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Showing posts with label Effective specifications. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Effective specifications. Show all posts

Sunday, March 18, 2018

Putting brakes on a mule. Whoa, Mule!!

US military says robotic pack mules are too noisy to use (2015)
The US military has reportedly shelved development of its robotic pack mule — the Boston Dynamics-built Legged Squad Support System or LS3. According to a report from Military.com, there are no "future experiments or upgrades planned" for the mechanical beast of burden, with the program in need of new contracts or support from senior military figures before it can be resurrected. And the reason for this parting of ways? LS3 was apparently too noisy to make a good soldier. Over the course of its development, LS3 was given updates to make it more autonomous, able to automatically follow humans and even respond to basic voice commands like "follow," "sit," and "stay." But, it seems it never really became all that quiet. In videos of the barrel-chested robot in action during military trials last summer, it sounds as loud as a sit-on lawnmower — definitely not the sort of companion you'd want bumbling alongside you on a nighttime patrol.

Army on Accelerated Path to Buy as Many as 5,700 Robotic Mules (2/9/2018)
Requirements for robotic mules go back at least to 2001 when the now canceled Future Combat Systems was conceived.An autonomous multifunctional utility logistics and equipment vehicle survived the FCS cancelation and was transferred to the follow-on Brigade Combat Team Modernization program, but that effort was eventually scrapped as well. Since then, development of robotic mules continued, with four of the vehicles reaching Afghanistan in 2012 for a battlefield assessment. The Lockheed Martin-built squad mission support system was deployed there for about five months. When the Army put out a call for robotic mules to take part in a vendor solution assessment in September and October, seven robot manufacturers were able to bring technically mature, off-the-shelf robotic mules.

After more than a decade of experimenting with robotic mules designed to take the load off overburdened foot soldiers, the service is on an accelerated path to field up to 5,700 squad multi-purpose equipment transport robotic vehicles in a winner-takes-all competition that may wrap up as early as 2019. Over the course of its development, LS3 was given updates to make it more autonomous, able to automatically follow humans and even respond to basic voice commands like "follow," "sit," and "stay." But, it seems it never really became all that quiet. In videos of the barrel-chested robot in action during military trials last summer, it sounds as loud as a sit-on lawnmower — definitely not the sort of companion you'd want bumbling alongside you on a nighttime patrol.

The program is using an “other transaction authority” contracting vehicle to rapidly transition the technology from experiments to a program of record. OTAs are normally used to bring in nontraditional contractors to make prototypes. The Army is in the middle of selecting a contractor after bringing in seven vendors with eight different vehicles in 2017 to perform operational tests. “That is significantly faster than we have been able to do previous efforts,” Maj. Gen. John George, director for force development, Army G-8, told reporters. “That is the beauty of the new OTA process. If you have a competition though OTA, you can go to procurement and turn it into a program of record,” George said. A typical program of this kind would take upwards of 10 years, he said. “The Army wants to go faster. It wants and needs to go faster,” he added.

But this is a “good news story,” he said. “We are doing that because we have learned to hack our own system” and by using the revised other transaction authority rules. “What has changed is that the transition mechanism provided in 10 USC 2371b (h), added by the 2016 NDAA, provides a greatly simplified way of transitioning the contracting. The follow-on production effort after a successful prototype OT can be executed as a production OT or awarded as a non-competitive procurement contract,” according to Richard Dunn, founder and consultant with the Strategic Institute for Innovation in Government Contracting.
Army Revamps Strategy to Acquire Robotic Mules (3/24/2017)
The Army intends to buy 20 robotic mules from manufacturers and send them out with brigades for a year-long operational test and evaluation, the service’s program manager in charge of unmanned ground systems said March 23. Bryan McVeigh, project manager for force protection, said a recent Army Requirements Oversight Council looking at the squad multipurpose equipment transport (SMET) vehicle put the breaks on the program, which was heading for fielding in the early 2020s. The council said, “Wait a minute guys, You’re laying out a standard program of record. This is taking too long. This is way too much testing. We’re not even sure this is what we want,” McVeigh said. Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Mark Milley instructed the PEO to go back and look at the things that really matter and get rid of the rest, McVeigh said.

Earlier in the conference, a senior service official said the proposed prices they had seen for SMETs had given officials “sticker shock.” “I’m not telling you what to bid on your price. But I am telling what we think it should cost,” McVeigh said. The vehicle after it reaches its assembly point will then have to switch over to an unmanned mode. “How do I pull what seems to be mutually exclusive design characteristics together?” McVeigh asked. That will be a tough problem for the manufacturers, he acknowledged.

The Army wants two basic configurations: one similar to the vehicles that have been tested and another that will have a seat and steering wheel so it can be optionally manned, he said. The reason for the optionally manned version is one of logistics. “How do I get from an airport to an assembly area? That kind of leads me to an optionally manned solution. There are not enough prime movers to tow all the systems that are supposed to be issued to the brigade,” he said.PEO force protection will proceed with an SMET rodeo as early as August, McVeigh said at the National Defense Industrial Association’s Robotic Capabilities conference in Springfield, Virginia. How is it going to be operated? Will it use a cord, a joystick or follow soldiers using breadcrumbs? Can it be towed at 20, 30 or 50 miles per hour without flipping over? The more capability the robot makers offer, the higher the score on their evaluation, he said.

A request for information will be published “shortly,” he said. “I need your feedback to make sure what I have in mind is executable. This is absolutely critical.” He needs to know how long it will take to get a prototype built. As for delivering the models by August: “I need you to tell me if I’m on drugs,” he said. Companies participating will be reimbursed for their expenses.

There are four possible scenarios, McVeigh said. The first is that one of the manufacturers “hits it out of the park” and gives the Army exactly what it wants. He has the authority to then go into limited production with a traditional acquisition contract. Another scenario is that a couple of the models do well, but are not quite right. There would be new requirements written, some changes, and then a down-select to one vendor. The third outcome is: “Thank you all for playing. Pick up your trophies on the way out. We learned that what we were asking for isn’t in the art of the doable.” The Army would return to an engineering, manufacturing and development phase and open up the contract again. The fourth option simply is that the Army decides it doesn’t need this capability, he said.
A note to newbies to this blog: I almost always slice and dice articles, leave out critical material, paraphrase, and add comment for purposes of turning real life situations into teachable procurement examples. Do not rely on my renditions to know the full story, or intent, of the article -- read the original at the link(s) provided.

Monday, October 5, 2015

Taking the cash stream out of streamlining

DCYF likely to bring some services back in-house as part of an overhaul
When Rhode Iland's financially ailing child welfare system decided to purchase most of its services from two private nonprofit networks three years ago, officials praised the new "system of care" as a model for streamlining services and cutting costs. A little more than three-and-a-half years later the continuation of the practice appears unlikely.

After years of cost overruns, Jamia R. McDonald, chief strategy officer and the agency's new de facto head, no longer believes that networks are the most efficient way to deliver services. Instead, it's likely that the agency will bring some services back in house and bid out others individually. "The theory was these administrative efficiencies could be gained by overseeing multiple activities .... The agency didn't posture itself well to manage that. We moved administrative oversight. We didn't restructure in any way in-house, and we also didn't create any oversight that ensured [the networks] delivered," McDonald said.

"When you have to change a system, I don't think you turn it off one day and turn on another. If we really want to think differently, the longer we bind ourselves into certain activities, the less opportunity we have to pivot," McDonald said.

Marty Sinnott, chief executive officer of Child & Family Rhode Island and head of the Rhode Island Care Management Network, put it more bluntly: "The contracts were poorly designed and poorly written right out of the gate. The networks have at least kept the lid on what is a poorly designed and poorly managed child welfare system," Sinnott said. "The system of care contracts are neither the problem or the solution. They have functioned under bad public policy and bad public leadership."

In 2012, the state Department of Children, Youth and Families signed three-year contracts with the two providers. The networks assign children under state care to residential and congregate care and subcontract with shelters and other service providers — and have consistently overspent their budgets. There are currently 3,095 children in DCYF care, a number that has grown over three years. (Sinnott pointed to a 30-percent increase over three years in the number of reports of abuse and neglect.) The contracts were set to expire June 30. After months of negotiations, they have been extended, but only for six months.

The fact that the DCYF appeared poised to make changes is not unexpected. In July, Governor Raimondo promised that the "dysfunctional" agency would be overhauled amid a litany of problems, including millions freely spent on contracts with no performance management, and state payment and procurement procedures that had been skirted.

The large network contracts are not the only DCYF agreements headed for change. McDonald said the agency has allowed some contracts for "redundant" services to expire, and other contracts have been reduced. "There were examples where we bought the same service two or three times, and we never used any of those vendors so there was no point in extending," McDonald said, referencing an issue highlighted in an audit of the DCYF this summer.

Tuesday, January 13, 2015

The "Toyota Way" has gone wayward

Over and over, we hear that government should purchase like private business, and develop better working relationships and collaboration with its suppliers. Maybe, but consider this case in point (please read the article at the link): Daihatsu Dismantling 'Toyota Way' As Market Changes, by Norihiko Shirouzu, Reuters
Daihatsu Motor Co launched the Mira e:S minicar in 2011, and the car was a hit. A number of improvements – in manufacturing, engineering, procurement – went into the car. But the real secret to success, says Kosuke Shiramizu, Daihatsu’s chairman at the time, lay in taking something out of the company’s business model. Daihatsu shaved off roughly $1,000 in the manufacturing costs of the car by dismantling its keiretsu - an informal but close interlocking business relationship between a manufacturer and its suppliers, cemented by cross-shareholdings and personnel exchanges.

Keiretsu, pundits preached, defused adversarial relationships between assembler and supplier, allowing them to share information and create better product quality. Hence Japanese automakers were able to leap ahead. [Cause and effect are not so easily understood.]

Shiramizu says the days of the keiretsu are numbered. Companies, he says, are competing for price and value by using market mechanisms instead of relationship-based arrangements. "The Toyota way is the high-cost way,” says Shiramizu, 74, in an interview at Daihatsu headquarters in the Osaka suburb of Ikeda. “Keiretsu doesn’t work anymore. If we stick with it, Daihatsu won't survive. Toyota might face a similar fate, too."

Shiramizu, who became advisor to Daihatsu's board and technical executive after stepping down as chairman three and a half years ago, says his parts procurement reform isn’t meant to be a template for Toyota. But it is being taken seriously there, he says.

Two major shifts over the past two decades in the competitive landscape have been working against Japanese car makers and their keiretsu systems.

First, Western rivals dramatically closed the gap with the Japanese. That was partly due to the fact cars have become easier to design and manufacture, because they are less mechanical and are controlled more electronically. Competition thus shifted to who could offer more value to the customer: the highest fuel economy, the sexiest look, and the most compelling functions for the lowest price.

The other competitive shift came from the emerging world. Keiretsu worked beautifully for Toyota because an overwhelming majority of the finely engineered cars it made were sold in the high-priced developed markets of the United States, Europe and Japan. That began changing in the early 2000s, with the rise of emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey. These economies already collectively buy half of the automobiles sold worldwide today.

Daihatsu is mostly in the lower end of the market. As it began buying more components from Toyota-group suppliers such as Denso and Aisin Seiki over the years, it was also stuck with Toyota's lofty quality standards. Shiramizu says Toyota’s specs are often too high for vehicles that some Daihatsu officials describe as “sandals,” as opposed to the dress shoes that Toyota makes. “Do we need parts and cars that withstand the desert heat in Arizona?” Shiramizu asks.

Shiramizu's first move was to send agents of change into the company’s procurement office. Until then, Daihatsu's purchasing office was staffed by non-technical types with little knowledge on how components are designed and produced and, says Shiramizu, "no ability to assess true cost." Instead of attacking costs, those purchasing managers put a priority on their relationships with suppliers - getting wined and dined and showered with gifts in the process, Shiramizu says.

Shiramizu then initiated another move: abolishing the “account” system that governed procurement deals. The status quo, he says, made it almost impossible for new, non-Toyota-group suppliers to do business with Daihatsu, even when they offered better quality and price. Under the account system, only existing suppliers with Daihatsu accounts could supply parts to Daihatsu. [Sounds a bit like the "best value" focus on "proven reliability".]

It allowed Shiramizu to deploy his new procurement leaders in the hunt for lower-cost parts across Japan - and beyond to China, Indonesia and India. Inoue, who was plucked out of the production engineering division by Shiramizu, and his team focused on China. The team quickly found Chinese suppliers of windshields, mirrors, speakers, and aluminum wheels at savings up to 50 percent.

One of the team's most critical findings was not a new supplier, however. It was the discovery that some account holders were slapping a hefty margin on components they procured cheaply in China.

Daihatsu last year bought approximately 1.3 billion yen worth of aluminum wheels in China without going through middlemen. “We have too many middlemen skimming off," Shiramizu says. "Getting rid of those middlemen is the shortest cut to cost savings.”

Buying directly from those suppliers has made the job of procurement specialists more complex. They have to ensure that the logistics for parts delivery are sound, making sure equipment orders are delivered to plants on time. It's worth it, Daihatsu officials say.

The China team discovered factory hubs in the eastern China province of Zhejiang for dirt-cheap generic auto parts – or, as one Daihatsu executive puts it, “fakes.” The results have been mixed: Designs by the generic parts producers are often robust, but the production quality is unreliable, according to Daihatsu officials.

One solution being pursued now is to produce on its own many of the core, high-ticket parts Daihatsu currently buys from Toyota suppliers. Those include air-conditioning and steering systems, drive shafts and wire harnesses. “Toyota suppliers aren't going to like it,” one official says, “but our basic philosophy is to go ‘in house’ - and that means no more middlemen.
Daihatsu had to find a better way to procure when it faced an austere emerging marketplace. That is exactly the condition the US, and other advanced economies, are in: austerity is the new black.

One of my takeaways from this fascinating case study is that we should not allow a fully assembled (or "bundled") product to determine if something should be made subject to "best value" rather than low price bidding.

Here, Daihatsu took the product apart, and even if it did not then acquire each part independently, it learned the true cost of the product, and that is a valuable piece of knowledge when buying in bulk, versus building in house. That's some serious market research.

An article I referenced in a recent post contained a statement by the author of it, Eric S. Crusius, that
"prior to the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act, which jumped-started best-value contracting in the federal marketplace, a common refrain heard in the federal market was “good enough for the government.” In other words, the government was content to settle for mediocrity—or worse."
That's a curious turn of phrase, as pointed out by the distinguished James F. Nagle, in his treatise, "History of Government Contracting". He points out that, in the early days of US procurement, before the Civil War, the government abandoned purchasing weaponry and other things from manufacturers when it found it could make all the parts and then assemble them "in house" in US armories and ship yards. It thereby developed the specifications needed to get exactly what it wanted, both in house and from suppliers. He says,
The rigorous inspection standards gave rise to a saying still in use today but with vastly different meaning. The saying was "close enough for government work". Originally the saying was a boast by contractors to would-be commercial customers, that their products were so well manufactured that the government would accept them even with its known high standards. Unfortunately, by the middle of the twentieth century because of scandals [recounted in the book], the same saying now is used to denote a feeling by a contractor that even shoddy work will be accepted by the government.
If we are ignorant of history, we are bound to repeat its mistakes. Taking the steps Daihatsu has taken are something out of the early days of US federal procurement; if they can do that and avoid the scandals Dr. Nagle described, we may go somewhere in procurement where man has gone before, but survive it with our integrity intact.

Sunday, January 11, 2015

Procurement is boring

How long was it from the invention of the wheel to mass production of automobiles? 

If you compress that time line down to months or years, you begin to understand the problem of procuring anything when the conditions requiring its acquisition change faster than production of the thing can keep up.

That was my first reaction to reading an item this morning, being outraged by the claim it made, then looking further into it and feeling outraged that the article intended to outrage me in the first instance.

It all happened when I got a Google News link to this: The Comedy the Pentagon Wishes We’d Forget. (Now, the movie this is based on and the book that gave rise to it are from pre-Millineal times, but there it was in today's news items.)
In the early 1980s, Air Force colonel James Burton was part of a group of reformers who, frustrated by billions wasted on needless research and development, attempted to change how the military did business. The Pentagon Wars chronicles his reform movement and the corruption within the Defense Department’s procurement process.

The Bradley fighting vehicle was a weapon system with countless flaws. Part troop transport, part fighting vehicle and part scout—it didn’t do any of these jobs well. The Army resisted Burton’s requests for a live-fire exercise. Ultimately, Burton got his exercise and proved that the Bradley needed serious changes. Despite the upgrades, the APC still had problems. It survived the 1991 Gulf War, taking out more Iraqi tanks than the M-1 Abrams. Quite a feat for a troop carrier. It didn’t fare as well on its return trip to Iraq in 2003. The Bradley proved vulnerable to improvised explosives and rocket-propelled grenades. It’s not an ideal counterinsurgency vehicle.

The Pentagon’s procurement process still produces broken weapon systems.
Then I read another article, this one a couple of years old, which said the whole thing could have been cleared up if only Burton had had a Project Manager as part of his team.

The Pentagon Wars – A Product Management Disaster
The film depicts the development of the Bradley fighting vehicle. Col Burton was appointed by Congress as an outsider to oversee the testing of new weapons in development, including the Bradley. In order to get up to speed with the development history of the Bradley, Burton dives into the mountain of paperwork documenting it’s development. This is where we pick up the movie below for a 11-min scene that takes us through the “product development process” in flashbacks.
I presume this 11 minute scene is what the first article above referred to as "The design-by-committee is one of the funniest moments in the 1998 HBO film The Pentagon Wars. It’s also uncomfortably close to the truth."

I sensed a real scandal. Alas, I then came across this forum below. 

It begins with a question about the development of the Bradley. The responses were enlightening, and presumably more credible than the Hollywood version. 

It seems all the changes in the Bradley were not born of an 11 minute design-by-committee scene.

Topic: Truth to The Pentagon Wars and the Bradley IFV??
Gubler: Rule number one of understanding history: never, ever take your history lesson from Hollywood. The story as outlined in ‘Pentagon Wars’ is as misleading and full of sh*t as the rest of that movie.

Gubler (again, after an exchange of comments): The movie Pentagon Wars and to a lesser extent the book primarily rely on ignorance of the armour needs and specifics of the Bradley to create the appearance of scandal.

The Bradley was designed to be resistant to splinters from nearby bursts of 152mm high explosive shells and hits from 14.5mm armour piercing bullets fired by Soviet heavy machineguns. These of course are not the only Soviet weapons on the battlefield but they were the type of weapons the Bradley was mostly going to be exposed to in its normal mode of use on a linear battlefield.

This protection requirement was based on how armoured personnel carriers (APCs), later renamed infantry fighter vehicles (IFV), were to be used on the linear battlefield in places like West Germany trying to stop a Soviet invasion. That is the vehicles move the infantry forward through the area target suppression fires of the Soviets but don’t close with the enemy to destroy them. The infantry do the later on foot. It is this closing with the enemy on the battlefield that exposes an APC to the fires of anti-tank weapons like the RPG or BMP’s 73mm gun. Weapons that are not effective at long range. Also the APC didn’t have to worry about long range anti-tank weapons like guided missiles or enemy tank guns because it was never to remain stationary while exposed to enemy direct fires like a tank does. However the type of suppressive fires they would face are artillery barrages and long range machinegun fires.

When the earlier APCs were designed (M75, M59, M113) the typical Soviet weapons used for suppressive fires were 122mm artillery and 7.62mm machineguns. So they were designed to be resistant to these weapons. But in the 1950s and 60s the Soviets upgraded these weapons to 152mm artillery and 14.5mm machineguns. So the Bradley and its predecessor the XM723 were specified to be resistant to these more lethal weapons the Soviets would use for their area supression.

In non-linear battles APCs were found to be exposed to anti-tank fires. As was seen in counter insurgency wars or deep penetration offensive actions like the IDF applied in Lebanon in 1982. Since they were never designed to be resistant to these types of  weapons they suffered high losses. But this was for the US at least a secondary requirement as the primary and most important battlefield was the linear defensive war in West Germany. After the Bradley was introduced the Soviets upgraded the BMP with a 30mm gun that could fire bursts of armour piercing ammunition to long range in place of the 14.5mm gun. This required an upgrading of the Bradley’s armour in the A2 version to be resistant to the 30mm armour piercing round. While claimed as a response to the Burton trials it had nothing to do with it.

The issue about vehicle survivability that Burton seized upon when the vaporifics issue was shown to be so much hot air was crew survivability after a penetrating hit. This argument, completely factually correct, was that the APCs like the Bradley with their fuel and ammunition stored inside alongside the large number of human occupants were highly dangerous after being hit and penetrated. That the sympathetic explosions of the fuel and ammunition made it extremely unlikely any of the crew would escape the vehicle after being hit.

This was of course no surprise to anyone involved in the design and use of APCs including the Bradley. Because of course it wasn’t designed to be exposed to these kinds of fires in the first place so why make it survivable to such a hit? You don’t build a street car to survive a roll over at speeds over 250 kph (~150 mph) because they don’t drive that fast. But you do build a racing car to survive such a roll over. However the sight of a burnt out APC is as emotive as a crushed street car even if the likelihood in the primary means of operations was extremely low. Burton was able to get the Army to build a Bradley with all fuel and ammunition moved to separate armoured boxes within or outside the vehicle. This vehicle was never entered into production however and fans of the Pentagon Wars frequently mistake this vehicle for the A2 armour upgrade. Even though the later vehicle retained all of its fuel and ammunition inside the vehicle alongside the occupants.

Since the end of the Cold War and an increasing focus on counter insurgency and offensive operations the US Army and others have upgraded their protection requirements for APCs.  Now they are often as high as tanks and with high flank protection. But this does not invalidate the effectiveness of the original design of protection for the Bradley. A vehicle that at its time of introduction was along with the West German Marder the most protected APC in the world and if asked to do what it was designed for would have provided adequate protection for infantry mobility in West Germany against a Soviet invasion.

Wednesday, December 17, 2014

Are we hard wired to corrupt our procurement systems?

The following article is, in original form, quite long, and a compelling story.  This extract is only a taste, and you really would do well to read the whole piece at the link.  It is a fine example of the difficulties government has in outsourcing services to private contractors.  

No worries; some day robots will provide all our services, and surely they will be much more uniformly competent, reasonable, selfless, up-datable to the latest technology and software, and unobtrusive, as well as inexpensive and non-proprietary?

Insiders’ rules: How government ‘wires’ contracts to get the people it wants
In this trial, one of the largest ever involving alleged white-collar crime, Canadians have been afforded rare glimpses into a government procurement system that is billed as competitive, open and fair but is actually riddled with tweaks and quirks that give bureaucrats significant power to determine outcomes.

It’s why the accused formed bidding alliances that are now a central issue in the ongoing trial in the Ottawa courtroom of Superior Court Judge Bonnie Warkentin. A 14-member jury is left to sort out whether those alliances were made known to federal contract officials, as required by the Competition Act.

While events leading to the trial occurred nearly a decade ago, little fundamental about the system has changed, the Citizen has determined through dozens of interviews with consultants, suppliers and former government contracting officials.

Suppliers have lived with the reality of rigid bureaucratic control for so long, it seems almost normal. They no longer think it odd that when departments issue a call for bids or proposals, the first order of business is to analyze the documents for evidence of ‘wiring.’

They’re looking for signs the government has already identified the winner or a preferred candidate. If it has, there’s usually no point in wasting time and money preparing a proposal that can easily run to 100 pages for something as simple as providing a few computer technology experts under contract.

“We see it all the time,” says the vice-president of a firm that has secured more than $100 million dollars worth of technology services contracts over the past decade from the federal government. “If it’s wired, we just move on to the next bid.”

Potential suppliers can tell if a request for bids is wired because the documents demand skills or experience so specific that only one or two firms can meet the minimum standard. Often these skills bear startling similarity to those possessed by contractors already on the job.

This is the real clue as to what’s behind this complex process — and the reason for it is simple: There’s an inherent conflict between running competitions and the desire of federal departments to solve practical problems by purchasing the services of specific, experienced consultants.

a central objective for many public servants is to ensure that important departmental projects get done on time and within budget. Whether this involves refurbishing the House of Commons or upgrading computer networks, government managers keen to avoid scandal want the best professionals possible on the job.

Thanks to many years of government downsizing, public service managers can no longer count on finding them in-house. So they purchase the know-how from the private sector. An estimated 60,000 private contractors or consultants are on the job at any given moment including about 25,000 in the National Capital Region alone. Not only do many of them work alongside full-time government employees, the departments involved have come to rely on them heavily.

This was certainly the case at the Canada Border Services Agency, which issued eight of the requests for proposals that are at the heart of the trial into alleged bid rigging.

“Because of their skills, consultants were actually the team leaders in the design and architecture (of computer systems),” Daniel Imbeau, a former manager with the CBSA, testified earlier this month. “A lot of times they were training our employees.”

The consultants, though, operate under finite contracts. When these come up for renewal, the CBSA and other departments are left to figure out how to make sure the right consultants – the incumbents — return.

The complication of course is that the government cannot – as a matter of sheer practicality – negotiate contracts with tens of thousands of individual consultants. They need to sign up with a corporate supplier such as Veritaaq, which in turn holds a contract with the government.

What we end up with is this world of artificial or constrained competition – in which federal departments make clear which consultants the suppliers should put forward during competitions. In many ways, consultants are just an extension of the public service. If they were employees, there would be no confusion about roles and no need to conduct competitions for their services.

Departments have every right to insist on certain types of experience and training, as long as they don’t cross the line and break the rules while they’re bending them in the direction they want.

Such was the case for instance with a major moving services contract sought by Envoy. The government last month revealed it had finally settled out of court, after agreeing to pay Envoy $35 million in lost profits and other damages. Envoy lost competitions against Royal Lepage Relocation Services (now Brookfield Global Relocation Services) in 2002 and 2004 – thanks to a rigged request for proposals.

Superior Court Justice Peter Innis noted in a ruling last year that the government “had acted intentionally to unfairly favour Royal Lepage Relocation Services, the incumbent.” Public Works officials had done so, he added, by weighting the technical aspects more heavily and, most crucially, by misleading Envoy about the true costs of providing property management services.

Innis concluded that Royal Lepage had used its insiders’ knowledge to reflect the fact hardly anyone actually used property management services while Envoy bid “using the grossly over-estimated values of PMS” described in the bid documents.” The inevitable result: Envoy lost.

The $1-billion-a-year informatics niche – which includes more than 200 firms in the Ottawa area alone — provides uniquely fertile ground for wiring. In part this is because its job descriptions are so complex. Knowledgeable bureaucrats can and do exclude consultants by requiring one extra computer language or one additional year of experience in an obscure software application among the compulsory features of a bid.

The level of detail in the requests for proposals is extraordinary. For example, CBSA last year published a 404-page RFP that listed nearly 100 technologies at play in the agency’s communications systems. The document noted that CBSA wanted to fill or renew hundreds of positions for information technology consultants involving 43 different categories of technical expertise.

On top of that, a supplier had to have done at least five information technology contracts each worth in excess of $1 million during the previous five years. Three of them had to have involved a government client.

The requirements prompted a lot of angst.

“As currently structured this RFP has the potential to prevent a notable majority of the vendors presently providing these services to CBSA to qualify,” one potential supplier wrote to the officials running the competition. “Will the Crown consider re-issuing this RFP?” the firm continued.

“No,” was the response from Public Works, the central agency that negotiates contracts on behalf of most federal departments.

CBSA last year whittled its list of informatics suppliers to fewer than 20 from nearly 50. The only new ones were the giants of the industry – IBM Corp. of New York and CGI Group of Montreal, both of which employ thousands of technical experts and could therefore meet the very difficult minimum requirements having to do with sheer volume. Smaller suppliers left out in the cold believe this was the point of the exercise.

When it comes to wiring bids, there are many shades of gray. For instance, a technical requirement that eliminates a consultant or supplier could very well reflect a rare set of skills essential for upgrading very old government computers – and not a deliberate desire to knock out the competition.

A former government official who has worked both sides of the street notes there is often a fine line in establishing technical requirements.

“You don’t want to set them so low that you’re faced with evaluating a ton of bidders,” he says, “on the other hand, you don’t want to make them so difficult you wind up with no competition.”

“We gave up trying,” said a senior executive with a large national firm that provides real estate advice and services. “The rules of the competitions kept changing and it always seemed as though conversations were taking place that we were never part of.”

Saturday, September 6, 2014

Market research in R&D must be integrated with needs assesment and specification crafting

Procurement Reforms Reignite Feud Between Weapon Buyers and Testers
Pentagon procurement chief Frank Kendall is proposing changes in how weapon systems are tested. He suggests tests should be performed earlier in the design cycle than is customarily done.

The sooner the testing, he says, the sooner the Pentagon will catch problems before the military sinks huge amounts of money into a program. This would help avert expensive redesigns and modifications — a costly lesson the Pentagon learned over the past decade from the F-35 fighter program.

Kendall also believes that earlier "developmental" testing can help reduce the cost of "operational" testing — realistic live-fire drills that are mandated by law before any weapon systems goes into production.

"We are trying to have more efficient test programs overall, get the data out before we make production decisions. That's critical to design stability," Kendall told National Defense after delivering a speech at a recent conference on acquisition reform. Program managers should have more data about how their systems perform before they begin operational tests, Kendall said. "We will continue to try to blend operational testing and developmental testing."

Kendall's deputy, Darlene Costello, in a speech to a test-and-evaluation industry conference last month, explained the rationale for planned changes related to weapon tests. There is now a "big emphasis on what we do before an RFP goes out. ... Testing is a big part of that," said Costello, who is director of program and acquisition management.

But the Pentagon's plan to wring out more "efficiency" from testing has stirred old animosities between the procurement shop and the office of the director of operational test and evaluation — which operates independently from the procurement office and reports directly to the secretary of defense. DOT&E, as the testing office is known, has been a thorn in the side of many big-ticket weapon programs. Kendall's comments are raising fears in the testing community that their budgets will be gutted.

For many years, program managers have sought to have more control over test reports before DOT&E releases them to Congress and the news media. Procurement officials would rather have test results reported directly to them and have greater say in what information is disclosed.

After operational testers gave the Navy’s littoral combat ship a scathing review in their fiscal year 2012 annual report to Congress, service officials were unprepared for the political damage the report would cause. Testers concluded the ship lacked firepower and was not survivable in high intensity conflict.

Speaking at the same conference, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation J. Michael Gilmore pushed back on the notion that testing costs should be treated as expendable overhead. "How are you going to compress testing in this era of constrained budgets? I think it's a mistake. It accepts the premise that testing is driving increased cost," he said. "The facts don't support that premise. We want to make sure we do testing as rigorously and as often as we can."

Infighting between program officers and testers is par for the course at the Defense Department. Kendall's predecessor Ashton Carter commissioned an independent team in 2011 to probe complaints that developmental and operational testing contribute to excessive cost and schedule slippages in programs.

At the root of the problems that have plagued major Pentagon programs is the way the military services define their requirements, said Gilmore. "Oftentimes requirements are defined in technical specifications. That's OK, but insufficient to ensure a system provides military utility." He cited the Navy's P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft as a case in point. In operational tests last year, the aircraft showed it could fly, but it was not able to perform key missions like wide-area antisubmarine surveillance. Gilmore blamed the flap on the Navy because it had not specified antisubmarine warfare as a "key performance parameter."

Poorly written requirements continue to haunt programs, he said. "In this wonderful town, common sense doesn't play a role." Gilmore said many of the key parameters for the F-35 joint strike fighter relate to aircraft performance and payload capacity. "If we were just going to test KPPs, we would not fly combat missions, we would not penetrate air defenses, we would just fly off the carrier and back. ... How meaningful are these requirements?"

The Army, he said, wasted billions of dollars on a future combat system and on digital radios that never materialized. Its leaders were guilty of "approving requirements that are not achievable." Some programs get to operational testing and still don't have concepts for how they will operate, he said. "If the testing community played a more prominent role in requirements — and that's a big if — perhaps we could have avoided these mistakes," Gilmore said.

Gilmore suggested major programs should have a firm "test and evaluation master plan" before an RFP is written. "I have never understood when I am told we cannot do a T&E master plan until we get a response back from contractors. How can you generate a meaningful RFP without a draft test plan? Just as importantly, how can you evaluate the responses industry provides? I don't get it. What I fear is that some of these RFP evaluations are check mark exercises. I hope that's not the case."
The handy DAU ACQuipedia site (I trust it if my browser baulks; up to you) describes market research in the federal acquisition arena, probably a good best practices guide.

This is only an excerpt, which I, as usual, may feel free to cut, paste, rearrange, omit, etc.: read the whole piece at the link.
To understand the subject of market research we must begin within its definition of being described as a “continuous process for gathering data.” That process takes shape from both a strategic and a tactical vantage point. Strategic market research is that overarching process of market “surveillance” that will take place continuously throughout the entire acquisition lifecycle. From the early stages of the Material Solution Analysis Phase through to the final steps in the Operations and Support Phase; acquisition workforce members in all disciplines are engaged at varying degrees of market research to remain knowledgeable in market developments that may meet government requirements.

Market research is conducted by all members of the acquisition team including contracting (business advisors), program managers, engineers, logisticians, legal staff, test and evaluation personnel, cost specialists, the customer, etc. Though each may focus attention toward specific aspects, their ultimate goal is to pull together the necessary information to be analyzed so an informed decision can be achieved. While it is necessary for every acquisition as stated earlier, the extent of research that may be required is dependent on five variables which are, the complexity of the acquisition, how urgent the need, the estimated dollar value, how readily information is available, and past experience with the product or service being acquired.

In most occupations, they say “the job isn’t done til the paperwork’s complete!” Well, in contracting that axiom is especially true. There are a number of functions and tasks contracting professionals must engage in to exercise prudent use of taxpayer dollars and in many instances the trail of logic must be fully supported and documented for the official record to stand up to the possible scrutiny of public interest. Market research is one such task that the FAR both suggests and requires documentation.
I tend to think of R&D as practical market research: since the need is fuzzy to begin with, it requires a constant information loop to assure what the need is at the time of acquisition, what the market has, what the market has the ability to provide if it doesn't have it, and what's it going to cost (is it "worth" it?). 

It is certainly not a check-the-box exercise, as Director Gilmore mentioned. And it should never be one, even if acquiring routinely used products, such as the portable radio equipment the FBI had decided to purchase from Motorola on a sole-source basis.

Sunday, February 9, 2014

The Canadianization of military procurement

Iain Hunter: Defence procurement is not about war
Last week, Public Works Minister Diane Finley outlined for defence contractors and lobbyists a new strategy to be run by a secretariat in her department that will challenge expressed military requirements and emphasize “international sales opportunities” for Canadian companies engaged in filling them. She said conditions attached by military planners to procurements “too often appear to be set to achieve pre-determined outcomes.”

In other words, the brass is setting specifications that are so precise that they favour the plane or truck they think is best, and therefore one bidder. And with one bidder in the running, the price inevitably is higher, and better economic spinoffs might be lost.

It wasn’t long ago that nations acquired things like tanks, ships and planes solely for the purpose of fighting wars. Today, the tanks, ships and planes are called platforms and their purpose is not just military.

Defence procurement in Canada also is about things like industrial and regional benefits, value to the Canadian economy, global markets and thriving domestic defence contractors.

There might be some retired colonels and commodores who find this odd, but in an age when so much stuff rusts out before it can be used in battle, and when new technologies have to be found to meet rapidly changing threats, a lot more than defence of the realm is at stake.

And as new “platforms” become more expensive, it makes sense to upgrade and maintain existing ones. Canadian defence analysts say that for every dollar, or million dollars, spent to acquire a new engine of war, five dollars or $5 million will be spent to keep it working over a life cycle of 30 years or more.

And that means that when the shiny new engine is unpacked, Canadian firms must find in the crate a guarantee that they have the terms and conditions, including access to intellectual property, to do the maintenance.
- See more at: http://www.timescolonist.com/opinion/iain-hunter-defence-procurement-is-not-about-war-1.842878#sthash.EHTfhdGE.dpuf
Canada revamps military procurement policy after controversies
Defense is one area where countries are allowed under international trade rules to favor their own industries. The question then becomes one of how much more governments are willing to pay to get domestic benefits. In addition to the governance changes, Finley will also now require that bidders for major projects put together a "value proposition" that will show what industrial spinoffs and subcontracts would go to Canadian companies. This would be given a 10 percent weight, suggesting that companies promising rich industrial benefits to Canada could still win even if their costs are slightly higher than those of their rivals.
Leveraging Defence Procurement to Create Jobs and Economic Growth in Canada
The three key objectives of the Defence Procurement Strategy (DPS) are to: deliver the right equipment to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the Canadian Coast Guard in a timely manner; leverage our purchases of defence equipment to create jobs and economic growth in Canada; and streamline defence procurement processes.

The Defence Procurement Strategy (DPS) represents a fundamental change in the Government of Canada's approach to defence procurement.
New plan for military procurement dilutes power of defence department
Finley sought to assure Canadians “that the capability of our men and women in uniform will remain paramount.” But she also left no doubt that the government is counting on industry turning $240 billion in planned defence spending over the next two decades into high-value, high-skill jobs.

“The defence procurement strategy underlines the goals that our government has had from the start,” she said. “Jobs, growth and economic prosperity. That’s what we pledged to Canadians. And that’s what we’ve been delivering.”

Defence officials had quietly expressed concern about military procurement being shifted too far towards business interests, warning in a secret briefing in November 2012 that National Defence “would, all things being equal, likely obtain less equipment and services.” The warning is rooted in fears the government will end up paying a premium to buy Canadian or boost otherwise boost Canadian industry, which is what is already happening with the government’s $38-billion national shipbuilding plan.
Canada Unveils Sweeping New Procurement Rules
The government’s initiatives closely follow a report from the Canadian government’s procurement adviser issued last year, which recommended that foreign defense companies be required to provide domestic companies with quality offset work in a number of key areas such as cybersecurity, training systems and soldier protection. The 88-page report, titled “Canada First: Leveraging Defence Procurement Through Key Industrial Capabilities,” was aimed at addressing growing frustration among Canadian defense firms that complain they have seen little quality work from the billions of dollars of military contracts announced in the past several years by Canada’s Conservative Party government. Those include the purchases of tanks, helicopters and transport aircraft.

The report from Tom Jenkins, special procurement adviser, noted that the Canadian government intends to invest CAN $240 billion (US $216 billion on new defense equipment in the next 20 years.

It recommended developing, at least initially, key industrial capabilities in six areas: Arctic and maritime security, soldier protection, command and support, cybersecurity, training systems, and in-service support. Foreign firms that want to bid on Canadian defense contracts would be required to provide offsets in those areas and would receive better consideration for their bids if they provide Canadian companies with work on international programs.

In their announcement Wednesday, Finley and Nicholson noted that an export strategy will also be developed to support international sales of Canadian defense products. Key industrial capabilities that the government wants to promote among industry will also be identified and highlighted.

The government also plans to provide more information to industry about military procurements, including informing companies early on about projects and publishing an annual acquisition guide to outline its priority programs.

The Defence Procurement Secretariat to be established within Public Works would provide expertise needed to oversee purchases of military equipment. The secretariat will use the principles of early and frequent engagement, independent advice and efficient decision-making to streamline defense procurement processes, the ministers stated.

An independent, third-party Defence Analytics Institute to provide expert analysis to support the objectives of the Defence Procurement Strategy will be established.

Tim Page, president of the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries, called the move a “critical and positive milestone” that will enhance security and economic interests. The association represents more than a 1,000 defense and security companies in Canada.
Ottawa to curb military’s role in procurement after costly delays
The dysfunctional record of military procurement in the last eight years – from light-armored combat vehicles to joint support ships to F-35 fighters – has hurt the Conservatives’ carefully cultivated reputation as prudent stewards of the public purse.

Wednesday, Mrs. Finley and Mr. Nicholson will announce they’re going to require that military suppliers provide more high-value industrial spinoff work for Canadian companies and well-paying jobs. The government is dissatisfied with the industrial regional benefits it received for several big purchases of military aircraft.

Major military purchases in Canada have frequently lacked what critics call a single point of accountability because as many as three or four government departments play a part in selecting what to buy – decisions that are sometimes made in isolation from one another.

National Defence currently has particularly strong influence because it first draws up specifications for what features it needs in equipment – which can result in the department effectively picking a supplier before a competition is held.  Defence officials will still have a central role in deciding what to buy for the Canadian Armed Forces, but other departments and outside advisers will now have the ability to properly question what is being requested.

This will change with what is unofficially called the “super secretariat,” a term the government does not embrace but which captures the concentration of decision-making taking place.


For instance, as one person who was familiar with the Wednesday announcement said, if the request is for a “Cadillac and you actually need a Corolla” then the system needs someone who “has the authority to ask why do you need this Cadillac?”

Part of the focus Wednesday will be on using defence spending to develop a competitive advantage in certain technologies. Foreign companies play a large role in supplying Canada’s military needs, yet in the past 30 years, this country has shied away from using defence policy to promote and build domestic industries.
Military defeated in war over procurement reform
Liberal defence critic Joyce Murray on Wednesday seemed prepared to hold her most serious criticisms to see if the government's proposed changes might have a positive effect. "It’s good that the government has admitted their failure," Murray said.

"I hope, as I think most Canadians hope, that they can do a better job ... with this new procurement mechanism. At the same time, you have to wonder whether adding a layer of bureaucracy and continuing to add additional ministers and deputy ministers into the pot, is actually going to be the correction that is needed. I don’t see clear improvement here," she added. "But let’s be optimistic. They can’t do a lot worse than has been done so far."

Wednesday, January 15, 2014

We have to fix IT; we have no choice

I've previously mentioned that Information Technology is a problem child. But it is our problem child, and like our other children, it is our future. We have no choice; we have to fix IT. 

We have reared IT to be our gate keeper for all of our information and communication. Our future is presently reliant on a problem child that is outgrowing its clothes before we have the old ones paid off; growing so fast we don't even know what size to buy next. We have made it too big for its britches; we feed it, we are its enablers. We have allowed if not conscientiously designed IT to be a panacea, mission critical to almost every small aspect of our lives, let alone government contracting.

Tinkering with the procurement system will never work until we understand better what this child's own goals are. IT has it own dreams -- problems. The child needs more help than the nurturing procurement system can muster. I have taught my children that they can be anything they want, but the cannot be everything they want. IT wants to be everything, and we have to learn to reign IT in.

The discussions have begun, and in some places is well under way. Many more of us will have to know much much more about the problems before we can hope to find a solution. We cannot leave it to the problem child to determine our destiny.

Can IT procurement be saved?
Can the tens of thousands of people involved in government procurement — employees and contractors alike — absorb any life lessons for navigating the often bumpy road of large government IT projects? High-profile government procurement projects sometimes take a wrong turn or crash spectacularly into technological or logistical ditches. Sometimes they can be resurrected or salvaged, and sometimes they are scrapped. The smoldering remains can be attributed to the myriad miscues, oversights or missteps in a hugely complex system.

In other words, bungled launches didn't start with HealthCare.gov, and the Obama administration's Department of Health and Human Services is hardly alone in its stumbling. In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security picked Boeing to oversee its $1.9 billion program dubbed SBInet, which sought to revolutionize border security by integrating infrastructure, technology and border security agents. Unfortunately, it didn't work.

Complex federal procurement rules can contribute to the failure of advanced IT systems such as HealthCare.gov or SBInet, but Amey contends that even a wholesale overhaul of those rules probably wouldn't help much. Others say spending cuts and budget uncertainty have sped up an erosion of the federal procurement workforce. Still others blame rules they say place a crippling emphasis on getting the lowest price at the expense of what might work best.

Ultimately, said Roger Waldron, president of the Coalition for Government Procurement, successful federal contracts happen when the government understands what it wants and what it is asking of bidders, and bidders understand how to work with the government. It's not just about getting to yes — it's about getting to yes, I know exactly what I want, and here's how I want you to give it to me.

Testing, predesign decisions and planning are essential to successfully integrating legacy systems, said Jay Shah, executive vice president of Octo Consulting Group. One key, he said, is not to rush the procurement process. Budget pressures are forcing agencies with legacy systems to "think incrementally and not transformationally" when it comes to implementing new systems, he added, but agile development is not a silver bullet.

"While most government agencies love the idea of agile, the [federal] procurement process and capital planning [are] counter to what agile espouses," Shah said. Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-Calif.), who represents a swath of Silicon Valley, wants to make the system more open and accessible. "My sense is that there are inside-the-Beltway contractors that know the current system very, very well, and they are the ones that are awarded the contracts," she said.
5 areas to start IT procurement reform
“There’s a beauty and a tragedy at this critical inflection point, in regard to people and technology,” said Stan Soloway, the president of the Professional Services Council. “We have a once in a multigenerational opportunity to do this.” Few envision such a complex system will change with one sweeping gesture.

Here are five broad areas of reform experts suggest as a place to start:

1. Put someone in charge
Numerous agencies weigh in on technology procurement, but no one carefully monitors the entire process. “Part of the problem with procurement is no one is taking a holistic view with the entire supply chain,” said Clay Johnson, a former presidential innovation fellow and current chief executive officer of the Department of Better Technology. [We need an IT czar? One?]

2. Prioritize people
The federal procurement process depends on contracting officers. “The government continues to struggle mightily to attract IT talent,” PSC’s Soloway said. [Note this is an argument for bringing more IT decision making in house via people who are trained to understand the problem well enough to fashion a solution, rather than outsourcing it to purveyors of legacy based systems.]

3. [Omitted by the administrator of this blog, revealing a lack of knowledge of principles of procurement (IT maybe, procurement no), and beating an old horse rather than seizing a once in a mulitgenerational opportunity as promised.]

4. Don’t fear the woodshed
Any real reform to federal IT, experts warn, must allow for ingenuity. “These guys are scared to death because if they make a wrong decision, they are going to get taken to the woodshed,” Safavian said. “Leaders need to become better risk absorbers,” Soloway said. “You can’t have a system where everyone thinks they are going to get hammered.” [Problem children need love and discipline.]

5. Throw away the rules
A complex tangle of regulations sometimes upends its very purpose. [And here I thought they were going to mean, start with new code and open architecture.]
Have ideas on government procurement?
The Department of Finance would like your feedback to help improve communication between government and industry during the procurement process.
Lessons for Procurement from IT Vendor Management: Audits, Inputs, and Competitive Spirit
Starting with audits, Erickson-Harris suggests that vendor management organizations “incorporate the right to conduct audits to gain a first-hand look at operations periodically” in part because “showing up tells the service provider that you take the relationship seriously.” [And want to be taken to lunch.] These audit rights should include contract penalty clauses that have teeth. [Problem children respond well to standing over them with a stick and a dog with big teeth. And auditors know all about the IT you're struggling with.]

Erickson-Harris suggests: “Asking vendors what measures they can put in place to ensure quality." [We hired these guys to do it because we didn't know how. We didn't even know how to spec the contract. And we expect the contractor to tell us how to do it better in a completely disinterested way that's going to save us money? How would be know?]

Finally, keep up the competitive spirit. To wit, “keep the vendor on its toes and the situation competitive". I might suggest tempering this recommendation, after all, you don’t want to find yourself using the threat of leverage or competition with a critical supplier when the vendor knows that you don’t really have other options. [On second thought, just ask him what we need and be thankful we have him on payroll.]
Government Tech Problems: Blame The People Or The Process? [Or something else, maybe, like the underlying assumptions of need?]
What should be done about government's tech issues depends on what you see as the source of the problem. And that's where there's disagreement among the "People Who Think About Procurement More Than You And Me."

Stan Soloway heads the Professional Services Council, which represents federal contractors who are hired to build these projects. He told The Times he sees the problem as the "punishing and punitive" environment of government. "It's the human capital, the way the government buys services, the way the government determines its own requirements, the lack of collaboration within government, the lack of collaboration between the government and the private sector, the outdated systems within government," Soloway told the newspaper.

Clay Johnson, who has been fighting for procurement reform since before it became cool, takes issue with that argument. "Bad clients exist everywhere. Blaming the client is the oldest trick in the book. It's toxic." Instead, he sees the issue as being an environment that doesn't favor competition, which boosts incumbents who do mediocre or even poor work.

Determining what's at root will drive future policy decisions. President Obama has said again and again that government needs to improve the way it procures and uses technology. But so far, the White House hasn't put out any specific plans to tackle the issue.

On the legislative front, the bipartisan bill to address part of the problem — the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) — passed the House last June but got axed from the Senate version. That bill did not centrally take on the competitive environment, but it would have given more power to technology officers inside government so they could better project-manage the work of contractors and developers.
Obama Calls for IT Procurement Reform
Obama said, “I personally have been frustrated with the problems around the website on health care. And it’s inexcusable.”

[He then offered excuses:] The president said part of the problem was simply managing an operation as large and complex as the federal government. “What I want to just remind people of is that this government is an enormous enterprise,” he said, “and so even as sometimes we see ourselves getting stymied at the congressional level, at the administrative level, in the work that we’re doing, all kinds of changes are happening.”
CGI's Contract to Help Run Health Site Won't Be Renewed
CGI Group Inc. said federal officials won't renew its contract to oversee key parts of HealthCare.gov, the online insurance marketplace that launched with major defects on Oct. 1. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services said in a statement that it chose Accenture become the lead contractor. People close to the project said they were "blindsided" when they learned of the decision Friday.
TechAmerica: Congress key to effective procurement reform
The problems afflicting federal IT acquisition system are not incurable, according to TechAmerica's newly installed Senior Vice President for Public Sector Mike Hettinger, but they could use a strong dose of legislative medicine. TechAmerica is working to foster congressional efforts to change acquisition rules beyond simple knee-jerk reactions to those particular failures. Hettinger said he is looking to educate lawmakers on the intricacies of federal IT acquisition practices and facilitate a dialogue across industry, legislative and executive branch lines. He also said the intricate nature of federal IT acquisition means only a handful of lawmakers have a full grasp of the process.  [But they likely have a better grasp of the IT acquisition process than of the IT process itself. which is a more easily exploitable weakness.]

Proposals to create a new agency that would manage large IT projects and boost the federal government's ability to hire IT specialists from private industry are steps in the right direction, he said. [Yes, revolving doors are good, for someone.]  But for effective reform, Congress must be involved, Hettinger said.

And he knows that legislative territory.

TechAmerica named Hettinger vice president of its public sector group in mid-December as the organization began a legal battle with rival Information Technology Industry after several former TechAmerica public sector executives, including former Senior Vice President for Global Public Sector Trey Hodgkins, left abruptly for jobs at ITI. TechAmerica alleges some of those former employees stole valuable membership information.

Hettinger said his new employer assured him the organization was committed to its public sector operations and that he had no reservations about taking on the new job. "The reason I'm here is because this is the premier association. TechAmerica is doing things no one else can." He also noted that TechAmerica is in the process of hiring three additional public policy group personnel in the coming weeks who will work with him. [See there? The key to problem is with Congress, not the IT industry, and all it needs is a good lobbyist or three to set things straight. Yea!]





Monday, August 5, 2013

Small service contractors deserted by OASIS?

Is OASIS too complex?
GSA released the RFPs for the next-generation One Acquisition Solution for Integrated Services (OASIS) contract on July 31. The contract was designed to be a one-stop management and consulting, professional engineering, logistics, and finance services contracting vehicle that would provide more uniformity and less redundancy.

GSA said it worked closely with industry to draft the RFPs. But, in doing all that spade work, some industry stakeholders said the GSA produced RFPs that are innovative but possibly a little too complex. Roger Waldron, president of the Coalition for Government Procurement, cited a vendor-scoring table as an example of needless complexity. While providing detailed criteria that could be useful, its 15 categories of evaluation that use 40 specific questions to award points for favorability might be too much information for some to digest.

On the other hand, said Alan Chvotkin, executive vice president and general counsel at the Professional Services Council, the table provides a "self-test, or open book test for companies" that want to bid on the contract. "It will eliminate some of the mystery around their actual capabilities." With various pools of potential providers, the selection and contracting process isn't as straightforward as ordering off of a schedule, Chvotkin said. "Ordering agencies will have to do some work" in drawing up contracts under OASIS. "There are some advantages over ordering off a schedule, but this is not the easiest multiple award vehicle to work with."

Larry Allen, president of Allen Federal Business Partners, predicted the detailed responses would serve a useful purpose: they'll "make it obvious to companies whether they should bid or go no-bid."

Thursday, June 27, 2013

Procurement controversy -- Augusta, Georgia, USA

Judge orders city to rebid employee health insurance contract
Aetna subsidiary Meritain Health protested the bid award last year, but the commission voted to deny the company’s protest and gave the contract to Blue Cross. Richmond County Super­i­or Court Judge David Rop­er blasted the Augusta Commission and city procure­ment department in a Wednes­day order demanding the city re-bid its new employee health insurance contract. The order comes in response to a lawsuit filed by Aetna subsidiary Meritain Health over Augusta’s award of the contract to administer a new self-funded health insurance pool, valued in excess of $20 million, to Blue Cross, the city’s existing provider.

Meritain alleged that procurement engaged in “11th hour” manipulation of the bid award, changing contract terms and ranking criteria to benefit Blue Cross, and Roper agreed. “Simply put, Ms. Sams, Ms. Kelley and the selection committee changed the rules at the 11th hour to require no lasering at inception, and decided that Total Maximum Costs was the driving factor,” he wrote. “No lasering” refers to an insurance practice that divides employees into low- and high-risk groups, covering each differently.

When the “no lasering” requirement was introduced, Aetna vice president of public sector sales Marcus Duckworth complained in two e-mails that only Blue Cross had access to recent claims data to formulate an accurate bid. “The court finds that Meritain was prejudiced thereby,” Roper said.

He also points to Kelley’s romantic involvement with Blue Cross sales representative Mark Dukes throughout the process, citing Commissioner Alvin Mason’s questioning of Kelley about the relationship during commission meetings.

Friday, May 31, 2013

RFP to manage two nuclear weapons plants explodes

Parts of Y-12, Pantex contract protests upheld; GAO says procurement should be re-opened
The U.S. Government Accountability Office also recommended re-opening the contract procurement, raising questions about the status of the $22.8 billion contract awarded to Consolidated Nuclear Security LLC, or CNS, in January. CNS was one of three bidding teams who competed for the contract to manage and operate the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge and Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas.

At the heart of the GAO decision, announced Monday, were questions about proposed savings. In particular, the agency seemed to question whether the National Nuclear Security Administration, which awarded the consolidated contract to CNS on Jan. 8, had properly evaluated the expected savings.

“NNSA failed to follow the publicly stated solicitation criteria, which provided that the agency would evaluate the feasibility and size of each offeror’s proposed cost savings resulting from the consolidation of the management and operation of these sites,” Ralph O. White, GAO managing associate general counsel for procurement law, said in a statement released Monday afternoon.

“Specifically, GAO concluded that NNSA failed to meaningfully assess the majority of each offeror’s proposed cost savings, and based its source selection decision on the unsupported assumption that all cost savings proposed by every offeror would be achieved,” White said. “The protesters raised various other protest allegations, which were denied.”

Earlier this year, federal officials said CNS had promised to help the federal government save $3.27 billion during the next decade, but many of the details would have to be announced later. The expected savings of the other two bidding teams have not been publicly disclosed.
The GAO decision is reported here.

B&W team says it’s the best choice for Y-12, Pantex contract
One of the two teams that did not win the $23 billion contract to manage and operate two nuclear weapons plants in Tennessee and Texas said newly released federal documents show it had the best bid.
And more tidbits at the last linked webpage.

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Eureka! IT discovers competition!

There is essential information in this article that you will only get by reading the source at the link.

Feds Stoke IT Vendor Competition
the idea of promoting increased competition among IT vendors serving the federal market has resurfaced as a cost-cutting tool.

The reasons for the lack of diversification range from technical requirements to sheer inertia. MeriTalk reported that 65 percent of respondents said they specify a manufacturer to ensure compatibility with existing infrastructure, 17 percent contend it's what management wants, 11 percent said it saves time, and seven percent said "it's just what we always do."

In a recent survey of federal IT professionals, almost half believe that adding a competitor to IT infrastructure projects drives down acquisition costs. According to MeriTalk, an online community for both government and private sector IT professionals, results of the survey it conducted indicated that federal agencies could save 20 percent of their annual budgets by adding a competitor.

That equals about $15.8 billion per year, government-wide. Also, nearly half of the agencies that use multiple IT vendors contend that supplier diversification increases network performance.

Federal agencies still fall short of having adequate supplier diversification when it comes to IT infrastructure, according to the MeriTalk survey, which was conducted in January.

Federal law requires agencies to conduct "fair and open" competition in procurement. While the law does provide exceptions when certain circumstances come into play, such as technical requirements, obtaining such exceptions is not routine.

"The government has a substantial burden to demonstrate why the normal competitive requirements should be waived," Alan Chvotkin, vice president and counsel at the Professional Services Council, told the E-Commerce Times.

Despite the law, and the acknowledged advantages of vendor diversification, MeriTalk reported that 76 percent of survey respondents said their agency's IT infrastructure procurements specify a vendor at least some of the time. 77 percent reported that their agency's IT infrastructure acquisitions are contracted directly with suppliers, rather than with a reseller or integrator, at least some of the time.

Nearly two-thirds of the 208 respondents reported that they only have one or two vendors in several key areas: network operations, client operating systems, and data center operating systems. Supplier diversity for server and storage hardware is only slightly better, the survey showed.

"It is time to redesign the critical network infrastructure to accommodate current and future network bandwidth and security needs," Robbins said. "There is a tipping point where maintaining the old infrastructure becomes substantially more expensive than acquiring new. While it depends on the agency, the average refresh cycle is estimated at four to seven years for basic infrastructure lease or purchase."

Recent research from Gartner showed that adding a second vendor to an enterprise network infrastructure would reduce capital expenditures by at least 30 percent, while only minimally increasing operating expenditures.

The issue is important given the more rapid pace of change and improvement associated with IT infrastructure vs. highways and roads, which are replaced or upgraded perhaps every 20 years or even longer. "

About 70 percent of every IT dollar spent by the federal government goes to supporting legacy systems and infrastructure, according to the General Accounting Office. "The IT network infrastructure in the federal government was designed decades ago and has evolved over the last 20 years -- increasing complexity and driving up support costs along the way," said Robbins. "Agencies typically have been very slow to modernize their networks and this is costing them millions of dollars each year."

"It's a little tricky to define exactly what constitutes 'vendor lock-in.' It could come from agency preference, the way a contract is written, or what a particular vendor is offering. Sometimes agencies accept 'proprietary' services which reduce options," said Chvotkin.

That perception was borne out by MeriTalk, which reported that agencies consider 30 to 40 percent of their IT infrastructure locked up by current vendors in a reliance on standards, systems, or technologies that would be considered proprietary.

In a genuine pursuit of system integrity, agency IT specialists may close themselves off to potentially better pricing or better performance by writing specifications that are so technically detailed that they effectively eliminate competition.

In the acquisition process, agencies need "to be sure that the legal requirements for competition are followed," Gordon said, "and not allow 'wired' procurements, whether explicitly calling for a particular name brand, or disguised with the specifications written so as to favor one company."

Gordon was among several panelists who addressed the vendor competition issue at a February 27 hearing conducted by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The committee, headed by Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.), is investigating federal IT contracting, and Issa is seeking feedback on his proposed bill to reform IT procurement.

During the hearing, Professional Services Council CEO Stan Soloway said that "competition is the single most effective means by which federal agencies can drive down their IT costs while also improving performance and efficiency."

Saturday, March 16, 2013

Can stand some improvement - Iowa, USA

State procurement chief concedes ‘lax’ enforcement of bid process rules
After cancelling three bid requests because of questions about the irregularities, the director of the Iowa Department of Administrative Services conceded to lawmakers Wednesday the process “can stand some improvement.”

Among the concerns prompting Carroll’s cancellation of the bid process were complaints from state legislators and law enforcement radio vendors that bid requests for communication radios for various state agencies have been intentionally uncompetitive with unusually exacting specifications.

Too often, he said, vendors approach employees in agencies in the process of buying goods or services in attempts to gain information that would improve their chances of winning bids. So he plans to enforce the prohibition against communication between vendors and any state employees other than the designated procurement officers.

The policy applies to communication from lobbyists, lawmakers and vendors to state employees, Carroll said. Even when the questions come from lawmakers, they can be traced back to vendors, he said.

At the same time, Carroll will institute a process to allow vendors to have anonymous communication with DAS internal auditors. That communication would be made public, but without the vendor’s identity attached.

Also, there will be a two-week protest period for vendors to raise questions about the vendor-neutrality of requests for proposals or the procurement process. That protest period will occur before the contract awarded, rather than after, Carroll said.

Chairwoman Sen. Janet Petersen, D-Des Moines, asked for more information about conflict of interest policies to prevent someone from leaving state employment to work for bidding on a state contract.

“I think Oversight would be interested in putting stronger fences around that,” she told Carroll.
I don't know. These seem like such basic matters that I suspect there would be quite a bit of more room for improvement.

Thursday, July 19, 2012

Canada opting to centralize some defense procurement processes?

Ottawa eyes plan to loosen DND’s grip on military procurement (NB: filed by the Globe and Mail under "politics")
The Harper government, eager to fix Canada’s chronically dysfunctional system for buying military equipment, is considering changes that would strip the Department of National Defence of significant responsibility in steering major purchases. Ottawa has considered the notion of a standalone central purchasing agency but judged it too onerous. There’s no support among the Harper cabinet for creating an arm’s-length entity, sources say.

One option under serious study is the creation of a permanent secretariat, reporting to the Department of Public Works, that would take responsibility for all major military procurements above a certain dollar value, a Department of National Defence source said. It would also represent an important reduction in DND’s traditional role in drawing up specifications for big expenditures: in effect, the designing and selecting of the options for purchase.

In military procurements, DND is responsible for taking a required purchase and developing the specifications for precisely what features are needed. This can be a lengthy process, partly because regular turnover among project managers at National Defence means the task of drawing up specifications ends up being restarted more than once.

National Defence’s involvement more often than not results in the department picking the supplier before a competition has been held. That’s because it draws up specifications that can be met by only one product – the one it likes best.

Under the proposed new system for major purchases, the Defence Department would tell the secretariat what its requirements are. But it would hand responsibility for generating the options and specifications to Public Works.

At the end of the process, the new procurement secretariat would return to the Minister of National Defence and unveil the options for purchasing before launching a competition for suppliers. The military would still have the final say on whether the options put forward meet its requirements, but National Defence would no longer be able to tailor the specifications to a particular supplier’s vehicle, equipment, vessel or plane.

A big embarrassment for DND last week – when the Harper government shut down a project to buy new army trucks because National Defence was trying to spend as much as 86 per cent more than authorized on the vehicles – is being held up as the last straw by procurement reformers.
The article is also interesting for some of its observations on similar approaches in Australia. And contrast that philosophy with the partial (?) privatisation of procurement contemplated in the UK.

Further reading on this subject:

Army trucks project cancelled after DND added $300 million to price tag without permission
The Defence Department had received government approval in 2009 to move forward with the $430 million purchase of 1,500 off-the-shelf medium-sized trucks. But in subsequent years department and military officials began adding more capabilities to what they wanted in the vehicles, bumping the estimated cost to between $730 million and $800 million.
Army trucks project canned due to $300M cost overrun
The cancellation is not fair to contractors who invested time and money into the bid preparations, NDP defence critic Jack Harris argued. He said taxpayers are too often kept in the dark about the ballooning costs of military purchases.
Read that last remark carefully. The contractors were not kept in the dark; the taxpayers were.

Wednesday, June 6, 2012

Minimum needs and the 70% solution

You can't always get what you want
But if you try sometimes, well you might find
You get what you need
-- From the Rolling Stones song, You Can't Always Get What You Want


Good specification writing comes from a talent more born of the art of interpretation than the science of description. That is because the basis of the specification is not the thing, it is the need. We get so often wrapped up in what we want that we lose sight of what we need.

Guam's laws on specifications, taken from the ABA Model Procurement Code, read more like principles than grammar and engineering. One fundamental such law is
"Specifications shall not include requirements, such as but not limited to restrictive dimensions, weights or materials, which unnecessarily restrict competition, and shall include only the essential physical characteristics and functions required to meet the Territory’s minimum needs."
It is the functional equivalent to the "70% Solution" mentioned in the following article.

Second Best Makes A Comeback
Established in 2002, RFI (Rapid Fielding Initiative) recognized that the American army did not always have the best weapons and equipment available. RFI was intended to do something about that and do it quickly. During the next nine years, the army approved the purchase of 409 items immediately, which is what RFI was all about.

Traditional weapons and equipment developers did not like RFI. Procurement bureaucrats like to take their time, even when there's a war going on. This is mainly to cover everyone's ass and try to placate all the big shots and constituencies demanding certain features.

The engineers often point out that they can deliver much more quickly if they are allowed to use the old "70 percent solution" rule. This bit of engineering wisdom is based on the fact that some capabilities of a weapon or other item are not essential but take an inordinate amount of effort to create.

Thus a "good enough" item can be produced very quickly, if you are willing to sacrifice 30 percent of the capabilities you thought you needed (but probably don't). Despite official opposition, the 70 percent solution has become all the rage over the last decade.

The age of change began with the troops who, thanks to the Internet and a flood of new civilian technology, got into the habit of just buying new stuff and using it in combat. If the army had developed a lot of this gear it would have more features, be more rugged, and taken a lot longer to arrive, if it ever did at all. But for the troops, the off-the-shelf gear filled important needs, even if it was a 70 percent solution.

You could see RFI coming. There were three existing trends pushing it. First, there was a lot more new technology coming on the market that troops could use. Some of it came from the companies that created equipment for the hiking and camping market (boots, rucksacks, all manner of outdoor clothing). Other stuff came from hunting and police suppliers (new gun sights and other accessories). There was a flood of new electronic gear, like lighter and more reliable GPS receivers and computer gear, plus new kinds of flashlights and, eventually, smart phones.

The second trend was that the troops were all on the Internet and like never before were in touch with each other via military related message boards, listservs, Facebook pages, and chat rooms. Troops have always been coming up with new ideas about how to use civilian gear for military purposes. But before the Internet each soldier's discovery spread slowly. Now, information about new discoveries gets spread army-wide, and world-wide, within hours.

Finally, there was SOCOM (Special Operations Command), which had long possessed its own RFI-like powers and budget to go with it. SOCOM could buy neat new weapons, as well as equipment. SOCOM could also afford to buy expensive stuff (the first night vision gear and satellite phones). SOCOM personnel were on the Internet as well. By 2001, thousands of soldiers were speculating, via the Internet, how much more effective they could be if they had SOCOM's freedom to quickly get new stuff that allowed them to do their job better.

Pentagon realized that the army would not look too good if too many journalists interviewed too many troops who had bought civilian equipment with their own money, while the Special Forces was getting it paid for by the government. This was especially embarrassing if the new equipment, from a civilian supplier, was obviously superior to the stuff the government was handing out. With this kind of incentive the Rapid Fielding Initiative was quickly set up and became a big success.

Some generals consider the official procurement bureaucracy beyond help. It is encumbered with generations of laws and rules, which are supposed to curb fraud, enhance efficiency, or whatever, and have just contributed to the many delays that make everything take far longer than it should. You can't mess with the laws, at least not too often, and especially not in peacetime, without getting brought up short by Congress and the courts. For the politicians, the defense budget is a principal tool for getting reelected. That procurement money means jobs for American voters and the politicians representing those voters know it. Congress will not relinquish too much control over this pot of gold.

Over a decade of war has changed a lot of things in the U.S. military but none more troublesome, to the military bureaucracy, than the new attitude of "we want it now." Senior commanders took on the military procurement bureaucracy in order to get new technology to the troops sooner. It's not a new fight but having so many generals involved in trying to speed things up; that is new. And often the generals were asking for some very expensive stuff. But these officers had done their homework and it was hard to say no to officers who are under fire every day. The 70 percent solution became a legitimate tool on the battlefield. But now the procurement bureaucracy wants to go back to the bad 0ld (but safer) days of taking your time and covering your ass.

Now the army has to decide which of these RFI items to make standard equipment and which to discard. So far, 11 percent have been made standard issue, 37 percent are being discarded (some didn't work out as expected, others were replaced by better stuff) while the remaining 52 percent are still being fought over by the troops and procurement bureaucrats. The marines already went through this process, and found that 63 percent of their RFI items were worth keeping, and only 17 percent were to be discarded. The rest are still being watched, or being further developed.