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Showing posts with label Social preference provisions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Social preference provisions. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 12, 2021

Race, Religion, and Privacy: Oh My!

Government Contracting does not exists in a vacuum. It exists within the public domain, with governance features that distinguish it entirely from private contracting.

 Lexology, always a reliable source for government contracting updates (and more), hit a trifecta of such features with its procurement related article selections that hit my inbox today.  Here's a brief sampling of them.

Race: Executive Order Prohibiting Bias Training? Ignore That. DoD Issues Class Deviation to Comply with Nationwide Ban on EO 13950 Provisions


On January 6, 2021, the DoD issued a class deviation, effective immediately, to implement the nationwide court order enjoining Sections 4 and 5 of Executive Order (EO) 13950, Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping. EO 13950 prohibits federal agencies, contractors, and grant recipients from using workplace diversity and inclusion trainings to “promote race or sex stereotyping or scapegoating,” with Section 4 applying specifically to government contractors.
That new Court Order trumped Executive Order 13950. Also see Venable's post,Dismantling EO 13950 – Nationwide Preliminary Injunction Results in Suspension of Enforcement Measures for a bit more flavor and information.
For the foreseeable future, Federal contractors, subcontractors, and grant recipients alike no longer need to comply with or worry about the enforcement of EO 13950, especially given President‑elect Joe Biden's very recent announcement that he is appointing Boston Mayor Marty Walsh as the Secretary of Labor. In particular, Mayor Walsh has issued executive orders over the past few years that declare racism an emergency and public health crisis with the goal of "dismantl[ing] [] systemic racism"; acknowledge and improve racial equity through government, as further reported on here; and "create a national model for breaking down system racism across all aspects" of Boston, as reported here. Given that history, it is likely safe to assume that, if confirmed, Mr. Walsh has no intention of advancing policies akin to those in EO 13950.
Religion: OFCCP Issues Final Rule on Religious Exemptions for Government Contractors
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs issued Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause’s Religious Exemption final rule, which becomes effective on January 8, 2021. The final rule is intended to clarify the scope and application of the religious exemption in light of recent developments, including Supreme Court rulings and Executive Orders. Among other things, it clarifies that, in addition to churches, the exemption covers employers that: are organized for a religious purpose; hold themselves out to the public as carrying out a religious purpose; engage in exercise of religion consistent with and in furtherance of a religious purpose; and either operate on a not-for-profit basis or present other strong evidence that their purpose is substantially religious. Moreover, religious employers may condition employment on compliance with religious tenets, as long as they do not discriminate on other protected bases. This particular provision has caused concern, as some have interpreted it to permit discrimination against LGBTQ individuals. Among its key provisions, the final rule adds a rule of construction to provide the maximum legal protection of religious exercise permitted by the Constitution and laws, including the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Privacy (well, one person's privacy is another person's transparency): New Corporate Transparency Act Will Impose Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements on Many Companies, Particularly Small Businesses
The Corporate Transparency Act (CTA), part of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act enacted into law on January 1, 2021, will impose new beneficial ownership reporting requirements on many companies. The stated purposes of the CTA include the collection of beneficial ownership interest information for corporations, limited liability companies and similar entities "to (A) set a clear, Federal standard for incorporation practices; (B) protect vital United States national security interests; (C) protect interstate and foreign commerce; (D) better enable critical national security, intelligence and law enforcement efforts to counter money laundering, the financing of terrorism and other illicit activity; and (E) bring the United States into compliance with international anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism standards." Many types of entities, however, are exempted from the requirements of the CTA. These entities include, among others: public companies; governmental entities; banks and bank holding companies; credit unions; broker dealers; registered investment companies; registered investment advisers; insurance companies; registered public accounting firms; public utilities; certain pooled investment vehicles; 501(c) entities; companies with more than 20 full-time employees in the United States, more than $5 million in gross receipts or sales, and an operating presence at a physical office in the United States; and entities owned or controlled by one or more of such exempt entities. A reporting company will be required to identify each beneficial owner and applicant and report the individual's full legal name, date of birth, current residential or business address, and a "unique identifying number from an acceptable identification document" (generally a nonexpired passport, state issued driver's license or identification card or, if the individual does not have any of these, a nonexpired foreign passport) or a FinCen identifying number. The reporting company need only report the name of the exempt entity having a direct or indirect ownership interest in the reporting company (and not any of the other identifying information otherwise required). There are many issues of scope, definition and interpretation in the CTA which are expected to be addressed by the Treasury's forthcoming implementing regulations.
See, also, How do you determine prospective contractor responsibility if you don't know who the contractor really is?

Thursday, September 1, 2016

For-proift out of state company beats non-profit in state organizations to fountain of youth services funding

Youth services providers protest bidding process
Two Arkansas companies that operate seven Youth Services Division facilities submitted protests Friday to the state’s intention to award a contract to run the facilities to an out-of-state company that has said it will charge the state more than the current operators charge. Bidders have 14 days to submit a protest after learning of an alleged flaw in the process.

Every seven years, the state is required to seek proposals from organizations interested in operating the juvenile treatment and juvenile offender facilities. Department of Human Services spokeswoman Amy Webb said it has been eight years since bids were taken because of a previous one-year extension. Youth Opportunity Investments of Carmel, Ind., proposed charging the state $232 per bed per day, up from the $147 the state pays now per day for each of the 249 beds in the facilities.

Sen. Terry Rice, R-Waldron, whose district includes the Mansfield facilities, said Friday he has “a great deal of concern” about the plan to switch to an out-of-state provider at greater cost to the state. The current operators “have not received a dime’s increase in three years,” he said.

Sen. Stephanie Flowers, D-Pine Bluff, chairman of the Senate Children and Youth Committee, also said she has questions. “A lot of the intake providers have been asking for more money for years and we haven’t given it to them. It seems quite odd to have an out-of-state contract and offer them more money,” she said.
2 protest youth services contract; ‘robbed’ of fair shot, current operator’s letter to state says
Two nonprofits running seven Arkansas juvenile treatment and detention centers say state officials failed to document why a for-profit, out-of-state company will replace them, even though the new company's bid was more expensive.

Both Consolidated Youth Services Inc. and South Arkansas Youth Services, which have operated the centers for more than a decade, are challenging the decision. The operators are mostly concerned with how their proposals and Youth Opportunity's were reviewed and the quality of the new company's youth services program.

"They robbed the entire bidding process of equity," state Sen. Jeremy Hutchinson* wrote in a protest letter on behalf of South Arkansas Youth Services. The director of the Department of Human Services is currently drafting a "formal written response" to both organizations, Amy Webb, a department spokesman, said Monday.

In its protest letter, Consolidated Youth Services stated it held "no assurances" that the selection process was consistent. The state agencies did not provide individual score sheets used by evaluators to show how they weighed the proposals in each technical category and only a cumulative score was available, according to both nonprofits' letters. Evaluators appeared to have little experience in the youth services field, and there was no proof they attended training beforehand, the letters said.

Consolidated Youth Services' letter, written by attorney Debby Thetford Nye, called for a new evaluation -- one "untainted by significant procedural deficiencies and bias."

Both nonprofits said that Youth Services Division officials held post-bid discussions with Youth Opportunities Investments, even though post-bid conversations can disqualify vendors competing for a contract. The new company was also permitted to change its proposal and circumvent the criteria laid out in the state's request for services, the current contractors said.

Leaders of the Arkansas-based organizations say their programs cost less, strengthen communities and do not slash services. "We are a community program," said Jerry Walsh, chief executive officer of Magnolia-based South Arkansas Youth Services. His organization runs the Dermott Juvenile Correctional Facility and juvenile treatment centers in Dermott and Mansfield. "We know how to approach the community and how to work with them and to get them to support the program."

Youth Opportunities Investments plans to hire subcontractors from Louisiana and Nashville, Tenn., to carry out services, according to its proposal. The Youth Opportunities plan appears to dedicate fewer staff members to special education, GED and technical-vocational coursework and relies more on online learning, Walsh said.

"There is nothing in their proposal to suggest they would enhance the program," said Bonnie Boon, executive director of Jonesboro-based Consolidated Youth Services. Boon also said that she found the state's ability to find the extra dollars for the increase under the new company "curious."

Youth-services advocates have asked for additional funds for years, which Boon and Walsh said has been frustrating.

"It says a lot about their financial management and not funding youth services. Now all of a sudden you're throwing tons of money in this? Unbelievable," Walsh said.

Friday, April 22, 2016

Of legs up, hand outs, and ... fingers crossed, eyes shut?

Government contracting staff have it hard enough making sure the public fisc is prudentially targeted to acquiring satisfaction of minimum needs with maximum value and efficiency. When social welfare schemes, or other political aims, let alone nefarious criminal schemes, are interjected into the process, acquisition staff and resources quickly get distracted from the primary purpose of the acquisition process. Putting responsibility on the acquisition process to account for such incidental matters is a step too far, a straw that may break the camel's back.

Responsibility for the smooth handling of those extraneous non-acquistition issues should be shouldered by other instrumentalities with the expertise required for those matters and dealing with the controversies that come with those activities. But someone must be saddled with that responsibility. Because, as we all know, government contracting money is a significant part of any government's budget, and unaccountable diversion of acquisition funds to non-acquisition activities taints public perception of the acquisition process, and reduces the government's purchasing power.

But when everyone is made responsible, no one is.

Note that you should read the article in its original at the link. I tend to cut, paste, delete, paraphrase and otherwise alter the story line to fit in the educational theme and space of this blog.

Governments Struggle to Root Out Fake Minority Contractors
Like many cities and states, Portland, Ord. has a program allowing it to give special consideration to women- and minority-owned companies when handing out government contracts. The goal, of course, is to help support traditionally disadvantaged companies by giving them a leg up. But as Margie Sollinger, the city's ombudsman, began to discover, the city wasn’t necessarily helping the firms it thought it was.

As the city’s ombudsman, Sollinger had for some time been hearing from business owners about fraud in the city’s minority- and women-owned contracting program. According to state law, the city of Portland wasn’t allowed to take action against minority-owned firms it believed to be fraudulent; those complaints had to be referred to the state. But Sollinger says the state Office of Minority, Women and Emerging Small Businesses initially shrugged her off.

So she referred the case to the Oregon Department of Justice, where the investigation continued for nearly two years. Simple city inspections to make sure the awarded company is showing up to perform the job would have caught past violators. But cities and states across the country are struggling to provide sufficient oversight when it comes to minority- and women-owned firms, also known as disadvantaged business enterprises, or DBEs. As a result, much of the money that’s targeted to help these businesses doesn’t really go where governments want it to.

State legislators took an interest in the issue, and last year passed legislation allowing all public agencies in the state to conduct their own investigations into future allegations of minority contract fraud.

It’s a problem that’s shown up all over the place. In Louisville, Ky., the metro sewer district banned two minority businesses from receiving future contracts after it was discovered that they were subcontracting with nonminority-owned businesses. An audit in Pittsburgh found the city didn’t even have a way to track how much work was going to DBEs. The city of Denver has also been dealt a blow by contracting scandals in recent years. In 2014, the city proudly touted a new contract for mechanical work at Denver International Airport that had been awarded to a company owned by an African-American woman; at $39.6 million, it was the city’s largest-ever minority contract. But it later became clear that the company was subcontracting more than $23 million of the work to a different firm, one that didn’t qualify as a minority contractor.

Nationwide data on DBE contracting programs is spotty; states’ efforts vary widely. The National Association of State Procurement Officials doesn’t monitor them. The US GAO has published a smattering of reports over the past 25 years on women- and minority-owned contracting programs with two main conclusions: More information was needed, and the contracting world in general lacks women and minorities.

Wendell Stemley, president of the board of the National Association of Minority Contractors believes states owe it to their residents to help minority firms. He says, "the faces of these businesses should reflect how diverse the locality actually is. And if a state has lax compliance standards, then of course there are going to be firms willing and able to game the system.”

Ensuring that a minority contracting program is functioning properly takes a lot of work. A 2013 internal audit by the Minnesota Department of Transportation found extensive problems with its DBE program, ranging from mismanagement and weak oversight to outright fraud. “We just weren’t seeing a lot of success, and we were even having protests outside the state Department of Transportation office,” says Minnesota state Sen. Scott Dibble, chairman of the Transportation and Public Safety Committee. The scathing audit highlighted millions of dollars that had been passed through to non-DBEs and a consistent failure to meet the state’s own DBE goals. But the key finding, says Dibble, was from the state Office of Civil Rights. “There were some serious concerns within that office that numbers were fudged,” he says.

This year a consortium of state agencies will be working together to develop more objective criteria for what really qualifies as a disadvantaged business. Perhaps most important, Dibble says, the effort has raised awareness among lawmakers of the need for intense oversight. “In order to remedy age-old injustices” against disadvantaged firms, he says, “it requires proactive action, not passive acceptance.” Still there’s an inherent challenge when a state endeavors to mix bureaucracy with “complicated social problems,” says Dibble. “It’s a problem, and I don’t really know how to solve it.”

Another place that’s taking on contract reform is New Orleans. The city has long had a minority contracting program in place, but when construction projects ramped up as the city rebuilt after Hurricane Katrina, it became clear the program had extensive problems. There was a two-year backlog of companies waiting to be certified as minority- or women-owned businesses, and the city had virtually no record-keeping or monitoring processes in place. In 2013, Mayor Mitch Landrieu introduced a set of proposals to raise the profile of the program. These reforms focused mostly on outreach and oversight of public contracts.

Last fall the city implemented a second wave of regulations, focused more on enforcement and compliance. Now, when fraudulent activity is discovered, the city can withhold payments and exclude that particular firm from future contracts. The city has also introduced new technology tools to monitor existing contracts and payments. (As a side benefit, the technology will allow subcontractors to see when a primary contractor gets paid, adding another level of transparency to the entire contracting process.) The city needed to invest in more people. When Landrieu took office in 2010, the Office of Supplier Diversity was made up of one person. But thanks to a local millage, the city was able to budget $700,000 to beef up staffing. Now there’s a staff of seven people. It’s too soon to know how effective the new technology and compliance measures will be; the city only began training employees on them in February.

National Association of Minority Contractors’ Stemley believes the high-profile cases of fraud and noncompliance are the exception to the rule. The onus, he says, is on states and cities to step up their efforts to attract more minority- and women-owned businesses. “We need to be trying harder to make sure we have workforce diversity in the contracting community,” he says. “We can’t ignore these underserved communities that need jobs.”
And don't forget that the main job of the acquisition program and staff is to get the government's needed things and services delivered when and where needed and on budget. Too many times, preference programs are simple political campaigns, big on promotion and bereft of substance and accountability, and the acquisition process gets blamed for the short-changes of the programs.

Sunday, March 22, 2015

Winner takes all?

I cannot forget when my children and grandchildren were little bundles of joy. But in the world of contracting, both government and private (as discussed below), some bundles are filled with despair, and anti-competitive effects.

In US federal contracting, bundling is recognized to provide benefit to the government as a means of reducing costs through efficiencies (although I am unaware of how that gets quantified).
Bundling may provide substantial benefits to the Government. Measurably substantial benefits may include, individually or in any combination or aggregate, cost savings or price reduction, quality improvements that will save time or improve or enhance performance or efficiency, reduction in acquisition cycle times, better terms and conditions, and any other benefits. The agency must quantify the identified benefits and explain how their impact would be measurably substantial. Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, the agency may determine bundling to be necessary and justified if, as compared to the benefits that it would derive from contracting to meet those requirements if not bundled, it would derive measurably substantial benefits (for which certain thresholds are given). Reduction of administrative or personnel costs alone is not sufficient justification for bundling unless the cost savings are expected to be at least 10 percent of the estimated contract or order value (including options) of the bundled requirements. Reduction of administrative or personnel costs alone is not sufficient justification for bundling unless the cost savings are expected to be at least 10 percent of the estimated contract or order value (including options) of the bundled requirements.  ( See FAR Subpart 7.107, Additional requirements for acquisitions involving bundling.)

Bundling is also recognized to adversely affect the ability of small contractors to obtain work they would otherwise be competitive to perform. Indeed, it appears that the only reason bundling has percolated up to attention at all as possibly anti-competitive is because of the social welfare income-shifting politics behind the Small Business Administration framework. (Don't get me wrong, I support some efforts to retain the small business engine of the economy, both as an incubator of enterprise but also to inhibit the progressive monopolization of of big money. I just think we need to call a spade a spade so we know the limits of what it is we are dealing with.)

This is revealed in the way the federal government has defined "bundling": it applies to existing contracts, however, there is movement to extend bundling rules to new contracts as well. Thus, an early study of the negative effects of bundling was criticized by the GAO in 2000:
The Office of Advocacy, an independent agency whose mission is to represent and advance small business before Congress, has sponsored studies that have concluded (1) that the federal government has fallen short of its 1998 goal of 23 percent of its prime contract dollars being awarded to small businesses and (2) that contract bundling is growing and negatively affecting small businesses. The Office of Advocacy's study is the only government-wide study to be completed to date and it concludes that contract bundling has increased and had a negative effect on small business' share of federal contracts; however, the study's analysis was based on a definition that was broader than the statutory definition of contract bundling and provided no convincing evidence that bundling caused adverse effects on small businesses.
The following report from the Congressional Research Service provides (in this quote) a brief description of the history of the bundling issue.

Contract “Bundling” Under the Small Business Act: Existing Law and Proposed Amendments
“Bundling” refers to the consolidation of two or more requirements for goods or services previously provided or performed under separate smaller contracts into a solicitation for a single contract that is likely to be unsuitable for award to a small business because of its size or scope. Although bundling can potentially reduce costs or improve performance for federal agencies, it can also limit opportunities for small businesses to receive federal prime contracts. For this reason, Congress amended the Small Business Act in 1997 to require that procuring activities comply with certain procedures before issuing a bundled solicitation. Specifically, the 1997 amendments require that procuring activities (1) conduct market research to justify acquisition strategies that could lead to bundled contracts, (2) provide advance notice of bundled solicitations to the Small Business Administration (SBA) and incumbent small business contractors, and (3) implement certain procurement strategies when solicitations involve “substantial bundling.” These steps are intended to ensure that any bundling is “necessary and justified.” Only “unnecessary and unjustified” bundling is prohibited under the 1997 and subsequent amendments.
Although bundling can be done if justified, it seems that requirement is not being heeded, and it is bumping up against cost-cutting measures intended to consolidate contracts, just the opposite of moves to prevent restrictive bundling. (The GAO report previously mentioned describes bundled contracts as a subset of consolidated contracts; a special case to be applied restrictively.)

Concerns over contract bundling cast shadow over 2013 small business successes
Rob Burton, a procurement attorney with Venable in Washington and a former deputy administrator at the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, said the issue of bundling and consolidation and the fact that agencies consistently are ignoring the requirements to justify their decisions isn't getting a lot of attention.

Emily Murphy, a House Small Business Committee staff member, said, "The numbers [of bundled or consolidated contracts] in the database are wrong, and that's bad from a public policy standpoint. But it's even worse when you consider it means that neither the justification, the mitigation nor the data capture is taking place when it comes to bundling or consolidation." She said the administration's goal of maintaining a certain percentage of dollars going to small firms doesn't take into account the long-term impact on the industrial base that these efforts are having on the companies in the private sector.

Ken Dodds, the Small Business Administration's director of policy, planning and liaison, said bundling has been a huge issue since the late 1990s. "Let's be clear: agencies can bundle, and they can consolidate. They just have to justify it. There are thresholds they have to do. They have to analyze the data. They have to mitigate. There are things they have to do," he said. Dodds said the problem is that there is little to no follow up with the agency that decided to bundle the requirements or contracts to see if they met their justification in terms of savings or efficiencies.

This issue came to light just recently when SBA ruled that GSA didn't justify its rationale for consolidating requirements under the office supplies 3 strategic sourcing solicitation.
I would think that that same kind of particularized justification for bundling in small business context should be extended to large scale "consolidation". Anti-competitive consolidations are just as invidious for large business as small, and minimized competition, at whatever the convenience is assumed to be, cannot justify the need to encourage competition.

But what about the private sector? Is winner take all consolidation simply part of the laissez-faire free market ideal, or should anti-competition laws or regulation also have a role to play in consumer choice? Consider sports TV.

Lawsuit could end sports leagues' all-or-nothing TV packages
Fans have long asked for tailored options to view live games on TV and other devices, saying league-wide [bundled] packages such as Major League Baseball's Extra Innings, the National Football League's Sunday Ticket and the National Hockey League's Center Ice offer more games than they want or can possibly watch.

A Boston baseball fan living in Los Angeles, for example, would currently have no choice but to order hundreds of games from across the league just to see the Red Sox play. The Extra Innings package, offering up to 80 out-of-market games a week, is advertised by cable providers for $195 a season.
Sony PlayStation Vue Is Cable TV Without The Cable Company
Sports fans can opt for a $60 per month bundle that adds regional sports networks like YES (New York) and Comcast SportsNet (Philadelphia and Chicago). ESPN (along with other Disney properties like ABC) remains a glaring omission for now. But by reaching distribution deals with carriers of pro franchises like the Yankees, Cubs, Bulls and Phillies, PlayStation Vue provides live home team coverage, a must for many cable subscribers. A $70 per month top-tier bundle brings the channel total to 85 with the addition of several family and lifestyle networks.

None of this sounds much different from a traditional pay TV package, minus the contract commitment and standalone cable box.
Cutting the cord: A sports fan's new breed of TV
As hundreds of thousands of Americans give up cable or satellite TV every year — watching their favorite shows on streaming devices such as Hulu or Netflix and earning the trendy name “cord cutters” — sports fans are being left behind, feeling chained to their expensive menu of channels because not enough alternatives exist outside of conventional methods.

Kevin Watterson, 34, lives in Minneapolis and considers himself a sports fan. But he ditched cable in 2013, fed up with his $120 monthly Comcast bill — which covered cable and Internet, but was soon to increase in price after the end of a discounted promotional period.

Today, he pays $130 a year for the MLB.TV package, streaming games onto his large screen via Apple TV, a $69 device. He watches other sports available over the air, via an HD antenna that can cost $40 or less. And he’s planning on picking up Sling TV, a new $20-a-month service that gives viewers a limited menu of channels, including ESPN and ESPN2, during April so he can watch the Masters.

“Sports is the last must-see-TV. You can watch everything else on demand,” said Dave Warner, 43, a recent sports fan cord cutter who analyzes TV sports trends on the website whatyoupayforsports.com.

But each channel costs something. ESPN and ESPN2 combined, for instance, make up a little over $6 on your monthly bill, Warner said. Other channels are a couple of dollars here, a few dollars there. It adds up — as providers, networks and fans know.

“It’s going to be a while until cord cutting really makes [networks] nervous,” Warner said. “They see it, but it’s not enough to truly impact their bottom line. For now, the networks are going to milk the cash cow for all its worth, and they will until nobody can afford it anymore.”
Big Ten facing crucial decisions about its TV future
The Big Ten Tournament has a nifty network threesome when it comes to television this week. Three networks -- CBS, ESPN, and the Big Ten Network -- will provide extensive coverage.

The more, the merrier from the perspective of Commissioner Jim Delany. The league's football and basketball deals with ESPN/ABC and CBS expire after the 2016-17 basketball season. Negotiations are expected to heat up soon, assuming they haven't already. One thing is certain: The Big Ten should be in line for a windfall. The conference will get significant increases from its 10-year, $1 billion deal with ESPN/ABC for football and basketball and 6-year, $72 million pact with CBS for basketball; It also has a 25-year, $2.8 billion deal with the league-run BTN that extends through 2031-32.

Delany knows his timing couldn't be better, as the Big Ten's TV rights will be the last major sports property, pro or college, to be on the market in this decade. That news isn't lost on Fox Sports, which desperately needs top-tier live programming for its cable outlet, Fox Sports 1. The network has struggled to gain a foothold in 1 1/2 years of operation. Fox is expected to make an aggressive bid for the Big Ten's rights. CBS Sports Network and NBCSN are unlikely contenders in this derby.

There are several factors in play, including this scenario: Delany might not have to pick between ESPN and Fox. With the commissioner looking to cash in big, there's speculation the price might be too high for one entity to write a huge multi-billion dollar check for the entire package. The best play might be for Delany to cut deals to place games on both networks. The move likely would lead to a bigger payday and it still would give the Big Ten a presence on ESPN.
I remember the days when to get a particular song you wanted, you had to buy a whole album, as the small-hole LPs took over the world of large-hole 45s. Given enough competition from the industry players, consumers will benefit. Given enough competition. 

And remember, the government is a consumer. It must always keep one eye on the market place to assure it "enough" competition. It is for that reason that we find the federal acquisition rule on bundling in the "Planning" part, Part 7, whose policy is "to promote and provide for ... full and open competition to the maximum extent practicable...." (Subpart 7.102(a))









Wednesday, January 7, 2015

Is this an appealing size or not?

First, I'd like to hattip this client alert article from Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, appearing on the very useful and user friendly Lexology website. It has introduced me to the very arcane world of Small Business Administrative decision making, in particular to the essential size factor for winning Section 8(a) set-aside contracts.

Next, this is not a discussion of the Sec. 8(a) SBA program, and I'd hardly have any authority to conduct one, although there have been a few posts on related subject matter in this blawg, e.g., here and here. You can search the web for many articles describing the program, which is an essential component of federal procurement legislation, and indicative of the kinds of programs that Prof. Steven Schooner has termed the "wealth distribution" principle of procurement, although, to me, it is also wrapped up in the goal of nurturing or propagating competition; something in the nature of an agricultural nursery.

The basic proposition for this topic is that size matters in the set aside provision. (It is a very basic proposition, in which there is no "one size fits all", but that's not a discussion for today.) Because the SBA program is about "small business" set asides, something of a valuable preference for contract awards, one of its major abuses has been qualifying a large business for a contract by use of a "front" small business. This little ruse comes in a variety of colors and forms, some of which actually work, proving the keen adaptability of businesses and lawyers. But many don't, proving that clever people can land themselves in hot water, jail and other uncomfortable headlines.

This post takes the case of one such close question. As expressed in the Pillsbury client alert mentioned above, "This decision serves to remind small and large businesses engaging in mentor-protégé relationships that the approval of a mentor-protégé agreement by the SBA does not create a safety net for the mentor-protégé joint venture formed to submit qualifying small business bids and proposals."

The "decision" is actually two decisions. One made in November "affirms Area Office finding that firms were affiliated by virtue of joint venture agreement because provisions of agreement between mentor and 8(a) protégé did not meet requirements of 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.513(c) and (d)". The other, made in December, "dismisses appeal because District Office's decision that joint venture agreement did not meet requirements of regulations was not a size determination and, therefore, could not be appealed to OHA". You can get the link to these and many more such "size decision" questions on SBA's website here.

The fundamental substantive question here was whether this particular "mentoring agreement", a concept promoted by the government to help small businesses become more competitive, might be seen as falling into the pile of relationships technically smelling of a "front". And it's not such a subjective question as it may appear at first blush, because, as any good bureaucratic regime, there are regulations that require certain hoops to be jumped to flush out the reality of the relationship. The devil here is definitely in the details, and no amount of artistic license can suffice as a subterfuge.

The first decision is Size Appeal of Kisan-Pike , A Joint Venture, SBA No. SIZ-5618 (2014):
On October 6, 2014, the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) Office of Government Contracting, Area I (Area Office) issued Size Determination No. 01-SD-2014-44, finding that Kisan-Pike, A Joint Venture (Appellant) is not a small business under the size standard associated with the subject procurement. Appellant is a joint venture between Kisan Engineering Company, P.C. (Kisan), an 8(a) Business Development (BD) participant, and The Pike Company, Inc. (Pike), a large business that SBA approved as Kisan's mentor. The Area Office found that Kisan and Pike are affiliated for this procurement under 13 C.F.R. §121.103(h)(2), as a result of their joint venture. For the reasons discussed infra, the appeal is denied and the size determination is affirmed.

The Contracting Officer )"CO") expressed concern that Appellant's joint venture agreement did not comply with 13 C.F.R. §§124.513(c)(6) and (7). As a result, Appellant might be ineligible for the mentor-protégé joint venture exception from affiliation.

The joint venture agreement between Kisan and Pike states that Kisan owns 51% of Appellant and serves as Appellant's Managing Venturer, and Pike owns the remaining 49%. [It spelled out the roles of each co-venturer in descriptive but general language. You must read the decision in its original at the link citation for details and full context; I paraphrase stuff like this in this blawg.]

The Area Office explained that SBA may find firms affiliated based on a joint venture relationship, unless an exception applies. One such exception refers to participants in an SBA approved mentor-protégé agreement, but if the size status of the joint venture is protested, the provisions of §§ 124.513(c) and (d) will apply. This means that the joint venture must meet the requirements of §§ 124.513(c) and (d) in order to receive the authorized exception to affiliation.

It then considered whether Appellant complied with 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(c)(6) and (7). Under those regulations, a valid joint venture agreement must contain provisions:
•(6) Itemizing all major equipment, facilities, and other resources to be furnished by each party to the joint venture, with a detailed schedule of cost or value of each; [and]
•(7) Specifying the responsibilities of the parties with regard to negotiation of the contract, source of labor, and contract performance, including ways that the parties to the joint venture will ensure that the joint venture and the 8(a) partner(s) to the joint venture will meet the performance of work requirements set forth in paragraph (d) of this section.
The Area Office found Appellant's joint venture agreement deficient with respect to both requirements.

As to subsection (c)(6), rather than itemizing all major equipment and facilities, the agreement contained a single sentence stating, “Upon award of the Contract, Kisan and Pike will provide equipment, facilities and other resources to the Joint Venture required to execute the contract.” (Size Determination at 4, quoting Agreement § 5.0.) Appellant argued that its agreement was sufficiently detailed because this is a design-build contract, and the Corps must approve the design before Appellant can confirm the construction plan. The Area Office rejected this explanation, however, observing that Appellant's Phase II proposal contained proposed design drawings and a detailed construction schedule. Therefore, while the design had not yet been approved, “the nature and the type of building construction are certain,” and “it is very unlikely that [Appellant] has no idea how [it] will execute [its] proposal to complete the project.”

As to subsection (c)(7), the Area Office observed that the joint venture agreement merely confirmed that Appellant will perform at least 50% of the non-construction labor costs and at least 15% of the construction labor costs.

The Area Office also considered Appellant's compliance with 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d), which requires that the 8(a) BD participant perform at least 40% of the work performed by the joint venture, and that this work consist of “more than administrative or ministerial functions.” Appellant did not meet this requirement, the Area Office reasoned, because the agreement made “broad” and “generic” representations that Kisan will perform at least 40% of the work “without any constructive plan to support [this] claim.”

Because the joint venture agreement was deficient, the Area Office determined Appellant may not avail itself of the mentor-protégé affiliation exemption. Accordingly, Kisan and Pike are affiliated for this procurement due to their joint venture. Pike is a large business, so the combined average annual receipts of Kisan and Pike exceed the applicable size standard, and Appellant is not a small business for this procurement.

Appellant contends that the Area Office “acted irrationally, arbitrarily, and outside the scope of its proper review.” First, Appellant argues, the size determination is clearly erroneous because Kisan and Pike are presumably unaffiliated as a result of their SBA-approved mentor-protégé agreement. Second, Appellant complains that it repeatedly asked SBA personnel to review and comment on the joint venture agreement, but SBA declined to do so before an award was made: “Had [Appellant] been able to obtain SBA input, it could have addressed these concerns up front." Third, that “at the
Phase I proposal stage of a design-build solicitation, at which no architectural, material, equipment or engineering details or even preliminary designs are known with any degree of specificity about the project, it is entirely infeasible for an offeror to make good faith determinations on the specific needs for equipment and managerial assignments.”

SBA stresses that a joint venture between a large and a small business, such as Appellant, is normally not eligible for a contract set aside for small businesses. SBA rejects Appellant's argument that Kisan and Pike are presumed unaffiliated. SBA asserts, concerns size determinations of the protégé itself, not size determinations of a joint venture between a mentor and a protégé, as is the
case here.

SBA notes that the joint venture agreement does not itemize resources, and Appellant makes no attempt to argue that its agreement does comply with these requirements. Further, the joint venture agreement “entirely flouts” the requirement in 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d) that the protégé firm, Kisan, perform at least 40% of the joint venture's substantive work. SBA argues that these omissions are egregious because the purpose of these rules is to prevent large businesses from enjoying contracts intended for small businesses. By failing to delineate responsibilities, Appellant makes it possible for Pike to perform all or most of the contract. Further, SBA argues, to create an exception for joint venture agreements drafted before the offeror is certain of the procuring agency's requirements would be “unwise and unworkable” because there is often some degree of uncertainty. (Id. at 6.) Such an exception would also be at odds with OHA precedent, which indicates that joint venture rules should be applied “literally and narrowly so as to preclude situations where the 8(a) concern brings very little to the joint venture relationship in terms of resources and expertise other than its 8(a) status.”

The CO notes Appellant executed its joint venture agreement on May 7, 2014, after the Corps had issued the Phase II technical specifications and drawings on April 28, 2014. These specifications, the CO emphasizes, contained “over 2000 pages of technical standards and criteria, and numerous conceptual drawings". Thus, Appellant had ample information to define the partners' respective responsibilities and to itemize equipment, facilities, and other resources. The CO casts doubt on Appellant's representation that it could not determine what each joint venture partner would need to bring to the project. To the CO, this statement is not credible because Pike, the mentor firm, has vast construction experience with similar projects.

Appellant also argues unconvincingly that mentors and protégés are presumably unaffiliated when there is an SBA-approved mentor-protégé agreement. The regulation Appellant relies upon, however, does not stand for the proposition Appellant advances. Importantly, the regulation does not establish a presumption that a mentor and protégé are unaffiliated. Rather, it merely states that the mentor and protégé are not affiliated based on the mentor-protégé agreement itself. The Area Office did not find affiliation based on the mentor-protégé agreement, but instead determined that the exception for mentor-protégé joint ventures is not available because Appellant's joint venture agreement does not meet the criteria.

For the above reasons, the appeal is DENIED and the size determination is AFFIRMED.
The first decision certainly, to this uninitiated eye, looked like a size determination: the CO "issued Size Determination No. 01-SD-2014-44, finding that Kisan-Pike, A Joint Venture (Appellant) is not a small business under the size standard".   Alas, things are not always what they seem, even though it seems the size determination stuck in any event. The second decision concluded that the SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) didn't have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the size decision.

This second decision is Size Appeal of Kisan-Pike, A Joint Venture, SBA No. SIZ-5623 (2014):
On November 10, 2014, Appellant filed an appeal with the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA). The appeal, titled “Joint Venture Agreement Rejection Appeal of Kisan-Pike, A Joint Venure”, challenges the decision by the District Office declining to approve Appellant's JVA. In the appeal petition, Appellant states that “SBA's determination that KPC's JVA does not conform to regulatory requirements is in essence a size determination.” OHA noted the determination Appellant seeks to challenge does not appear to be a formal size determination.

Appellant states that the “instant matter is at its very essence a size determination because under the mentor-protégé regulations, the Determination is a finding of affiliation between [Kisan Engineering Company, P.C.] and [The Pike Company].” Appellant contends OHA, in the past, has routinely taken jurisdiction over cases involving size determinations where an SBA Area Office rejected a JVA. Appellant maintains the difference here is that the District Office rejected the JVA without explaining that the rejection was based on Appellant's size.

OHA's jurisdiction, stated by regulation, provides in pertinent part: “OHA has authority to conduct proceedings in the following cases: ... Appeals from size determinations ...." The regulations
governing size protests and formal size determinations include “Who makes a formal size determination?” provides: “The responsible Government Contracting Area Director or designee makes all formal size determinations in response to either a size protest or a request for a formal size determination. . . .”

Here, the District Office's disapproval of the JVA is not a formal size determination according to this definition. The disapproval did not come from a Government Contracting Area Director, and it was not issued as the “response to either a size protest or a request for a formal size determination.” A size protest may only be filed after bid opening or notification to offerors of the selection of the apparent successful offeror. Appellant did not file a protest after receiving notification of the identity of the apparent successful offeror, but only upon receipt of the disapproval of the JVA. The regulation does not provide for filing an appeal from this decision.

Accordingly, the District Office's letter rejecting Appellant's JVA is not a formal size determination, or in “essence” a size determination as Appellant argues, and OHA does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
As noted above, this is pretty arcane stuff, and the devil is in the details. That said, the broad structure is pretty common and understandable.








Monday, September 1, 2014

Paying the fare for fair wages

Contractors, and their subcontractors, will have their feet held a little closer to the legal fires to get or keep their contracts with the US federal government under the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order released July 31, 2014.

It's a typically legalistic Order, so the President also released a "Fact Sheet" 'splaning what the Order is "supposed" to say (read the paper at the link; I'm as usual only cutting, pasting, deleting, paraphrasing, extracting, re-arranging, commenting, etc. to suit myself):

FACT SHEET: Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order
The Department of Labor estimates that there are roughly 24,000 businesses with federal contracts, employing about 28 million workers.

Taxpayer dollars should not reward corporations that break the law, so today President Obama is cracking down on federal contractors who put workers’ safety and hard-earned pay at risk. As part of this Year of Action, the President will sign an Executive Order that will require prospective federal contractors to disclose labor law violations and will give agencies more guidance on how to consider labor violations when awarding federal contracts. By cracking down on federal contractors who break the law, the President is helping ensure that all hardworking Americans get the fair pay and safe workplaces they deserve. [So the Order does not apply to those workers who do not work hard?]

The Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order will govern new federal procurement contracts valued at more than $500,000. We expect the Executive Order to be implemented on new contracts in stages, on a prioritized basis, during 2016.

Key Provisions

1. Hold Corporations Accountable: Under the terms of the Executive Order, agencies will require prospective contractors to disclose labor law violations from the past three years before they can get a contract. Agencies will also require contractors to collect similar information from many of their subcontractors.

2. Crack Down on Repeat Violators: Contracting officers will take into account only the most egregious violations, and each agency will designate a senior official as a Labor Compliance Advisor to provide consistent guidance on whether contractors’ actions rise to the level of a lack of integrity or business ethics. The Executive Order will ensure that the worst actors, who repeatedly violate the rights of their workers and put them in danger, don’t get contracts and thus can’t delay important projects and waste taxpayer money. [What bright lines are there to determine an egregious labor law violation, to ferret out from all egregious violations only the "most" egregious, and to decide how many repeats during what time frame constitutes "repeated" violations? Without those facts, this is just a policy statement.]

3. Promote Efficient Federal Contracting: Last year, Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee Chairman Tom Harkin issued a report revealing that dozens of contractors with significant health, safety, and wage and hour violations were continuing to be awarded federal contacts. Another study detailed that 28 of the companies with the top workplace violations from FY 2005 to FY 2009 subsequently received federal contracts, and a quarter of those companies eventually had significant performance problems as well—suggesting a strong relationship between contractors with a history of labor law violations and those that cannot deliver adequate performance for the taxpayer dollars they receive. Because the companies with workplace violations are more likely to encounter performance problems, today’s action will also improve the efficiency of federal contracting and result in greater returns on federal tax dollars. [That passes for a "finding" and a hope, not an order.]

4. Protect Responsible Contractors: The vast majority of federal contractors have clean records. The Executive Order builds on the existing procurement system, so it will be familiar to contractors and will fit into established contracting practices. Responsible businesses will check a single box on a bid form indicating that they don’t have a history of labor law violations.

5. Focus on Helping Companies Improve: The goal of the process created by the Executive Order is to help more contractors come into compliance with workplace protections, not to deny contracts to contractors. Companies with labor law violations will be offered the opportunity to receive early guidance on whether those violations are potentially problematic and remedy any problems. Contracting officers will take these steps into account before awarding a contract and ensure the contractor is living up to the terms of its agreement.

6. Give Employees a Day in Court: The Executive Order directs companies with federal contracts of $1 million or more not to require their employees to enter into predispute arbitration agreements for disputes arising out of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or from torts related to sexual assault or harassment (except when valid contracts already exist).

7. Give Employees Information About their Paychecks: The Executive Order requires contractors to give their employees information with their pay stub concerning their hours worked, overtime hours, pay, and any additions to or deductions made from their pay, so workers can be sure they’re getting paid what they’re owed.

8. Streamline Implementation and Overall Contractor Reporting: The Executive Order directs the General Services Administration to develop a single website for contractors to meet their reporting requirements—for this order and for other contractor reporting. Contractors will only have to provide information to one location, even if they hold multiple contracts across different agencies. The desire to “report once in one place” is a key theme in the feedback received from current and potential contractors.

Monday, February 17, 2014

Giants don't know Jack

Little Jack can be pretty scrappy.


New procurement rules for prison stores scrapped
A chief state procurement officer has nixed changes in how Illinois purchases snacks, toiletries and other goods sold to prison inmates — apparently heeding criticism from small businesses that they gave supply giants an unfair advantage.

State puts hold on bids for prison purchasing contracts
For now, the move means small businesses selling everything from prison-approved Nike shoes to tins of sardines will continue to do business with individual prisons as they've done for years. Matt Brown, the chief procurement officer overseeing contracts for major state agencies, issued his ruling earlier this month, saying a number of irregularities made it necessary for a massive do-over of the bidding process.

Currently, each of the state’s prisons stocks its own canteen, working directly with a number of national and local suppliers to get items such as pallets of chocolate chip cookies, boxes of Nike shoes and cases of potato chips. Keefe Coffee and Supply Co. of St. Louis controls about 30 percent of the inmate market, with an estimated 180 companies -- many of them homegrown, Illinois businesses -- taking a share in the remaining 70 percent of the sales, according to a state study of the commissaries. Brown said the setup as outlined by the Illinois Department of Corrections could have resulted in only one company being deemed qualified to win a contract that could be worth as much as $30 million in sales.

More than a decade ago, however, Auditor General Bill Holland began raising red flags about the supply chain, saying goods being sold at the prisons were being purchased outside of the proper state bidding channels. More than three years ago, Illinois Department of Corrections officials began to draft a new plan designed to centralize commissary purchasing.

The rules that were drafted, however, enraged local suppliers, who said they wouldn't be able to compete if they had to bid on selling products to every state prison or even to a segment of the market grouped by geography. Some companies, for example, sell their wares to just one or two facilities.

Even more vexing for the local companies was a concern voiced by top prison officials that the changes wouldn't result in any savings for the state. In a September meeting with vendors, Corrections Chief of Staff Bryan Gleckler acknowledged that concern. “There may be areas where costs go up; there may be areas where costs go down,” he said during a meeting attended by a number of worried vendors.

"They know they need a new commissary program," Brown said.

At the same time, however, local prison officials say the state needs to realize that local businesses are valuable when it comes to not only prices, but service and reliability.
This is a classic case of the principle of getting bang for taxpayer buck running up against the principle Prof. Steven L. Schooner of George Washington University calls the wealth distribution principle.  I'm not entirely fond of that label since, in local preferences at least, there are macro economic principles that could well justify spending tax dollars where they are raised rather than draining them from the local economy, especially in a pretty much closed economy as on a small island in the middle of the Western Pacific like Guam.  I don't see that so much as wealth distribution as wealth conservation.  I would prefer a term like social preference, but it's his Desiderata. 

Blind adherence to lowest available cost leads to market dominance and control by one or few suppliers (monopoly or oligopoly, thus reducing competition, so-called creative capitalism, and innovation) while blind pursuit of spreading the contracting dollar around the community, such as a buy local preference, means paying higher prices than available from the big guys, greater transaction cost from multiple suppliers, and increased cost of contract administration.

Professor Schooner has written about this inherent conflict of procurement goals in his famous Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law available here and here. 

As Matt Brown, back in Illinois, tries to decide how to reconcile the various interests in his predicament, with a view to creating an improved commissary system, he may well want to consider the Desiderata:
Sometimes the most simple questions prove the most vexing. For example, what does your government hope to achieve through its government procurement law? It is possible to draft and enact a new law without answering the question, and experience demonstrates that this is often the case.  Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to attempt to describe general aspirations for a procurement system before drafting begins.

At a macro level, the author prefers to begin with three “pillars” that, in my opinion, underlie the United States procurement system: system transparency; procurement integrity; and competition. Yet, there is no universal agreement that a procurement system should be premised solely upon transparency, integrity, and competition. Other goals merit discussion.

Historically, our elected representatives have viewed our procurement system as a vehicle to distribute wealth. For example, our government has chosen to leverage its purchases to support domestic firms and, more specifically, small businesses. It is axiomatic that government spending can influence behaviour and infuse growth in communities and economic sectors.

No system can achieve all of these goals. Nor can a state expect that its objectives for its system will remain constant over time. Determining which goals are most important is a daunting, ever-evolving challenge. Because no system can achieve all of the goals here (or the many not discussed), your desiderata entails important tradeoffs."
Or, as Prof. Schooner told us here on Guam (see, Working a good man hard), "You can't have it all".

It is all about balance and priority. For most, transparency and integrity and low prices achieved through competition represent foundational, primary principles. To the extent that you must give up some degree of transparency, integrity or competition to achieve other goals, to maintain the primacy of the foundation principles, the procurement system should implement brakes or safeguards to make up for the effects of the lessened primary principles.

Thus, although it may be possible to achieve the lowest cost by dealing with one vendor under a centralized procurement regime, there may also be savings achieved through more uniformity of acquisition and transactional costs through centralization which makes the marginally higher cost of dealing with more regional suppliers palatable, without even factoring in the broader economic benefits.


Sunday, February 9, 2014

The Canadianization of military procurement

Iain Hunter: Defence procurement is not about war
Last week, Public Works Minister Diane Finley outlined for defence contractors and lobbyists a new strategy to be run by a secretariat in her department that will challenge expressed military requirements and emphasize “international sales opportunities” for Canadian companies engaged in filling them. She said conditions attached by military planners to procurements “too often appear to be set to achieve pre-determined outcomes.”

In other words, the brass is setting specifications that are so precise that they favour the plane or truck they think is best, and therefore one bidder. And with one bidder in the running, the price inevitably is higher, and better economic spinoffs might be lost.

It wasn’t long ago that nations acquired things like tanks, ships and planes solely for the purpose of fighting wars. Today, the tanks, ships and planes are called platforms and their purpose is not just military.

Defence procurement in Canada also is about things like industrial and regional benefits, value to the Canadian economy, global markets and thriving domestic defence contractors.

There might be some retired colonels and commodores who find this odd, but in an age when so much stuff rusts out before it can be used in battle, and when new technologies have to be found to meet rapidly changing threats, a lot more than defence of the realm is at stake.

And as new “platforms” become more expensive, it makes sense to upgrade and maintain existing ones. Canadian defence analysts say that for every dollar, or million dollars, spent to acquire a new engine of war, five dollars or $5 million will be spent to keep it working over a life cycle of 30 years or more.

And that means that when the shiny new engine is unpacked, Canadian firms must find in the crate a guarantee that they have the terms and conditions, including access to intellectual property, to do the maintenance.
- See more at: http://www.timescolonist.com/opinion/iain-hunter-defence-procurement-is-not-about-war-1.842878#sthash.EHTfhdGE.dpuf
Canada revamps military procurement policy after controversies
Defense is one area where countries are allowed under international trade rules to favor their own industries. The question then becomes one of how much more governments are willing to pay to get domestic benefits. In addition to the governance changes, Finley will also now require that bidders for major projects put together a "value proposition" that will show what industrial spinoffs and subcontracts would go to Canadian companies. This would be given a 10 percent weight, suggesting that companies promising rich industrial benefits to Canada could still win even if their costs are slightly higher than those of their rivals.
Leveraging Defence Procurement to Create Jobs and Economic Growth in Canada
The three key objectives of the Defence Procurement Strategy (DPS) are to: deliver the right equipment to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the Canadian Coast Guard in a timely manner; leverage our purchases of defence equipment to create jobs and economic growth in Canada; and streamline defence procurement processes.

The Defence Procurement Strategy (DPS) represents a fundamental change in the Government of Canada's approach to defence procurement.
New plan for military procurement dilutes power of defence department
Finley sought to assure Canadians “that the capability of our men and women in uniform will remain paramount.” But she also left no doubt that the government is counting on industry turning $240 billion in planned defence spending over the next two decades into high-value, high-skill jobs.

“The defence procurement strategy underlines the goals that our government has had from the start,” she said. “Jobs, growth and economic prosperity. That’s what we pledged to Canadians. And that’s what we’ve been delivering.”

Defence officials had quietly expressed concern about military procurement being shifted too far towards business interests, warning in a secret briefing in November 2012 that National Defence “would, all things being equal, likely obtain less equipment and services.” The warning is rooted in fears the government will end up paying a premium to buy Canadian or boost otherwise boost Canadian industry, which is what is already happening with the government’s $38-billion national shipbuilding plan.
Canada Unveils Sweeping New Procurement Rules
The government’s initiatives closely follow a report from the Canadian government’s procurement adviser issued last year, which recommended that foreign defense companies be required to provide domestic companies with quality offset work in a number of key areas such as cybersecurity, training systems and soldier protection. The 88-page report, titled “Canada First: Leveraging Defence Procurement Through Key Industrial Capabilities,” was aimed at addressing growing frustration among Canadian defense firms that complain they have seen little quality work from the billions of dollars of military contracts announced in the past several years by Canada’s Conservative Party government. Those include the purchases of tanks, helicopters and transport aircraft.

The report from Tom Jenkins, special procurement adviser, noted that the Canadian government intends to invest CAN $240 billion (US $216 billion on new defense equipment in the next 20 years.

It recommended developing, at least initially, key industrial capabilities in six areas: Arctic and maritime security, soldier protection, command and support, cybersecurity, training systems, and in-service support. Foreign firms that want to bid on Canadian defense contracts would be required to provide offsets in those areas and would receive better consideration for their bids if they provide Canadian companies with work on international programs.

In their announcement Wednesday, Finley and Nicholson noted that an export strategy will also be developed to support international sales of Canadian defense products. Key industrial capabilities that the government wants to promote among industry will also be identified and highlighted.

The government also plans to provide more information to industry about military procurements, including informing companies early on about projects and publishing an annual acquisition guide to outline its priority programs.

The Defence Procurement Secretariat to be established within Public Works would provide expertise needed to oversee purchases of military equipment. The secretariat will use the principles of early and frequent engagement, independent advice and efficient decision-making to streamline defense procurement processes, the ministers stated.

An independent, third-party Defence Analytics Institute to provide expert analysis to support the objectives of the Defence Procurement Strategy will be established.

Tim Page, president of the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries, called the move a “critical and positive milestone” that will enhance security and economic interests. The association represents more than a 1,000 defense and security companies in Canada.
Ottawa to curb military’s role in procurement after costly delays
The dysfunctional record of military procurement in the last eight years – from light-armored combat vehicles to joint support ships to F-35 fighters – has hurt the Conservatives’ carefully cultivated reputation as prudent stewards of the public purse.

Wednesday, Mrs. Finley and Mr. Nicholson will announce they’re going to require that military suppliers provide more high-value industrial spinoff work for Canadian companies and well-paying jobs. The government is dissatisfied with the industrial regional benefits it received for several big purchases of military aircraft.

Major military purchases in Canada have frequently lacked what critics call a single point of accountability because as many as three or four government departments play a part in selecting what to buy – decisions that are sometimes made in isolation from one another.

National Defence currently has particularly strong influence because it first draws up specifications for what features it needs in equipment – which can result in the department effectively picking a supplier before a competition is held.  Defence officials will still have a central role in deciding what to buy for the Canadian Armed Forces, but other departments and outside advisers will now have the ability to properly question what is being requested.

This will change with what is unofficially called the “super secretariat,” a term the government does not embrace but which captures the concentration of decision-making taking place.


For instance, as one person who was familiar with the Wednesday announcement said, if the request is for a “Cadillac and you actually need a Corolla” then the system needs someone who “has the authority to ask why do you need this Cadillac?”

Part of the focus Wednesday will be on using defence spending to develop a competitive advantage in certain technologies. Foreign companies play a large role in supplying Canada’s military needs, yet in the past 30 years, this country has shied away from using defence policy to promote and build domestic industries.
Military defeated in war over procurement reform
Liberal defence critic Joyce Murray on Wednesday seemed prepared to hold her most serious criticisms to see if the government's proposed changes might have a positive effect. "It’s good that the government has admitted their failure," Murray said.

"I hope, as I think most Canadians hope, that they can do a better job ... with this new procurement mechanism. At the same time, you have to wonder whether adding a layer of bureaucracy and continuing to add additional ministers and deputy ministers into the pot, is actually going to be the correction that is needed. I don’t see clear improvement here," she added. "But let’s be optimistic. They can’t do a lot worse than has been done so far."

Wednesday, January 15, 2014

Procurement: What's prevailing wage labor law got to do with it?

The California case reported in this post concerns the debarment of a state government contractor arising from violation of state prevailing wage laws. It is typical that such laws exist in states, requiring contractors under state procurement contracts to pay prevailing wage and benefits as determined by the law. They are similar in scope, but do differ in detail. 

Remember, I cut and paste excertps, sometimes rearrange or paraphrase, citations are generally left out, etc. This is not a legal citation but only an educational general procurement blog post. Read the original authority if you need to be precise in your understanding.

Ogundare v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 214 Cal.App.4th 822, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 369 (Cal. App., 2013)
Pacific was a general engineering construction company based in Bakersfield, California, that performed concrete (flat) and underground (water, soil and sewer) construction work. Ninety-nine percent of the projects undertaken by Pacific were public works projects. Pacific was owned and managed by Ayodeji A. Ogundare (Ogundare), who was a licensed contractor.

In 2007 and 2008, DLSE [the State of California, Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement] conducted investigations regarding public works projects on which Pacific was a subcontractor, including a project in Delano for sewer and sidewalk construction (the Delano project), a project in Madera to build a youth center (the Madera project), and a project in Exeter to construct a school building (the Exeter project). As a result of these investigations, DLSE notified Pacific of apparent violations of laws relating to public contracts and issued civil wage and penalty assessments against Pacific. Additionally, DLSE initiated the instant debarment proceedings against Pacific based on particular allegations that Pacific violated prevailing wage laws in a manner that was allegedly willful and with intent to defraud.

[After hearing} the DLSE statement of decision stated that Pacific committed willful violations with intent to defraud, and a one-year debarment of Pacific was ordered by DLSE therein. The statement of decision stated the following principal conclusions: ―[Pacific] willfully‘ and with intent to defraud‘ violated the public works laws in not paying prevailing wages to one worker, Laborer Miguel Ibarra and [in not paying] prevailing overtime to two workers, Laborers Javier Perez (on the Madera project) and Juan Ramirez (on the Exeter project). Although the DLSE argued that [Pacific] had a pattern and practice of failing to pay prevailing wages and prevailing overtime on the three projects at issue as well as on previous projects ... the evidence simply was not presented at this hearing to establish this was the case.

Further, as to the alleged inadequacy of Pacific's payroll records, the statement of decision stated that Pacific willfully violated provisions of section 1776 by submitting certified payroll records to DLSE, prime contractors, awarding bodies and others, that were ―not accurate. However, Pacific's failures to provide adequate payroll records, although willful, were not sufficient in themselves to show intent to defraud.

On the specific issue of intent to defraud, the statement of decision elaborated: ―[Miguel] Ibarra's testimony that he was always paid $15.00 per hour on the Delano project and worked 61 hours during the week ending August 4, 2007 is credible especially since he provided a copy of a paycheck corroborating his testimony. [Pacific] knew that payment to this individual was not in compliance with the public works laws as evidenced by the fact that the check shows payment at $15.00 per hour for 61 hours worked yet [Pacific] submitted to the DLSE certified payroll records listing the correct prevailing wage rate that should have been paid and listing only 25 hours worked for the week ending August 4, 2007. In this regard, [Pacific] willfully‘ violated the public works laws. [Pacific] also violated the public works laws with intent to defraud‘ evidenced by the fact that he put the required amount of payment on the certified payroll records he signed under penalty of perjury knowing that he paid a much lower rate. Additionally, the statement of decision indicated that Pacific's intent to defraud was further corroborated by the failure to pay overtime prevailing wages to Javier Perez and Juan Ramirez, since it appeared that Pacific ―was attempting to split the total hours worked by Perez and Ramirez, so as not to have to pay or report prevailing overtime that was in fact worked by both workers. As a consequence of the violations and of the finding of intent to defraud, the statement of decision ordered that Pacific ―shall be ineligible to, and shall not, bid on or be awarded a contract for a public works project, and shall not perform work as a subcontractor on a public work ... for a period of one (1) year....

[Pacific appealed to court, and the trial court ruled in its favor, overturning the DLSE decision. DLSE then appealed to the Appellate Court, which issued this decision. The case turned on technical legal issues concerning the standard of review of an appellate court and the requirements of the form in which the matter was appealed, here a writ of mandate. This may differ in other jurisdictions.]

Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs judicial review by administrative mandate of any final decision or order rendered by an administrative agency. A trial court's review of an adjudicatory administrative decision is subject to two possible standards of review depending upon the nature of the right involved. If the administrative decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the trial court must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence. The trial court must not only examine the administrative record for errors of law, but must also conduct an independent review of the entire record to determine whether the weight of the evidence supports the administrative findings. If, on the other hand, the administrative decision neither involves nor substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the trial court's review is limited to determining whether the administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Looking to the character and quality of the right involved, we conclude that Pacific's one-year debarment from being able to bid or work on public projects did not implicate a fundamental vested right. Pacific was not prevented from bidding or working on all construction projects, but only from certain kinds of work (i.e., public projects). Hence, it appears that the interest affected was purely economic in this case. It follows that the trial court applied the wrong standard. It should have reviewed DLSE's administrative decision under the substantial evidence test rather than under the independent judgment standard of review.

In order to impose debarment in the present case, it was necessary for DLSE to establish intent to defraud under section 1777.1. That statute provides, in relevant part, as follows: ―Whenever a contractor or subcontractor performing a public works project pursuant to this chapter is found by the Labor Commissioner to be in violation of this chapter with intent to defraud, ... the contractor or subcontractor ... is ineligible for a period of not less than one year or more than three years. "'Intent to defraud‘ means the intent to deceive another person or entity, as defined in this article, and to induce such other person or entity, in reliance upon such deception, to assume, create, transfer, alter or terminate a right, obligation or power with reference to property of any kind."

DLSE's position is that intent to defraud was established by the evidence, in particular Ibarra's testimony that he was paid $15 per hour as confirmed by the paycheck for the week of August 4, 2007, and the certified payroll records for that same week showing that Ibarra was paid prevailing wages of $36.10 per hour and only worked 25 hours that week. No satisfactory explanation was ever provided by Pacific for this glaring discrepancy between Ibarra's actual paycheck reflecting $15 per hour and the contrary representations by Pacific to DSLE. A reasonable conclusion from this evidence is that Pacific violated the prevailing wage law with intent to defraud. We agree with DLSE.
This case is interesting from a Guamanian's perspective because it clearly shows that debarment authority arising from a labor law requirement is vested in the department of labor, which is also alone vested with power to enforce labor laws. California's labor laws therefore do not muddy it procurement laws.  On Guam, the law has confusingly split the authority, with the result that a matter such as this could easily, and does continually, fall through the cracks in the system.

Although the Guam Department of Labor has authority to enforce prevailing wage laws, it does not have the independent authority to debar or suspend a government contractor for violation of the law. The "government of Guam may" terminate the contractor's right to proceed with the part of the work to which the violation is concerned (5 GCA § 55102), but there being no obligation to do so, and often no means by which a contracting officer would discover the violation, there is no effective enforcement of this provision. 

Moreover, "the Treasurer is further authorized and is directed to distribute a list to all departments of the government of Guam giving the names of persons or firms whom he has found to have disregarded their obligations to employees" and "No contract shall be awarded to the persons or firms appearing on this list, or to any firm, corporation, partnership, or association in which such persons or firms have an interest, until three years have elapsed...." (5 GCA § 55103(a)) But the Treasurer is not likely to ever make such a finding; that is a Department of Labor obligation. No such list is likely to ever be produced because it requires too much coordination between agencies to enforce.

Guam Procurement Law contemplates that action may be taken by an agency to suspend or debar a contractor, and gives the Public Auditor administrative review of such an action. (5 GCA § 5426.) Thus, this power does not directly reside within the authority of the Department of Labor. The procurement law power to suspend and debar lists a few justifiable reasons to suspend or debar, but none specifically based on a violation of the prevailing wage law. The closest enumerated cause is "any other cause [an agency] determines to be so serious and compelling as to affect responsibility as a territorial contractor" (§ 5426(b)(5)).

Bill 224-32 is currently pending in the Guam Legislature, and includes an amendment to the causes for suspension or debarment based on prevailing wage law violations; one based "upon a petition of the Department of Labor, failure [of a contractor] to pay employees engaged on the contract in violation of Wage Determination law or contract conditions". There is no requirement that such failure be based on "intent to defraud" as found in the California statute and case reported above. 

Time will tell, if this provision is enacted, whether the Department of Labor will seek to enforce this requirement through the available auspices of the procurement law.

US SENATE REPORT

In the federal arena, a United States Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee recently issued a Majority Staff Report,  "Acting Responsibly? Federal Contractors Frequently Put Workers' Lives and Livelihoods At Risk".

It declares the mandate of government contract law in summary form:
Federal law is intended to prevent taxpayer dollars from increasing the profits of companies with a record of violating federal law in two ways: by requiring contracting officers to assess a prospective contractor’s responsible compliance with federal law prior to awarding a contract, and by allowing agencies to suspend or debar contractors for certain behavior, including violations of federal law, in order to protect the integrity of taxpayer dollars.

It frames the issue this way
The Federal Government Frequently Contracts with Companies that Violate Federal Labor Laws
The report responds that contractor responsibility is in part an issue of integrity, but labor issues do not come to the attention of contracting officers. These determinations, it says, "suffer from flaws that allow taxpayer dollars to be awarded to companies that do not abide by federal labor law." It cautions,
The fact that a company is among the recipients of one of the largest wage or safety penalties does not suggest that any particular company is not responsible or that a company should have limitations placed on its ability to obtain contracts. Rather, the record of non-compliance laid out below suggests that not enough is being done to ensure that compliance with multiple labor laws is being tracked, considered or evaluated as a part of the contracting practice. While the companies that appear below are those that publicly available enforcement data indicates have some of the worst records of compliance with labor laws, more needs to be done to evaluate the gravity, severity and repeated nature of violations to determine if a particular company is indeed a responsible actor.
On the matter of suspension and debarment, the report states:
As previously discussed, in order to best protect the public, agency officials have discretion to debar or suspend contractors under a number of circumstances, including when a contractor is convicted of or found civilly liable for a lack of business integrity or for "any other cause of so serious or compelling a nature that it affects the present responsibility of a contractor."  These provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation provide the Department of Labor with authority to suspend or debar a federal contractor that has a record of non-compliance with federal labor law if the Department were to find that this record of non-compliance was so severe as to demonstrate a lack of business integrity that would impact the present responsibility of the contractor.  However, while the Department suspends and debars companies using the statutory authority provided by the Service Contract Act and the Davis-Bacon Act, the Department does not appear to have debarred a company as a result of OSHA or other wage-related violations, or attempted to cross reference repeat or willful violators of multiple laws.

Additionally, the suspension and debarment process suffers from a number of more widespread problems, including the lack of standardization across the government. Agencies structure and perform their exclusion functions in very different ways, and this affects the degree to which agencies exclude contractors.  Moreover, even when a contractor is debarred or suspended, agencies are authorized to waive a contractor’s exclusion if they determine “there is a compelling reason for such an action.”  Some agencies have regulations that define what constitutes a “compelling reason” while others do not.  Further, these waivers are agency-specific and are not always communicated to other agencies.

Unfortunately, the existing suspension and debarment process is underutilized and inconsistent. At the same time, the debarment process tends to focus directly on conduct related to a specific contract rather than on the overall labor practices of federal contractors.  If Federal agencies are given more tools and encouraged to look to solutions short of debarment or suspension, they could more effectively deter companies that fail to comply with federal labor laws from future violations.
All in all, add labor law issues to the bundle of matters a contracting officer will have to consider apart from but equal to the business of acquiring the things and services the government needs to function.

Wednesday, October 30, 2013

Finding value in local preference

Ontario beefing up procurement rules to favour local construction bids
Since 2006, Ontario has received generally positive reviews for managing public-private partnerships with a focus on value for money, rather than other policy or political goals. In recent years, that approach led to controversial decisions to award projects to foreign bidders, including for Hamilton’s football stadium and Windsor’s $1.4-billion parkway.

Under pressure from the Ontario General Contractors Association and organized-labour allies, Mr. McGuinty brought “local knowledge” into the process at the end of 2012. Bidders are now required to provide “narratives” about experience meeting those standards, navigating permit processes with municipalities and working with the province’s labour force and suppliers. Those considerations are then cumulatively given 10-per-cent weight during requests for quotation (RFQs), the procurement stage that narrows competition down to a few finalists.

Ms. Wynne is now looking for ways to bolster the new criterion. Those could include making “local knowledge” a factor not just in RFQs but also in Requests for Proposals (RFPs), in which Infrastructure Ontario chooses from among the finalists. It is also possible that it could be made to count for more than 10 per cent in RFQs, RFPs or both.

The government also appears to be responding to criticism that “bundling” large quantities of work on the LRT and other projects into one procurement process prevents smaller Ontario companies from competing. Future projects could be broken up into multiple contracts, or winning bidders required to subcontract a minimum share of the work.
New EU procurement rules will ‘rebalance the markets towards social enterprises’