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Showing posts with label Evaluation of submissions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Evaluation of submissions. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 28, 2017

The laborious SAGA of the US Navy's BOSS contract on Guam

This post is a follow-up to a prior post almost 3 years ago, Protest of Navy's BOSS contract on Guam upheld.

Note: As always, I take considerable liberties with the source documents when presenting them here. For instance, critical citations are often omitted, parts are re-arranged and/or paraphrased, etc. Read the source at the link if accuracy, completeness and fidelity is important to you. (If it is not important to you, reconsider wandering around the web without an escort.)

Before the GAO in re Matter of: Fluor Federal Solutions, LLC, File: B-410486.9, January 18, 2017
DIGEST: Fluor maintains that the agency misevaluated proposals and made an unreasonable source selection decision. Protest challenging agency’s evaluation of staffing and resources proposals is sustained where record shows that agency evaluated the protester’s and awardee’s proposals disparately in a manner that prejudiced the protester. We sustain the protest.

This is our third occasion to consider the propriety of the Navy’s actions in connection with this acquisition. In a prior decision, we sustained a protest filed by Fluor relating to the agency’s evaluation of proposals and conduct of discussions in connection with this acquisition. We recommended that the agency reopen discussions with the offerors, solicit, obtain and evaluate revised proposals, and make a new source selection decision.

The Navy implemented our recommended corrective action and again selected DZSP for contract award. Fluor filed a second protest challenging the agency’s selection of DZSP in the wake of the agency’s corrective action. After full development of the record in that case, we conducted an outcome prediction alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedure at the request of the Navy. We advised the parties that the agency’s evaluation of DZSP’s proposed cost in the area of its exempt employee compensation (discussed in detail below) appeared to have overlooked certain significant features of DZSP’s proposed costs. As a result, the GAO attorney advised that our Office likely would sustain the protest. The agency advised our Office that it intended to take corrective action to address the concerns we identified, and on that basis we dismissed Fluor’s second protest as academic.

After dismissal of Fluor’s second protest, the agency engaged in limited discussions with the protester and DZSP and solicited, obtained and evaluated revised proposals. The agency again selected DZSP for award, and the current protest followed.

The RFP advised offerors that the agency would make award on a best-value basis, considering cost and several non-cost evaluation factors. The non-cost factors were as follows: past performance, occupational safety, staffing and resources, technical approach, and small business utilization. For cost evaluation purposes, the RFP advised offerors that the agency would evaluate proposals for completeness, reasonableness, balance, and realism. The RFP stated that the agency would assign past performance examples relevancy ratings of very relevant, relevant, somewhat relevant or not relevant, and would assign each offeror’s past performance a confidence rating of substantial confidence, satisfactory confidence, limited confidence, no confidence or unknown confidence. Finally, the RFP stated that past performance was approximately equal in importance to the other four non-cost evaluation factors combined, and that all five non-cost factors, when combined, were approximately equal in importance to cost.

DZSP had proposed 113 exempt labor categories, and claimed that it was escalating the direct rates of compensation for these employees by [deleted] percent for each year of contract performance. A careful examination of the record showed, however, that in addition to applying an escalation factor of [deleted] percent, DZSP also was applying what it termed a “decrement factor” of [deleted] percent to these same rates of compensation. The net result of these calculations was that, rather than escalating its direct labor by [deleted] percent per year, DZSP actually was reducing the rates of compensation for these employees by [deleted] percent during each year of contract performance. The contemporaneous record showed that the agency failed to recognize this decrease in DZSP’s proposed compensation, and that its cost realism evaluation failed to take it into account.

The record further showed that Fluor had been found technically superior to DZSP under the non-cost evaluation factors. While both firms received the highest ratings (substantial confidence and outstanding) under the past performance, occupational safety, staffing and resources, and small business utilization factors, Fluor’s proposal received an outstanding rating under the technical approach factor, while DZSP’s proposal was assigned a rating of good under that factor.

The agency’s selection of DZSP’s lower-rated proposal was based on its conclusion that it represented a savings of approximately $6.9 million over the life of the contract. However, we concluded, based on the error associated with the agency’s failure to recognize DZSP’s decrease in its exempt employee compensation, that this apparent cost savings was largely non-existent. We therefore concluded that the agency’s source selection decision was not reasonable.

Subsequently, the agency elected to allow Fluor and DZSP to make limited revisions to their proposals.
Both firms revised their proposals and the agency reevaluated them on the basis of those revisions. The agency made no changes to the adjectival ratings assigned to the offerors’ non-cost proposals (Fluor was again found superior under the technical approach factor). Both firms revised their proposed costs: Fluor proposed a total cost of $494,519,656, and DZSP proposed a total cost of $491,894,166. The agency made no adjustments to either firm’s proposed cost for purposes of evaluating realism. On the basis of these evaluation results, the agency again made award to DZSP, concluding that, although Fluor’s proposal was technically superior, it did not merit the approximately $2.6 million cost premium.

The focus of Fluor’s latest protest centers on a change in the proposed approach to managing and compensating its exempt personnel that DZSP introduced in response to the agency’s latest round of discussions. The agency had provided DZSP a discussion question relating to the fact that, in its earlier proposal, it had offered to reduce its exempt employees’ compensation by a net factor of [deleted] percent during each year of contract performance. The agency advised DZSP that such an approach was not considered by the government to be reasonable or realistic because it implied that every exempt position would be replaced with a new hire at a lower rate of compensation for each year of contract performance.

In response to the agency’s discussion question, DZSP essentially introduced an entirely new approach to how it would manage and compensate its exempt employees. In effect, DZSP’s new approach was that it would replace incumbent workers at a rate of [deleted] percent of its exempt workforce per year and hire new, lower paid, employees in their place. These new employees would be paid [deleted] percent of the hourly rates identified in DZSP’s proposal. The employees that were not replaced in a particular contract year would be given a [deleted] percent escalation to their hourly rates of compensation (until such time as they were replaced), and this would result in [deleted] hourly rates of compensation that would [deleted] over the life of the contract.

Fluor raises various challenges to the agency’s evaluation of DZSP’s proposed approach to maintaining [deleted] wage rates for its exempt employees. Among other arguments, Fluor alleges that the agency engaged in disparate treatment in connection with evaluating its proposal and DZSP’s proposal in the area of staff recruitment and retention.

For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the protester that the agency evaluated the two proposals disparately in connection with the question of recruitment and retention of staff. It is axiomatic that agencies are required to evaluate proposals on a common basis and in accordance with the terms of the RFP; agencies may not properly engage in disparate treatment of offerors in the evaluation of proposals.

Under the express terms of the RFP, the agency was required to evaluate the adequacy of the offerors’ staffing approach as it related to the recruitment and retention of staff.

The record shows that Fluor’s staffing approach for exempt employees involved recruitment of 95 percent of the incumbent staff. Fluor represented to the agency that it was confident in its ability to do this based on the wage rates it was proposing. Of significance, Fluor specifically represented that, in the event it was unable to attract the incumbent staff with the rates of compensation it was proposing, Fluor proposed to [deleted] for exempt employees. Notwithstanding this representation in the Fluor proposal, the record shows that the agency’s evaluators and source selection authority expressed a concern that Fluor would be unable to recruit the incumbent exempt employees at the wage rates it had proposed. The agency’s technical evaluators questioned Fluor’s ability to recruit the incumbent exempt staff based on the wage rates it had proposed, and suggested that Fluor’s approach could result in employee morale and retention issues. The agency’s cost evaluators echoed these same concerns.

In contrast, the evaluators did not give meaningful consideration to similar implications of DZSP’s proposed approach described above, or how it would impact the firm’s retention of employees, as required by the RFP. In this connection, the evaluators gave no consideration to the fact that DZSP expressly proposed to replace its incumbent staff at a rate of [deleted] percent per year for each year of the 8-year potential life of this contract. The agency technical evaluators confined their observations to consideration of whether or not it was realistic for DZSP to replace its existing, incumbent exempt employees, and concluded that it was “very realistic” for DZSP to do so because approximately [deleted] percent of DZSP’s overall workforce was comprised of an aging population. In addition, the technical evaluators observed only that DZSP’s claimed 95 percent retention rate for its exempt employees would “not be applicable” to future contract periods, but did not criticize the firm’s proposal for this reason. The cost evaluators, for their part, did not give consideration to DZSP’s proposed plan to replace its exempt workforce, and instead confined their observations to whether or not DZSP’s proposed rates of compensation were reasonable and realistic.

In addition to these inconsistencies, the agency’s source selection authority (SSA) specifically found the DZSP proposal superior to the Fluor proposal in the area of employee retention and used that as a discriminator for making her selection decision. In fact, she apparently was unaware of DZSPs’ proposed approach of essentially replacing its exempt workforce more than once over the life of the contract.

In sum, the record shows that the agency evaluated the offerors disparately under the staffing and resources factor, criticizing Fluor’s proposed approach as possibly involving a risk that it would not be able to recruit the incumbent workforce, while at the same time failing to meaningfully consider whether a similar risk was raised by DZSP’s proposed approach of repeatedly replacing its exempt employee workforce over the life of the contract. In light of these considerations, we sustain Fluor’s protest.

We recommend that the agency reevaluate proposals in a manner that is consistent with this decision and make a new source selection decision after performing that reevaluation. Should the agency conclude that DZSP is no longer in line for award, we further recommend that the agency terminate DZSP’s contract for the convenience of the government, and make award to Fluor, if otherwise proper.

Monday, November 27, 2017

When all salient factors are rated similarly for best value, there is no prejudice to rejected offeror; But...

In a best value photo finish, when a protesting offeror’s past performance evaluation factor was recognized by the agency as more advantageous than the others, there is a reasonable possibility that the protester was prejudiced by award being made to another offeror. Thus, the protest was valid.

The following GAO decision is instructive for its discussion of the means for evaluating technical factors, past performance factors and price factor trade-offs. It is particularly instructive for dealing with photo finishes. As always, I take great liberty in presenting cases and articles, so this is not an official recitation. If you need that, go to the link.

Matter of: SITEC Consulting, LLC; VariQ Corporation; Logistics Systems, Inc.
1. Protests challenging the agency’s evaluation of technical proposals are denied where the evaluations were reasonable, performed in accordance with the solicitation evaluation criteria, and equal.

2. Protests challenging the agency’s failure to conduct an adequate risk assessment of the awardee’s price are actually challenges that the agency failed to perform a price realism analysis and, where the solicitation did not provide for a price realism analysis, such challenges are without merit.

3. Protest challenging the agency’s evaluation of past performance is sustained where the agency concedes errors in its past performance evaluation and the record establishes that one protester was prejudiced.
Under the terms of the RFQ, award was to be made to the firm whose proposal represented the best value to the government, considering technical approach, past performance, and price. Technical approach was more important than past performance. Those two factors, when combined, were significantly more important than price.

With respect to past performance, the RFQ advised offerors that the government would evaluate “relevant past performance.” Relevant is defined as “similar to the IT services in the PWS and similar in nature, scope, size and complexity to the required services.”

Past performance was to be rated based on a stepped adjectival rating scale from “Significant Confidence” (highest) to “Confidence” to “Neutral” to “No Confidence” (lowest). Each rating was defined, for instance: ‘Confidence’ shows “the Vendor’s past performance record indicates the Vendor should be able to successfully perform the required effort. Some Government intervention is expected to be required in achieving the required level of performance.” The next lowest rating, ‘Neutral’, shows “the Vendor has no relevant performance record. A thorough search was unable to identify any relevant past performance information. This is a neutral rating. It does not hinder or help the Vendor.”

In the Technical evaluation, one offeror (the highest price) was rated a notch above the other three offerors, who all received the same rating. In Past Performance evaluation, the agency rated all offerors equally, as “Confidence”. In the result, award was made to CWS, the second lowest price offeror. VariQ protested. It asserted that the agency deviated from the past performance evaluation criteria specified in the solicitation and should have been rated higher than its given rating.

Here, the agency ultimately admitted the substance of the protested error. A review of the agency’s own evaluation of past performance information supplied by CWS, SITEC, and LSI supports a past performance rating of neutral for each of those offerors. The agency determined that while LSI and CWS had some past performance that was similar in scope, it was smaller in size. The agency also determined that SITEC had past performance that was narrower in scope than the current requirement. However, in all cases, because the agency did not find any negative past performance, it assigned each of those offerors a confidence rating. The agency conceded that neutral is the appropriate past performance rating for all of the offerors except VariQ.

But, the agency asserted that the errors in the past performance evaluation did not prejudice the protester, and that even if the other three vendors had been given a “Neutral” rating for past performance, the source selection authority (SSA) could not have used that as a discriminator due to the fact that a “Neutral” rating can neither hinder nor help the vendor. In effect, the agency said that the hierarchy of the four rating levels specified in the solicitation was neutralized by the description of one of them.

But the agency had chosen a “best value” method of source selection, and that entails a trade-off of the various stated factors according to their relative ratings. The agency’s assertion that the SSA could not have considered VariQ’s past performance confidence rating in VariQ’s favor in its tradeoff decision, because the other offerors’ proposals were rated neutral, is inconsistent with prior decisions of this Office. Although agencies may not rate an offeror that lacks relevant past performance favorably or unfavorably with regard to past performance standing alone, an agency may, in a price/technical tradeoff, determine that a high past performance rating is worth more than a neutral past performance rating.

Competitive prejudice is an essential element of a viable protest; where the protester fails to demonstrate that, but for the agency’s actions, it would have had a substantial chance of receiving the award, there is no basis for finding prejudice, and our Office will not sustain the protest. However, GAO will “resolve doubts regarding prejudice in favor of the protester; a reasonable possibility of prejudice is sufficient to sustain a protest.”

Here, the RFQ stated that the technical factor is more important than the past performance factor and that those two factors combined are significantly more important than price. The record shows that there are variances behind the technical factor ratings, the offeror’s prices are clustered relatively closely together, and, as the agency has now stated, VariQ’s proposal is the only one to have a past performance rating of confidence rather than neutral.

Under these circumstances
, we find a reasonable possibility that the protester was prejudiced. Consequently, we sustain VariQ’s challenge to the agency’s past performance evaluation.
FURTHER READING: GAO Makes Rare Finding of Error in Past Performance Evaluation, and Underscores Incumbents Are Not Automatically Entitled to Highest Technical Rating

Wednesday, April 19, 2017

The lowest what?

Bid awards are meant to go to the lowest responsive bid from a responsible bidder, right?

Lowest what?

Too often, the assumption, therefore the focus, is on price: the sticker price. Lowest price wins, right?

But from the phrase "sticker price", we also get the phrase "sticker shock".

Sticker shock is what County Officials are coming to terms with as they near completion of a new 22-story Superior Courts building in downtown San Diego, California. Here's the story from the San Diego Union Tribune:

COSTLY ADD-ON AT NEW COURTHOUSE
The new building downtown county courthouse, designed with 71 courtrooms, will consolidate operations at the 1960s-era downtown criminal courthouse on Broadway, Family Court on Cedar Street and the Madge Bradley Building on Ash Street. The 110 deputies and community services officers working at those three locations will be transferred to the new courthouse.

It will cost an extra $3.3 million a year in staffing to resolve security risks caused by the design of the $555 million downtown county courthouse set to open this summer, county officials say.

They point, in part, to a cost-cutting decision not to build a $25 million tunnel under Union Street that would have allowed deputies to escort inmates directly from the Central Jail to the new Superior Courts building.

“This design difference imposes a measurable and higher level of security costs,” said a 2016 report by Sheriff Bill Gore and Helen Robbins-Meyer, the county’s chief administrative officer.

The San Diego County Sheriff’s Department provides deputies and community services officers as security at the region’s courthouses. The department said it needed 33 more positions on top of the 110 originally planned in order to safely move prisoners in and out of the new 22-story building, and to respond to any courtroom emergencies.

The tunnel from Central Jail to the new courthouse was part of the original construction plan, and Keim said the sheriff continues working with state and local leaders to get it built.

Without the tunnel, the plan is to bus jail inmates two blocks to a controlled entryway at the courthouse called a sally-port. Gore says the buses require extra supervision, as do extra holding cells added to the courthouse design.

Gore’s report, submitted to the state Department of Finance, said the new courthouse’s high-rise configuration “significantly affects the ability of deputies to respond to security issues, dangerous incidents or emergencies.”

He noted that a 2015 study showed an average of 16 such incidents per week at the current courthouse.

There will be up to four criminal trial courtrooms on each of 11 floors in the new building. The sheriff wants roving deputies available to run up or down stairwells to assist courtroom bailiffs in any emergencies. Using an elevator might actually be slower if deputies on multiple floors stop it to get on board, the report says.

Other “rovers” would keep an eye on large public spaces, including the lobby and food court. More deputies also are needed to run the five weapons-screening stations at the entrance.

Two felony arraignment courtrooms pose added concerns: They are on the first floor near the exit doors. That proximity, the sheriff’s report says, “presents an increased security risk for a successful escape of in-custody prisoners charged with serious felony crimes.”

The sheriff has asked the state to cover the $3.3 million estimated annual cost of hiring 30 more deputies and community service officers, and three sergeants.

San Diego County spokesman Michael Workman said, “We need $3 million. If that doesn’t happen, we’ll have to determine what to do. It would probably have to come out of (the sheriff’s) budget.”
So, to save the upfront price to construct the tunnel by $25 million in fixed today's dollars, the taxpayers (of either the State of the County) will have to shell out over $3 million a year in servicing expenses, which tend to escalate over time -- for the lifetime of the complex.

Such a deal to get a lower bid price! In just eight years that $25 Million up front price will look a bargain, but the court will be doing 8 years to life (cycle).

This is an example of contemplating bid prices on sticker prices. That is not the model used, however, in the ABA Model Procurement Code, nor the Guam procurement law and regulations, which are founded on the ABA Model Code.

Whatever the colloquial use of "lowest price" may describe the Model law and regulation require a more holistic analysis. It requires "bids will be evaluated to determine which bidder offers the lowest cost". Moreover, "Only objectively measurable criteria which are set forth in the Invitation for Bids shall be applied in determining the lowest bidder. Examples of such criteria include, but are not limited to, transportation cost, and ownership or life cycle cost formulas." (See, Guam regulation 2 GAR 3109(n)(4))

Nobody likes sticker shock. In a $555 million procurement, that is a rookie mistake.

Monday, January 30, 2017

It takes one to know one: Evaluating the evaluators

Campground manager wins bid protest
The county on Friday upheld a bid protest by the current manager of the Chassahowitzka River Campground, ruling that scorers did not have the necessary expertise to judge the bids adequately. Moore & Moore Realty Inc. of Homosassa, which has had the campground contract the past five years, filed the protest after the county had recommended the contract instead be awarded to a Cape Canaveral company.

In his response to Moore’s bid protest, Assistant County Administrator Jeff Rogers acknowledged that the scoring process was flawed and the county did not assign experts to score the four bidders. “I do believe the county could have had county staff and/or external staff that might have had more interaction with the daily operation of the campground or had more knowledge of the operation of a campground involved in the scoring,” Rogers wrote.

Moore and Chassahowitzka residents who supported the current contract took particular dispute with Phillips, who along with two other county staffers scored the bids in seven areas. Phillips gave Moore & Moore low scores in all but one category, and all three gave high scores to the eventual winning bidder, Camp Leisure.

Rogers wrote that staffers who should have been involved in the scoring could not participate because of a conflict of interest with one of the bidders. Still, he said county regulations require bids be reviewed and scored by individuals with knowledge or expertise of the service or commodity being procured. He said the county could have sought outside expertise to assist with the bid scoring.

The company, in its bid protest, said the county should never had sought proposals in the first place. Company president Elaine Moore said that both the prior Parks and Recreation director and Tobey Phillips, director of the Department of Community Services, assured her in July 2016 that the county planned to give her a five-year contract extension. She said the only reason the county sent the contract out to bid is because a Hudson company inquired about the campground in October.

In his response to Moore’s bid protest, Assistant County Administrator Jeff Rogers did not find fault in the county seeking new bids.

Sunday, October 30, 2016

It's sticking to "the letter and spirit of the evaluation procedures" that counts

These articles, which I've sliced and diced to my own ends, discuss the ramifications of looking at bid protests from a practical, not pendantic, view point. You can read the case discussed here; you should read the full stories at the links provided, lest my version taint your perspective.

OPINION: Contractors must recognise new US procurement rules
Nothing illuminates the essential characteristics of this new era better than the Government Accountability Office’s stinging and even humiliating rejection of Boeing’s protest at the US Air Force’s decision to award the long range strike-bomber (LRS-B) contract to Northrop Grumman a year ago; the GAO’s newly-released decision offers valuable instruction for competing in this new era.

The most surprising revelation in the report is how the USAF structured the LRS-B competition. It may be the first time it has acquired a combat aircraft based on a lowest-cost, technically compliant bid. Northrop heavily invested corporate funds in classified risk-reduction efforts, a fact the GAO says played a key role in reducing the USAF’s estimated price for its proposal. As bidders line up for a host of new USAF contracts, upfront investments by contractors are essential.

It is fair to say that Boeing did not like how the USAF evaluated both proposals on cost. Boeing quibbled over which historic programmes should be used as the baseline to forecast production costs on LRS-B. According to the GAO, Boeing submitted cost data based on derivative programmes, but the USAF preferred clean-sheet aircraft developments. Boeing sent the USAF a rebuttal, but apparently used inaccurate labour cost data, which, the GAO passive-aggressively notes, “did not enhance the credibility of Boeing’s estimate”.

Despite Boeing’s multiple objections, the GAO laid out a clear case that the USAF stuck to the letter and spirit of the evaluation procedures.
Game Over: GAO Protest Reveals Cost Was Deciding Factor in B-21 Contest
The Air Force in October 2015 awarded Northrop the contract to develop and produce its newest bomber, now designated the B-21 Raider. Northrop beat out a Boeing-Lockheed Martin team for the two-pronged contract that covers the engineering, manufacturing and development phase of the program as well as the first five low-rate initial production lots.

According to the GAO decision, Boeing argued that the Air Force did not effectively measure the risk of Northrop’s bomber. The company contended that if the service had followed definitions set in the request for proposals, Northrop would not have met four out of seven unnamed technical capability subfactors. Boeing also stated that Northrop’s proposal was “inherently high risk” with regard to certain requirements in a way that should have rendered its offering unacceptable.

GAO shot down those claims, saying its review found the Air Force evaluated Northrop’s bid in a way that was “reasonable and consistent” with the RFP.

Boeing also alleged that the service overestimated the price of its own offering and relied too heavily on independent government estimates. Again, the GAO disagreed.

“We see no error in the Air Force’s rejection of supporting cost data presented in Boeing’s proposal, or its upward adjustment to Boeing’s proposed EMD costs,” it wrote.

The office noted that both Northrop’s total weighted price and total estimated price were lower than Boeing’s. Although Boeing calculated that its proposal price had been overestimated, the decision noted, even if Boeing’s proposal was adjusted by that figure, it would have not been enough to topple Northrop, which would have nabbed the contract on the basis of its lower total weighted price. Thus, GAO said Boeing could not demonstrate that the Air Force had demonstrated competitive prejudice — a situation where the company would have won the contract if not for the government mismanagement or wrongdoing.

the decision sheds light on many interesting aspects of the competition. After the companies submitted their proposals to the Air Force in 2014, the service found both offerings technically unacceptable and held eight rounds of discussions where the competitors worked through deficiencies, although the GAO noted that some risk still remained with each proposal.

Those discussions failed to resolve questions about ​both Boeing and Northrop’s cost estimates for the EMD phase of the program, which Air Force found to be overly optimistic when compared with its own independent government estimates. Even after eight rounds of talks, neither company was able to put forward a proposal that could be considered realistic with respect to the majority of the cost categories.

But while Northrop increased its own estimates, Boeing kept its own cost data at the same level, the GAO said. And, partially because Northrop offered to pay for certain expenses internally on its own dime, the company was able to keep EMD costs below Boeing’s throughout the duration of the discussion process.
How the Air Force's $55B bomber contract became an LPTA competition
Information on the bomber program is apparently a touchy subject for the Air Force, which has steadfastly refused to release the value of Northrop Grumman’s bid. The $55 billion price is based on price estimates prior to the competition.

U.S. Sen. John McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has been especially vocal with his criticism that the contract is a cost-plus contract and subject to overruns that the government will be on the hook for. He has threatened to withhold funding for the bomber.

To be fair to the Air Force, initial development of the first 21 planes is cost-plus, but once the craft moves into full production of up to 100 planes the contract switches to fixed price.

In a footnote, GAO describes how Northrop’s engineering and manufacturing development costs were significantly lower than the Boeing-Lockheed proposal because of investments Northrop had made but did not pass on to the government. What those investments were is redacted from the decision and Northrop declined to comment.

Northrop also had lower labor rates and labor escalation rates. Northrop also declined to comment on how they made their labor rates lower.

Because of Northrop’s investments and lower labor rates, the independent government estimates of costs for Northrop’s proposal was lower than the Boeing-Lockheed proposal.

This is significant because both teams were deemed to be technically acceptable.
The solicitation’s selection criteria stipulated that if the higher bid was greater than 103 percent of the lower bid than the lower bid would be deemed best value. The bid by the Boeing-Lockheed team was more than 103 percent so the Air Force picked Northrop.

The argument is that this is best value because why should the Air Force pay a higher price if both proposals were found technically acceptable?

As GAO said, Northrop’s price “created a near-insurmountable obstacle to Boeing’s proposal achieving best value.”

Thursday, September 1, 2016

For-proift out of state company beats non-profit in state organizations to fountain of youth services funding

Youth services providers protest bidding process
Two Arkansas companies that operate seven Youth Services Division facilities submitted protests Friday to the state’s intention to award a contract to run the facilities to an out-of-state company that has said it will charge the state more than the current operators charge. Bidders have 14 days to submit a protest after learning of an alleged flaw in the process.

Every seven years, the state is required to seek proposals from organizations interested in operating the juvenile treatment and juvenile offender facilities. Department of Human Services spokeswoman Amy Webb said it has been eight years since bids were taken because of a previous one-year extension. Youth Opportunity Investments of Carmel, Ind., proposed charging the state $232 per bed per day, up from the $147 the state pays now per day for each of the 249 beds in the facilities.

Sen. Terry Rice, R-Waldron, whose district includes the Mansfield facilities, said Friday he has “a great deal of concern” about the plan to switch to an out-of-state provider at greater cost to the state. The current operators “have not received a dime’s increase in three years,” he said.

Sen. Stephanie Flowers, D-Pine Bluff, chairman of the Senate Children and Youth Committee, also said she has questions. “A lot of the intake providers have been asking for more money for years and we haven’t given it to them. It seems quite odd to have an out-of-state contract and offer them more money,” she said.
2 protest youth services contract; ‘robbed’ of fair shot, current operator’s letter to state says
Two nonprofits running seven Arkansas juvenile treatment and detention centers say state officials failed to document why a for-profit, out-of-state company will replace them, even though the new company's bid was more expensive.

Both Consolidated Youth Services Inc. and South Arkansas Youth Services, which have operated the centers for more than a decade, are challenging the decision. The operators are mostly concerned with how their proposals and Youth Opportunity's were reviewed and the quality of the new company's youth services program.

"They robbed the entire bidding process of equity," state Sen. Jeremy Hutchinson* wrote in a protest letter on behalf of South Arkansas Youth Services. The director of the Department of Human Services is currently drafting a "formal written response" to both organizations, Amy Webb, a department spokesman, said Monday.

In its protest letter, Consolidated Youth Services stated it held "no assurances" that the selection process was consistent. The state agencies did not provide individual score sheets used by evaluators to show how they weighed the proposals in each technical category and only a cumulative score was available, according to both nonprofits' letters. Evaluators appeared to have little experience in the youth services field, and there was no proof they attended training beforehand, the letters said.

Consolidated Youth Services' letter, written by attorney Debby Thetford Nye, called for a new evaluation -- one "untainted by significant procedural deficiencies and bias."

Both nonprofits said that Youth Services Division officials held post-bid discussions with Youth Opportunities Investments, even though post-bid conversations can disqualify vendors competing for a contract. The new company was also permitted to change its proposal and circumvent the criteria laid out in the state's request for services, the current contractors said.

Leaders of the Arkansas-based organizations say their programs cost less, strengthen communities and do not slash services. "We are a community program," said Jerry Walsh, chief executive officer of Magnolia-based South Arkansas Youth Services. His organization runs the Dermott Juvenile Correctional Facility and juvenile treatment centers in Dermott and Mansfield. "We know how to approach the community and how to work with them and to get them to support the program."

Youth Opportunities Investments plans to hire subcontractors from Louisiana and Nashville, Tenn., to carry out services, according to its proposal. The Youth Opportunities plan appears to dedicate fewer staff members to special education, GED and technical-vocational coursework and relies more on online learning, Walsh said.

"There is nothing in their proposal to suggest they would enhance the program," said Bonnie Boon, executive director of Jonesboro-based Consolidated Youth Services. Boon also said that she found the state's ability to find the extra dollars for the increase under the new company "curious."

Youth-services advocates have asked for additional funds for years, which Boon and Walsh said has been frustrating.

"It says a lot about their financial management and not funding youth services. Now all of a sudden you're throwing tons of money in this? Unbelievable," Walsh said.

Wednesday, February 24, 2016

Just stand still whilst we try to sort this out

On Guam, there are time limits within which an appeal of a protest must be brought, both administratively and for judicial review. Separately, remedies available to a successful protester are significantly different depending on whether the protest is brought before the award or after the award.

This has led to a bit of hard ball, with agencies denying a protest and immediately awarding a contract, notwithstanding that protesters have about two weeks to appeal the award decision from the date of that decision. That nasty business has been held up in recent times as the Public Auditor has ruled on administrative appeal that the award must not be made until a protester's time to appeal has run. There are also moves afoot to try to make that a statutory requirement. (I have alluded to this issue before.)

But, things have already been codified in in the UK and other European jurisdictions which close the door on that treacherous behavior/behaviour, as seen in the following articles. 

The usual caveat here: I cut, rearrange, paraphrase, edit, omit (quite often very important matter), and pretty much often make a mash of articles mentioned, so to be safe and fully informed, read the whole bits at the links.

Procurement Law Jargon Buster - "Standstill Periods" and "Alcatel Letters"
The Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (the ”Regulations”) require public contracting authorities to apply a compulsory waiting period between their decision to award a contract to which the Regulations apply and the date on which the contract is signed. This is commonly called the Standstill Period. The regulations themselves apply to contracts for the supply of goods works and services, where contract values are above specified thresholds.

This requirement follows a judgement of the European Court of Justice in the Alcatel case when the ECJ decided that contracting authorities should allow a period of time to elapse between decision and signing in order to give unsuccessful bidders a chance to seek remedies if they were dissatisfied with the procurement process. To achieve this, a contracting authority must inform bidders of its decision to award the contract, commonly called Alcatel Letters.

The period kicks in from the date the authority decides to award the contract. Usually this will come towards the end of an often lengthy procurement process where bidders will have been shortlisted and finally whittled down to one, for example through a process called “competitive dialogue”. At that point, when the authority makes its selection, the Alcatel Letter is issued and the standstill period should then commence. At the end of that period the contract is signed. This is designed to give unsuccessful bidders an opportunity to challenge the award if they believe there has been a breach of the procurement rules.

The decision notice should include the criteria for the contract award and the reasons for the decision including the characteristics and relative advantages of the winning tender, the scores of the winning bid and of the party receiving the notice. The notice also must name the winning bidder and provide details of the standstill period. On receipt of the notice, unsuccessful bidders may request an “accelerated debrief”.

If the contract is awarded inside the standstill period or an Alcatel letter is not issued, under the new rules, it may be possible to get the contract declared “ineffective” with potentially serious consequences for the procuring authority.
Unsuccessful Tenderers’ Entitlement to Information: Irish Court Clarifies Position
In a significant judgment delivered on 15 February 2016, the High Court has given guidance on the level of detail that must be included in standstill letters to disappointed tenderers in a procurement process. The judgment also provides clarity as to the level of further engagement that is required subsequent to the initial standstill letter, as well as the point at which the challenge period begins to run in circumstances where further reasons are provided.

This case concerned an above-threshold competition run by Kildare County Council (“KCC”) seeking engineering consultancy services in relation to the design and delivery of the new Athy southern distributor road.1 RPS Consulting Engineers Ltd (“RPS”) was unsuccessful, despite having tendered a price that was significantly lower than that of the successful tenderer. RPS engaged in correspondence with KCC in which it alleged that it had not been given sufficient reasons in the standstill letter as to why it had not been selected. KCC responded on two occasions to the effect that it had provided all of the information to which RPS was entitled, at which point RPS instituted proceedings against KCC. The proceedings were commenced after the standstill period and after the contract had already been signed, and the Court was asked only to determine whether sufficient reasons had been given to RPS.

The Court held that KCC had breached its obligation to provide sufficient reasons for its decision, and ordered that KCC provide such reasons within 15 days of the judgment. The Court held that the reasons given by KCC had been inadequate for a number of reasons.

It is not enough to state that the successful tenderer’s response was superior to that of the addressee; rather the letter must contain reference to specific matters, respects, examples or facts which explain why the decision about relative advantage was made (eg matters which the winner’s response included, or the applicant’s response lacked, or vice versa), so that the bidder is aware of the matters of fact and law on the basis of which the decision to reject its tender was reached. In this case, the narrative in the letters to the disappointed bidders consisted only of a repetition of the criteria, a repetition of the score (but phrased in terms of “good”, “very good” etc rather than numerically) and a handful of additional words to indicate comparative quality as between the unsuccessful and successful tenderers. This was held not to be sufficiently precise as to the matters of fact and law that were relied upon by KCC in making its decision. The provision of scores alone will not suffice for qualitatively assessed criteria but may suffice in respect of price.

The reasons provided to a disappointed tenderer must be bespoke to the tenderer in question; it is in breach of the obligation to give reasons to copy and paste generic reasons that could apply to any tenderer. The Court was severely critical of the fact that formulaic reasons were included in all of the letters to unsuccessful tenderers, with the only variations being whether the addressee’s bid was “good”, “very good” etc. Reasons provided must fully explain why the marks in question were awarded; if a person unfamiliar with the process cannot readily understand from the reasons why a particular score was awarded then the reasons will be insufficient.

Contracting authorities must respond positively to requests for further reasons, after the initial standstill letter is sent. A refusal to engage was described as a “fundamental flaw”. The Court concluded that there are two separate elements to the obligation to give reasons under EU law, namely:

• a contracting authority must automatically give a summary of the reasons for its decision with the standstill letter (this is expressly transposed in the Irish Remedies Regulations); and
• the contracting authority must provide further information, within 15 days, upon receipt of a written request (under Article 41 of Directive 2004/18)
.
To round out a short overview, also have a look at The five biggest standstill letter mistakes.


Saturday, August 1, 2015

Questioning process of evaluation is not same as questioning evaluation judgment

World wide UK founded legal services firm Pinsent Masons LLP through its online legal news site Out-Law.com reports, in a couple of articles, an apparently groundbreaking procurement contract award decision. 

As usual, you should read the original at the link, as I take liberal editorial liberties that may, however unintentionally, distort the content or intent of the authors.

High Court orders ‘unsatisfactory’ public contract award to be set aside
In finding against Milton Keynes Council, Mr Justice Coulson was the first judge in an English court to set aside a public body’s contract award decision under the 2006 Public Contract Regulations. The judge noted that procurement laws allow the courts to overturn a public body’s contract award in circumstances where it had “committed a manifest error”. However, he commented that these were often harder to prove than transparency or equality breaches as the contracting authority has a “margin of appreciation” when making its assessment. Despite this fact, he went through each of the award criteria one by one.

On two particular points, the judge found that the council had awarded EAS a 10/10 score when it should legally have awarded the company zero. He said that the scoring criteria were “a matter of law” and that, if a response did not meet the council’s requirements or was unacceptable in accordance with the council's own scoring methodology, then it required to be given a zero score. That the council had not done so in one particular case was “incapable of rational explanation”, the judge said.

“In my view, an informed reader would think that the EAS answers were almost studiedly vague, strong on aspiration and management-speak, light on detail,” he said. “The Woods’ answers, on the other hand, could fairly be said to bristle with detail and commitment.”

On the “unsatisfactory” scoring notes provided by the council, he said that the absence of clear reasons to explain certain scores created a “lack of certainty in the nature of the council’s case”.

"This is a significant decision because it is the first time that an English court has set aside a procuring authority's contract award decision under the Public Contracts Regulations," said procurement law expert Ben Lasserson of Pinsent Masons, the law firm behind Out-Law.com.

"Essentially, this case boiled down to whether the council's evaluation exercise had been conducted lawfully. In the past, such a challenge would have been very difficult for a claimant to sustain because the courts were always reluctant to 'second guess' a procuring authority in matters of evaluation.
Council expected to pay damages after conducting flawed procurement process
Mr Justice Coulson said that Woods Building Services (Woods) was entitled to damages after losing out on the contract on the basis of a flawed procurement run by Milton Keynes Council.

Woods also asked the High Court to order Milton Keynes Council to award the contract to it. However, that request was rejected. Mr Justice Coulson said that "requiring A to contract with B, in respect of a contract which might last for years, would be an exceptional order for the court to make".

"In principle, it might be open to the Court to order a mandatory injunction requiring the Council to enter into a contract with Woods," the judge said. "But it is trite law that a mandatory injunction, which would here require the Council to enter into a contract which would last for many years, will only rarely be granted."

"Whilst I do not suggest that a mandatory injunction of the type which they seek would never be granted in a procurement case, I am satisfied that it would only be granted in exceptional circumstances, and there are no such circumstances here," he said.

Mr Justice Coulson cited a number of reasons for not awarding Woods the contract by way of remedy, including stating that it would have been wrong to award the contract to Woods after determining that the procurement process had been flawed.

"Woods were right to challenge the procurement and, all other things being equal, they would have been awarded the contract," Mr Justice Coulson said in his judgment. "In those circumstances, it would be absurd if, having lost so badly, the Council could then avoid the natural consequence of those breaches, namely an award of damages in favour of Woods."

Public procurement law expert Christopher Murray of Pinsent Masons, the law firm behind Out-Law.com, said that it was unusual for legal challenges brought under public procurement legislation to reach a hearing on remedies.
The typical procurement law in the US is that, whilst deference is paid to agency decisions on the facts of a decision, the decision must be made based on the factors specified in the solicitation and required by law or regulation. 

Thus, the distinction is understood: if a decision is rationally made, it will not be set aside, but it must be shown that the process of deliberation was undertaken and supported by rational application of the facts to the issues. In effect, a court will not set aside a procurement decision that it considers wrong or bone-headed so long as it was clear that a rational thought process had taken place and the judgment was not a bare conclusory opinion.

And it is not at all unusual for a court, or reviewing administrative body for that matter, to set aside an award or contract that was in violation of law. See, e.g., Guam Code Annotated §§ 5451 and 5452.

Thursday, July 9, 2015

Incumbency as a double edged sword

Aha, aha, mmm, hmm, mmm, hmm
Gonna get along without you now
Aha, aha, mmm, hmm, mmm, hmm
Gonna get along without you now

Got along without you before I met you
Gonna get along without you now
Gonna find somebody that's as twice as cute
'Cause I didn't like you anyhow

--- Popularized by Patience and Prudence, lyrics by MetroLyrics


This is a decision of the GAO. It involved the eventually unsuccessful protest of a best value award of a contract to provide security-rated linguists. It was noted in the RFP that the grant of security status was not under the control of the using agency, and experience in passing though that minefield, and managing the flow of applicants through the process, would be essential.

The protester is "SIG", the incumbent under the existing contract. The award was made to "CWU". As usual, this is not a complete or necessarily accurate rendition of the decision and you are most encouraged to read the original at the link below rather than rely on the presentation here. There are other interesting comments and issues in the decision not here presented.

Matter of: Strategic Intelligence Group, LLC, B-410881.3, June 23, 2015
The RFP provided for award on a best-value basis, considering the following factors (in descending order of importance): (1) technical, including subfactors for technical approach and management approach; (2) past performance; and (3) cost/price.

The final evaluation matrix looked like this:


In comparing the proposals, the SSA ("source selection authority") noted that SIG’s proposal was the second highest-priced proposal and one of the lowest-rated proposals, while CWU’s and another offeror’s proposals were both higher-rated and lower-priced than SIG’s.  The SSA selected CWU’s proposal for award, noting with respect to SIG’s proposal that “it would not be in the best interest of the Government to justify paying a higher price [for SIG’s proposal] than proposals that were rated as OUTSTANDING and are lower priced.”

With regard to past performance, the solicitation specified that the agency would assign a performance confidence assessment based on the relevancy and quality of offerors’ performance on recent efforts.

CWU’s proposal was rated overall outstanding under the technical factor based upon an outstanding rating under the technical approach subfactor and a good rating under the management approach subfactor. CWU’s outstanding technical approach rating was based on several evaluated strengths. The SSA concluded that CWU's“[e]xceeding the minimum requirements to facilitate security processing identifies a level of preparedness to ensure successful transition and to maintain a higher pipeline capacity.”

In contrast, SIG’s proposal received only a single strength under the technical approach subfactor, based on SIG’s approach to transition (that is, start-up and continuity of services in transition from an existing contract to the new contract). Specifically, the SSA noted that, since SIG is the incumbent contractor, transition would involve minimal phase-in activities. Thus, SIG’s proposal was rated only acceptable under the technical factor overall.

SIG challenges the agency’s evaluation under each of the evaluation factors, and argues that the resulting selection decision was unreasonable because it was based on a flawed evaluation. In reviewing protests challenging an agency’s evaluation of proposals, our Office does not independently evaluate proposals; rather, we review the agency’s evaluation to ensure that it is consistent with the terms of the solicitation and applicable statutes and regulations. In this regard, the evaluation of proposals is a matter within the discretion of the procuring agency; we will question the agency’s evaluation only where the record shows that the evaluation does not have a reasonable basis or is inconsistent with the RFP. Here, we find the evaluation and source selection decision to be reasonable.

As an initial matter, SIG challenges the agency’s equal rating of both SIG’s and CWU’s past performance as satisfactory confidence, asserting that the past performance evaluation was unreasonable and failed to recognize differences in the offerors’ past performance. Our Office will examine an agency’s evaluation of an offeror’s past performance only to ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria and applicable statutes and regulations, since determining the relative merit of an offeror’s past performance is primarily a matter within the agency’s discretion. While an agency may provide for an evaluation of relevance, the agency is not required to evaluate the past performance of the incumbent contractor as superior to its competitors simply because the incumbent has the most relevant past performance.

Here, we find the agency’s past performance evaluation to be reasonable. Of the several contracts cited by SIG for proof of its past performance, only the incumbent contract was rated as relevant, because of the gross difference between the price (well over $100 million) of the new contract compared to the other proposed contracts. And, in considering the past performance of the incumbent contract, it was noted that the performance was less than stellar. For example, when asked whether SIG satisfied performance requirements, the reviewer stated:
Overall, I find this vendor’s performance acceptable. That said, as discussed below there were, are, and continue to be both cost and schedule concerns associated with executing this effort, however at this time they have not risen to the level of unacceptability.
Likewise, in the area of meeting required performance schedules, the reviewer stated as follows:
Rated overall acceptable, however this vendor is on the low end of the scale [with regard to] fulfilling all CME [Contract Manpower Equivalent] requirements under this task order. The government did issue the vendor a letter of concern to ensure an acceptable number of candidates was routinely submitted for government consideration. That said, the untimely nature of government security vetting processes continues to be a major impediment to vendor success
.
Similarly, when asked whether SIG stayed within cost estimates, the reviewer stated:
Rated overall acceptable, however this vendor is on the low end of the scale [with regard to] cost performance under this firm fixed price contract. While the government arguably neglected to articulate a number of issues in the solicitation that ultimately required an equitable adjustment, at the same time, the government was forced to take action (above and beyond the equitable adjustment issues) to facilitate the vendor’s ability to maintain their current level of performance (see schedule above) by providing increased contract reimbursable compensation to their employees. One could argue that the vendor proposed less than market competitive compensation rates to win the solicitation.
SIG does not challenge the agency’s conclusion that its performance under the “very relevant” incumbent contract merited a rating of satisfactory confidence.

With regard to the disregard of the other proposed contracts, deemed to be less than relevant, even if the agency erred in its evaluation of SIG’s non-incumbent contracts, there is no basis to question the agency’s overall rating of SIG’s past performance as satisfactory confidence given SIG’s performance problems on its “very relevant” incumbent linguist contract.

In any case, prejudice is an essential element of every viable protest, and we will not sustain a protest when it is clear from the record that a protester has suffered no prejudice as a result of an agency evaluation error.

SIG also challenges the agency’s evaluation under the technical factor, which included an evaluation "to determine the extent to which successful performance is contingent upon proven devices and techniques.

SIG complains that the agency unreasonably failed to assign a strength to SIG’s technical proposal as a result of its experience as the incumbent contractor. Specifically, SIG contends that it deserved a strength due to its “well-developed process and procedures for recruiting, qualifying, and retaining linguists,” that were developed through its incumbency. SIG further argues that the agency erred by failing to recognize that the firm is “uniquely positioned” as the incumbent to process linguists using an approach the firm developed under the incumbent contract, and that SIG’s “significant experience” as an incumbent indicated a better understanding of the recruitment and approval cycle. The protester also contends that the agency engaged in unequal treatment by assigning a strength to CWU’s proposal for its “robust pipeline” of qualified linguist candidates while ignoring the fact that SIG already has many of the needed linguists vetted and in place due to its incumbency.

SIG’s arguments are without merit. As noted, the evaluation was to include consideration of whether offerors had proposed “proven devices and techniques.” The record reflects that SIG has struggled to meet the requirements of the incumbent contract, thus belying the claim in its proposal that “our current pipeline . . . along with continued recruiting efforts, is sufficient to meet the . . . levels required.”  For example, SIG’s technical proposal acknowledged that, under SIG’s incumbent contract, there are currently unfilled category III linguist positions.   Given SIG’s acknowledged, significant shortfall in satisfying the linguist requirements under its incumbent contract, we find that the agency reasonably concluded that SIG’s proposed approach, based on its incumbent contract, did not exceed the solicitation’s requirements so as to warrant the assignment of a strength.

In contrast, the evaluators found that CWU’s proposal provided “very detailed information” demonstrating its ability to meet the solicitation’s requirement to provide the required number of linguists. For example, CWU’s proposal indicated that the firm already has linguists that have been security vetted and would be available to perform under the contract. The evaluators also noted that the awardee’s proposal indicated that CWU’s pipeline of linguists contains hundreds of linguists who previously held or currently hold security clearance. In addition, CWU’s proposal stated that the firm anticipated hiring some of the incumbent workforce. In these circumstances, we find that the agency reasonably concluded that, although CWU is not the incumbent, its proposal exceeded the solicitation’s requirements for filling the linguist positions required under this contract.

Next, SIG challenges the agency’s decision to assign equal strengths to both SIG and CWU in evaluating offerors’ transition risk. In this regard, SIG contends that its proposal was superior because only SIG, as the incumbent, could offer a "no-risk" transition. The protester contends that the agency’s assignment of a strength to CWU’s proposal for offering a low risk transition essentially and unreasonably treated SIG’s transition risk as equivalent to CWU’s transition risk.

Evaluation ratings and the number of strengths and weaknesses assessed are merely a guide to, and not a substitute for, intelligent decision making in the procurement process.   The relevant question is whether the record shows that the agency fully considered the actual qualitative differences in vendors’ proposals.

Here, the record provides no support for the protester’s challenge to the agency’s assessment of strengths for both offerors’ transition approaches. First, the evaluation report and selection decision show that the evaluators and the SSA were aware of, and acknowledged, the differences in the offerors’ proposals with regard to transition. Specifically, with regard to SIG, the evaluators acknowledged that as the incumbent, it would have minimal transition risk, which SIG described as a “no risk” solution. With regard to CWU, the agency concluded that CWU’s detailed proposals increased the likelihood of an early transition without any degradation of service, thereby exceeding the solicitation requirements such as to merit a strength. While SIG may disagree with the agency’s assessment that this proposed approach to transition merited a strength, the protester has failed to demonstrate that the agency’s evaluation in this regard was unreasonable or inconsistent with the record.


Tuesday, May 5, 2015

Unusual confluence of 3 separate GAO protests, all involving one contractor

You can View Recent Bid Protest Decisions of the GAO on its website. My recent visit to the site came up with the unusual coincidence of three separate protests, each involving one contractor, SupplyCore Inc. 

As always in the blawg, do not rely on the rendition of the cited piece presented; read the full piece at the link provided, to keep me honest, first of all, and to learn more than what is presented, secondly, including internal citations. I cut, rearrange, paraphrase and generally conduct mayhem with the material to suit my own purpose in presenting a view point for a teachable moment; for right or wrong.

Matter of: SupplyCore Inc., File: B-409418.4; B-409418.5; B-409418.6, April 16, 2015
DIGEST: Protest challenging the agency’s decision to cancel a solicitation is denied where the agency reasonably concluded that continued in-house performance would result in cost savings and efficiencies.

DECISION: SupplyCore Inc., of Rockford, Illinois, protests the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) cancellation of request for proposals (RFP) No. SPM7LX-14-R-0029, for supply chain integration and management of lead-acid batteries. SupplyCore contends that DLA’s decision to cancel the solicitation was unreasonable. We deny the protest.

DLA issued the RFP with the intent of eliminating and reducing its current inventory of lead-acid batteries through attrition, and transfer of the responsibility for supply chain management functions such as forecasting, acquisition, storage, distribution, and transportation to a supply chain integrator. The RFP solicited proposals for a supply chain integrator to manage and perform all responsibilities required under the supply chain for worldwide support of current and future Department of Defense lead-acid batteries customers.

Based upon the agency’s evaluation of the offerors’ final proposal revisions, the SSAC and the contracting officer unanimously recommended the award of a contract to an offeror other than SupplyCore. Thereafter, the agency sent the presumptive awardee’s price information to a DLA business analyst to conduct an acquisition business case analysis (BCA) in accordance with DLA procedures. The final analysis found that it would cost the agency $13.8 million more to award a contract as compared to keeping the requirement in house. DLA also requested a BCA be performed by a private firm, which used a proprietary methodology distinct from the VSRM model used by DLA. The private firm’s BCA found an approximately $7 million cost of awarding the contract, as compared to continuing in-house performance, after accounting for transportation and contract costs. Thereafter, the agency determined that it would cancel the solicitation.

SupplyCore challenges the agency’s decision to cancel the procurement. The protester contends that the agency’s rationale for cancelling the RFP is pretextual because DLA does not want to award it a contract. SupplyCore alleges that the cancellation is unreasonable because the final BCA was based on faulty information and improper assumptions. Based upon our review of the record, we find that the agency’s cancellation was reasonable.[5]

As a general rule, our Office does not review agency decisions to cancel procurements and instead perform the work in-house, since such decisions are a matter of executive branch policy. However, where, as here, a protester argues that the agency’s rationale for cancellation is but a pretext -- that the agency’s actual motivation is to avoid awarding a contract -- we will examine the reasonableness of the agency’s actions in cancelling the procurement.

The protester makes three primary assertions in support of its allegation: the BCA improperly relied upon the price of the presumptive awardee, instead of SupplyCore’s lower-priced proposal; the BCA unreasonably assumed a 10‑percent decrease in demand; and the BCA failed to consider that the contract would be awarded on a fixed-price basis without an economic price adjustment, while the agency’s costs of in-house performance are not fixed. SupplyCore contends that these flaws led the agency to skew its cost analysis in favor of in‑house performance.

With regard to SupplyCore’s first assertion -- that it was unreasonable for the BCA to use the presumptive awardee’s price, while there may have been other methodologies the agency could have chosen to calculate costs for its final BCA, had the final BCA recommendation used the lowest-priced offer instead of the best-value offeror as the protester argues, such analysis would have been of little value to the agency given the solicitation’s best‑value award criteria, which placed significantly more importance on the non‑price factors. We find nothing unreasonable about the agency’s decision.

With regard to SupplyCore’s challenge to the agency’s assumed decrease in demand, we likewise find the agency’s evaluation unobjectionable. In this regard, the agency states that offerors were provided with demand history and briefing charts from an industry day, which showed declining demands and divestiture schedules. The agency also explains that its BCA included a sensitivity analysis that covered a range of demand scenarios, including a 10-percent increase in demand, which demonstrates that a savings would not be realized even if the BCA assumption of a 10-percent reduction was removed.

Finally, we also find unpersuasive SupplyCore’s argument that the final BCA did not consider differences between the fixed-price nature of the contract and in-house performance costs that would not be fixed. In fact, the BCA cost analysis summary clearly notes that the absence of an economic price adjustment in the fixed-price contract is “a further cost benefit” of contract award.

Matter of: Al Raha Group for Technical Services, Inc.; Logistics Management International, Inc., File: B-411015.2; B-411015.3, April 22, 2015
DIGEST: 1. Protests challenging the agency’s evaluation of the awardee’s past performance are sustained where the record shows that the evaluation was inconsistent with the terms of the solicitation and not adequately documented.

2. Protests challenging the agency’s evaluation of the protesters’ past performance are sustained in part, where the record shows that, for one protester, the agency unreasonably failed to consider information verifying the protester’s claimed past performance, and where the agency did not have a reasonable basis to discount positive past performance references.

DECISION: Al Raha Group for Technical Services, Inc. (RGTS), of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and Logistics Management International, Inc. (LMI), of Eastman, Georgia, protest the award of a Foreign Military Sales contract to SupplyCore, Inc., of Rockford, Illinois, by the United States Air Force under request for proposals (RFP) No. FA8505‑13‑R-31138, for F‑15 fighter jet transportation support services (TSS) for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). RGTS and LMI challenge the agency’s evaluation of the offerors’ past performance, and LMI challenges the agency’s tradeoff determination. We sustain the protests in part, and deny them in part.

The RFP sought proposals for comprehensive fleet management for various special-purpose vehicles and trailers to support base stand-ups and continued RSAF operation of F-15s. The contractor will provide all transportation and support services required to source, procure, track, warehouse, and deliver assets needed within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to support RSAF F-15 operations.

For purposes of award, the Air Force was to evaluate proposals under the following three factors: technical; past performance; and cost/price. With regard to past performance, the Air Force was to assess an offeror’s ability to successfully accomplish the proposed effort based on its demonstrated present and past work record. In addition to the present/past performance FACTS sheets prepared by offerors for four past performance references and the associated past performance questionnaires (PPQ) obtained by offerors, the agency also expressly reserved the right to obtain performance information from other sources. The RFP further provided that the agency was to evaluate the number and severity of performance problems, the appropriateness and effectiveness of corrective actions taken, and the overall work record; the solicitation warned that prompt corrective action in isolated instances might not outweigh overall negative performance trends.

The RFP advised offerors that the Air Force would evaluate the recency and relevance of each past performance reference. Recency was defined as active or completed efforts performed within the past 5 years from the issuance date of the RFP. For purposes of evaluating relevance, the RFP provided that the Air Force would evaluate the scope, magnitude of effort, and complexities for each reference. The RFP provided that the evaluation would include logistical and programmatic considerations, including but not limited to, the quantity procured, length of effort, complexity of the required delivery timeline, and dollar values of efforts submitted. The relevance rating was dependent on the degree to which the past performance references reflected similar scope, magnitude of effort, and complexities as compared to the solicitation’s requirements. For example, if the submitted contract met essentially the same technical complexities, but involved only some of the programmatic and logistical scope and magnitude of effort, a lesser relevancy rating was to be assigned.

the Air Force was also to evaluate whether an offeror’s past performance references demonstrated experience with the following: (1) foreign military sales or direct commercial sales material procurement; (2) procurement negotiations; (3) electronic asset visibility tracking and reporting; (4) subcontractor management; (5) international teaming agreements and/or international operations management; (6) packing, handling, shipping, and transportation management; and (7) quality assurance management. The RFP stated that the relevance rating for each reference would be based on the scope, magnitude, and complexity of the effort, and whether the reference demonstrated experience in the seven enumerated areas of experience.

Under the technical factor, the Air Force was to evaluate an offeror’s proposal for acceptability--essentially, a pass/fail evaluation. Among the technically acceptable proposals, the Air Force was then to make a best value tradeoff between past performance and cost/price, wherein past performance was to be significantly more important than cost/price.

After evaluating the recency, relevance, and quality of an offeror’s past performance, the Air Force was to assign an overall past performance confidence assessment using the following ratings: Substantial Confidence, Satisfactory Confidence, Limited Confidence, No Confidence, and Unknown Confidence (Neutral). The following matrix was established:


The Source Selection Authority (SSA) determined that SupplyCore’s proposal, based on its “Substantial” confidence past performance assessment, warranted paying a price premium of 4.18 percent over LMI’s proposal and 2.15 percent over RGTS’s proposal, both of which received “Limited” confidence assessments. Based on the tradeoff, the SSA determined that SupplyCore’s proposal offered the best value to the government, and selected the proposal for award.

 RGTS and LMI both challenge the Air Force’s evaluation of SupplyCore’s past performance as warranting a “substantial confidence” assessment, and each separately challenges the agency’s evaluation of its past performance as warranting a “limited confidence” assessment.

As a general matter, the evaluation of an offeror’s past performance is within the discretion of the contracting agency, and we will not substitute our judgment for reasonably based past performance ratings.   However, we will question an agency’s evaluation conclusions where they are unreasonable or undocumented.  The critical question is whether the evaluation was conducted fairly, reasonably, and in accordance with the solicitation’s evaluation scheme.  Here, we find that the agency’s evaluation with respect to SupplyCore’s and LMI’s past performance was unreasonable, inconsistent with the terms of the RFP, and not adequately documented and sustain these protest arguments.  We find that the agency’s evaluation with respect to RGTS’s past performance was reasonable and in accordance with the terms of the RFP and deny these protest arguments.

As discussed above, our Office will question an agency’s past performance evaluation where the record indicates that the agency either failed to evaluate, or otherwise unreasonably considered, the relevance of past performance references in accordance with the solicitation’s stated evaluation criteria. As relevant here, an agency’s evaluation of an offeror’s past performance is unreasonable where the solicitation requires the agency to consider the value of the offerors’ references as compared to the value of the solicited requirement, and the agency fails to reasonably explain why comparatively small-value references provide a basis to justify a high past performance rating, or in this case the highest possible rating.

Additionally, where an agency fails to document or retain evaluation materials, it bears the risk that there may not be an adequate supporting rationale in the record for us to conclude that the agency had a reasonable basis for its source selection decision.

 In sum, based on the fact that SupplyCore’s past performance submitted for evaluation was with respect to references that were small fractions of the size of the effort required by the RFP and the Air Force’s reliance on other past performance information did not adequately evaluate relevance pursuant to the RFP’s applicable criteria, the agency’s decision to assign SupplyCore the highest past performance confidence assessment of “substantial confidence” is not supported by the record.

Notwithstanding that the past performance information claimed for LMI’s CEO was verified by knowledgeable agency officials in the written PPQs,  the Air Force effectively elected to “verify” the verification set forth in the PPQs by seeking further information from the subsequent program manager.  That individual, who was not the program manager for two of the three cited references, could not verify certain aspects of the LMI CEO’s performance. The agency, however, has failed to advance any reasonable explanation for how the subsequent program manager’s inability to verify the LMI CEO’s performance negates the verification provided by knowledgeable agency officials in the PPQs.   We have held that an agency is required to consider PPQs in its possession.  The agency’s wholesale discounting of the verification provided by the PPQs, on the basis that it could not confirm LMI’s past performance information through yet an additional source, was unreasonable.  As a consequence, the Air Force failed to meaningfully consider available agency information regarding LMI’s past performance of similar requirements for the Air Force, and therefore we sustain the protest on this basis.

 In summary, we find that the Air Force’s evaluation of SupplyCore’s past performance was inconsistent with the relevancy requirements of the RFP and not adequately documented. Because the reevaluation of SupplyCore’s past performance could result in a new rating for that offeror, which could in turn require a new source selection decision, we conclude that RGTS and LMI, both of whom submitted lower-priced offers, were prejudiced by this error.  We also find that the agency unreasonably failed to consider information regarding LMI’s past performance on similar efforts for the agency, and that the protester was also prejudiced by this error.

We recommend that the Air Force, consistent with our decision, reevaluate offerors’ past performance information. Based on that reevaluation, we recommend that the agency make a new source selection determination. We also recommend that the agency reimburse the protesters their respective costs associated with filing and pursuing their protests, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.

[Note:  there is a considerable amount of fact and application of particular elements of the RFP requirements that is analyzed to reach the decision made.  You have to look to the source cited above to read it.]

Matter of: Dalma Tech2 Company, B-411015, April 22, 2015
DIGEST: 1. Protest challenging the agency’s evaluation of the awardee’s proposal as technically acceptable is denied where the agency’s evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation.

2. Protest challenging the agency’s evaluation of the awardee’s past performance is denied where the evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation.

DECISION: Dalma Tech2 Company (DTC), of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, protests the award under request for proposals for F‑15 fighter jet transportation support services (TSS) for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). DTC challenges the agency’s determination that SupplyCore’s proposal was technically acceptable, and the agency’s evaluation of DTC’s past performance. We deny the protest.

DTC challenges the Air Force’s determination that SupplyCore’s proposal was technically acceptable, arguing that SupplyCore failed to meet In-Kingdom licensing and facility requirements. The protester also challenges the agency’s evaluation of its past performance as warranting only a “satisfactory confidence” assessment. For the reasons that follow, we find that none of DTC’s challenges provides a basis to sustain the protest.

DTC alleges that SupplyCore cannot satisfy the RFP’s requirement to present a valid Saudi Arabian business license because SupplyCore is not a registered company or legally affiliated with an agent, distributor, joint venture partner, or teaming partner under Saudi Arabian law. See Protest at 2; Comments at 2.

Ordinarily, a solicitation requirement for a contractor to warrant that it possesses, or will otherwise obtain prior to performance, licenses required to conduct business in a foreign country is a matter concerning a contractor’s responsibility. In most cases, responsibility is determined based on standards set forth in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 9.104-1, and involves subjective business judgments that are within the broad discretion of the contracting activities. Our Office generally will not consider a protest challenging an agency’s affirmative determination of an offeror’s responsibility.

Here, however, the Performance Work Statement in the RFP (PWS) explicitly required that offerors “include [a] copy of [an] actual Saudi business license” with their In-Kingdom Execution Plans, effectively imposing what amounted to a “definitive responsibility” criterion. Definitive responsibility criteria are specific and objective standards designed to measure a prospective contractor’s ability to perform the contract. Such criteria, which must be met as a precondition to award, limit the class of contractors to those meeting specified qualitative and quantitative qualifications necessary for adequate performance, e.g., unusual expertise or specialized facilities. Where an agency includes a definitive responsibility criterion in a solicitation, we will review the record to ascertain whether evidence of compliance has been submitted from which the contracting officer reasonably could conclude that the criterion has been met; generally, a contracting agency has broad discretion in determining whether offerors meet definitive responsibility criteria since the agency must bear the burden of any difficulties experienced in obtaining the required performance.

Based on our review of the record, we find nothing objectionable about the Air Force’s determination that SupplyCore met the RFP’s licensing requirement. The RFP did not require that the offeror itself have a Saudi Arabian business license. Rather, the RFP specifically contemplated that an offeror could satisfy the licensing requirement by maintaining a sponsorship or teaming effort with a Saudi Arabian company. SupplyCore’s proposal states that the awardee’s proposed subcontractor, Arwadh Establishment, is a Saudi Arabian company licensed in accordance with applicable Saudi law. SupplyCore’s proposal included copies of Arwadh’s business licenses. Id. The Air Force found that Arwadh will conduct the In-Kingdom TSS requirements, and the SupplyCore team will utilize Arwadh’s stand-alone In-Kingdom Operations department to ensure that the company maintains and adheres to the local laws and customs for Saudi Arabia and to ensure that foreign personnel maintain a legal work status. Thus, the agency reasonably concluded that SupplyCore demonstrated compliance with the RFP’s licensing requirement through its teaming arrangement with a licensed, Saudi Arabian company.

To the extent DTC argues that the teaming agreement between the awardee and its subcontractor is inconsistent with Saudi Arabian law, the protester’s argument is misplaced. Our focus is limited to whether SupplyCore met the eligibility requirements under the terms of the RFP. In this regard, the RFP did not require offerors to demonstrate that their proposed teaming approaches were approved under Saudi Arabian law; rather, the RFP required evidence of an “actual Saudi business license,” which, as noted above, SupplyCore provided through its subcontractor, Arwadh. Under these circumstances, we find that the Air Force reasonably found that SupplyCore satisfied the RFP’s licensing requirement.
















Monday, June 30, 2014

Huntington Ingalls Industries fails the cut for Coast Guard cutter

HII protest over lost contract bid is rejected
Eight companies originally pursued the project to design the new Coast Guard offshore patrol cutter, smaller than the national security cutter. It is intended to replace its fleet of 210-foot and 270-foot medium endurance cutters.

In a rare move, HII and another shipbuilder filed a formal protest with the federal government. Between Ingalls and Newport News Shipbuilding, HII is the government's most productive shipbuilder. But the Government Accountability Office recently denied the protest in a 21-page decision that sheds light on what factored into a highly competitive bidding war for a program presumed to be worth an eventual $12 billion.

A side-by-side comparison of the bids showed HII running even with the three eventual winners in factors such as sound design, its design approach, organizational management and production capability.

The key difference was past performance. In this case, the company's past performance on other programs came into play, including the San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ships, the GAO report showed. HII was rated "marginal" while the three winners were deemed "satisfactory."

Regarding the San Antonio class problems, HII spokeswoman Beci Brenton said the company "has vigorously applied lessons learned, markedly improving quality and efficiency with each successive ship, resulting in very successful trials and, we believe, a very satisfied customer." "We are seeing the benefits of lower costs, higher quality and increased learning which comes from serial production," she said.

"I think it was a big surprise to the industry that Huntington Ingalls was not included," said Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with The Lexington Institute, Arlington-based research group. "First of all, they make the national security cutter, which is widely considered to be a success." Thompson said these types of solicitations place a major emphasis on past performance. But in this case, "past performance isn't really indicative of current capability," he said.

Still, Thompson said Coast Guard's source selection authority "is in a legal strait jacket in terms of applying its selection criteria. If the solicitation places an emphasis on past performance, then Huntington Ingalls is stuck with that aspect of its credentials, even though the company is better run today and has better capability."

"You've got to stick with the rules," he said.
This short description of the GOA decision is pretty accurate so far as it goes, but a reading of the whole decision reveals a close attention to detail that renders the implication that the decision was based on arbitrary subjective criteria out of place. I also will not provide all of it, so you should read the whole decision at the link. I do hope, however, to provide enough information taken from the decision to suggest a more dispassionate judgment. 

As usual, I cut, paste, rearrange, delete citations and paraphrase, so go to the source if you need reliable unedited authority.

Matter of: Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc.; VT Halter Marine, Inc., File: B-409541; B-409541.2; B-409541.3; B-409541.4; B-409541.5, June 2, 2014 (pdf here)
Huntington Ingalls and VT Halter Marine both challenge the Coast Guard’s evaluation of Bollinger’s past performance, arguing that the agency unreasonably assigned Bollinger a satisfactory past performance rating despite receiving negative information about Bollinger’s performance on the Fast Response Cutter contract. In this regard, Huntington Ingalls contends that the Coast Guard unequally evaluated its and Bollinger’s past performance. Specifically, Huntington Ingalls contends that the Coast Guard ignored negative information with respect to Bollinger’s performance of the Fast Response Cutter contract, while focusing on negative comments in a PPIRS report in evaluating Huntington Ingalls’ performance of the LPD contract.

As a general matter, the evaluation of an offeror’s past performance is within the discretion of the contracting agency, and we will not substitute our judgment for reasonably based past performance ratings. Where a protester challenges an agency’s past performance evaluation and source selection, we will review the evaluation and award decision to determine if they were reasonable and consistent with the solicitation’s evaluation criteria and procurement statutes and regulations, and to ensure that the agency’s rationale is adequately documented. A protester’s disagreement with the agency’s judgment concerning the merits of the protester’s past performance does not establish that the evaluation was unreasonable.

The technical evaluation team (TET) determined that the offerors had corrected all identified weaknesses or deficiencies, and assigned all offerors superior ratings under the two concept design subfactors, and under the design approach factor.

With respect to past performance, the agency’s past performance evaluation team (PPET) reviewed the past performance questionnaires for contracts identified by the offerors for recency and relevance. The PPET also identified additional recent and relevant contracts through the past performance information retrieval system (PPIRS). Where the PPET found negative or questionable past performance information, the PPET had telephone conversations with references.

The RFP stated that the agency’s evaluation of offerors’ relevant past performance would be based on the following elements (in descending order of importance):
(1) Overall Customer Satisfaction – Would the customer select this firm again?
(2) Cost Control – Delivered within budget, provided current and accurate/complete billings, and relationship of negotiated costs to actuals.
(3) Quality of Product – Compliance with contract requirements, accuracy of reports, technical excellence, management responsiveness, appropriateness of personnel, and stood behind warranty.
(4) Timeliness of Performance – Met interim milestones, reliable, completed on time, including wrap-up and contract administration.

Here, the record shows that the Coast Guard’s evaluation of Bollinger’s past performance on the Fast Response Cutter was reasonable. The agency’s past performance evaluation team recognized that the most recent PPIRS report included four marginal ratings in the areas of schedule, management, management responsiveness, and logistic support/sustainment. The PPET also received, however, a more recent past performance questionnaire from the same individual (the contracting officer) that prepared the PPIRS report for this cutter. The questionnaire provided adjectival ratings that ranged from mostly exceptional to satisfactory; there were no marginal or unsatisfactory ratings. The questionnaire’s narrative comments indicated that Bollinger had made “substantial changes” to its organization and to its management, which resulted in improved performance.

With respect to Huntington Ingalls, the PPET determined that the offeror’s past performance was marginal. The PPET received past performance questionnaires for four contracts for the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutters and the U.S. Navy’s DDG 51 destroyer. All were found to be recent and relevant, and included mostly positive comments. However, the PPET noted that a PPIRS report for the National Security Cutter No. 5 contract indicated schedule problems. The PPET also identified three PPIRS reports for Huntington Ingalls’ contract for LPD-17 class amphibious transport dock ships. The PPET found that the PPIRS reports, which covered performance from October 2009 to September 2012, included adjectival ratings that ranged from exceptional to unsatisfactory. In this regard, the PPET noted that, although the customer that completed the PPIRS report stated that it “probably would” again award a contract to Huntington Ingalls, the PPIRS report included numerous adverse comments. For example, the PPET noted Huntington Ingalls’ unsatisfactory rating for cost control, under which the LPD customer commented that “[c]ost performance . . . has degraded” over the performance period. The PPET’s follow-up conversations on the LPD contract indicated that negative performance was continuing. In this regard, the customer for the LPD contract noted that Huntington Ingalls’ work had deteriorated prior to Hurricane Katrina, worsened after the hurricane, and had improved to be “stabilized at a poor level.” On this basis, the PPET concluded that Huntington Ingalls’ failure to meet contract requirements was the contractor’s fault.

The evaluation results were provided to the agency’s Source Selection Authority (SSA), who weighed the comparative merits of the offers based upon the final evaluation reports. In this regard, the SSA identified strengths and differentiating characteristics of the offerors’ proposals under each of the evaluation factors. With respect to the most important factor, concept design, the SSA concluded that all the competitive range offerors had strong technical concept designs and that no offeror stood out. The SSA recognized, however, that various offerors had strengths under the hierarchical requirements.

Under the design approach factor, the SSA concluded that all offerors provided a comprehensive design approach, with few discriminators, but noted that Bollinger offered an approach that increased the government’s confidence of success.

Under the organizational management factor, the SSA concluded that all offerors provided adequate descriptions of their organizational management and met the minimum requirements of the RFP, but noted that the proposals of Huntington Ingalls and Bath Iron Works were the only ones to receive strengths under this factor.

Ultimately, the SSA concluded that past performance provided the basis upon which to differentiate these proposals. With respect to Huntington Ingalls’ past performance problems, the SSA noted that the customer provided updated information that indicated that Huntington’s performance, though improved, remained at a poor level. The SSA agreed with the PPET that Huntington Ingalls’ and VT Halter Marine’s past performance should be assessed as marginal.

Based upon his review, the SSA concluded that, although Huntington Ingalls’ and VT Halter Marine’s proposals met all technical and management requirements and offered some unique strengths, the offerors’ recent and relevant past performance records did not provide confidence that they would be able to satisfactorily perform the contract. The SSA further concluded that Huntington Ingalls’ proposal included “essentially a threshold Concept Design” and otherwise had limited distinguishable benefits in comparison to other offerors. The SSA also noted that considering the firm’s marginal past performance rating, its proposal was the least advantageous to the government.

The protests are denied.

In contrast to the Huntington Ingalls Industries case, another case, Gaver Technologies, illustrates a winning protest when evaluation factors are questioned.

Here, the protest is sustained where record shows that agency’s source selection authority lacked a reasonable basis for failing to give weight to several source evaluation board findings pertaining to strengths in the protester’s proposal. The RFP sought services for computer science, computer software engineering, IT security, networking, application development, and web services. The protestor, Gaver Technologies, Inc., is referred to as GTI.

The RFP provided for award to the offeror whose proposal was considered most advantageous to the government based on the following three factors (of approximately equal weight): mission suitability, relevant experience/past performance, and cost. The mission suitability factor was comprised of three subfactors: technical requirements (worth 45% of the factor weight), management plan (worth 35%), and work management (worth 20%).

 Matter of: Gaver Technologies, Inc., File: B-409535 June 3, 2014 (pdf here)
It is a fundamental principle that agencies must evaluate proposals consistent with the terms of a solicitation and, while the evaluation of offerors’ proposals generally is a matter within the procuring agency’s discretion, our Office will question an agency’s evaluation where it is unreasonable, inconsistent with the solicitation’s stated evaluation criteria and requirements, or undocumented. Further, while source selection officials reasonably may disagree with the evaluation ratings and results of lower-level evaluations, they are nonetheless bound by the fundamental requirements that their independent judgments be reasonable, consistent with the stated evaluation factors, and adequately documented.

Of relevance to this protest, the RFP explained that in evaluating offerors’ technical approaches, the agency would consider their overall understanding and approach to accomplishing the requirements of the SOW, taking into account the “adequacy, realism, effectiveness, quality assurance, risk reductions, efficiencies, and completeness” of the information provided in the following areas:
1. Proposed approach of disciplines, skills, and techniques the Offeror plans to use in the performance of this work.
2. Proposed innovative processes, systems, and technology trends the Offeror suggests for accomplishing and/or streamlining the tasks required in the SOW with supportive rationale.

Of significance to this protest and our discussion below, with regard to the technical requirements subfactor, three of the five significant strengths for GTI concerned its technical approach.

The Source Selection Board's (SEB’s) first significant strength was that GTI had “demonstrated a thorough understanding of the SOW [Statement of Work] by proposing the critical disciplines, skills and techniques needed to effectively implement the SOW requirements.” The evaluators found that GTI’s proposed initiatives, as summarized in the five bullets, would “significantly increase the quality and timeliness of contract deliverables,” which was “expected to result in greatly enhanced performance of IT services throughout the life of the contract.”

The second significant strength assigned GTI was based on the SEB’s finding that GTI’s proposed technical approach contained “a multitude of highly innovative processes and insightful technology trends.” This finding was supported by six bullets with explanatory details. The third significant strength was based on the finding that GTI’s technical proposal demonstrated “an in‑depth understanding and innovative approach to accomplishing the requirements in the SOW area of IT Security (ITS).” The evaluators supported this conclusion with four detailed bullets.

In comparing GTI’s and Peerless’s proposals under the technical requirements subfactor, the Source Selection Authority (SSA) noted that while she had initially agreed with the SEB’s observation that the protester’s proposal provided several innovations and insights, she concluded after extensive discussions with the SEB that “there existed offsetting considerations,” which led her to “question the overall impact of the findings.” Summarizing the technical requirements subfactor, I acknowledge the potential benefits stemming from the GTI proposal. However, considering the unknown implementation costs, I find them of relatively lesser value to the Government because I do not have high confidence that the innovations could be implemented. Based on this, I believe that the quantitative difference between the two Offerors is immaterial.

The SSA then compared the two proposals under the management plan subfactor. She noted that Peerless offered an organizational structure that mirrored the agency’s own structure, which, in her view, demonstrated a keen understanding of the GRC’s requirements and culture that would lead to successful contract performance. The SSA also noted that she was impressed with Peerless’s proposed customer feedback mechanism and viewed it as a discriminator in her selection decision. She went on to identify Peerless’s proposed phase-in plan as a second key discriminator, noting that Peerless’s approach left the final 30 days of phase-in for dealing with contingences and unexpected issues associated with start up of the new contract, which ensured that GRC would have “no systematic problems upon full contract initiation.” The SSA further noted that in comparing the proposals under the management plan subfactor, she had considered the significant strength assigned GTI’s proposal for subcontracting agreements, but had concluded that this significant strength was not “of the same qualitative merit” as the findings associated with Peerless’s proposal under the management plan subfactor.

As a result of the above findings, the SSA concluded that Peerless’s proposal had a slight advantage over the protester’s with regard to the mission suitability factor. She further found that while both offerors received ratings of high confidence under the relevant experience/past performance factor, Peerless’s proposal had a slight edge under the factor due to the highly relevant experience of its team members and “the direct experience and overall successful performance of its major subcontractor” on the predecessor contract to the contract here. Finally, the SSA noted that the probable costs of the two proposals were almost equal, with Peerless’s being slightly lower. She concluded that because Peerless’s proposal offered slight advantages under each of the three factors, it represented the best value to the government.

GTI complains that the SSA failed to adhere to the evaluation scheme set forth in the RFP in evaluating its proposal under the technical requirements subfactor by unreasonably failing to credit GTI’s proposal with any of the proposed innovations identified by the SEB, as contemplated by the solicitation. The protester further contends that Peerless’s phase-in plan should not have been viewed as a significant strength, and that the SEB and the SSA treated the two proposals unequally by crediting Peerless’s proposal, but not its own, for offering a management structure mirroring the structure of the OCIO.

As noted above, under the technical requirements subfactor, the SSA considered the protester’s proposed innovations, which formed the basis for the significant strengths assigned by the SEB, to be “of relatively lesser value to the Government,” and she gave them little weight in her source selection decision. In dismissing the weight of the SEB’s findings, the SSA concluded that she did not have high confidence that the innovations could be implemented due to their unknown implementation costs. In order to further shed light on the extent to which the SSA’s concerns regarding funding pertained to the innovations underpinning the significant strengths assigned GTI’s proposal by the SEB, our Office held a hearing.

In our view, the SSA’s explanation for why she did not attribute value to the innovative approaches proposed by the protester that were funded is not supported by the contemporaneous record. The SSA made no contemporaneous reference to insufficiently detailed descriptions in her SSS (she referred only to unknown implementation costs), nor is there any indication in the record that she directly reviewed the content of the proposals herself (rather, she based her decision on the information presented by the SEB). Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that the SEB questioned the value of proposed innovative approaches, such as horizontal protection, on the basis that the approaches were not adequately described, or that the SEB conveyed such a concern to the SSA.

In sum, we find that the record fails to support the SSA’s conclusion that the protester’s proposal should not be given any meaningful credit for the multiple proposed innovative approaches for which implementation funding either was included in the protester’s proposal or was not required. That is, while we recognize that the overall impact of the SEB’s findings pertaining to the protester’s proposed innovations is diminished when items with unknown implementation costs are excluded, we nonetheless fail to see a reasonable basis for the SSA to have given the innovations for which unknown implementation costs was not an issue--in particular, those pertaining to IT security--essentially no weight. Accordingly, we sustain GTI’s complaint pertaining to the evaluation of its proposed innovative approaches.

GTI further argues that the SEB unreasonably assigned Peerless’s proposal a significant strength for its proposed phase-in plan -- indeed, the SSA cited Peerless’s plan to complete phase-in within 30 days, rather than the required 60, as a key discriminator in her selection decision.

The record supports GTI’s position. While Peerless represented in its proposal that it “can complete transition in as little as 30 days because we are very familiar with all aspects of the contract,” it went on to indicate that “[w]e acknowledge a lower level of risk associated with a 60-day transition and planned our schedule accordingly.” Peerless Mission Suitability Proposal at 59 (emphasis added). Thus, while Peerless believed that it could accomplish the phase-in transition in as little as 30 days, it did not commit to do so; rather, it proposed a 60-day phase-in schedule to reduce risk. Because Peerless did not propose to complete the phase-in transition within 30 days, both the SEB’s finding to that effect and the SSA’s reliance upon that finding as a key discriminator in her source selection decision lacked a reasonable basis.

We recommend that the SSA make a new source selection decision, taking into account our findings above. If, as a result, the protester is selected for award, the agency should terminate the contract awarded to Peerless and make award to the GTI. The protest is sustained.