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Showing posts with label Disposal of surplus property. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Disposal of surplus property. Show all posts

Friday, November 26, 2010

Debating transparency in Kenya: a case for reform

Note: This post contains a number of labels, as the opinion piece in this post is a comprehensive critique of the procurement situation in Kenya. You should read the full article, particularly if you do not understand the reference to any particular label.

Transparent and competitive public procurement system key to a functioning economy
all governmental entities are struggling in the face of unrelenting budget constraints, downsizing, public demand for increased transparency in public procurement and greater concerns about efficiency, fairness and equity. Additionally, public procurement professionals have faced a constantly changing environment typified by rapidly emerging technologies, increasing product choice, environment concerns, and the complexities of international and regional trading agreements.

Further, policy makers are increasingly using public procurement as a tool to achieve socioeconomic goals. In this environment, public procurement has become much more complex than ever before, and public procurement officials must deal with a broad range of issues.

They have been walking on a tight rope in balancing the dynamic tension between (a) competing socioeconomic objectives, (b) national economic interests vis-à-vis- global competition as required by regional and international trade agreements, (c) satisfying the requirements of fairness, equity and transparency, (d) maintaining an overarching focus on maximising competition; and (d) utilising new technology to enhance procurement efficiency, including e-procurement and purchase cards.

A sound procurement system is based on four major elements or pillars: legislative and regulatory framework, institutional framework and management capacity, procurement operations and market practices, and integrity of procurement system. A weakness in one of the four pillars inevitably leads to an unsound public procurement system. This contribution highlights the weakness in the current legal and regulatory framework on public procurement—the Public Procurement and Disposal Act 2005.

The principal reason for the enactment of the Act was to have a legal regime that weeds out inefficiencies in the procurement process, remove patterns of abuse, and the failure of the public purchaser to obtain adequate value in return for the expenditure of public funds.

However, these objectives have never been fully achieved in practice. Key provisions of the Act and the regulations are replete with textual weaknesses that have often been abused by procuring entities. Moreover, the Act does not envisage contemporary market realities hence the need to continuously revise it to keep pace with these developments.

The authors’ review of more than 100 decisions from the Review Board and the High Court has revealed an inconsistent implementation of these policy objectives. There are no set guidelines, judicial or statutory, that ought to guide decision makes in the interpretation and application of the policy objectives. It is proposed that the Act is amended to restate and redefine the stated policy objectives.

transparency and non-discrimination are the key pillars of the legal regime on public procurement and disposal. A transparent and openly competitive public procurement system with clear procedures and contract award criteria is a prerequisite to a functioning economy.

A good procurement system must therefore provide watertight provisions amongst others , (a) requiring procuring entities to publish tender notices in good time to allow adequate responses from bidders, (b) clearly stipulating any technical specifications and procedures, (c) outlining bid opening procedures and detailing the terms and conditions of the contract awarded, and (d) requiring the procuring entity to maintain reliable record of proceedings, disclose all relevant information and avail for inspection the name and address of the successful bidder and the value of the winning bid.

the right of unsuccessful tenderer to challenge the award of the tender is a key feature of the public procurement process. An ideal public procurement legal regime should contain bid-challenge procedures that are non-discriminatory, timely, transparent and effective.

A critical review of the Act reveals that while the mere fact of lodging of a request for administrative review to the Review Board automatically operates to suspend the procurement proceedings, there are no concomitant provisions for automatic interim measures when an applicant seeks to challenge the decision of the Review Board by way of judicial review to the High Court.

This conflict was played out in the case of Republic Versus the Public Procurement Administrative Review ex parte Egerton University where the Review Board’s decision to direct procuring entity to extend the disputed contract for three months was stayed by the High Court. This created a hiatus that led to the completion of the original project thereby rendering the judicial and administrative review proceedings nugatory.

Monday, October 25, 2010

Procurement principles should also apply to disposals

Law Must Protect Public Property
That the system of procurement and disposal of public assets in government is significantly flawed and that this system costs taxpayers billions of shillings each year.

There can be no doubt that the deals outlined in the report resulted in loss of public revenue. Properties such as the embassy plot in Lagos were grossly undervalued.

The nation has come a long way since the 1970s and 1980s when procurement was governed simply by circulars from Treasury.

The Public Procurement and Disposal Act of 2005 was designed to promote transparency. But the system is evidently failing. Amendments should be made to this law to make it far more difficult for public officials and their private sector accomplices to cheat the taxpayer.

Recommendations such as ensuring there are strong departmental internal audit systems, that the Kenya National Audit Office is strengthened and that there should be far more public access of procurement records for all ministries should be implemented urgently.

The overwhelming suspicion is that the Foreign Affairs ministry scandal is only the tip of the iceberg. Parliament should act to avert further loss of public money to corrupt officials who in the current scandal stopped short of auctioning public property.

Friday, February 5, 2010

Procurement controversies -- the District of Columbia

D.C. Mayor Fenty's associates bypassed rules in donating rescue vehicles
A friend and a staffer of Mayor Adrian M. Fenty's skirted procurement rules in arranging a deal that raised questions about how to properly dispose of city property.

"What makes the transaction so incredible is the fact that so much effort -- at the highest levels of District government -- was expended to facilitate a transfer of surplus property without even a hint of potential benefit for the District government," said a report by the Committee on Government Operations and the Environment. "Rather, the entire affair was merely the pet project -- even if well intentioned -- of a senior District official and a well-connected non-government individual."

No city laws were broken

In their reports on the firetruck controversy, the committees call for stricter policies on how government property can be donated or auctioned off, especially to a foreign government. The reports also say that the Fenty administration hastily arranged the transfer of the firetruck and ambulance to Sousa outside traditional procurement procedures.

according to the report, Skinner, Giles and Jannarone were working behind the scenes to make sure the transfer would be legal. In March 2009, the District government issued an emergency rule "to allow the Chief Procurement Officer to donate surplus supplies to Peaceoholics," according to the report.


D.C. Council questions parks projects it didn't approve
D.C. Mayor Adrian M. Fenty's administration has funneled at least $82 million to the D.C. Housing Authority to build a dozen parks, ballfields and recreation centers, a process that has circumvented D.C. Council oversight and awarded contracts to firms with ties to the mayor.

By law, the council must approve contracts that exceed $1 million. Last month, contracts for as much as $16 million went to various construction companies as part of the mayor's effort to improve the city's parks system.

Banneker Ventures, a firm owned by a Fenty fraternity brother, Omar Karim, is the construction manager on every project

Some talks with housing authority and parks officials this week led to the discovery of millions of dollars in projects that the council never approved. Thomas said it appears the money was taken from the Department of Parks and Recreation, given to the Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development and then passed through the quasi-government agency that operates the city's public housing system.

Thomas said he wanted to know how Banneker received the 12 contracts last month. "There are some real concerns that one contractor could win competitive contracts 100 percent of the time," he said.

Dena Michaelson, a spokeswoman for the housing authority, said Thursday that she did not have information about the projects. She also said she did not know whether the contracts had been competitively bid.

But she said it is not unusual for city officials to route money through the housing authority for construction work. "They tap into us . . . to get the projects off the ground," Michaelson said. "We get projects going fast, and we keep costs low."


FURTHER READING: In 2007 the GAO issued a report regarding Washington D.C., which was headed "Procurement System Needs Major Reform". In its introductory comments and preliminary brief it said (excerpts):
The District’s procurement law generally does not apply to all District entities nor does it provide authority to the CPO to effectively carry out and oversee the full scope of procurement responsibilities across all agencies. A lack of uniformity in its procurement law and the CPO’s limited authority not only undermines transparency, accountability, and competition but also increases the risk of preferential treatment for certain vendors and ultimately drives up costs.

The District has been challenged to effectively manage and oversee its procurement function, due in large part to the low-level position of the procurement office in the governmental structure, the rapid turnover of CPOs, and multiple players having authority to award contracts and affect contract decisions. At the same time, the District does not have the basic tools that contracting and agency staff and financial managers need to effectively manage and oversee procurements—including a procurement manual, a professional development program, and an integrated procurement data system.

In summary, the District’s procurement system does not incorporate a number of generally accepted key principles and practices for protecting taxpayer resources from fraud, waste, and abuse. Specifically, the District lacks a comprehensive procurement law that applies to all District entities over which the CPO has sole procurement authority and promotes competition; an organizational alignment that empowers its procurement leadership; an adequately trained acquisition and contracting workforce; and the technology and tools to help managers and staff make well-informed acquisition decisions.

The District’s history of procurement problems—which include poor planning, excessive use of sole source contracts, and unauthorized personnel committing government resources—is well documented. Contracts have suffered from poorly defined requirements, noncompliance with procurement rules, and avoidance of competition. Almost 10 years ago in an effort to improve its procurement outcomes and promote oversight and accountability, the District amended its procurement law. Since then, the District’s inspector general’s and auditor’s offices as well as numerous press reports continue to identify improper contracting practices across various District entities.

the law has frequently been amended to grant exemptions to its provisions and the CPO’s authority for certain entities and special procurements. Current and former CPOs, as well as NASPO and other city procurement officials, noted that these exemptions distort the District’s law, undermine efforts to establish a central authority, and circumvent the competitive process.

In addition to generally lacking a law that reflects accepted key principles of sound procurement, the District has been challenged to effectively manage and oversee its procurement system. The low-level position of the procurement office within the District’s governmental structure, combined with rapid turnover of five CPOs in the past 10 years, has resulted in fragmented and inconsistent procurement management and oversight with multiple players having authority to award contracts and affect procurement decisions. At the same time, contracting and agency staff and financial managers do not have the basic tools needed for effective procurement management and oversight.