for school bus contracts.”

This indictment is part of an “ongoing effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes” in the District of Puerto Rico. In particular, this is the first case resulting from an ongoing federal antitrust investigation into price fixing, bid rigging, and other anticompetitive conduct in Puerto Rico’s school bus transportation services industry.
Plus ça change ...:

According to the Spanish historian Carlos Madrid, in his book Beyond Distances (Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands Council for Humanities, 2006), there was an uncommon distress in the Marianas Islands in 1876, brought about by a combination of factors, chiefly Spain’s forcible introduction into the Islands of hundreds of political and other criminal deportees from Spain, but also typhoon and drought. The situation on Saipan had become particularly dire. 

As he tells the story
“Chamorros and Carolinians together with the deportees were facing a famine without precedent that could bring the island to catastrophe. Martín [the Saipan Spanish authority] wrote Governor Brabo [the Guam-based Governor of the Marianas] with an urgent request for provisions, since in a few days they would literally have nothing to eat. In Guam this request would have been received with great concern as resources in Agaña were also extremely limited. But the situation in Saipan was nevertheless so pressing that Governor Brabo authorized, on his account, the purchase of all the necessary rice, which was to be sent in the launch San José as soon as possible.

The obligatory legal procedures, which mandated that government requisitions had to be contracted through free and open auction, still had to be fulfilled. The gobernadorcillo of Agaña, following the custom, ordered the prominent display of the notice announcing the public auction in the busiest areas of the capital. At the same time the pregonero, or town crier, spread the news in the streets for three consecutive days. In order to save time, knowing that in the whole of the Marianas only George Johnston could provide the necessary quantities of meat from his leasehold in Tinian, the request for the purchases of barrels of cured pork was directly made to his representative Vicente Calvo. The barrels were to be sent to Saipan in the amount of a pound daily per deportee.

The conditions of the auction of palay or unthreshed rice were basically to be able to provide dry rice, free of dust and preferably from the last harvest. The minium quantity for each bid being ten cavanes, it had to be delivered to the Tribunal in Agaña within forty-eight hours. In return, it was guaranteed that the payment would take place on the day after delivery, which was an incentive to all who knew that the colonial administration was a late and often bad customer.

The auction was held in the government offices on the ground floor of the Palace, at ten o’clock in the morning of Monday, July 26, 1876. To speed up the process, bids were submitted not in writing but vocally. All the bidders must have agreed on a price among themselves before the auction, as everyone offered the same bid of two pesos per cavan. “The mention of these individuals is very significant since they undoubtedly represented a social class of means.

What was the social background of these people? How the principalía of the villages and the capital had the right to use the title “Don” was earlier discussed, but in actual fact many individuals not belong[ing] to the principalía were also referred to as “Don” or “Doña” probably because [of] their social or economic ascendancy."

Wednesday, March 18, 2015

Procurement controversie de jour: private contracting procurement fraud?

The Commonwealth Bank of Australia, despite its name, is not a government institution (any more). It is a pillar (really -- one of the official "four pillars") of Australian private banking. Other than that, this would be a scandalous, but not unusual, controversy of procurement fraud. 

Procurement fraud is not restricted to government contracting. Some principles of procurement are universal, as are the problems.

US firm ServiceMesh founded by former Al Gore adviser at centre of CBA scandal (Read the whole story of all cited articles at the links.)
IT executive Keith Hunter, the bank's former general manager of technology service management and operations, was arrested on Tuesday and charged with two counts of bribery relating to a contract awarded by the bank to a US IT firm – ServiceMesh. Jon Waldron, the Commonwealth Bank's former general manager of IT engineering, flew to the US on the weekend after he became aware of the police's bribery investigation. Last week police froze an account with almost $2 million of allegedly corrupt payments.

The men are alleged to have awarded big-money contracts, worth tens of millions of dollars, to US firm ServiceMesh without putting it to public tender. The two men then allegedly received payments from a not-for-profit organisation, Ace Foundation, which was set up by by ServiceMesh, in return for awarding the contract. ServiceMesh was sold to US giant Computer Sciences Corporation in 2013.

NSW police will allege that the Commonwealth Bank contract was of a "significant size" and would have "contributed significantly" to the IT company's sale to CSC. After the sale, police allege that Mr Hunter and Mr Waldron were paid $2.19 million.

The Commonwealth Bank began its own investigation into the alleged crime last October while also notifying police. Both Mr Waldron and Mr Hunter were fired by the bank last year. "We have no tolerance for any illegal activity by any employee and we take every situation seriously," a statement from the bank released on Wednesday said. CSC said it was assisting authorities while also conducting its own investigation.

Mr Hunter pleaded not guilty to both bribery charges when he appeared at Sydney's Central Local Court on Wednesday.
US citizen charged in Sydney with bribery over bank contract
A US citizen who was recently a senior executive at the Commonwealth Bank of Australia pleaded not guilty in a Sydney court today to charges that he accepted bribes to award a contract to a US information technology firm.

Keith Robert Hunter, 61, formerly of San Francisco, and his alleged accomplice another Sydney-based American who has not been named were allegedly paid USD 2.19 million for awarding a bank contract to ServiceMesh without a tender, according to court documents.

Hunter, who had previously held senior positions at global corporations Visa Inc. And J.P. Morgan, was arrested at his Sydney apartment yesterday. "I want to vomit. I cannot believe we were tis (sic) stupid," Hunter wrote, according to police evidence tendered to the Sydney Central Local Court.

The money was paid through a California-based shelf company Ace Inc. Which had been set up by ServiceMesh, police evidence said. When questioned by bank investigators, Hunter and his alleged accomplice said the payments from Ace were for consultancy work.

Sunday, August 3, 2014

That's some expensive shtuff

From the Philippines.

Sen. Lito Lapid faces graft charge
On Friday, August 1, the Office of the Ombudsman announced that it has found probable cause to indict Senator Manuel "Lito" Lapid and several others for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the P728 million fertilizer fund scam.

In a statement, the Ombudsman said a special panel determined that Lapid, Provincial Accountant Benjamin Yuzon and Provincial Treasurer Vergel Yabut committed several violations of the procurement rules after purchasing fertilizer that was "1,000 percent higher than the other fertilizers of the same kind."

The Ombudsman panel cited records showing the provincial government, under Lapid, purchased 3,880 liters of fertilizer at P1,250 per liter from Macro-Micro Fertilizer in 2004. At that time, Lapid was still governor of Pampanga.

Investigation showed the same kind of fertilizer costs only P120 per liter.

"If the Provincial government of Pampanga undertook the purchase through public bidding, it could have purchased a fertilizer of equal or better quality than Macro-Micro Foliar Fertilizer at a lesser or competitive cost, thus allowing the Province of Pampanga to secure the best commercially available fertilizer product at the lowest price possible," the Ombudsman resolution said.

Ex-Gov. Lito Lapid, Pampanga execs charged for graft in fertilizer fund scam
Lapid also issued a certification that "there was no suitable fertilizer substitute with the same quality" and that the mode of procurement would be direct purchase from its exclusive distributor, MPTC.

Also charged were the incorporators of Malayan Pacific Trading Corporation (MPTC) Ma. Victoria Aquino-Abubakar and Leolita Aquino, and Dexter Alexander Vasquez, proprietor of D.A. Vazquez Macro-Micro Fertilizer Resources.

While in the performance of their duties, Lapid, Yabut and Yuzon, in conspiracy with Vasquez, Aquino and Abubakar, committed the act of purchasing the fertilizers in complete disregard of Republic Act No. 9184, or the "Government Procurement Reform Act", and its implementing rules and regulations.

Moreover, the manner and inordinate speed by which the transaction was consummated in a mere 12 days -- manifested the partiality of Lapid, Yabut and Yuzon to D.A. Vazquez and MPTC.

Meanwhile, the criminal cases against Lulu Alingcastre, Leonardo Mendoza, Ramir Flores, Ismael Abubakar, Jr., Alberto Aquino, Arthur Aquino, Paul Albert Aguino, Marites Sto. Domingo, Rolando Dorado and Ade Nasuiton were dismissed for lack of probable cause. In the related administrative case, Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales also ordered the dismissal from the service of Pampanga provincial treasurer Vergel Yabut and Pampanga provincial accountant Benjamin Yuzon. On the other hand, the administrative charges against other co-respondents Lulu Alingcastre, Leonardo Mendoza and Ramir Flores were dismissed for lack of merit.
Lapid case shows how public funds were stolen, say farmers



Monday, August 5, 2013

The good, the bad and the corrupt-ish

Taiwan Is Angry But Is It Also Corrupt?
Proudly democratic Taiwan with the world’s 26th largest economy is demanding that the graft-detection group Transparency International do a recount after placing it on the NGO's corruption list. It has also sent the Berlin-based NGO two letters of protest. But Transparency International, which calls its barometer the biggest ever survey on global public opinion on corruption, says it stands by its findings and has no plans to scrap or redo its research on graft in Taiwan.

The standoff between Taiwan and Transparency International leaves open the question of how corrupt this global exporter in the West Pacific really is. Public records laws let the public see a lot of government in action. The news media have ample freedom. No one is charging the government with systematically stealing wads of public money to spend on itself. Taiwan’s leaders are no African kleptocrats.

At the same time, despite the liberal democratic reforms put in motion since martial law was lifted in 1987, Taiwan is hardly free of corruption. Based on local news reports and discussions with lawyers, it’s safe to call payoffs and unholy alliances core part of government business. Government procurement is considered shady. And it’s widely suspected that contractors pay officials under the table and that some don’t even need contracts.

Some projects are so “off the wall” that the public must imagine a hidden financial motive, says Robin Winkler, who founded his Taipei-based law firm in 2002. He says lawmakers may also raise construction bid prices to get more from themselves and others in their camp.

Sunday, February 17, 2013

Monsoon of scams?

It's raining scams: Chopper controversy's yet another proof of political foot-dragging on corruption
It's politics as usual. Facing graft charges in a Rs 3,546-crore chopper deal inked in 2010, the Congress says spadework for the transaction began under NDA rule. The BJP exhumes the Bofors ghost, playing up the Italian origin of the scandal-hit defence firm, Finmeccanica, whose CEO was arrested in a graft-related probe in Italy. Instead of mudslinging, both sides should focus on the problem at hand. The corruption issue that led to widespread protests in 2011 hasn't gone away. The question is, what's been done about it?

It's not enough to say India won't lose money courtesy the deal's 'integrity clause'. What about powerful people and middlemen alleged to have illegally profited? We need a thorough probe to book those found guilty, no matter how influential they may be. Sadly, foot-dragging is evident across the political board on institutional clean-ups.

Not a single systemic reform is fully up and running yet, whether to promote transparent public procurement, non-discretionary resource allocation, strict social spending audits, targeted services delivery or revamp of land acquisition norms. The CBI's autonomy remains an issue. Judicial and police reforms are pending. And UPA-II seems to think knee-jerk moratoriums on defence purchases ”in lieu of effective monitoring” suffices to bury scandal, even if the price paid is delayed modernisation of India's military.

Whether it's the prime minister or defence minister, government representatives can no longer make personal probity an alibi against failure to stem all-pervasive corruption.