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Showing posts with label Responsiveness. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Responsiveness. Show all posts

Friday, January 31, 2020

The keys to deciphering solicitation consequences of "key personnel"

This post is built around the GAO protest decision in Deloitte Consulting, LLP, B-416882.4. As often warned, I make use of resources as tools to make a didactic point, even if it stretches the facts or law of the article or case. So, read the case at the link, and don't come back to me saying you were misled. I often paraphrase, reorganize, omit, insert, and generally slice and dice such resources to meet the space and objectives of this blawg. I don't try to mislead, but rely on your own judgment of the material.

The Comptroller's Decision and Digest: This is a protest challenging the agency’s evaluation of the protester’s quotation as unacceptable is denied where the agency reasonably found, consistent with the stated evaluation criteria, that one of the protester’s proposed key personnel failed to satisfy the solicitation’s minimum requirements.

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an RFQ to acquire information technology services of a very particular and special type. Deloitte offered its services. The RFQ included the following evaluation factors, in descending order of importance: technical approach, relevant experience, and price. The RFQ stated that award was to be made to the responsible vendor whose quotation represented the best value to the government, but this case turned on something else, the "technical approach" factor.

The technical approach subfactor required the submission of resumes for qualified key personnel, one of which was an enterprise solutions architect. The RFQ required that the proposed enterprise solutions architect satisfy the following minimum qualifications:
• Possesses extensive knowledge of and hands-on experience with [Oracle] Hyperion or [Oracle Business Intelligence Suite, Enterprise Edition (OBIEE)] or custom applications;
• Minimum Skills/Qualifications: At least 10 years [of] experience in Oracle Enterprise or OBIEE Oracle or Custom applications.
• Has Public Sector experience.
The agency was to evaluate the relevance of each listed key person’s experience, knowledge, certification, and identified skill sets for the ability to successfully complete the activities listed in the statement of work.

Subsequently, the agency amended the RFQ to require offerors to provide a "crosswalk", describing how general experience leads to the specific experience required in the solicitation. Offerors were specifically required to detail in which positions held by the proposed key personnel, did they obtain the required skills, qualifications, and minimum years of experience.

The proposed key person's resume in this instance explicitly stated that the proposed candidate possessed over 20 years of experience using Hyperion and Essbase, which are “core technologies of the Oracle [EPM] that [pre-date] Oracle’s 2007 acquisition of Hyperion and their subsequent rebranding of the software.” The agency didn't disagree with that assessment, but did disagree that Deloitte's proposed architect failed to detail "at least 10 years experience" with the Oracle, Hyperion and custom software required.

The agency contracting officer evaluated the material presented in support of the required experience and concluded that some of the dates listed in the detailed work history overlapped where the proposed candidate worked simultaneously for different employers. To compute the length of experience with Oracle EPM, OBIEE framework, or custom UI applications, the contracting officer eliminated duplicative periods of time for the overlapping and simultaneous employment, and only credited the total time worked with the required systems. The contracting officer’s computation showed that the proposed candidate had a total of 99 months, or 8.25 years, of relevant experience.

The agency then determined that, because the minimum 10 year experience requirement was not met. A quote that fails to conform to a material solicitation requirement is technically unacceptable and cannot form the basis for award. Qualifications for key personnel, specifically where the solicitation requires resumes for key personnel, are material requirements of a solicitation such that an offeror’s failure to propose personnel meeting those requirements would render a proposal unacceptable. The protest was denied.

This case involves the responsiveness of the offer, not the responsibility of the offeror, illustrating distinctively different and often confused fundamental procurement elements. It is not an unreasonable confusion given the way those elements are presented in laws and regulations. For instance, the ABA Model Procurement Code describes responsibility to mean a person who has the capability to perform the contract requirements and provide good faith performance. On the other hand, it defines responsive bidder to mean a person who has submitted a bid which conforms in all material respects to the invitation for bids. At first blush, both of those descriptions could describe the questions presented here. So how do I justify the assertion this case involves responsiveness not responsibility?

The key is in the language used; the artful procurement vocabulary that does not always carry the vernacular connotations of every day speech.

Look at the first sentence used in describing the matter above. It says the protest involves agency "evaluation" of the "unacceptability" of the offer. This is language used to describe responsiveness. The code, and the ABA Model Regulations, require that bids be "evaluated" based on criteria in the solicitation specifications, including criteria used to determine "acceptability". The regulations state, specifically, "any bidder's offering which does not meet the acceptability requirements shall be rejected as nonresponsive". And the nail in the coffin is the statement that qualifications for key personnel, specifically where the solicitation requires resumes for key personnel, are material requirements of a solicitation. As noted above, the definition of responsiveness rests on conformity with material respects of the bid. The language of responsiveness rests on issues of evaluation, unacceptability and materiality.


On the other hand, responsibility is not an objective evaluation of any kind based on criteria in a bid. It is a subjective judgment, based on a weighing of various "standards of responsibility", one of which is the bidder's record satisfactory performance. A determination that a bidder is, in the satisfaction of the Procurement Officer, responsible, and can be made by resort to information extrinsic to the bid submission, at any time up to award or even time of due performance. Responsibility is for practical matters presumed unless the Procurement Officer determines that the bidder is non-responsible.

It can be noted here that questions about the responsiveness or responsibility of bidders are decided at entirely different times and by entirely different standards.

Recalling, in this case, that the offeror was required to substantiate proof of experience in its submission, Cibinic and Nash, in their text, Formation of Government Contracts, Third Edition, also note the confusion that can arise between responsiveness and responsibility.
"When data or information is required to be submitted with the bid, the Comptroller will consider the purpose for which the data of information is to be used when determining whether it is a matter of responsiveness or responsibility. Thus, if descriptive data are to be used to determine a bidder's ability or capacity to perform, the matter will be one of responsibility, and failure to submit the information with the bid will not cause its rejection. (Citations mostly omitted but, noting one particular case where "failure to submit personnel resumes did not render bid nonresponsive".)  On the other hand, information or data may be required to be submitted with the bid for purposes of more precisely determining the nature of the work the bidder is agreeing to accomplish. Such data can be considered to go to the responsiveness of the bid." Id, pp 537-538. (emphasis in original)

Responsiveness, an area in which the contracting officer has limited discretion,deals with the question of whether the contractor has promised to do exactly what the Government has requested. Responsibility, however, involves the question of whether the contractor can or will perform as it has promised, and the contracting officer is accorded a great deal of discretion. Questions of responsiveness are determined only on the basis of information submitted with the bid and on the acts available at the time of bid opening. Conversely, responsibility determinations are made on the basis of information submitted or available up to the time of award. ... As a general rule, matters that deal with bidder responsibility cannot be converted into matters of responsiveness merely by inserting a provision into the IFB requiring rejection of bids that do not comply. Id, p 545. (emphasis in original)
It can be added that a similar analysis is conducted when licenses and permits are required as an element of a solicitation. See Cibinic and Nash, supra, pp 414 et seq.


Wednesday, March 28, 2018

Oops -- My mistake

This article comes from Athol, Maine, and is a perfect textbook hypothetical procurement quiz question, played out in real life. It involves a bid error, and seeks to find a way to deal with it. The facts of mistake are always at the core of a problem such as this. But the clarity of the law would help its resolution.

I've set out the whole article as presented, but for our purposes, let's just pretend it is a test question. How would you analyze the problem and solution?

State AG’s office denies Kenefick bid protest
The attorney general has denied a protest by Kenefick Corp., which submitted the low bid to the town for the Queen Lake Dam rehabilitation project. Bids were opened Jan. 31, and the hearing was held March 9.

Kenefick’s bid of $268,150 was the lowest of the 11 bids received, but the town rejected it because the document was not properly filled out. Kenefick argued that the $60,435 error on the form was obvious and should have been corrected by the town.

On the form, Kenefick wrote the total bid price was $268,150. There was a unit price schedule attached to the form. Bidders were asked to provide a unit price for approximately 20 items. The bidders were expected to multiply each unit price by the estimated quantity to derive a total bid amount. Bidders were further instructed to write the extended price for each item in words.

Instead of listing the extended price for each item in words, Kenefick expressed its unit prices in words. The total of the amounts in written words equaled $207,715, which conflicted with the total bid price of $268,150. The town said it made Kenefick’s bid obscure, mandating the rejection.

In the town’s rules relating to bids, in case of a discrepancy between words and figures, the amount expressed in words governs.

Kenefick was notified that its bid read as $207,715. Project Engineer David Lenart told the selectmen this week that, “Kenefick was told to take the bid for the lower amount, or withdraw it. He filed a protest.”

Kenefick maintained the error was obvious, and the town should have corrected it.

The town argued that Kenefick’s bid was obscure because of its $60,435 discrepancy, and also that Kenefick is not a responsible bidder, because it does not have experience with three dam projects, which was called for by the bid specifications.

The company’s lack of experience was also a concern, the town said. Lenart said, “Kenefick could only come up with two projects, which were not comparable” to the scope of the work needed on the Queen Lake project.

State Assistant Attorney General Deborah A. Anderson wrote that the town was under no obligation to correct Kenefick’s bid price, noting if a bidder’s error makes the price or scope of work ambiguous, the bid must be rejected. She further stated the town did not abuse its discretion by failing to correct Kenefick’s error.

Anderson ruled, “I find that Kenefick’s error was an obvious one, even though Kenefick’s bid price could be read as either $207,715 or $268,150. The town had the discretion to correct this error, but it chose not to do so. This was not an arbitrary decision.’

Anderson said as protestor, Kenefick did not meet its burden to prove that its rejection was arbitrary. She said the town was rightfully concerned about allowing Kenefick to choose which bid price was the correct price, thus giving Kenefick ”two bites of the apple.” Also, she said the town followed its own rule. For those reasons the protest was denied.

The second-lowest bidder, R. Bates & Sons, who bid $270,540, made similar, though fewer, errors on the bid forms. He was informed of the same issue.

Selectmen signed two documents prepared by the town’s attorney, officially rejecting the Kenefick and Bates bids. Selectmen then voted to award the bid to the third lowest bidder, Edward Page Corp., which came in at $319,069 ($50,919 higher than the Kenefick bid).

Chairman Thomas Brouillet and John Telepciak signed the contract saying Page “did everything right, and has good experience.”

The project involves the demolition of the dam’s existing spillway and outlet conduit, and construction of a new concrete spillway and gate structure, outlet gates, trash racks, low level outlet pipe, riprap slope protection, gravel crest and landscaping.

Representing the town at the Boston hearing were Thomas McEnaney (town counsel) who filed a response to Kenefick’s protest, and David Lenart, the project engineer.

Work on the dam will begin after Labor Day.
So, what happened here? Kenefick presented a bid with itemized unit prices. In accordance with bid requirements, Kenfeck's bid amount was provided for each itemized line item, but was spelled out in word form. The total amount of all bids was then provided, in Arabic numerals.

Setting aside the question of Kenefick's responsibility for the moment, because the article makes it look like its bid was rejected on grounds of responsiveness, not responsibility, its bid was rejected because the bid "was obscure because of its $60,435 discrepancy" between the total bid price and the mathematical total of the itemized prices. Kenefick argued it was an obvious mistake, but the State Assistant Attorney General held that the town was under no obligation to correct the bid, on the ground that, if a bidder's error makes the price ambiguous, the bid must be rejected. She said the town did not abuse its discretion by failing to correct Kenefick's error.

That may well be the applicable law in Athol, which evidently has a rule that, "in case of a discrepancy between words and figures, the amount expressed in words governs." But this blog is about the ABA Model Procurement Code, and more particularly the Guam procurement law, which follows the ABA MPC, and there is no such law in that context. Remember, we are treating this article as a hypothetical factual situation for our analysis purposes.

MPC § 3-202(6) states that "correction ... of inadvertently erroneous bids before or after award ... shall be permitted in accordance with regulations. This is the same language in Guam law, 5 GCA § 5211(f).

The pertinent ABA MPC regulation is in R3-202.11 ("Mistakes in Bids"), in particular R3-202.11.4(b)("Mistakes where intended correct bid is evident"), which states, "if the mistake and the intended correct bid is clearly evident on the face of the bid document, the bid shall be corrected to the intended correct bid and may not be withdrawn. Examples of mistakes that may be clearly evident on the face of the bid document are ... errors in extending unit prices, ... and arithmetical errors." 

It might be the case that the town did not consider this to be a "clearly evident" mistake. But the AAG was certain it was a clearly evident mistake: "I find that Kenefick’s error was an obvious one...."

The AAG also said "the town was rightfully concerned about allowing Kenefick to choose which bid price was the correct price, thus giving Kenefick 'two bites of the apple'.” Again, I do not question the AAG's statement of applicable Maine law. But the "two bite at the apple" old saw is irrelevant in the MPC regulation, which says such a mistaken bid "shall be corrected ... and may not be withdrawn.

Moreover, there is another element here. Both bites of Kenefick's bid were the lowest prices bid. "Kenefick’s bid price could be read as either $207,715 or $268,150." The next lowest bid, at $270,540, was higher than both of those bids, if we assume, for argument, they were intended to be two separate bids. Even if the totaled low bid written in words,$207,715, the total bid expressed in Arabic numerals, $268,150, remained the low bid. For some reason, “Kenefick was told to take the bid for the lower amount, or withdraw it. He filed a protest."

I hope that there was a stronger reason to reject the bid because of issues of responsibility, though there is not much in this article that would help an analysis of that issue. This bid was rejected before it was evaluated from all appearances, even though it was the lowest bid. It was reported only that "Kenefick is not a responsible bidder, because it does not have experience with three dam projects, which was called for by the bid specifications." 

In the ABA MPC regulations (R3-401.10), it is not necessary to actually have all the experience at the time of bid if it can be obtained (R3-401.03) after bid evaluation, for instance by subcontractors or other professionals available for hire. This regulation requires a separate inquiry to determine responsibility after bid opening, so long as the low bidder's responsibility is determined to the satisfaction of the procurement officer before award (R3-401.04). There was evidently here no finding that Kenefick was nonresponsible (see, R3-401.05), merely "a concern".

And what did the town get from this? The obligation to pay $50,000 more for the next available bid, about 20% more than Kenefick's stated total bid.

It might be asked, why is the ABA MPC so lenient on allowing low bidders to correct bids? It would seem, unless the low bidder has determined to be nonresponsible, that government should be allowed the opportunity to take a low bid, notwithstanding technical mistakes in it that do not prejudice the competitive standing of other bidders. Here, correction of the bid, even to the higher amount, would not improve the competitive position of any of the other bidders.  

It is one of the foundation purposes and policies of the MPC, and Guam's procurement law, "to maximize to the fullest extent practicable the purchasing value of public funds". (MPC § 1-101(2)(f); 5 GCA § 5001(b)(5).)  It is mandated that the procurement law is to be construed and applied to promote its purposes and policies.  (MPC § 1-101(1); 5 GCA § 5001(a).)


Sunday, February 18, 2018

An army of one can get government contract

FEMA Contract Called for 30 Million Meals for Puerto Ricans. 50,000 Were Delivered.
For this huge task, FEMA tapped Tiffany Brown, an Atlanta entrepreneur with no experience in large-scale disaster relief and at least five canceled government contracts in her past. FEMA awarded her $156 million for the job, and Ms. Brown, who is the sole owner and employee of her company, Tribute Contracting LLC, set out to find some help.

Ms. Brown, who is adept at navigating the federal contracting system, hired a wedding caterer in Atlanta with a staff of 11 to freeze-dry wild mushrooms and rice, chicken and rice, and vegetable soup. She found a nonprofit in Texas that had shipped food aid overseas and domestically, including to a Houston food bank after Hurricane Harvey.

By the time 18.5 million meals were due, Tribute had delivered only 50,000. And FEMA inspectors discovered a problem: The food had been packaged separately from the pouches used to heat them. FEMA’s solicitation required “self-heating meals.” “Do not ship another meal. Your contract is terminated,” Carolyn Ward, the FEMA contracting officer who handled Tribute’s agreement, wrote to Ms. Brown in an email dated Oct. 19 that Ms. Brown provided to The New York Times. “This is a logistical nightmare.”

Ms. Brown described herself in an interview as a government contractor — “almost like a broker,” she said — who does not keep employees or specialize in any field but is able to procure subcontracted work as needed, and get a cut of the money along the way. She claims a fashion line and has several self-published books, and describes herself on Twitter as “A Diva, Mogul, Author, Idealist with scars to prove it.”

After Tribute’s failure to provide the meals became clear, FEMA formally terminated the contract for cause, citing Tribute’s late delivery of approved meals. Ms. Brown is disputing the termination. On Dec. 22, she filed an appeal, arguing that the real reason FEMA canceled her contract was because the meals were packed separately from the heating pouches, not because of their late delivery. Ms. Brown claims the agency did not specify that the meals and heaters had to be together.

Tribute has been awarded dozens of government contracts since 2013, including one in 2015 for $1.2 million in mattresses for the Defense Logistics Agency, which supports military combat troops, federal spending databases show. Tribute delivered the mattresses, according to the agency. The databases offer only a fragmented picture of federal contracts. The government has also canceled Tribute contracts on at least five occasions.

Four cancellations involved the Federal Prison System, which found that Tribute failed to deliver meat, bakery, cereal and other food products to various correctional institutions. A fifth termination involved the Government Publishing Office, which terminated a contract for 3,000 tote bags after Tribute failed to print the Marine Corps logo on both sides of the bags.

An investigation by the office’s inspector general found that Tribute “altered and submitted a false shipping document and subcontracted the predominant production function on two contracts without proper authorization,” according to a 2015 report submitted to Congress. The report did not name Tribute, but a Government Publishing Office spokesman confirmed that it was the Georgia company mentioned in the document. The office awarded Tribute 14 contracts totaling more than $80,000 from 2014-15, and the company “routinely delivered late,” the report said.

As a result of the botched tote-bag job, the Government Publishing Office prohibited the award of any contracts over $35,000 to Tribute until January 2019. But that exclusion applied only to that office, not to any other federal agency.

Tribute has had three indefinite contracts with FEMA for hygiene kits since 2013, but none of them have been activated.

Asked about the cancellations, Ms. Brown offered explanations for each case, including that she had supplier trouble with the prison meals. She could have fought the Government Publishing Office on the tote bags contract, she said, but could not afford to at the time.

The bid protest could slow down the Pentagon’s cloud acquisition effort.
A $7 million sole-source cloud support contract awarded by the Defense Department to a company with one employee in January has come under bid protest.

Interoperability Clearinghouse filed the protest with the Government Accountability Office on Feb. 5, and contends the Defense Department failed to conduct a reasonable responsibility determination of Eagle Harbor Solutions LLC’s capabilities and resources. Eagle Harbor Solutions is an Alaska Native-owned 8(a) small disadvantaged business that federal contracting database records indicate has an annual revenue of $91,005, a single employee and few past government contracts.

The protest also alleges a conflict of interest due to Eagle Harbor Solutions being a subsidiary of Koniag Government Services and its parent company, Koniag Inc., which provides cloud services to the Defense Department through the Army’s ACCENT contract. A $7 million sole-source cloud support contract awarded by the Defense Department to a company with one employee in January has come under bid protest.

Interoperability Clearinghouse filed the protest with the Government Accountability Office on Feb. 5, and contends the Defense Department failed to conduct a reasonable responsibility determination of Eagle Harbor Solutions LLC’s capabilities and resources. Eagle Harbor Solutions is an Alaska Native-owned 8(a) small disadvantaged business that federal contracting database records indicate has an annual revenue of $91,005, a single employee and few past government contracts.

The protest also alleges a conflict of interest due to Eagle Harbor Solutions being a subsidiary of Koniag Government Services and its parent company, Koniag Inc., which provides cloud services to the Defense Department through the Army’s ACCENT contract.

The Defense Department previously said the contract “is for program office support services,” and that Eagle Harbor Solutions “is serving in a support capacity only by providing a small team of highly skilled individuals.” In a press release, Eagle Harbor Solutions said it would provide the Defense Department “a full range of infrastructure engineering, software engineering, acquisition, strategic communications, business operations, cost estimation, and budgetary expertise.”

The Defense Department previously said the contract “is for program office support services,” and that Eagle Harbor Solutions “is serving in a support capacity only by providing a small team of highly skilled individuals.” In a press release, Eagle Harbor Solutions said it would provide the Defense Department “a full range of infrastructure engineering, software engineering, acquisition, strategic communications, business operations, cost estimation, and budgetary expertise.”
How can these contracts possibly be justified? Bid contracts are awarded (or meant to be) to the lowest priced responsive bid of a responsible bidder. A bidder who offers a product or service conforming materially to all solicitation requirements can, with a low bid, be considered to have presented a responsive bid.

But that is only half the story. The bidder must also be responsible.  Responsibility and responsive are not at all the same thing.  They are often, wrongly, conflated.  See, Responsivebility.

How can a small shop win a contract for a complex job?

Responsibility is a matter of judgment, involving the weighed consideration of several factors, which the ABA Model Procurement Code calls "Standards of Responsibility". A bidder's responsibility is to be determined before award, and is most often not considered until after bids are opened.

The standards include, a satisfactory record of performance. That is only useful if governments keep such records and share them amongst its various arms. The record can include non-government contract, particularly important for new entrants to the field of competition. Similarly a satisfactory record of integrity is a factor.

And this is where it gets a bit non-intuitive to the uninitiated. Although a bidder is required to have "available the appropriate financial, material, equipment, facility, and personnel resources and expertise" to indicate its capability to meet all contractual requirements, it is also deemed responsible if the bidder has "the ability to obtain them". There are some organizations who have become very adept at understanding a new opportunity and marshaling the stuff necessary to perform the job. These bidders can also win a government contract.

Another example of such a case is provided by the Hawaiian case, BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES OF HAWAll, INC. It was an administrative hearing before the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs of the State of Hawaii. It involved an award to provide rubbish collection services at the Honolulu airport. It did not have trucks, containers, personnel, drivers, collection facility or practically anything else, but did show, to the satisfaction of the Procurement Officer, that it had the ability to obtain all of it. 

Note that, in the Eagle Harbor situation, there was an additional element: whether the bidder was a bona fide, qualified Alaska Native-owned 8(a) small disadvantaged business, or whether it was a front for its much larger owner, which provided the resources it lacked.


Monday, December 19, 2016

Minor post-bid mistatkes

Protests arise following Shop Road extension contract award
The Richland County Council has spoken on a contract for a $25 million road project aimed at sparking industrial development. However, one of the firms that lost out is still fighting to overturn the decision.

On Friday, attorney Kathleen McDaniel for Richardson Construction Company, a Richland County-based company, went to court in a last ditch effort to win a contract of at least $22 million dollars. She says the contract was wrongly awarded to another bidder. “We believe this is not consistent with Richland County's procurement ordinance.”

McDaniel admits Richardson made a minor and easily correctable mistake on its bid proposal. However, that mistake could cost taxpayers about $2.9 million if the contract goes to McClam and Associates - the highest bidder and the one approved by a 9-2 majority of the county council.

“The county has a concern that if they permit any type of revision to a bid, post-bid I think, that would be inconsistent with the county procurement code. I think we just have a different interpretation of what the procurement code permits and that's why we will be filing a protest with the Richland County procurement review board,” McDaniel said.

It won't be easy for Richardson to prevail, however. Richland County Council's Torrey Rush and others in county government are worried about setting a precedent for other bidders to try to change their proposals after submitting them. County government is also concerned that overturning the decision could cause construction delays and problems for development of another project dependent on the road.

Read more and more accurately at the link.

In a related article, Construction company suing Richland County over Shop Road project, it is reported:
The plaintiff, Richardson Construction Co. of Columbia, says it was the lowest bidder for the project by $3 million but made what it considers a minor mistake in its bid that caused the county not to consider the company for the job. Richardson’s complaint was filed Thursday in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas.

County administrator Gerald Seals has told County Council the county’s procurement laws do not require the county to allow bidders to correct errors in bids once the bids have been opened.

Read more and more accurately at the link.
The American Bar Association procurement law and regulations have provisions that speak to this situation, and could aid Attorney McDaniel if the same or substantively similar rules apply in Richland County and the facts are amenable.

Guam's procurement law is based on the ABA model, so I will refer to the Guam version.  Guam has a regulation dealing with mistakes in bids, generally, and with mistakes made in various stages of the solicitation process. 2 GAR § 3109(m)(4) particularly deals with mistakes made after bid opening but before award.

Generally speaking, the rule distinguishes between mistakes of judgment and other non-judgmental mistakes. "If the mistake is attributable to an error in judgment, the bid may not be corrected. Bid correction or withdrawal by reason of a nonjudgmental mistake is permissible, but only to the extent it is not contrary to the interest of the territory or the fair treatment of other bidders." (§ 3109(m)(1).)

A nonjudgmental mistake made after opening but before award may consist of a minor informality or a matter of substance that is insignificant. Such insignificant mistakes "can be waived or corrected without prejudice to other bidders; that is, the effect on price, quantity, quality, delivery, or contractual conditions is negligible. The Procurement Officer shall waive such informalities or allow the bidder to correct them depending on which is in the best interest of the territory." (§ 3109(m)(4).)

This regulation is specifically backed up by statute: "Correction or withdrawal of inadvertently erroneous bids before or after award, or cancellation of awards or contracts based on such bid mistakes, shall be permitted in accordance with regulations...." (5 GCA § 5211(f).) The corresponding ABA Model Procurement Code cite is §3-202(6) and the Model Regulation is §R3-202.11.

As an aside, regulation § 3109(m)(4) incidentally provides a guide to what is meant by the term "bidder prejudice", indeed it is the only reference in the Model Code and Regulation that comes close to specifically defining the term. 

Insignificant mistakes, the regulation tells us, can be waived or corrected "without prejudice to other bidders; that is, the effect on price, quantity, quality, delivery, or contractual conditions is negligible". Thus, a claim of bidder prejudice must be based in something in the bid that has an effect on price, quantity, quality, delivery, or contractual condition which is more than negligible. For instance, bidder responsibility is based on factors concerning the nature of the bidder, not the nature of the bid. This can be a handy guide to distinguishing between what constitutes an issue of responsiveness and what constitutes a matter of responsibility.

Friday, September 23, 2016

Sole searching in Oakland, CA?

Courthouse News Service, which is a nationwide news service for lawyers and the news media, filed the following story. This shortened version is intended to alert you to the item and tease you to go to the sourced link and read it in full. Especially since I cut, paste, omit, edit, rearrange and paraphrase to suit the educational content and intent of this blawg; so you must read the original and not take my version of it as true, complete or accurate.

Oakland Playing Fast & Loose With Contracts, Bidders Say
Competitive bidding is meant to secure the lowest price for a project by creating competition and ensuring contracts don't go to pre-selected firms. So when an agency wants to sole-source a contract, it must justify the move internally and get it approved. If that doesn't happen, officials can use sole-sourcing to steer contracts to favored firms and exclude cheaper bidders — raising project costs that taxpayers ultimately pay.

"They're trying to convert the process from a shield-bidding process to a negotiation process and at the federal level, it's not appropriate," said Steve Sorret, an attorney with Kutak Rock in Washington and a former curriculum director for The George Washington University Law School's government contracts program. "What they're doing here certainly goes against the grain of a typical public contracting process."

In a city known for awarding fraudulent contracts, routinely sole-sourcing its projects signals entrenched problems in the way Oakland does business, and in how that affects residents. The City Council currently faces findings by the Alameda County Grand Jury that it improperly awarded a $1.5 billion trash collection contract to an unqualified recycler. The 2014 deal sent garbage collection fees skyrocketing, prompting a group of Oakland landlords to sue the city earlier this year.

And in a 2013 report, the city auditor blasted councilmembers Desley Brooks and Larry Reid for breaking the law by steering part of a $2 million contract for demolition work at the former Oakland Army Base to a friend's company after the city had already begun negotiating with another contractor. Those initial negotiations, too, were illegitimate since municipal law requires the contract to go up for competitive bids first. Brooks also negotiated three separate contracts for a teen center in East Oakland, something only the city administrator can do.

Emboldened by high-ranking officials willing to look the other way when councilmembers break the law, the Oakland City Council routinely waives its legally mandated competitive bid requirement for awarding construction contracts worth more than $50,000 and negotiates the contracts directly with firms of its choice, according to a report by the city auditor.

The council simply relies on a statute allowing it to reject bids it deems invalid — or "nonresponsive." And at a City Council meeting on Tuesday, it blessed another competitive bid waiver, this time for the $400,000 renovation of the Dimond Branch library in East Oakland. Instead, the city will approach construction firms and negotiate with them one-on-one in a process known as sole-source contracting.

But falling short of small business goals and bidding over the project price don't render a bid nonresponsive. If a bidder fulfills all of the requirements for submitting the bid, they are by definition responsive and both Greentech and Wickman satisfied those requirements.

Jonathan Wickman says the city violated its own laws in deeming his firm's proposal nonresponsive so it could justify moving to direct negotiations. "That doesn't seem legal to me," Wickman said. "They should rebid it or find more money and rebid with more money in the budget. It's not like they're left with no avenue."

Monday, September 29, 2014

Girl talk

No offense intended to anyone, but this post is about confidential discussions, which immediately leads me to recall one of my favorite songs, called Girl Talk (get a taste of it here), by a sweet Hawaiian duet team that call themselves Hula Honeys.

It also happens that the articles cited here are written, in some cases co-written, by Attorney Michelle E. Litteken of the law firm Mayer Brown LLP, and collected on the Lexology website.  Attorney Litteken has produced a very informative collection of articles on the "problems" of engaging in discussions in the solicitation process of negotiated contract formation. I have already posted one such article here, and just came across these others, which add texture and color to this confusing and complex subject. Taken together, they provide a welcome tonic to the headache that comes from trying to sort out the ins and outs of permissible discussion.

Again, the caveat: read the whole article at the link. I cut, paste, leave out important stuff, paraphrase, rearrange and otherwise use great license to present articles on this post, doing them no justice, I am sure, but I do so with the best intention of bringing the subject to you, for you to discover and discern. Here, I have left out all discussions of cited cases, and that must be read to appreciate the nuances the cases deal with.

When does an agency cross the line from clarifications to discussions?
FAR 15.306 defines clarifications as “limited exchanges, between the Government and offerors, that may occur when award without discussions is contemplated.” The FAR does not expressly define “discussions,” but it explains that “discussions” include negotiations that “are undertaken with the intent of allowing the offeror to revise its proposal.” The FAR used to limit clarifications to communications about relatively small matters, such as eliminating clerical mistakes or minor irregularities. However, the rules were revised in 1997 to allow a free exchange of information without requiring discussions. Decisions from the GAO and CFC reveal that the two protest forums apply the FAR provisions differently, with the CFC appearing to embrace a more substantial exchange of information that can still be characterized as clarifications.

Both GAO and the CFC recognize that, if an offeror is given an opportunity to revise its proposal, the agency has engaged in discussions. Several GAO and CFC cases refer to this as the “acid test.” The tough cases come when either (i) questions (often called “clarifications” by the agency) seek information that is necessary to determine technical acceptability of the proposal, or (2) the agency seeks a substantial amount of “clarify[ing]” information and an offeror’s response approaches (or crosses) the line of changing the proposal.
Don’t be misled: what contractors should know about misleading discussions
Discussions can be useful to contractors because the questions asked and issues raised can direct an offeror to areas of its proposal needing improvement. In some situations, discussions can help a contractor turn an unacceptable proposal into a successful offer. However, information provided by an agency during discussions can also lead an offeror in the wrong direction. If the agency selects another proposal, the disappointed offeror may file a protest and argue that the discussions were misleading. But what qualifies as misleading discussions? How specific does an agency need to be when it engages in discussions? These are issues that contractors should be mindful of as they engage in discussions—and that they must understand to frame potential protest issues when they are not the prevailing offeror.

Although the FAR does not define misleading discussions, decisions from GAO and CFC provide guidance on when discussions are misleading. Both forums have stated: “An agency may not inadvertently mislead an offeror, through the framing of a discussion question, into responding in a manner that does not address the agency’s concerns; or that misinforms the offeror concerning its proposal weaknesses or deficiencies; or the government’s requirements.”

To succeed in a misleading discussions protest, the protester must show that the allegedly misleading discussions were prejudicial, i.e., made its proposal less competitive. For example, in Tech Systems, Inc., the protester claimed that the agency misled it by focusing on its proposed technical approach, which led the protester to overemphasize management, but refused to discuss pricing, which proved to be the determinative factor in source selection. The court rejected the protester’s argument that the discussions misled it into proposing a high-cost approach because the protester did not show that is costs were higher because of the management-centric approach the agency purportedly encouraged it to propose.

As is the case in challenges to the meaningfulness of discussions, the amount of specificity required to avoid misleading an offeror is highly fact dependent. Contractors should be aware of an agency’s obligation to refrain from misleading offerors as they engage in discussions and litigate bid protests.
What is required for discussions to be meaningful?
It’s basic procurement law that, when an agency engages in discussions with offerors under FAR Part 15, the discussions must be meaningful. FAR 15.306, which provides for exchanges with offerors after receipt of proposals, does not specifically define “meaningful” in the context of discussions. Instead, the FAR states that an agency must discuss “deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and adverse past performance information to which the offeror has not yet had an opportunity to respond.” GAO and the CFC have based their analyses of what discussions qualify as meaningful on this FAR provision. Issues that arise with respect to whether discussions were sufficiently meaningful include:

• When is a weakness significant?
• Do weaknesses that are discriminators have to be discussed?
• How specific does the agency need to be?
• Does an agency need to discuss a weakness if it first appears in an offeror’s FPR?

Since the FAR only requires that deficiencies and significant weaknesses be discussed, and because there is no obligation to discuss garden-variety weaknesses within a proposal, a protest ground regarding the failure to discuss such issues (absent an unequal discussions issue) would be dead on arrival.

The FAR (15.001) defines a “weakness” as “a flaw in the proposal that increases the risk of unsuccessful contract performance.” A weakness is “significant” when the concern “in the proposal is a flaw that appreciably increases the risk of unsuccessful contract performance.” So the distinction between a weakness and a significant weakness turns on the judgment of whether there is an “appreciable” effect on the risk of unsuccessful contract performance.

There are numerous bid protests in which offerors’ proposals are closely matched and a weakness that was not discussed (or group of such weaknesses) becomes the discriminator. Substantial precedent makes clear that the fact that a weakness eventually becomes the deciding factor does not create an obligation to conduct discussions.

In cases in which there is no dispute about the significance of a weakness, the parties may disagree over whether the discussions directed the offeror to the area of its proposal needing improvement. The boilerplate legal concepts applied by the CFC and GAO are clear. An agency is not required to “spoon feed” offerors during discussions; instead, the agency is merely required to lead offerors into the areas of their proposals requiring amplification or correction. Consistent application of these rules can be tricky.

In sum, although the failure to engage in meaningful discussions is a common protest ground, there are nuances in the law that may add complexity to what seems like a familiar argument.
“That wasn’t fair!”—protests based on unequal discussions
The principles of fair and equal competition drive many aspects of procurement law and policy. These principles are evident in the FAR’s requirement that when an agency engages in discussions with offerors, the agency cannot “engage in conduct that [f]avors one offeror over another.” Discussions often occur as part of the procurement process, and can be beneficial to the agency and offerors. However, discussions have their drawbacks. If an unsuccessful offeror believes that other offerors were given better direction or provided with more information, discussions can provide the basis for a protest based on purportedly unequal discussions.

At first glance, the rule that discussions between the Government and offerors must be equal and not favor one offeror over another seems clear. However, application of the rule can be complicated because agencies are not required to conduct identical discussions with offerors, and because discussions must be tailored to offerors’ different proposals. As such, when GAO or the CFC is faced with a protest alleging unequal discussions, it is not a simple matter of determining how many questions were asked, how long discussions were conducted, or the type and number of issues that were addressed. Instead, the question is whether the agency’s questions or statements made during discussions gave an offeror an unfair advantage.

One difficult aspect of unequal discussions issues is that in most cases, the issues can only be understood by bid protest counsel examining an administrative record released under a protective order (PO), and the issues usually cannot be discussed in any detail with the client (as doing so would be inconsistent with the PO).

When considering pursuing a protest, contractors should be mindful of an agency’s obligation to conduct equal discussions. It is important to remember that the number of questions raised or issues addressed is not decisive regarding whether discussions were unequal. Instead, contractors must consider the substance of the discussions—and whether they have any basis to believe the agency provided another offeror with an unfair advantage.
Finishing off her series is this reported on Mondaq: Discussions Round-up: Recent Protests Challenging Discussions
As this series has shown, disappointed offerors often raise protest allegations related to discussions. Although protesters frequently allege that discussions were unequal, misleading, or not meaningful, challenges based on these allegations can be difficult to win. In researching decisions to include in this round-up, I found only two decisions issued in 2014 sustaining a protest based on a discussions issue: Kardex Remstar LLC, which was discussed in the series' first post, and Marathon Medical Corp.). Of course, although many of the protests discussed didn't result in sustained protests based on the facts presented, they often provide useful insights for contractors in developing new claims and are worth close study.

When Does an Agency Cross the Line from Clarifications into Discussions?

The 2014 Windstream Communications protest followed a 2013 protest in which Windstream challenged the exclusion of its proposal from the competitive range. The agency took corrective action, and during the reevaluation, the agency contacted Windstream about its pricing. After reevaluating Windstream's proposal, the agency assessed two deficiencies under the "technical and management approach" subfactor and determined that Windstream's proposal was unacceptable. Windstream argued that the agency failed to engage in meaningful discussions because it raised concerns about Windtsream's prices but not the technical and management approach deficiencies. The Agency argued that it was not required to address the deficiencies with Windstream because it did not engage in discussions – the exchanges were clarifications. Windstream attempted to bolster its claims that the exchanges were discussions by pointing to the fact that it had submitted new detailed pricing information in response to the agency's questions – thereby revising its proposal – the "acid test" for discussions. However, in its submission to the agency, Windstream wrote: "We did not change any of our prices.". GAO denied the protest, finding that although the format of the pricing information was different, the elements and its proposed price were the same. As such, the exchanges were clarifications – not discussions – and the agency was not required to address the proposal's deficiencies.

What Does It Take for Discussions to Be Meaningful?

In our What Is Required for Discussions to Be Meaningful? post, we discussed Sentrillion Corp., a decision in which GAO sustained the protest because the agency failed to raise its concerns about the completeness of some of Sentrillion's business license applications. Based on GAO's recommendation, the agency reopened the competition and issued discussion letters. In its letter to Sentrillion, the agency stated that if Sentrillion was proposing to partner with other companies to perform the work, it must submit evidence of a partnership agreement along with any business licenses or applications. During the reevaluation, the agency deemed Sentrillion's proposal technically unacceptable because the teaming agreements it had submitted—which provided that the parties would negotiate a subcontract if Sentrillion was awarded the contract—were not binding partnership agreements. Sentrillion protested at the CFC, asserting (among other protest grounds) that the discussions were not meaningful because the agency never told Sentrillion to submit binding subcontract agreements or that teaming agreements were unacceptable. The court denied the protest, finding that the discussion letter adequately conveyed the need for finalized agreements.

What Constitutes Unequal Discussions?

In Bannum Inc., the agency determined that because the awardee was rated slightly better for past performance and technical/management, the benefits of its proposal justified paying a three percent price premium. During discussions, the agency had told the awardee that its proposed price was high but did not comment on the protester's pricing, and the protester asserted that discussions were unequal. GAO denied the protest, stating: "unless an offeror's proposed price is so high as to be unreasonable or unacceptable, an agency is not required to inform an offeror during discussions that its proposed price is high in comparison to a competitor's proposed price, even where price is the determinative factor for award." GAO stated that the requirement to conduct discussions does not depend on how an offeror's proposed price compares to the Independent Government Estimate (IGE). However, in support of its decision, GAO noted that the protester's price was the lowest received and less than the IGE–and the awardee's initial proposed price had been above the IGE.

No Matter What, a Protester Must Show Prejudice

As is the case in all bid protests, prejudice is a central requirement in challenging the way in which an agency conducted discussions. In some instances, GAO or the CFC may not address whether the agency violated the FAR provisions governing discussions because the protester failed to demonstrate how it was prejudiced by the alleged violation. For example, in Inchape Shipping Services, the protester argued that the agency engaged in unequal discussions because it allowed the awardee to revise its proposal by replacing the individual proposed for a key personnel role with another employee after the individual it initially proposed was placed on leave. GAO determined that it need not decide whether the change in key personnel constituted discussions because the protester had not demonstrated competitive prejudice.
On that last sentence about no competitive prejudice, I note that the notion of competitive prejudice is hard in the first instance to get hands around.  But it is easier once the concept is grasped. 

In this case, for instance, the protestor's competitor was allowed to change the name of a person with a key role to play in the performance of the contract. Whether a bidder or offeror has the capability to perform is an issue of "responsibility". In the framework of ABA Model Procurement Code law, such as is Guam's, "capability" is one of the standards of responsibility and need not be finally determined until just before award.

Bidder or offeror capability is not an issue that determines whether the bid or offer is responsive. Only issues concerning responsiveness affect bidder prejudice, and only if the matter is material. As the Guam regulations state, "Minor informalities are matters of form ... or insignificant mistakes that can be waived or corrected without prejudice to other bidders; that is, the effect on price, quantity, quality, delivery, or contractual conditions is negligible." (2 GAR § 3109(m)(4)(B).) 

Thus, when the government determines responsibility, it is given great deference to make that judgment call about the person it wants to do business with; but, when it is determining whether a bid or offer proposes to provide the very thing or performance specified, to make sure everyone is proposing, say, apples if it is apples the government wants, the government must reject a bid or offer that proposes oranges, and it prejudices the other bidders if the government goes ahead and chooses an orange.   

Matters of responsiveness are scrutinized more carefully and early in the game, by the time bids and offers are opened or considered, and cannot be waived or altered unless the matter is immaterial or negligible.

Issues dealing with whether the government wants to or should deal with a particular bidder or offeror relate to responsibility.  Issues dealing with price, quantity, quality, delivery or contractual terms or other specifications describing the product or service required to be delivered are issues of responsiveness.  Prospective contractor responsibility must be distinguished from product or service accepetability and responsiveness.

Saturday, September 20, 2014

The key personnel difference between responsiveness and responsibility

Sometimes the difference between contractor responsibility and bid responsiveness can be slippery to catch. This is particularly true when services rather than things are being procured.

Under the ABA Model Procurement Code regime, as adopted on Guam, the determination of responsibility is made by examining certain standards of responsibility. Among relevant inquiries is the judgement of the prospective contractor's ability to perform the contract, or the ability to obtain the necessary requirements to perform when performance comes due. Capability is to be determined before award of contract, and can be assessed through an inquiry process after bids or offers are opened.

Responsiveness, however, means submitting all material requirements to provide the government the exact thing or service that the solicitation demands. Responsiveness is answered from data submitted in the bid or offer, and is not curable by submission of revised bids or offers after opening.

It is fundamental that matters of responsibility cannot be transformed into issues of responsiveness by requiring submission of evidence of responsibility in the bid or offer.

These general principles are often reflected in procurement regimes other than the ABA Model Code, such as the US federal acquisition rules for request for task order proposals ("RTOP"), as the following decision of the GAO indicates. Again, I remind readers to read the original material at the link; that which follows is edited in ways that may distort the actual case, and often excludes additional issues of interest.

Matter of: Paradigm Technologies, Inc., File: B-409221.2; B-409221.3, August 1, 2014
The RTOP was issued pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 16.505 to holders of MDA Engineering and Support Services multiple award contracts. The solicitation provided for the issuance of a cost-plus-fixed-fee task order for various strategic planning and financial support services for a base year and two option years.

Offerors were informed that the task order would be issued on a best-value basis, considering technical, past performance, small business utilization past performance, cost, and small business utilization. The technical factor was considered to be significantly more important than all other factors, and consisted of four, equally-weighted subfactors: approach, labor mix, key personnel, and transition.

As relevant here, with respect to the key personnel subfactor, offerors were required to propose as key personnel a contract program manager and a task order lead. In this regard, offerors were instructed to submit resumes for these two key personnel, as well as for any subject matter experts that were proposed.

MDA received proposals from Paradigm (the incumbent) and Booz Allen, which were evaluated by the agency’s technical evaluation team, past performance evaluator, and cost/price evaluation team. The technical evaluation and past performance teams assigned adjectival ratings under the evaluation factors for each proposal, supported by a narrative that identified strengths, significant strengths, and weaknesses. MDA conducted several rounds of discussions with the offerors, and requested final proposal revisions (FPR). Booz Allen submitted its FPR on July 22, 2013, in which it provided resumes for the contract program manager (Ms. G) and the task order lead.

On August 5, Booz Allen’s proposed contract program manager, Ms. G, notified Booz Allen that she had accepted a position with another firm. On October 23, MDA selected Booz Allen for issuance of the task order, and on October 28, Booz Allen notified the contracting officer of Ms. G’s departure and proposed to provide Mr. H as the new contracts program manager.

Following a debriefing, Paradigm protested to our Office on November 4, arguing, among other things, that Booz Allen proposed a key person, Ms. G, that Booz Allen knew would be unavailable. MDA informed our Office that it would reevaluate proposals and make a new selection decision. We dismissed the protest as academic.

In the reevaluation of FPRs, as relevant here with respect to the evaluation of Booz Allen’s proposal under the key personnel subfactor, the technical evaluation team noted that, “on information and belief,” Booz Allen’s proposed contract program manager, Ms. G, was no longer employed by Booz Allen.

Although the evaluation team did not change Booz Allen’s satisfactory subfactor rating, it assigned a weakness for Booz Allen’s failure to provide one of the two required key personnel. In this regard, the evaluators stated that the risk regarding Booz Allen’s ability to satisfy key personnel requirements “is mitigated to some degree by the fact that [Booz Allen] has the demonstrated ability to recruit and hire qualified personnel to fulfill the Key Personnel ([contract program manager] in this case) duties.”

The selection authority recognized that Paradigm’s proposal was rated higher than Booz Allen’s under the technical and past performance factors, and that the technical factor was significantly more important than any other factor. The selection authority, however, concluded that the difference between the two technical proposals was not as significant as the adjectival ratings implied. In this regard, he also noted that, although Paradigm’s proposal presented virtually no performance risk to the government, Booz Allen’s proposal presented a low to moderate performance risk. The selection authority acknowledged that Paradigm’s highly-rated proposal was worth paying some amount of cost premium, but concluded that the merit of Paradigm’s proposal was not worth the substantial cost premium.

The selection authority again selected Booz Allen to receive the task order. After a debriefing, Paradigm protested to our Office.

As explained below, we sustain Paradigm’s challenge to the agency’s evaluation of Booz Allen’s contract program manager.

Paradigm argues that Booz Allen’s FPR was technically unacceptable, complaining that MDA in its reevaluation of proposals knew that Booz Allen’s proposed contract program manager, Ms. G, was no longer employed by the firm and would not be available to perform under the task order. Protest at 22. Paradigm contends that, because offerors were required to propose a contract program manager as a key person, Booz Allen’s lack of a contract program manager failed to satisfy a material solicitation requirement. Paradigm also argues, in the alternative, that MDA allowed Paradigm after the submission of FPRs to substitute a new contract program manager, in effect reopening discussions with only Booz Allen.

It is a fundamental principle in a negotiated procurement that a proposal that fails to conform to a material solicitation requirement is technically unacceptable and cannot form the basis for award.

The proposal of a contract program manager is a material solicitation requirement, as offerors were required to identify a specific individual for this key position by submitting a resume. When Ms. G left Booz Allen’s employment, Booz Allen’s FPR no longer satisfied this material requirement.

Although MDA considered this failure to be a weakness [affecting responsibility], it was in fact a deficiency. A weakness generally reflects a proposal flaw that increases the risk of unsuccessful performance, while a deficiency reflects the failure of a proposal to meet a material requirement.

Our concern here is with MDA’s failure to recognize that Booz Allen’s revised proposal could not be viewed as satisfying the solicitation’s key personnel requirements. That is, having been informed prior to its reevaluation of proposals and making a new selection decision that Booz Allen’s FPR no longer satisfied requirements concerning a key person, MDA could not simply accept Booz Allen’s revised proposal and consider the matter a weakness.

We recommend that MDA either reject Booz Allen’s proposal as unacceptable or reopen discussions, obtain revised proposals, and make a new selection decision. If Booz Allen’s proposal is rejected or Paradigm’s proposal is found to offer the best value to the government, the agency should terminate Booz Allen’s task order for the convenience of the government and issue a task order to Paradigm. We also recommend that the protester be reimbursed its reasonable costs of filing and pursuing the protest, including attorneys’ fees.
This case reflects that, just as a solicitation cannot convert a matter of responsibility into an issue of responsiveness, nor can an evaluator convert a material specification factor into a matter of responsibility.

The key to understanding this case is to focus first on what it was that the government demanded to receive. Here, the government demanded a particular service. It sought to acquire "various strategic planning and financial support services." Having sought services, it set parameters for the services it specifically wanted. This was not a case where the services were merely incidental to what was required. These services were precisely what the government wanted to acquire. Responsiveness speaks to the question, does this bid or offer give the government what it wants. Responsibility speaks to the question, does this bidder or offeror have the capability and integrity to give the government what it wants under the contract terms required for performance.

Thus, when the government described the specific services it wanted, it wanted to know who that service provider was and the qualifications of that person. When that person was not identified in the request for final proposals, the proposal was unacceptable, which is to say nonresponsive. 

The award was then made to the nonresponsive offeror anyway, because the agency changed focus, saying that while the offeror failed to have the thing needed at the time of submission of final proposals (the functional equivalent to bid opening), the offeror had the ability to obtain that requirement later.  

Having the ability to become capable of performance when it is required is an element of responsibility, however, not responsiveness.  It was error to treat an issue of responsiveness in the manner of determining responsibility. Weaknesses in evidence of responsibility can be cured after bid opening, up to time of award, or even required performance in some cases, whereas acceptability, that is responsiveness, is determined at bid opening and cannot be cured afterwards.

The GAO stated the obvious (but perhaps not so obviously): that a nonresponsive bid cannot be cured with a responsibility analysis.
"The proposal of a contract program manager is a material solicitation requirement [in a solicitation for "for various strategic planning and financial support services"], as offerors were required to identify a specific individual for this key position by submitting a resume. ... Although MDA considered this failure to be a weakness [affecting responsibility], it was in fact a deficiency. A weakness generally reflects a proposal flaw that increases the risk of unsuccessful performance, while a deficiency reflects the failure of a proposal to meet a material requirement."








Monday, April 15, 2013

Responsive does not mean precise, but does require no bidder prejudice

Canada Allows Firms To Fix Bid Errors
The Canadian government has introduced a provision to allow defense firms to repair their bids on military equipment programs. The provision is an attempt to head off situations in which companies vying for a contract are disqualified over minor infractions.

Over the past two years, Canada has disqualified a number of bids for military programs because of a draconian system that prohibits any errors, even minor ones, in bid proposals. The disqualifications have delayed projects and have cost companies millions of dollars, industry sources say.

The new process would allow companies to submit more information to meet the bid requirements, even after bidding is closed.

A bid by Thales Canada was rejected because one official involved in the company’s proposal lacked the proper security clearance, according to government and industry representatives. The name of the individual, a health and safety officer, had been submitted in error and Thales asked Public Works to remove the name from its bid. Instead, Public Works refused and disqualified the bid. Public Works rejected another company’s bid for the project because information provided in two charts outlining spare parts acquisition did not exactly match up.

Tim Page, president of the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries, welcomed the change. “Any way for the government to exercise some reasonable discretion that doesn’t affect the reasonableness of a procurement is of value.”

But others say it opens up the bidding process to potential manipulation. “It could be used as a loophole to favor a company that should be disqualified and to give them a second chance at bidding,” said one defense industry executive. “I can see this as opening the way to potential abuse.”

Page said he doesn’t believe the change will allow abuse of the system. “If you’ve got knowledgeable and experienced procurement officers in the federal government who understand the business of procurement, then the risk of abuse will be significantly reduced,” he said.
Under the American Bar Association Model Procurement Code, and most if not all US jurisdictions whether or not they adopt the ABA MPC, a bid must be responsive to the Invitation for Bid, which includes specifications and contract requirements. A bid is responsive if it conforms in all material respects to the Invitation for Bids. Materiality is the operative standard, not conformity.

Ultimately, of course, materiality is a judgment call. In an ideal procurement world, judgment would be based on objectively verifiable criteria, not subjective ones. That is not often possible in the real procurement world. Some form of flexibility ("reasonable discretion" as mentioned above") is required when matching bids with IFBs to avoid absurd, slavish insistence on exact conformance to terms which are not always clear, let alone material.

To minimize the influence of extraneous, subjective factors, I think an appropriate balance of the principles of integrity and effectiveness should demand a robust determination process, and made accountable by written reports setting forth a rational rendition of facts and analysis supporting the determination and suppressing the suspicion of bias. Then, even a determination made in error will dispell the tainting suspicion that undermines faith in the system.

The ABA MPC sets out a comprehensive and elaborate framework to facilitate the flexibility required. It may not be perfect in application, or theory, but it is better than the elimination of all flexibility.

In the Guam regulations, the relevant model regulations are adopted in 2 GAR § 3109(m), and speak of the needed flexibility in terms of "mistake" and "informality" and distinguishes between an "error in judgment" and a "nonjudgmental mistake".

The general rule applicable in all circumstances is that
"Correction or withdrawal of a bid because of an inadvertent, nonjudgmental mistake[] in the bid requires careful consideration to protect the integrity of the competitive bidding system, and to assure fairness.  If the mistake is attributable to an error in judgment, the bid may not be corrected.  Bid correction or withdrawal by reason of a nonjudgmental mistake is permissible, but only to the extent it is not contrary to the interest of the territory or the fair treatment of other bidders."
To implement this general rule,
When the Procurement Officer knows or has reason to conclude that a mistake has been made, such officer should request the bidder to confirm the bid. Situations in which confirmation should be requested include obvious, apparent errors on the face of the bid or a bid unreasonably lower than the other bids submitted. If the bidder alleges mistake, the bid may be corrected or withdrawn [under certain prescribed conditions]."
Regulations also apply different rules, standards and procedures, depending on if a mistake is discovered before bid opening, after opening but before award, and after award. The rule for mistakes discovered after bid opening but before award are instructive as to what is meant by a bid that "materially conforms" to the IFB. It says a minor informality or insignificant mistake can be waived. It describes an insignificant mistake as one "that can be waived or corrected without prejudice to other bidders". Thus a only a nonconformity that does prejudice other bidders is material.

But what is it that is deemed to prejudice other bidders? 

Obviously another bidder is benefited by tossing out a lower bid, thus any mistake that is waived, in one sense, burdens the higher bidder.  But the regulation is not so broad as to equate benefit or burden with materiality. It specifically limits the scope of what is meant by "prejudice".  It says of prejudice,
 "Minor informalities ... or insignificant mistakes ... can be waived or corrected without prejudice to other bidders; that is, the effect on price, quantity, quality, delivery, or contractual conditions is negligible."
Thus, it is only those traditional "material" items of contract law -- "that is, ... price, quantity, quality, delivery or contractual condition" -- which are deemed to prejudice other bidders. Those are items which each bidder can and does specify in its race for the contract; when accepted, the bidder has determined these material terms.  

Allowing a bidder to modify any such material item, with knowledge of another's bid, is obviously unfair advantage.  But, allowing a bidder to modify other matters which are not under the control of the bidders is, to an extent, none of their business; it is the government's business. That extent, of course, is based in principle: the duty to maintain the integrity of the procurement law and to treat all bidders fairly and equitably.

Only material nonconformity is, under the ABA model, deemed sufficient to require that the bid be set aside as nonresponsive. And it is only those matters that affect bidder prejudice that are considered to be "material": price, quantity, quality, delivery or contractual condition.

Not all nonconforming bids are nonresponsive. Nor is bidder prejudice implied by any change of terms.


POST ADDITION:

And on the topic of bidder prejudice, note this case comment by Attorney Claude P. Goddard of lawfirm Husch Blackwell LLP, with its tip to making a successful protest (be able to show prejudice). The GAO case is BC Peabody Constr. Serv., Inc., B-408023 (May 10, 2013) and is reported here.
Without prejudice, procurement errors are not enough to sustain a protest
The GAO agreed the Corps’s action was procurement error. “Where multiple proposals propose the same contractor, once the agency becomes aware of that subcontractor’s experience . . . it cannot reasonably assign one proposal a higher score than another based on that experience.” GAO nevertheless denied the protest.

During the protest, it came to light that BC Peabody had failed to provide a required letter of commitment from Bauer, an omission that would have been deemed a deficiency. GAO concluded that BC Peabody could not show that it was prejudiced by the Corps’s improper evaluation. Even if the procurement error had been corrected, BC Peabody could not have won the contract because its proposal still would have been considered unacceptable.

A protester must be prepared to show that it would have had a substantial chance of receiving the award but for the agency’s improper actions. A fourth-ranked offeror, for example, must be able to show not only that it would have received a better technical evaluation score, but also that it would have beat out the second and third-ranked offerors and been in contention for the contract award.

Sunday, March 10, 2013

Past performance as responsiveness issue

In many of the posts on this blog, I have referred to past performance as a measure of prospective contractor responsibility. It may at times be the case that past performance is a measure of responsiveness. Almost always, that should be when the subject of the test of past performance is the thing solicited (including when the "thing" is a particular service, such a one in which a particular license or other certificate of qualification is necessary), not the bidder or offeror. This article is one such example. It involves the solicitation of a light, armed aircraft, to be purchased by the US Air Force for an allied country's services. One bidder is from a state, Kansas, that offers a full court press of its "Hill" representatives. The other is to be produced in a state, Florida, but is based on the design and license of Brazil, a US ally. The standard to be selected here is "best value", not lowest cost.

As always, read the story at the link for the full enchilada. This rendition is just an appetizer.

Beechcraft Protests Light Air Support Award; Kansas Lawmakers On Warpath
Depending on how you count, this marks the second or third time the military has tried to buy Super Tucanos (from Florida) only to run afoul of Beechcraft and its backers (from Kansas).

The Air Force announced that Sierra Nevada would provide 20 aircraft plus spare parts, training, and other support for $427 million. Beechcraft's bid for its AT-6 Texan II was about 30 percent less, $297 million. Beechcraft and the AT-6 scored "excellent" in five of five criteria for "mission capability," criteria ranging from the technical performance of the aircraft to the kind of training programs the company could provide. The Super Tucano only got "excellent" on four of five.

But that's only part of the story and of the scoring system. It's entirely possible for Beechcraft to get more "excellent" marks and still lose overall.

the AT-6 aircraft is still in prototype: While Beechcraft has built thousands of T-6 trainers for the US and its allies, the specific variant on offer -- the armed ground-attack version, the AT-6 -- is significantly different and not entirely proven. Competitor Sierra Nevada is hardly risk-free either, because their Florida factory has yet to build a single aircraft, but they would be making the exact same plane already mass-produced in Brazil and in service with nine nations. So there are both business and technological reasons the Air Force might have rated the Beechcraft AT-6 as higher risk.

In fact, alongside "mission capability" and price, the Air Force applies a whole third set of criteria, "past performance." The Super Tucano boasts an extensive track record of service in countries from Colombia, where it's seen combat against drug traffickers, to Mauritania. The basic T-6 has an even longer track record as the standard trainer for both the US Air Force and Navy, but only two prototypes of the specific AT-6 combat variant even exist.

If the US were choosing an aircraft for itself, the AT-6 would be a slam dunk, because it's the big brother of something the American military knows and loves. But these planes are being bought on behalf of the fledging Afghan air force, and Afghanistan's capabilities are a lot more like Mauritania's than America's. So the Super Tucano's "past performance" track record looks both stronger and more relevant than the AT-6's.

Beechcraft backers argue that the administration is tilting the scales to appease Brazil, noting that Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter called Brazil's defense minister to offer his congratulations within hours of the 2012 award. Beechcraft mobilized a massive "buy American" campaign in favor of its aircraft, even though Sierra Nevada insists it would build its Brazilian-designed airplane in its (yet to be completed) Florida factory.

So the Light Air Support contract has been a rolling, multi-year disaster, a microcosm of everything that's wrong with the military acquisitions system: meddling by politicians, incompetence by bureaucrats, and legal wrangling by the contractors. (Sierra Nevada filed suit itself at one point). Meanwhile US troops and their Afghan allies are without a lightweight, low-altitude air support plane that commanders first said was necessary in August 2009.

Friday, July 29, 2011

A different way to look at bid responsiveness vs bidder responsibility

Under common procurement regimes in the US, including the ABA Model Code (followed by Guam) and the Federal Acquisition Regulations, bid/proposal analysis tends to go down two forks, responsiveness and responsibility. The usual catch phrase is to award to the lowest, or best value, "responsive and responsible" bid or offer.

That is normally easier to state than apply and people are often confused by the substance and process in identifying the separate forks. The rubric is that responsiveness is meant to evaluate whether the bid offers the government exactly what it was that the government asked for in its specifications. Responsibility, on the other hand, is meant to determine whether the bidder has the integrity and capability to get the job done in the time and on the conditions the government required.

A bid's responsiveness is said to be determined based on what's in the bid envelope. That is, it is determined at bid opening and material deviations beyond the scope of the specifications are not allowed after bids are opened.

A bidder's responsibility, on the other hand, is determined after the proposed award winner is selected, but before the award is finalized. Indeed, some final proofs of bidder responsibility may not be required until after the award, up until the time of performance. The focus is on the capability of the bidder to perform, an expectation of performance, when required to do so. Determination of responsibility is not a guarantee of complete and perfect performance, but a reasonable expectation that the government can rely on the promise of performance. If the bidder does not perform, there will be contract liability, and a mark will be noted against any future bid, suggesting the bidder is not responsible.

Terminology is sometimes tricky, but these concepts tend to be universally observed. In Europe, Canada and elsewhere, rather than "bids" or "proposals", the terminology often is "tender", and the notions of responsiveness and responsibility are referred to, respectively, as "tender compliance" and "contract performance", as this following Canadian article describes.

Transfer station requirement sparks compliance dispute
The case dealt with a municipal tender call for waste-removal services. The tender call included the requirement of an in-town garbage transfer station. The winning bidder did not have an in-town transfer station but was awarded the contract. The plaintiff, a competing bidder, challenged the process, alleging that the contract was awarded to a non-compliant bidder. The town claimed that the selected tender was compliant.

At issue was whether the tender call requirement for an in-town transfer station was a tender compliance requirement or whether it was a contract performance requirement that needed to be met after contract award. The court ultimately found that the transfer station was a contract performance requirement rather than a tender compliance requirement:

It is important to note that Tantramar was the only party which already had a transfer station in the Town and that therefore, according to them it appears that nobody else in the world could have submitted a compliant bid. Their argument leaves no room for other bidders and does not allow the required period to obtain a permit and open a transfer station.

Tantramar’s bid was, for the five year period, $480,000.00 higher than PBS’s bid. For the year 2004 alone Tantramar’s bid was $82,350.56 higher than PBS’s bid. The Town had not budgeted for such an increase. The tax rate to realize such an additional amount would see an increase of between 1.5 and 2 cents per mill.

The main issue in this case is whether PBS’s bid was materially non-compliant. The British Columbia Court of Appeal said at paragraph 34 of its decision in Graham Industrial Services Ltd. v. Greater Vancouver Water District, [2004] B.C.J. No. 5:

“According to these definitions, in the context of the present case, material non-compliance will result where there is failure to address an important or essential requirement of the tender documents, and where there is a substantial likelihood that the omission would have been significant in the deliberations of the owner in deciding which bid to select.”

In the case at bar, PBS was compliant on the face of its bid.

There was no requirement to have been pre-approved for the permit. The Town knew that only Tantramar had a transfer station and that another bidder would have to obtain a permit and proceed to put one in place. The delay in obtaining the permit was beyond the control of the parties.

A transfer station is only a convenience and not a requirement that goes to the essence of this contract for garbage collection and disposal.

[Read more.]

The case above might be contrasted with the following dispute. It involves a solicitation in Arizona. The bidder did not submit proprietary confidential data required in a "bidder qualification" statement in its bid, but did say it was "available upon request" to the government. It's bid was rejected as nonresponsive.

Bidder qualification information is classic data going to a determination of bidder responsibility. The financial information sought is expressly referred to in the kinds of data described as "standards of responsibility" in the ABA Model Procurement Code. That data is not necessary to be included in the bid envelope, and is meant to be obtained by an "inquiry" after bid opening if the bidder's responsibility is called into question or unknown.

Cases generally hold that a bid solicitation cannot transform a matter of bidder responsibility into an issue of responsiveness by requiring responsibility information to be put in the bid package; that requirement is ignored and the information is presentable in the time and manner specified for the determination of responsibility. (This is all discussed in the Guam Procurement Process Primer if you want to have a look at it; click the link and follow instructions in the sidebar panel, top.)


Contractor files protest over rejected bid
B's Contractors has filed what may be an unprecedented formal protest with the Yavapai County Board of Supervisors after the three-member board threw out the company's low bid on a county construction project Thursday, citing missing information on the bid application.

The project is the County Facilities Office/Warehouse job. B's, a local company, submitted a bid of $1,449,000, which was the lowest. However, the forms sent with the bid included the phrase "available on request" on the Qualification Statement, which includes a financial statement.

District 2 Supervisor Tom Thurman acknowledged that B's might have submitted the form without the information on purpose. "They're all getting scared now about putting out this personal information."

That was precisely what B's had in mind, as the information would become public if submitted. "We don't like to put out financials - there's some information people don't need to see," said Brian Bombardieri of B's Contractors.

Jim Holst, county capital improvements coordinator, said that such information was needed to make decisions on whether a company was financially able to handle a job, and pointed out that other contenders for the job had supplied it.

The supervisors decided that the omission made the bid ineligible for consideration.

[Read more.]