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Showing posts with label Determinations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Determinations. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 10, 2017

Government gets spanked for hitting a "new record"

There have been (at least) a couple of of good reviews of a recent decision of the Court of Federal Claims in the case Gallup, Inc. v USA.   In that case, the government got caught out making up an entry for the procurement record in the course of a procurement protest; in effect, attempting to create a new record.

Tch tch.

The court was, shall we say, livid:
The Contracting Officer, Ms. Julia A. DeLoach, signed the Memorandum for Record. While the document itself contains no date, the Index identifies June 24, 2016 as the date of creation for the Memorandum of Record. The Market Analysis contains an undated chart which summarizes the USSOCOM evaluation team’s comments on each RFI response. Pursuant to normal Court procedures, the Administrative Record also contains a “Certification of Contracting Office” signed by Ms. DeLoach affirming that “after careful review, the following documents constitute the record of administrative actions . . . .”

The Government notified the Court that on March 23, 2017 the Government learned the Memorandum for Record “had been prepared on or about December 15, 2016, i.e., after the agency had proceeded with the procurement. In order to “uncover the nature of the inaccuracy present in the administrative record and determine whether any action should be taken by this Court”, the Court issued an Order retaining the March 30, 2017 hearing date, and requiring “all those individuals who assisted in the production of the administrative record” to attend the hearing.

At the hearing, the Court questioned Ms. DeLoach while she was under oath. She further testified that she personally compiled the Administrative Record in this case without any assistance, including choosing the June 24, 2016 date for the Memorandum for Record in the Index, and signed the Certification of Contracting Office. Ms. DeLoach confirmed that the chart accompanying the Memorandum for Record was created on June 24, 2016 and that it accurately represents the contemporaneous comments of the USSOCOM evaluation team. When presented with the Memorandum for Record and asked to explain why she created the document, Ms. DeLoach responded:
[W]hen I received the pre-filing notice about December 13th, I said, uh-oh, if [Gallup] really file[s], I need to make sure my record [is] in good shape. […] I realized I had the [chart] with nothing that consolidated that or nothing that summarized that and I prepared the [Memorandum for Record] at that time, sir. I now know that [] was a huge mistake and I am deeply sorry that this has come to this. . . . [T]he timing was wrong.
Ms. DeLoach confirmed that the GRAP acquisition was already “underway” when she created the Memorandum for Record.

On March 30, 2017, immediately following the hearing, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause stating that “the Court contemplates the imposition of sanctions against the government and ordered the Government to explain why the Court should not require USSOCOM to pay Gallup’s attorney’s fees and costs associated with the prosecution of this bid protest. Knowingly providing inaccurate information to the Court is certainly grounds for sanctions.

A recent bid protest before this Court, Coastal Environmental Group Inc. v. United States, presents nearly identical facts to those here and further supports the imposition of sanctions in this case. An EPA official included a backdated document in the administrative record in order to “make it appear to anyone who read the document that she prepared and signed the document ten months earlier than she actually did.” The official then “attempted to cure her oversight by preparing . . . a Determination and Findings document.” Accordingly, Judge Margaret Sweeney of this Court imposed sanctions.

In this case, Ms. DeLoach also realized her record was incomplete and attempted to “cure her oversight” by preparing a Memorandum for Record nearly six months after USSOCOM made its set-aside decision.

The Court held a telephonic status conference at the request of the parties during which counsel for the Government indicated (and confirmed in writing the same day) that the parties had “reached an agreement in principle for USSOCOM to pay Gallup’s attorney fees and litigation costs . . . as contemplated by the Court’s order.” In addition, the Government noted that USSOCOM will:
issue guidance to its contracting staff emphasizing the importance of completeness, accuracy, and integrity in preparing records and accompanying certifications [and] is in the process of planning a training session . . . that will focus on issues of accuracy and ethics in preparing and certifying administrative records.
Therefore, the Government does not dispute the appropriateness of sanctions in this case.

The integrity of the administrative record, upon which nearly every bid protest is resolved, is foundational to a fair and equitable procurement process. While the Government has accepted responsibility for its misconduct, the importance of preventing a corrupted record cannot be overstated. The Court encourages USSOCOM to take all reasonable steps to ensure that its contracting office appreciates the necessity of conducting a well-documented, well-reasoned procurement and producing a meticulous and accurate record for review.

The Court will not tolerate agency deception in the creation of the administrative record.
The two reviews mentioned above are:
Government “Misconduct” in Preparing the Administrative Record Warrants Sanctions, and
Fed. Claims Warns SOCOM Over $45M Contract 'Misconduct'
It might be noted that Guam procurement law, consistent with the ABA Model Procurement Code, requires that "No procurement award shall be made unless the responsible procurement officer certifies in writing under penalty of perjury that he has maintained the record required by § 5249 of this Chapter and that it is complete and available for public inspection. The certificate is itself a part of the record." (5 GCA § 5250)

Wednesday, February 24, 2016

Just stand still whilst we try to sort this out

On Guam, there are time limits within which an appeal of a protest must be brought, both administratively and for judicial review. Separately, remedies available to a successful protester are significantly different depending on whether the protest is brought before the award or after the award.

This has led to a bit of hard ball, with agencies denying a protest and immediately awarding a contract, notwithstanding that protesters have about two weeks to appeal the award decision from the date of that decision. That nasty business has been held up in recent times as the Public Auditor has ruled on administrative appeal that the award must not be made until a protester's time to appeal has run. There are also moves afoot to try to make that a statutory requirement. (I have alluded to this issue before.)

But, things have already been codified in in the UK and other European jurisdictions which close the door on that treacherous behavior/behaviour, as seen in the following articles. 

The usual caveat here: I cut, rearrange, paraphrase, edit, omit (quite often very important matter), and pretty much often make a mash of articles mentioned, so to be safe and fully informed, read the whole bits at the links.

Procurement Law Jargon Buster - "Standstill Periods" and "Alcatel Letters"
The Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (the ”Regulations”) require public contracting authorities to apply a compulsory waiting period between their decision to award a contract to which the Regulations apply and the date on which the contract is signed. This is commonly called the Standstill Period. The regulations themselves apply to contracts for the supply of goods works and services, where contract values are above specified thresholds.

This requirement follows a judgement of the European Court of Justice in the Alcatel case when the ECJ decided that contracting authorities should allow a period of time to elapse between decision and signing in order to give unsuccessful bidders a chance to seek remedies if they were dissatisfied with the procurement process. To achieve this, a contracting authority must inform bidders of its decision to award the contract, commonly called Alcatel Letters.

The period kicks in from the date the authority decides to award the contract. Usually this will come towards the end of an often lengthy procurement process where bidders will have been shortlisted and finally whittled down to one, for example through a process called “competitive dialogue”. At that point, when the authority makes its selection, the Alcatel Letter is issued and the standstill period should then commence. At the end of that period the contract is signed. This is designed to give unsuccessful bidders an opportunity to challenge the award if they believe there has been a breach of the procurement rules.

The decision notice should include the criteria for the contract award and the reasons for the decision including the characteristics and relative advantages of the winning tender, the scores of the winning bid and of the party receiving the notice. The notice also must name the winning bidder and provide details of the standstill period. On receipt of the notice, unsuccessful bidders may request an “accelerated debrief”.

If the contract is awarded inside the standstill period or an Alcatel letter is not issued, under the new rules, it may be possible to get the contract declared “ineffective” with potentially serious consequences for the procuring authority.
Unsuccessful Tenderers’ Entitlement to Information: Irish Court Clarifies Position
In a significant judgment delivered on 15 February 2016, the High Court has given guidance on the level of detail that must be included in standstill letters to disappointed tenderers in a procurement process. The judgment also provides clarity as to the level of further engagement that is required subsequent to the initial standstill letter, as well as the point at which the challenge period begins to run in circumstances where further reasons are provided.

This case concerned an above-threshold competition run by Kildare County Council (“KCC”) seeking engineering consultancy services in relation to the design and delivery of the new Athy southern distributor road.1 RPS Consulting Engineers Ltd (“RPS”) was unsuccessful, despite having tendered a price that was significantly lower than that of the successful tenderer. RPS engaged in correspondence with KCC in which it alleged that it had not been given sufficient reasons in the standstill letter as to why it had not been selected. KCC responded on two occasions to the effect that it had provided all of the information to which RPS was entitled, at which point RPS instituted proceedings against KCC. The proceedings were commenced after the standstill period and after the contract had already been signed, and the Court was asked only to determine whether sufficient reasons had been given to RPS.

The Court held that KCC had breached its obligation to provide sufficient reasons for its decision, and ordered that KCC provide such reasons within 15 days of the judgment. The Court held that the reasons given by KCC had been inadequate for a number of reasons.

It is not enough to state that the successful tenderer’s response was superior to that of the addressee; rather the letter must contain reference to specific matters, respects, examples or facts which explain why the decision about relative advantage was made (eg matters which the winner’s response included, or the applicant’s response lacked, or vice versa), so that the bidder is aware of the matters of fact and law on the basis of which the decision to reject its tender was reached. In this case, the narrative in the letters to the disappointed bidders consisted only of a repetition of the criteria, a repetition of the score (but phrased in terms of “good”, “very good” etc rather than numerically) and a handful of additional words to indicate comparative quality as between the unsuccessful and successful tenderers. This was held not to be sufficiently precise as to the matters of fact and law that were relied upon by KCC in making its decision. The provision of scores alone will not suffice for qualitatively assessed criteria but may suffice in respect of price.

The reasons provided to a disappointed tenderer must be bespoke to the tenderer in question; it is in breach of the obligation to give reasons to copy and paste generic reasons that could apply to any tenderer. The Court was severely critical of the fact that formulaic reasons were included in all of the letters to unsuccessful tenderers, with the only variations being whether the addressee’s bid was “good”, “very good” etc. Reasons provided must fully explain why the marks in question were awarded; if a person unfamiliar with the process cannot readily understand from the reasons why a particular score was awarded then the reasons will be insufficient.

Contracting authorities must respond positively to requests for further reasons, after the initial standstill letter is sent. A refusal to engage was described as a “fundamental flaw”. The Court concluded that there are two separate elements to the obligation to give reasons under EU law, namely:

• a contracting authority must automatically give a summary of the reasons for its decision with the standstill letter (this is expressly transposed in the Irish Remedies Regulations); and
• the contracting authority must provide further information, within 15 days, upon receipt of a written request (under Article 41 of Directive 2004/18)
.
To round out a short overview, also have a look at The five biggest standstill letter mistakes.


Wednesday, October 7, 2015

The tenacity - and audacity - of incumbent legacy

Although not part of the ABA Model Procurement Code which is Guam's model for its own Procurement Act, 5 GCA 5210, which summarizes the various authorized procurement methods, says "(a) Unless other wise authorized by law, all territorial contracts shall be awarded by competitive sealed bidding [except as authorized by other specified procurement methods. (b) Nothing in this Section requiring competitive bidding shall prohibit the development of specifications which require compatibility with existing supplies, equipment or data processing systems."

On the face of it, such compatibility seems rational enough. The Guam drafters of this provision thought so, commenting "In the past, some problems have arisen due to the requirement for competitive bidding for equipment which should have been, but was not, compatible with existing equipment. The reason alleged was that the lowest bidder had to be chosen. Of course, the proper writing of specifications could have prevented the problem and Subsection (b) makes clear that compatibility may be a legitimate part of the specifications."

Fortunately, the provisions on specifications, in Article 4 of the procurement law, is not part of "this Section", so are not, on the face of the provision, restricted by it, and the provisions of Article 4 are replete with requirements for competition, saying nothing of compatibility. This become important when one stops to consider that compatibility is a substitute for legacy, old school technology and creative destruction.

Which brings me back to yet another Motorola case, this one decided by the federal GAO, related to Motorola's lock on the radio communications market. As always, read the cases and articles in the original, and don't rely on my creative destruction of them in my rendering.

Matter of: Harris IT Services Corporation B-411699; B-411796, October 2, 2015
Harris IT Services Corporation protests the terms of two requests for proposal issued by the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to acquire land mobile radio (LMR) equipment through the issuance of a single delivery order under each RFP. Harris maintains that both of these RFPs improperly contemplate the issuance of a single, second-tier, indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) instrument (labelled by the FBI as a delivery order), under which the agency will place subsequent delivery orders for this equipment without providing Harris a fair opportunity to compete for those orders, in violation of the statute authorizing the use of multiple-award IDIQ contracts. Harris also argues that the RFPs contemplate the issuance of orders that potentially exceed the scope of the underlying multiple-award IDIQ contract program, and include unduly restrictive specifications.

We sustain the protests.

Both solicitations have been issued under the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) tactical communications (TacCom) IDIQ multiple award contracts program and competition has been limited to concerns that previously have been awarded contracts under the DHS TacCom program. The underlying DHS TacCom multiple award IDIQ contract program solicitation contemplated the award of IDIQ contracts for a full array of communications equipment and services ("commodity products, infrastructure and services"). "DHS seeks to establish a multi-vendor approach to implementing fully interoperable solutions to support mission critical, public safety communications." In effect, the equipment to be purchased using the TacCom program is required to employ open systems architecture so that each contractor’s equipment will “interoperate” with equipment manufactured by other concerns.

The current RFPs represent the FBI’s second attempt to meet its requirements for the equipment being solicited. The first attempt sought the award of a sole-source contract for these requirements, and supported its solicitation with a justification and approval ("J&A"; aka "determination")) document maintaining that only one source--Motorola--was capable of meeting its requirements. After protests, this approach was abandoned.

This is the second attempt. RFP 68 is for the acquisition of “subscriber base radio” LMR equipment and is valued at approximately $200 million. RFP 81 is for the acquisition of infrastructure LMR equipment and is valued at approximately $135 million. Both RFPs contemplate the issuance of what the FBI characterizes as a single delivery order for a base year, with 4 one-year options.

The Federal Acquisition and Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) provided agencies with express authority to award task and delivery order type contracts. Broadly speaking, the statutory and regulatory framework favors the award of multiple task or delivery order contracts for the same requirements, rather than the award of a single task or delivery order contract for an agency’s requirements.
The drafters of this federal law said the use of task order contracts for advisory and assistance services and establishing a requirement that solicitations for such contracts shall ordinarily provide for multiple awards and for fair consideration of each awardee for task orders issued under the contracts; indiscriminate use of task order contracts for broad categories of ill-defined services unnecessarily diminishes competition and results in the waste of taxpayer dollars; in many cases, this problem can effectively be addressed, without significantly burdening the procurement system, by awarding multiple task order contracts for the same or similar services and providing reasonable consideration to all such contractors in the award of such task orders under such contracts; and, all federal agencies should move to the use of multiple task order contracts, in lieu of single task order contracts, wherever it is practical to do so.

[Similarly, see Guam procurement regulations: 2 GAR 3122(b): A multiple award is an award of an indefinite quantity contract for one or more similar supplies or services to more than one bidder or offeror when the territory is obligated to order all of its actual requirements for the specified supplies or services from those contractors. A multiple award may be made when award to two or more bidders or offerors for similar products is necessary for adequate delivery, service, or product compatibility.]

The statutory and regulatory framework contemplates that, where an agency is issuing task or delivery orders using a multiple-award IDIQ contract program, it is not required to engage in full and open competition, and may instead confine its competition to firms that have been awarded an underlying multiple-award IDIQ contract. However, those same provisions require agencies to give each contractor that has been awarded a contract a “fair opportunity” to be considered for each task or delivery order in excess of $3,500, and to provide for “enhanced competition” for orders in excess of $5.5 million. Finally, each task or delivery order must specify all of the services to be performed or all the property to be delivered under the order.

Harris first argues that the RFPs impermissibly call for the issuance of what amounts to IDIQ instruments to the successful contractor for a 5-year period. The protester maintains that the RFPs effectively remove the agency’s requirements from further competition for an extended period and amount to an impermissible “downselect” to a single vendor. Harris maintains that this is inconsistent with the terms of the underlying TacCom contracts, as well as applicable statutes and regulations which, the protester maintains, require the FBI to permit all of the eligible TacCom vendors to compete for every delivery order that the FBI may issue to meet its requirements.

The FBI explains that it elected to take this approach to meet its ongoing and future, geographically diverse, requirements in the most streamlined manner possible. According to the agency, its approach will allow it to avoid individually having to compete potentially dozens of delivery orders for varying quantities of equipment over a 5-year period. According to the agency, the latter approach--competing potentially dozens of separate delivery orders--“would place an enormous administrative burden on the FBI.” Legal Memorandum at 5. The agency states that its approach will result in substantial savings of both time and money over the contemplated 5-year period of the delivery orders.

As set forth below [sorry: you're going to have to read the case decision], we conclude that the FBI’s solicitations contemplate the award of what, in effect, would amount to single, multi-year, second-tier IDIQ instruments that are not permitted under the requirements discussed above. The FBI’s contemplated award of a 5-year second-tier IDIQ instrument to a single contractor is inconsistent with the requirements of the applicable statutes and FAR provisions regarding what constitutes a “delivery order.” Those requirements are, at a minimum, that the delivery order be defined as to quantity, place of delivery and schedule.

[Compare Guam's definition of an "incremental" contract, which is distinct from the "multiple award" contract mentioned earlier, in 2 GAR 3122(a). An incremental award is an award of portions of a definite quantity requirement to more than one contractor. Each portion is for a definite quantity and the sum of the portions is the total definite quantity required. An incremental award may be used only when awards to more than one bidder or offeror for different amounts of the same item are necessary to obtain the total quantity or the required delivery. The right to make such an award and the criteria for award shall be stated in the solicitation. Thus, multiple awards, for indefinite quantities, and incremental awards, for definite quantities, are limited to cases where awards to more than one contractor are necessary to obtain the total quantity of the required delivery.]

In essence, the two orders contemplated under these RFPs will deprive all the other TacCom contractors of a fair opportunity to compete for each of the delivery orders that will be issued in the future, despite their aggregate value of approximately $335 million. We therefore sustain this aspect of Harris’s protest.

Harris also maintains that the RFPs impermissibly include a period of performance that exceeds the period of performance of the underlying TacCom contracts. In this connection the FBI’s RFPs contemplate the issuance of delivery orders until August 31, 2020 (whereas the TacCom contracts only allow for issuance of delivery orders until March 25, 2019), and contemplate fulfilling those delivery orders by August 31, 2021 (whereas the TacCom contracts contemplate fulfilling all delivery orders by May 25, 2021). The FBI notes in connection with this allegation that both RFPs incorporate the terms of the underlying TacCom IDIQ contracts and provide that, in the event of a conflict, the terms of the underlying TacCom contracts control. According to the agency, to the extent its RFPs specify a period of performance longer than that contemplated under the TacCom contracts, the terms of the TacCom contracts supersede the terms of its RFPs.

We agree with Harris that the RFPs seek impermissibly to increase the scope of the underlying TacCom contracts. As noted, the agency does not deny that its contemplated delivery schedules vary from, and increase the period of performance beyond, the terms of the underlying TacCom contracts. Rather, the FBI merely asserts that the terms of the TacCom contracts will supersede the inconsistent terms of its solicitations. However, the fact remains that the RFPs expressly contemplate a period of performance longer than the period of performance included in the TacCom contracts.

In addition, and more fundamentally (as discussed above), neither RFP includes a maximum quantity, but, rather, specifies only an estimated quantity. As we conclude above, there essentially is no limit on the quantities the agency could order under the second-tier IDIQ instruments contemplated by the RFPs. It follows that the agency could order quantities that exceed not only the estimated quantities specified in the RFPs, but also the maximum value of the underlying TacCom contracts. In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the FBIs RFPs contemplate delivery orders that potentially are beyond the scope of the underlying TacCom contracts. We therefore sustain this aspect of Harris’s protest.

As a final matter, Harris’s protests that certain specifications are unduly restrictive and are designed to result in the award of the delivery orders to Motorola. Because we recommend below that the agency cancel the RFPs and consider alternatives to how it intends to meet its requirements, we need not consider these allegations in great detail. Nonetheless, we discuss several obvious solicitation requirements that even the agency concedes call for Motorola-specific products.

RFP 68 requires that all radios provided be compatible with a standards based radio system called “SmartNet.” In a similar vein, RFP 68 calls for providing radios that can be reprogrammed using “over-the-air-rekeying” when used with a “key variable loader.”

Harris maintains that these requirements are proprietary to Motorola and that, for all intents and purposes, they limit competition under RFP 68 to products made by Motorola. Harris also maintains that specifying such requirements is inconsistent with the overarching requirement of the TacCom contracts to provide equipment that is interoperable and that meets the P25 open architecture standards.

The agency does not challenge Harris’s fundamental assertion, but nonetheless maintains that these requirements are necessary in order for the radios that it acquires to meet the agency’s needs for data security, and in order for them to be useable with state and local law enforcement entities that still use legacy radio systems that depend on the Motorola-proprietary standards specified.

Where an agency seeks to issue a task or delivery order to acquire items peculiar to one manufacturer, it must execute a J&A in support of its specification for the task or delivery order, unless it has otherwise executed a J&A for other than full and open competition. Here, the agency concedes that it has specified Motorola-specific requirements. However, the record does not include the required J&A, and the agency has offered no explanation regarding its failure to execute such a J&A.

The agency previously attempted to meet its requirements on a sole-source basis, but concluded that the J&A prepared in connection with that acquisition was inadequate to support its attempted sole-source acquisition of Motorola products. Here, the agency again is attempting to acquire Motorola-specific products, but has not executed the required J&A, or even, for that matter, explained or demonstrated why it is not required to execute the J&A. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the RFPs include specifications for products that are specific to Motorola, and that the agency has failed to justify its inclusion of such requirements. We agree with Harris that the agency’s attempt to acquire Motorola-specific equipment appears fundamentally inconsistent with the underlying interoperability objective of the TacCom IDIQ contract program.

We recommend that the FBI cancel the solicitations.









Saturday, August 1, 2015

Questioning process of evaluation is not same as questioning evaluation judgment

World wide UK founded legal services firm Pinsent Masons LLP through its online legal news site Out-Law.com reports, in a couple of articles, an apparently groundbreaking procurement contract award decision. 

As usual, you should read the original at the link, as I take liberal editorial liberties that may, however unintentionally, distort the content or intent of the authors.

High Court orders ‘unsatisfactory’ public contract award to be set aside
In finding against Milton Keynes Council, Mr Justice Coulson was the first judge in an English court to set aside a public body’s contract award decision under the 2006 Public Contract Regulations. The judge noted that procurement laws allow the courts to overturn a public body’s contract award in circumstances where it had “committed a manifest error”. However, he commented that these were often harder to prove than transparency or equality breaches as the contracting authority has a “margin of appreciation” when making its assessment. Despite this fact, he went through each of the award criteria one by one.

On two particular points, the judge found that the council had awarded EAS a 10/10 score when it should legally have awarded the company zero. He said that the scoring criteria were “a matter of law” and that, if a response did not meet the council’s requirements or was unacceptable in accordance with the council's own scoring methodology, then it required to be given a zero score. That the council had not done so in one particular case was “incapable of rational explanation”, the judge said.

“In my view, an informed reader would think that the EAS answers were almost studiedly vague, strong on aspiration and management-speak, light on detail,” he said. “The Woods’ answers, on the other hand, could fairly be said to bristle with detail and commitment.”

On the “unsatisfactory” scoring notes provided by the council, he said that the absence of clear reasons to explain certain scores created a “lack of certainty in the nature of the council’s case”.

"This is a significant decision because it is the first time that an English court has set aside a procuring authority's contract award decision under the Public Contracts Regulations," said procurement law expert Ben Lasserson of Pinsent Masons, the law firm behind Out-Law.com.

"Essentially, this case boiled down to whether the council's evaluation exercise had been conducted lawfully. In the past, such a challenge would have been very difficult for a claimant to sustain because the courts were always reluctant to 'second guess' a procuring authority in matters of evaluation.
Council expected to pay damages after conducting flawed procurement process
Mr Justice Coulson said that Woods Building Services (Woods) was entitled to damages after losing out on the contract on the basis of a flawed procurement run by Milton Keynes Council.

Woods also asked the High Court to order Milton Keynes Council to award the contract to it. However, that request was rejected. Mr Justice Coulson said that "requiring A to contract with B, in respect of a contract which might last for years, would be an exceptional order for the court to make".

"In principle, it might be open to the Court to order a mandatory injunction requiring the Council to enter into a contract with Woods," the judge said. "But it is trite law that a mandatory injunction, which would here require the Council to enter into a contract which would last for many years, will only rarely be granted."

"Whilst I do not suggest that a mandatory injunction of the type which they seek would never be granted in a procurement case, I am satisfied that it would only be granted in exceptional circumstances, and there are no such circumstances here," he said.

Mr Justice Coulson cited a number of reasons for not awarding Woods the contract by way of remedy, including stating that it would have been wrong to award the contract to Woods after determining that the procurement process had been flawed.

"Woods were right to challenge the procurement and, all other things being equal, they would have been awarded the contract," Mr Justice Coulson said in his judgment. "In those circumstances, it would be absurd if, having lost so badly, the Council could then avoid the natural consequence of those breaches, namely an award of damages in favour of Woods."

Public procurement law expert Christopher Murray of Pinsent Masons, the law firm behind Out-Law.com, said that it was unusual for legal challenges brought under public procurement legislation to reach a hearing on remedies.
The typical procurement law in the US is that, whilst deference is paid to agency decisions on the facts of a decision, the decision must be made based on the factors specified in the solicitation and required by law or regulation. 

Thus, the distinction is understood: if a decision is rationally made, it will not be set aside, but it must be shown that the process of deliberation was undertaken and supported by rational application of the facts to the issues. In effect, a court will not set aside a procurement decision that it considers wrong or bone-headed so long as it was clear that a rational thought process had taken place and the judgment was not a bare conclusory opinion.

And it is not at all unusual for a court, or reviewing administrative body for that matter, to set aside an award or contract that was in violation of law. See, e.g., Guam Code Annotated §§ 5451 and 5452.

Saturday, January 24, 2015

Protest of Navy's BOSS contract on Guam upheld

As of November 2017, this contract is still being protested.  For an update, see The laborious SAGA of the US Navy's BOSS contract on Guam.

Matter of: CFS-KBR Marianas Support Services, LLC; Fluor Federal Solutions LLC,: B-410486; B-410486.2; B-410486.3, January 2, 2015 (The redacted version was approved for public release. The version below is my own, unofficial version.)
DIGEST

1. Protest challenging agency’s cost realism evaluation of proposals is sustained where record shows that agency’s evaluation was based on the mechanical application of a government estimate that did not take into consideration each offeror’s unique technical approach, and therefore was not consistent with the terms of the solicitation and applicable procurement statutes and regulations.

2. Protest alleging that agency engaged in misleading discussions is sustained where record shows that agency’s discussions questions were based on the results of its underlying, irrational, evaluation of proposals.
CFS-KBR Marianas Support Services, LLC, of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Fluor Federal Solutions, LLC, of Greenville, South Carolina, protest the award of a contact to DZSP 21 LLC, of Hagatna, Guam, under request for proposals (RFP) issued by the Department of the Navy for base operations support services for the Joint Region Marianas on the island of Guam.

The RFP contemplates the award of a cost reimbursement-type contract. The RFP advised offerors that the agency would make award on a best-value basis, considering cost and several non-cost evaluation factors. For cost evaluation purposes, the RFP advised offerors that the agency would evaluate proposals for completeness, reasonableness, balance, and realism, and that all five non-cost factors, when combined, were approximately equal in importance to cost.

After performing an initial evaluation, the agency established a competitive range comprised of six concerns and engaged in discussions with those offerors. After conducting discussions, the agency solicited and obtained final proposal revisions (FPRs), which the agency evaluated. On the basis of that evaluation, the agency assigned the protesters and awardee the following technical ratings and evaluated costs:

On the basis of these evaluation results, the agency made award to DZSP, finding that its proposal offered the best value to the government.

After being advised of the agency’s selection decision and requesting and receiving debriefings, CFS and Fluor filed protests in our Office. CFS maintains that the agency misevaluated proposals and failed to engage in meaningful discussions; Fluor maintains that the agency misevaluated proposals and engaged in misleading discussions. We sustain Fluor’s protest and dismiss CFS’s protest as academic.

Fluor essentially argues that, because the agency’s initial evaluation was irrational, it led the agency to engage in misleading discussions with the protester which led, in turn, to Fluor adding unnecessary personnel to its proposal and, ultimately, to proposing a cost that made it uncompetitive. Secondarily, Fluor maintains that the agency’s cost realism evaluation after the agency engaged in discussions also was unreasonable.

Fluor asserts that, in its initial evaluation of proposals, the agency never performed a meaningful cost realism evaluation in connection with the offerors’ proposed staffing. According to Fluor, the agency mechanically applied a government estimate in evaluating the sufficiency of the offerors’ proposed staffing. Fluor argues that the agency’s actions were improper because any meaningful cost realism evaluation is required to take into consideration the offerors’ respective technical approaches to accomplishing the requirements.  [Remember, this is a best value evaluation for a cost-reimbursement contract, and cost alone does not determine who gets the award.]

When an agency evaluates proposals for the award of a cost-reimbursement contract, an offeror’s proposed estimated cost of contract performance is not considered controlling since, regardless of the costs proposed by the offeror, the government is bound to pay the contractor its actual and allowable costs. As a consequence, a cost realism analysis must be performed by the agency to determine the extent to which an offeror’s proposed costs represent what the contract costs are likely to be under the offeror’s unique technical approach, assuming reasonable economy and efficiency.   In addition to these broad considerations, while an agency can utilize a reasonably derived estimate of labor hours based on the government’s experience as an objective standard to measure the realism of proposed costs, an agency may not mechanically apply its own estimates for labor hours or costs--effectively normalizing cost elements of an offeror’s proposal to government estimates--without considering the offeror’s unique technical approach.

The record here shows that, in evaluating the offerors’ initial proposals, the agency mechanically applied a government estimate to evaluate the sufficiency of the offerors’ proposed staffing. In particular, the record shows that the agency evaluated all proposals against an undisclosed government estimate of the number of full time equivalent staff (FTE) that the agency considered sufficient to perform the requirements. In each instance where a proposal offered less FTEs than the agency had identified as necessary for any given part of the contract ("annex"), the agency evaluators described the offeror’s proposed staffing as unrealistic and insufficient to perform in the annex identified.

In performing this evaluation, the agency concluded that Fluor’s proposed staffing was insufficient.  The record thus shows that the agency’s initial evaluation was based on a mechanical application of the government estimate to the proposals that did not consider the offerors’ varying technical approaches. In the absence of a cogent explanation for the Navy’s actions, such a mechanical application of the government estimate in the evaluation of proposals is unreasonable. We therefore sustain this aspect of Fluor’s protest.

Fluor further argues that the mechanical application of the government’s estimate discussed above led the agency to pose misleading discussion questions to the firm regarding the sufficiency of its proposed staffing. The protester maintains that it initially proposed staffing that it considered sufficient to perform the contract in light of its proposed technical approach. Fluor argues that, when it attempted to respond to the agency’s concerns during the discussions that were based on the agency’s mechanical application of the government estimate, it effectively priced itself out of the competition.

It is a fundamental principle of negotiated procurements that discussions, when conducted, must be meaningful; that is, discussions must identify deficiencies and significant weaknesses in an offeror’s proposal that could reasonably be addressed so as to materially enhance the offeror’s potential for receiving award.  Here, the record shows that the agency asked each offeror a specific question that identified precisely the number of FTEs by which the agency considered the proposal deficient.  An agency may not mislead an offeror through the framing of a discussion question into responding in a manner that does not address the agency’s actual concerns, or otherwise misinform the offeror concerning a problem with its proposal.

The agency subsequently issued a clarification to these questions, stating that it was not the intent of the agency to dictate the number of FTEs proposed, but to verify that the offeror had a methodology to accomplish the work with the number of FTEs proposed.  Nonetheless, the agency did not retract its original discussion questions.

The record shows that Fluor revised its proposal to precisely the number of FTEs identified by the agency as lacking in its initial proposal.   Ultimately, Fluor’s high evaluated cost led the agency not to select it for award, even though its proposal had been ranked first from a non-cost standpoint.  Because the record shows that Fluor’s revised staffing was raised in direct response to the agency’s discussion question, we conclude that the firm was misled to its competitive prejudice.

As a final matter, Fluor maintains that the agency essentially abandoned the original staffing estimates that it used to evaluate the offerors’ initial proposals, thereby demonstrating the arbitrary nature of the original evaluation. Fluor maintains that the agency’s final evaluation confirms that its initial evaluation bore no relationship to the offerors’ unique technical approaches, and also demonstrates that the agency’s evaluation of revised proposals failed to meaningfully evaluate the offerors’ proposals for realism purposes.

Notwithstanding the fact that the other two firms also offered additional staffing in response to the agency’s initial evaluation and discussion questions, the evaluators nonetheless assigned DZSP an outstanding rating for its proposed staffing and resources, and assigned the CFS proposal a good rating for its proposed staffing and resources (both proposals originally had been rated unacceptable under this evaluation factor).

The agency’s technical evaluators articulated no reasoned analysis for why, despite the fact that these firms did not propose the staffing initially identified by the agency as inadequate, the firms nonetheless merited these better ratings.  For reasons unexplained in the record, the agency did not evaluate the realism of the offerors’ proposed staffing where it exceeded the government estimate.  The agency’s unexplained and inconsistent application of the government estimate further highlights the underlying irrationality of its evaluation.

In effect, the agency’s evaluators appear to have abandoned the initial government estimates, as well as their evaluation findings based upon those estimates. In addition, since the evaluators did not explain why they considered the offerors’ revised staffing adequate in light of their respective technical approaches, we have no basis to find the agency’s reevaluation of proposals reasonable.
In this connection, agencies are required to adequately document their evaluation results in order to facilitate our examination of the record; where, due to a lack of documentation, we are unable to understand the agency’s evaluation conclusions, we will sustain a protest challenging the agency’s evaluation.
We have carefully considered all of CFS’s allegations and find no basis to sustain the firm’s protest. We find no merit to its allegations concerning the agency’s evaluation of technical proposals, and we also find no merit to its allegation concerning the agency’s alleged failure to engage in meaningful discussions with CFS. In addition, while CFS arguably may be correct concerning the agency’s evaluation of cost proposals, we are not persuaded that CFS was prejudiced by the agency’s evaluation in that area, and therefore find no merit to that aspect of its protest.

In light of our discussion above, we sustain Fluor’s protest. We recommend that the agency reevaluate proposals in a manner consistent with our discussion above.  After performing its reevaluation, we further recommend that the agency afford the competitive range offerors meaningful discussions based on its reevaluation of proposals.

After engaging in discussions, we recommend that the agency solicit, obtain, and evaluate revised proposals and make a new source selection decision based on that reevaluation.  Notwithstanding our conclusions regarding the merits of CFS’s protest, we point out that the firm will, in fact, benefit from our recommended corrective action because it will be afforded an opportunity to participate in any reopened competition.

Finally, we recommend that the agency reimburse Fluor the reasonable costs of filing and pursuing its protest, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. The protester’s certified claim for costs, detailing the time expanded and costs incurred, must be submitted to the agency within 60 days after receipt of this decision.

Wednesday, October 22, 2014

The responsibility to consider all factors to make a determination of responsibility

It is too often said to hammer the point, but no government contract award should go to a bidder or offeror who is not responsible. The curious thing about the ABA Model Procurement Code and Guam's version of it is that there is no specific requirement that there be a written determination of responsibility. There is, however, a specific obligation to make a written determination of non-responsibility. (See ABA Model Code § 3-401(1) and Guam law 5 GCA 5230(a).)

What's a determination? Well, it's not definitively clear what a determination per se is, but the Regulations to the Model Code describe a written determination (handy to know because only written determinations are specifically required to be kept (Model Code § 1-201). According to R1-201.01.2, "each written determination shall set out sufficient facts, circumstances, and reasoning as will substantiate the specific determination which is made". It seems reasonable to expect, then, that an unwritten determination must be based in sufficient facts, circumstances and reasoning to substantiate the determination made, even if not put to hand or keyboard.

So what's responsibility, since, "before awarding a contract, the Procurement Officer must be satisfied that the prospective contractor is responsible"? (Model Regulation R3-401.04, Guam regulation 2 GAR § 3116(b)(4).) This is where it gets interesting, because finding responsibility is a judgment call, not easily second-guessed by other bidders, administrative tribunals or courts.

The Model Code, and Guam law likewise, define responsibility in their regulations. The relevant regulations describe responsibility in terms of "Standards of Responsibility", including such factors as availability of appropriate resources (plant & equipment, financial, personnel and otherwise), or ability to obtain them; satisfactory records of performance and integrity; qualification to do business (basically, a general business license), and responding to requests for information to corroborate those things.

The thing that has stood out in my interpretation of these standards is that, while they do not usually all come into play in any given case, the must all be considered in every case. The language of the regulation says, "factors to be considered in determining whether the standard of responsibility has been met include whether the prospective contractor has [met those standards]". The phrase "to be considered" is, to my thinking, mandatory, though I have not yet found a case that says precisely that.

But the following story seems to underline my theory. I have put it together from several indirect sources because I cannot yet find the primary source. As I present it, the story is pieced together from the following articles, and you need to read each for full context, and to find which part of any such article, if any, I borrowed:
GAO upholds FCi protest against security contract to USIS unit
USIS suffers another blow as GAO rules for competitor in wake of fraud allegations
GAO sustains protest of DHS contract to USIS
Bid Protest Ruling Deals Blow to Background Check Contractor
GAO questions fitness of USIS
    The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on Monday upheld portions of a protest filed by vetting firm FCi Federal Inc against a $190 million contract awarded to a unit of U.S. Investigative Services LLC (USIS) earlier this year by the Department of Homeland Security. The matter was released in a statement. GAO has not released the full protest decision because it contains sensitive acquisition information. GAO will release a redacted version in the coming weeks.

     FCi Federal has filed the protest, arguing that federal fraud charges filed against USIS LLC by the U.S. Justice Department for "dumping" 665,000 background check cases without conducting proper reviews should have disqualified it from winning the contract.

     The GAO said the Homeland Security Department should take another look before deciding whether contractor USIS is “presently responsible” enough to receive a field services contract at the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

     GAO concluded that “DHS’s affirmative determination of USIS’s responsibility was not reasonable because the agency failed to consider pending allegations of fraud by the awardee’s parent company under another federal contract,” GAO General Counsel for Procurement Law, Ralph O. White, wrote. “GAO recommended that [DHS] reasonably consider whether USIS can be viewed as a responsible contractor, taking into account USIS’s description of its relationship with its parent company, USIS LLC, as well as the specific allegations of fraud raised by the Justice Department against USIS LLC.

     Asked for a comment, a USIS spokesman said, “This ruling flies in the face of the outstanding ratings awarded to US Investigations Services, Professional Services Division Inc. during the contract award process. PSD won this contract from the incumbent contractor after a rigorous two-year competition, which followed long-standing government procurement procedures, and, since the contract award decision, USCIS has graded PSD’s performance on another significant contract as exceptional or very good across the board.”

     The Justice Department has accused USIS of cheating the government out of millions of dollars through a practice called “dumping,” in which the company purportedly claimed it completed background investigations that remained unfinished from 2008 to 2010.

     But USIS has said it has new leadership and has beefed up oversight at the company. It said the accusations involved a “small group of individuals” who are no longer with USIS. The company also said the Homeland Security contract went to USIS’ professional services division, which is separate from the background check operation.

     "GAO sustained FCi Federal's protest after concluding that DHS's affirmative determination of USIS's responsibility was not reasonable because the agency failed to consider pending allegations of fraud by the awardee's parent company under another federal contract," said Ralph White. "An affirmative determination of responsibility is the legal term that describes the threshold finding, inherent in the award of every federal contract, that the company awarded the contract has the capacity, ability, and requisite integrity to perform a contract for the government."

     The GAO ruling highlighted a portion of federal procurement law that says contractors must be “presently responsible” to get hired. In layman’s terms, that means contracting officers must attest to the fact that companies have the integrity, manpower and finances to complete the contract.

Friday, October 3, 2014

Emergency procurement: the last refuge of the sole source scandal

Pearson Lands Common-Core Contract in Mississippi After Testing Standoff
Mississippi officials have approved an "emergency procurement" contract with Pearson to administer common-core tests for the coming academic year—a step taken after a state board questioned the legality of the business arrangement and refused to sign off on it.

The one-year deal, which state officials said is worth $8.3 million, comes on the heels of the state's personal service contract review board telling the state department of education that it would reject a proposed, sole-source, four-year agreement because it believed competing proposals should have been sought from other vendors.

"To be approved as a sole source and awarded without competition, the service must be available from only a single supplier," said Deanne Mosley, executive director of the Mississippi state personnel board, which supports the contract review board, in a statement. "The company selected by New Mexico officials is not the only company which can provide these services."

Because of the board's stance, department of education officials say they had little choice but to approve the one-year contract to ensure that a portion of the state's schools, scheduled to give tests in December, could do so. The other options would have been to put forward competitive sealed bids or proposals, the agency said.

The board's decision angered department officials, who released a timeline of what they described as a lengthy and persistent effort to win approval of the contract.

The dispute in Mississippi has ties to a broader fight over a PARCC contract out of the state of New Mexico, a fracas that Education Week has been following closely.

In April, New Mexico officials approved a contract for PARCC test administration with Pearson, the only bidder on the project. A rival vendor, the American Institutes for Research, protested the bidding process, arguing that it improperly favored Pearson by bundling testing work that company was already providing PARCC with future duties administering the exam. AIR later sued in state court to stop the deal. After its appeal was rejected this summer by New Mexico's state procurement office, the AIR scaled back its legal fight. It is now suing to try to limit the scope of the contract to one year, and to have the remainder of the deal, which it says could last either four or eight years, re-bid.

Why does a deal hatched in New Mexico matter in Mississippi? The New Mexico contract establishes a price agreement with Pearson, which other PARCC states, including Mississippi can latch onto, if they want.

(The overall financial stakes of that Pearson vs. AIR fight could be massive in scale: In court documents, the AIR has said that if other PARCC states procure services for testing through the New Mexico deal, the contract could be worth $1 billion.)

Mississippi department of education officials, in statements, have argued that they have followed the proper process, over a period of several months, in seeking a sole-source contract with Pearson.

In their timeline describing those efforts, department officials said things were rolling along until they began meeting resistance from the contract review board.

Last month, when Mississippi's contract-review board told the department of education that the Pearson contract would not be heard by the board until September, the agency reacted with alarm—fearing the delay would jeopardize tests slated to be given to about 16,000 students in Mississippi schools later this year.

Mosley, in a statement, said that the contract-review board, after evaluating the New Mexico deal, became convinced it did not meet the legal standards of her state. Department officials had not shown that Pearson was the only company that could carry out the testing job, said Mosley, whose office declined further comment to Education Week.

"[I]t could not be approved as a legal and proper expenditure of taxpayer funds as it did not follow Mississippi procurement laws," Mosley said. "The New Mexico officials who selected this vendor to receive the contract did not take that into account and did not follow Mississippi laws in place to protect Mississippi taxpayers."

The department of education, however, disagrees.
A foundational principle of procurement is competition. As the Guam procurement law says (5 GCA § 5001(b)(6)), following ABA Model Procurement Code guidance, the state should "foster" competition. The first rule of Guam law is that the principles of procurement should be construed and applied to give effect to the laws. (§ 5001(a).) Thus, given a choice of 2 ways to assess a situation, the way the that gives effect to competition should be preferred to the way that does not. Giving away a contract by sole source when there is any question of availability of competition violates this first law.

Furthermore, Guam law understands that "emergency" is not a failure of planning, as does Federal law. Under Guam law, "emergency" is defined a "a condition posing an imminent threat to public health, welfare, or safety which could not have been foreseen through the use of reasonable and prudent management procedures...." (§ 5030(x).) Further, the emergency method of source selection requires "emergency procurements shall be made with such competition as is practicable under the circumstances" and limits the scope of the acquisition to "an amount of goods or supplies [not] greater than the amount of such goods and supplies which is necessary to meet an emergency for the thirty (30) day period immediately following the procurement". (§ 5215)

At the federal level, use of sole source, described under the general description as "Other Than Full and Open Competition" (see FAR SubPart 6.3), requires particular scrutiny and written justification. In particular, Subpart 6.301(c)(1), says "Contracting without providing for full and open competition shall not be justified on the basis of— (1) A lack of advance planning by the requiring activity...." Also see Part 7 for a description of planning principles and rules aimed to promote competition and Part 10, which requires market research to, among other goals, "Determine if sources capable of satisfying the agency’s requirements exist" (Subpart 10.001(a)(3)(i)).

None of that seems to have bothered the decision makers in the instances reported above.

Avoiding sole source scandals is such an easy step. Don't use it: just do the planning and market research, put a competitive method of source selection out, actually foster competition, and see what you get.

Oh, and provide incentive to do so.  Guam has an "ENFORCEMENT OF PROPER GOVERNMENT SPENDING" Act.   Under the act, any taxpayer has standing to bring action against any government officer or employee, including the governor, to recover for the government purse, any funds expended "without proper appropriation, without proper authority, illegally, or contrary to law."  (§ 7103.)

Tuesday, April 15, 2014

Settlement agreements do not abrogate procurement mandates

This GAO decision is interesting, not least of all because it sustained a protest (not the norm in GAO experience). 

 It is interesting because it indicates the type of critical analysis that should occur before a sole source contract is given out, but more interesting because it shows that when an agency proposes to give a sole source contract to settle a protest dispute, that decision is not binding; settlement agreements cannot vitiate procurement mandates. It gets fascinating with its description of the internal wrangling within the government and the influence of connections.   Finally, the case indicates the need to verify the claims of contractors pleading poverty and to justify exceptions to competition with valid facts and rationale; conclusory statements do not suffice for reasoned analysis.

As usual, I've excerpted, rearranged, paraphrased and left out citations to suit myself; read the decision at the link for a proper and independent recitation of the decision.

Matter of: Coulson Aviation (USA) Inc., File: B-409356.2, March 31, 2014
NextGen large airtankers are intended to replace the Forest Service’s use of “Legacy” large airtankers, which are generally much older, slower, and less reliable aircraft. The NextGen solicitation was intended to be the primary, but not the only, means by which the Forest Service met its modernization strategy goal of 18-28 modern large airtankers. The Forest Service’s procurement of NextGen airtanker services has a long and contentious history.

The NextGen RFP, issued as a small business set-aside, contemplated the award of multiple fixed-price contracts under seven contract line items (CLIN) for airtanker firefighting services on an exclusive-use basis. The CLINs, each of which had a 5‑year base period and five 1-year options, contained sub-CLINs providing the Forest Service with the option to add up to 2 additional airtankers in the second contract year and 2 more airtankers in the third through tenth contract years, for a possible total of 5 aircraft and 44 aircraft-years per line item.

Offerors were permitted to submit proposals for award of any or all of the CLINs, and were informed that awards would be made on a best value basis, considering price, structural integrity, maintenance, equipment, past performance, and organizational experience factors.

Nine offerors, including Neptune, Coulson, 10 Tanker, and Minden, submitted proposals. Coulson and 10 Tanker protested to our Office, challenging the agency’s price and technical evaluations, communications with offerors, and source selection decision; the GAO hearing official noted that the testimony thus far appeared to support the protesters’ arguments that the communications between the agency and various offerors were discussions rather than clarifications. Thereafter, the agency decided to take corrective action by reopening the competition.

While it was conducting the NextGen large airtanker procurement, the Forest Service also awarded a number of Legacy contracts for large airtanker services. The Forest Service awarded Neptune a Legacy contract for five P2V aircraft for 5-years, and for one P2V and one BAe-146[7] aircraft for a base year with four option years, at a total estimated price of $180,252,600. Shortly thereafter the Forest Service modified Neptune’s Legacy contract and added an additional BAe-146 aircraft for the 2013 fire season at a total estimated price of $4,960,200.

Neptune failed to win any NexGen award. Shortly after learning that it would not receive a NextGen contract award, Neptune informed the contracting officer of its intent to protest to our Office unless an “acceptable solution” could be worked out. Neptune’s protest triggered a stay of the NextGen contract awards pending our resolution of the protest.

Following a meeting between Neptune’s CEO, Forest Service FAM and AQM Directors and staffs, and USDA counsel, the parties engaged in a series of settlement discussions concerning the Forest Service’s noncompetitive award of a NextGen contract to Neptune pursuant to FAR § 6.302-3 (industrial mobilization) in exchange for Neptune withdrawing its protest.

Neptune’s CEO was quite familiar with the FAM Director and other agency officials, as the CEO had been the Forest Service’s AQM Director until his retirement. The record contains many letters and emails between Neptune and the Forest Service during this period, and reflects a number of conversations between Neptune’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Forest Service’s Director of Fire and Aviation Management (FAM) and Director of Acquisition Management (AQM). Neptune and the Forest Service had significant communications during the period between when Neptune learned it would not receive a NextGen contract and Neptune’s receipt of a sole-source contract.

The record indicates that the verbal representations of Neptune’s CEO concerning the firm’s financial viability were relied upon by the Forest Service when determining the agency’s actions. For example, shortly before or after filing its protest, Neptune’s CEO told the FAM Director that the company had made a significant investment in modern large airtankers and would go out of business without a NextGen contract award. At the Forest Service’s request, Neptune provided the agency with the firm’s financial projections. The Forest Service had USDA’s Rural Utilities Service (RUS) analyze Neptune’s continued financial viability based on the information provided by Neptune.

RUS provided USDA with its financial viability review of Neptune. The RUS noted that the information provided by Neptune did not include detailed expense projections or a balance sheet and cash flow projections for the next 5-year period. Id. The RUS also questioned whether Neptune had the ability to modify the payment terms of any of its existing long terms debts. Accepting the projected revenues and expenses as provided by Neptune on their face, RUS ultimately concluded that the only scenario in which the company could obtain a positive net income over the next 5 years was where Neptune received two NextGen contract awards in addition to its current Legacy contract.

The Forest Service and Neptune then entered into a written settlement agreement, under which the agency agreed to award Neptune a sole-source contract for two NextGen large airtankers in exchange for Neptune withdrawing its protest (and thereby ending the CICA stay of the NextGen contract awards). Our Office confirmed the withdrawal of Neptune’s protest and closed the file without rendering a decision on the protest’s merits.

Subsequently, the Forest Service realized that the sole-source contract promised to Neptune would require the approval of USDA’s senior procurement executive (SPE). Accordingly, the Forest Service informed the SPE of the settlement agreement that the agency had entered with Neptune, and requested that she execute a justification and approval (J&A) for the sole-source award.

The SPE did several things before taking any action on the Forest Service’s request. First, the SPE and her staff familiarized themselves with the NextGen procurement and the Forest Service’s requirements for large airtankers generally. The SPE made a series of requests of the Forest Service for additional information, including Neptune’s financial statements and balance sheets, Neptune’s Legacy contract, and documents related to the NextGen procurement. The SPE also engaged FI Consulting, an external auditing firm, to perform an independent financial viability analysis of Neptune.

FI found that Neptune had based its revenue projections for years 2-5 of the Legacy contract on the base-year rates instead of the higher, option-year rates set forth in the contract. FI also found that Neptune had based its revenue projections for the same period on the use of seven P2V aircraft, rather than six P2V and one BAe-146 aircraft (and the higher BAe-146 rates) as specified by the terms of the Legacy contract. After also finding Neptune’s expected costs to be lower than the company’s projections, FI concluded that Neptune would have the financial capacity to operate and continue performing on its in-place Legacy contract with the Forest Service through, at a minimum, calendar year 2016, without any further contract awards.

The SPE then asked FI to perform a comparison of its conclusions with those of RUS. FI found that the fundamental difference was that RUS had solely relied on Neptune-provided financial projections while FI had had access to a wider range of information that allowed it to develop its own projections. One such example was the difference in Neptune’s revenue projections detailed above. Similarly, the cost projections developed by FI assumed, per the terms of the Legacy contract, that Neptune would be reimbursed its fuel costs in addition to aircraft flight rates. By contrast, “Neptune did not provide any detail with its cost projections to RUS, so it is unclear if fuel is included, or if government reimbursement is considered.” In a subsequent meeting conducted by the SPE, RUS employees generally agreed with the FI findings and conclusions.

Based on her review of all information, including the FI financial analysis, the SPE concluded that the planned sole-source contract award to Neptune for industrial mobilization reasons was not presently justified (“Neptune didn’t need a contract”). Consequently, the SPE refused to approve the sole-source award to Neptune. the Forest Service informed Neptune that the SPE would not approve the sole-source contract contemplated by the parties’ settlement agreement, insofar as the financial analysis of the additional documents provided by Neptune indicated that the company was financially viable without such a contract.

For the next three months the Forest Service tried to reach an alternative settlement agreement; Neptune, however, rejected all offers that differed materially from the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement. Moreover, Neptune repeatedly informed the Forest Service that Neptune would file a lawsuit against the agency if the agency did not satisfy the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement.

Various internal meetings also took place among senior Forest Service and USDA officials, including USDA’s Undersecretary for Natural Resources and Environment (NRE Undersecretary) and the Assistant Secretary for Administration (ASA), in an attempt to resolve the Neptune matter.] The SPE testified that, in the meetings she attended, she heard no rationale advanced for a sole-source award to Neptune that she had not previously considered, and no rationale that she believed properly justified such an award.

At that time, the request for approval of the J&A was elevated to the ASA, a level above the SPE within the agency’s hierarchy. The SPE had several conversations with the ASA in which she recommended that he not approve the J&A as there was not a valid justification for doing so. Specifically, in making her recommendation the SPE stated as follows:
General – Public policy, the Competition in Contracting Act, and the FAR promote competition to ensure a fair playing field for firms interested in doing business with the Federal government. Competition encourages innovation and lower prices. Noncompetitive awards should be limited to only what is needed to achieve the objective, in this case to maintain a vital source of supply . . . . In this case, we have a competitive field and recently awarded multiple contracts on a competitive basis to five firms from a pool of eight firms that submitted proposals on the solicitation.

Rationale – The rules do not support the issuance of a sole source award based on the fact that a firm did not win a competitive procurement or in exchange for a particular action, such as the withdrawal of a protest or [Freedom of Information Act] request.

Neptune’s Financial Stability - . . . [A]n independent financial review revealed that Neptune has the financial capacity to operate and continue to supply planes under the current contract with no further contract awards. There’s no evidence to support the assertion that Neptune would not be able to meet an emergency need for aircraft.

Maintain Capacity and Employee Skills - The [Forest Service] currently has a supplier base of five firms on the Next Gen contract. These firms are building both capacity and employees skills. [Forest Service] also has two firms on the legacy contract that can supply planes. Neptune has supplied Next Gen type planes on the existing legacy contract and others could be added provided it is within the scope of that contract.

Balanced Supply Source – It is not clear how a noncompetitive award to Neptune would create a balanced source of supply . . . . It seems like if we’re interested in creating a balanced source of supply we would award more air tankers to the other legacy contractor, Minden, or add more air tankers to the current Next Gen contractors versus issuing a noncompetitive award to an unsuccessful offeror.
The SPE was not the only agency official providing advice to the ASA. The NRE Undersecretary recommended the award of a sole-source contract to Neptune. AR, Tab 43, NRE Undersecretary Memo to ASA, Nov. 26, 2013, at 1-2. The NRE Undersecretary emphasized the importance of large airtankers for wildland firefighting and the Forest Service’s need for additional airtankers, particularly with regard to the 2014 fire season. Id. at 1. The NRE Undersecretary also stated that, insofar as USDA counsel had determined that awarding a sole-source contract here was permitted and Neptune had airtankers available, he strongly recommended the award of two NextGen aircraft to Neptune for up to 10 years.

On December 9, the ASA executed a J&A for the sole-source award to Neptune for two NextGen aircraft. The J&A stated the following justification for the sole-source award to Neptune:
Pursuant to FAR 6.302-3(b) [sic] (i),(ii),(iii) and (vi) [sic], the use of the industrial mobilization exception to the requirement to use full and open competition is appropriate when it is necessary to--(i) [k]eep vital facilities or suppliers in business or make them available in the event of a national emergency; (ii) prevent the loss of a supplier’s ability and employees’ skills; (iii) maintain an acceptable balance of sources; and (vi) [sic] provide for an adequate industrial base by dividing the supply among two or more contractors. The Forest Service has determined that based on all the above reasons, it has become necessary to invoke this authority with respect to Neptune Aviation, whose resources and equipment must be available to provide key services if the Forest Service is to successfully fulfill its mission.
Although factual assertions were given in support of the justification, absent from the J&A was any discussion regarding Neptune’s need for a sole-source contract to remain a source of supply.

A noncompetitive contract was awarded to Neptune on December 12. Although the J&A supported an award of two NextGen large airtankers, the contract actually awarded to Neptune permitted (by mutual agreement) the addition of two more airtankers to the first CLIN and three more airtankers to the second CLIN in each contract year. These protests followed publication of the sole-source award to Neptune in FedBizOpps.

Our review of an agency’s decision to conduct a noncompetitive procurement focuses on the adequacy of the rationale and conclusions set forth in the J&A. Where a federal agency makes a sole-source award for purposes of maintaining a particular source for an item or service, concern for maximizing competition is secondary to the agency’s industrial mobilization needs. Decisions as to which suppliers should be included in a mobilization base, and which restrictions are required to meet the needs of industrial mobilization, involve complex judgments that are generally left to the discretion of the federal agencies. We will question those decisions only if the evidence shows that the agency has abused its discretion. We will sustain a protest, however, where an agency’s J&A fails to demonstrate that it is in fact necessary to award a contract to a particular source for industrial mobilization purposes.

As explained below, the record does not support the USDA’s decision to award a sole-source contract to Neptune for industrial mobilization purposes. Rather, the record demonstrates that the sole-source contract--promised by the Forest Service in exchange for Neptune’s withdrawal of an earlier bid protest--was without a reasonable basis.

The protesters contend that the sole-source award to Neptune was improper, insofar as the agency promised to enter into the contract in exchange for Neptune withdrawing its protests of the NextGen contract awards. In this regard, the protesters claim that the agency’s actions have been motivated by the desire to fulfill the terms of a settlement agreement and to avoid a lawsuit by Neptune for allegedly breaching that agreement. The protesters argue that the agency “put the cart before the horse,” and agreed to settle Neptune’s protest before properly determining that the promised sole-source award complied with CICA. The USDA does not dispute that its consideration of a noncompetitive award to Neptune was motivated by its promise of a sole-source contract in exchange for Neptune withdrawing its bid protest and thereby ending the CICA stay that then precluded the Forest Service from fielding NextGen large airtankers for the 2013 fire season.

A settlement agreement promising award of a contract on a sole-source basis in exchange for abandoning ongoing litigation, such as a bid protest, is not a permissible basis for restricting competition and excluding potential offerors. Quite simply, the existence of a settlement agreement does not permit a contracting agency to act in ways not otherwise permitted by applicable statutes and regulations.

Nevertheless, USDA argues that it did not act improperly because the sole-source award complied with all applicable procurement statutes and regulations. The Forest Service entered into a settlement agreement with Neptune on the basis that the award of a sole-source, NextGen-type contract was necessary to maintain Neptune as a vital source of large airtankers. The independent financial analysis subsequently performed by FI on behalf of USDA concluded that Neptune did not require the award of a sole-source contract to remain financially viable. Nothing in the record refutes FI’s conclusions, nor is there any evidence to suggest that Neptune intends to go out of business now merely because its future prospects appear uncertain. In sum, while the agency may not have entered into a settlement agreement promising to disregard applicable procurement statutes and regulations, the agency’s subsequent decision to award a sole-source contract to Neptune so as to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement and avoid a Neptune-threatened lawsuit was without a reasonable basis.

The agency has acknowledged that it was initially concerned that Neptune would “immediately go out of business during the 2013 fire season, leaving the Forest Service without any of the Legacy air tankers Neptune supplied under the contract awarded March 27, 2013.” The agency admits, however, that ultimately it concluded there was no concern with Neptune’s present viability, but only with its viability after 2017. Consequently, the agency argues, the J&A was not grounded on the agency’s belief that Neptune would immediately go out of business without a NextGen contract, but was based on its concern with Neptune’s continued availability as a large airtanker supplier after 2017 when its Legacy contract expired. However, changing its focus during the course of the protests, the agency has also argued that its actual concern is whether it could obtain sufficient NextGen airtankers for the 2014 fire season. In this regard, the agency maintains that it cannot tolerate any further delay in acquiring additional NextGen airtankers for the 2014 fire season. The Forest Service contends that this immediate need for additional NextGen airtankers provided it with “an industrial mobilization need in December 2013” when it decided to award Neptune a sole‑source, 9-year contract for NextGen airtanker services.

Based upon on our review of the record, including the J&A, its supporting documentation, the agency’s submissions in response to these protests, and the testimony of the agency’s representatives at the hearing held at our Office, the agency has failed to demonstrate that Neptune requires a sole-source contract to remain a source of large airtanker services for the Forest Service. Although the J&A documents the agency’s belief that Neptune is, presently, a vital supplier of large airtanker services under Neptune’s Legacy contract, the J&A is devoid of evidence or analysis supporting the need to provide Neptune with a sole-source award for the firm to remain a viable source of supply. Rather, the record demonstrates, as acknowledged by the agency, that Neptune is presently financially viable and is expected to remain financially viable through the term of its Legacy airtanker contract (2017). Moreover, apart from Neptune’s own unsupported statements and the anecdotal views of various agency officials, the record contains no analysis or evidence of Neptune’s financial condition after 2017. While the agency contends that the J&A did not rely on the FI financial analysis to assess Neptune’s long-term viability, neither did the agency rely on any other information when making such an assessment. In fact, there is simply no record--in the J&A or otherwise--of any assessment by the agency of Neptune’s long-term viability.

Additionally, the agency’s apparent belief that an immediate need for NextGen airtankers in 2014 justified the award of a sole-source, 9-year contract on the basis of industrial mobilization is not supported and has no rational basis. The industrial mobilization exception to competition requirements may be used where an agency determines that “it is necessary to award the contract to a particular source . . . in order . . . [t]o maintain a . . . [vital] supplier . . . .” FAR § 6.302-3(a)(2)(i). As noted above, no reasoned analysis has been presented to support a determination that a 9-year, sole-source contract was required to maintain Neptune as a source. To the extent the agency believed an urgent need for large airtanker services would justify a noncompetitive 9-year contract, there is no analysis or explanation in the record demonstrating that this is so.

Moreover, given the contract options available to the Forest Service under the competitively-awarded NextGen contracts, Neptune may no longer represent a vital source that must be maintained by the Forest Service after 2017. While agencies have authority to make noncompetitive awards when necessary to maintain vital sources, they do not have authority to make noncompetitive awards merely because an offeror is unsuccessful in a competitively-conducted procurement, or because such action was promised in a settlement agreement. Neptune would undoubtedly prefer the financial security that would accompany a long-term NextGen contract, but this is simply not the standard by which an agency is permitted to make a noncompetitive award for industrial mobilization purposes.

As a final matter, in addition to the fundamental lack of support for the J&A’s premise that Neptune now requires a 9-year sole-source contract in order to maintain the firm in the future as a vital supplier of aircraft, the record reflects that the J&A was premised on materially inaccurate information. As stated above, our review of an agency’s decision to conduct a noncompetitive procurement focuses on the adequacy of the rationale and conclusions set forth in the J&A. The adequacy of the rationale and conclusions set forth in the J&A is dependent on the completeness and accuracy of the information included in the J&A. We find the J&A to be incomplete and inaccurate in certain key regards. Alternatively, if the J&A was accurate here, then the contract awarded to Neptune impermissibly exceeded what the ASA had approved. This is significant because where, as here, an agency proposes to award a sole-source contract under the industrial mobilization exception to the general competition requirements, the amount being ordered must meet--not exceed--the objectives of this authority.

Similarly, when considering alternative sources and the market research regarding such sources, the J&A states that “[t]here are no certified [large airtankers] currently available that aren’t already under contract with the Forest Service. Aircraft capable of meeting these standards and requirements are not readily available and would take a considerable amount of time to be developed and operationally ready for service.” This statement is also factually inaccurate.

The fact that the J&A was inaccurate with regard to alternative sources is also important because where, as here, an agency proposes to award a sole-source contract premised on the vital nature of a supplier, it must accurately consider whether the industrial base can be maintained without resorting to noncompetitive procurements. While the agency argues the fact that other contractors may have airtankers available to perform Neptune’s contract to be irrelevant here, we fail to see how the agency can reasonably find Neptune to be a vital source without accurately considering all sources.