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Showing posts with label Fair and equitable treatment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fair and equitable treatment. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 28, 2017

The laborious SAGA of the US Navy's BOSS contract on Guam

This post is a follow-up to a prior post almost 3 years ago, Protest of Navy's BOSS contract on Guam upheld.

Note: As always, I take considerable liberties with the source documents when presenting them here. For instance, critical citations are often omitted, parts are re-arranged and/or paraphrased, etc. Read the source at the link if accuracy, completeness and fidelity is important to you. (If it is not important to you, reconsider wandering around the web without an escort.)

Before the GAO in re Matter of: Fluor Federal Solutions, LLC, File: B-410486.9, January 18, 2017
DIGEST: Fluor maintains that the agency misevaluated proposals and made an unreasonable source selection decision. Protest challenging agency’s evaluation of staffing and resources proposals is sustained where record shows that agency evaluated the protester’s and awardee’s proposals disparately in a manner that prejudiced the protester. We sustain the protest.

This is our third occasion to consider the propriety of the Navy’s actions in connection with this acquisition. In a prior decision, we sustained a protest filed by Fluor relating to the agency’s evaluation of proposals and conduct of discussions in connection with this acquisition. We recommended that the agency reopen discussions with the offerors, solicit, obtain and evaluate revised proposals, and make a new source selection decision.

The Navy implemented our recommended corrective action and again selected DZSP for contract award. Fluor filed a second protest challenging the agency’s selection of DZSP in the wake of the agency’s corrective action. After full development of the record in that case, we conducted an outcome prediction alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedure at the request of the Navy. We advised the parties that the agency’s evaluation of DZSP’s proposed cost in the area of its exempt employee compensation (discussed in detail below) appeared to have overlooked certain significant features of DZSP’s proposed costs. As a result, the GAO attorney advised that our Office likely would sustain the protest. The agency advised our Office that it intended to take corrective action to address the concerns we identified, and on that basis we dismissed Fluor’s second protest as academic.

After dismissal of Fluor’s second protest, the agency engaged in limited discussions with the protester and DZSP and solicited, obtained and evaluated revised proposals. The agency again selected DZSP for award, and the current protest followed.

The RFP advised offerors that the agency would make award on a best-value basis, considering cost and several non-cost evaluation factors. The non-cost factors were as follows: past performance, occupational safety, staffing and resources, technical approach, and small business utilization. For cost evaluation purposes, the RFP advised offerors that the agency would evaluate proposals for completeness, reasonableness, balance, and realism. The RFP stated that the agency would assign past performance examples relevancy ratings of very relevant, relevant, somewhat relevant or not relevant, and would assign each offeror’s past performance a confidence rating of substantial confidence, satisfactory confidence, limited confidence, no confidence or unknown confidence. Finally, the RFP stated that past performance was approximately equal in importance to the other four non-cost evaluation factors combined, and that all five non-cost factors, when combined, were approximately equal in importance to cost.

DZSP had proposed 113 exempt labor categories, and claimed that it was escalating the direct rates of compensation for these employees by [deleted] percent for each year of contract performance. A careful examination of the record showed, however, that in addition to applying an escalation factor of [deleted] percent, DZSP also was applying what it termed a “decrement factor” of [deleted] percent to these same rates of compensation. The net result of these calculations was that, rather than escalating its direct labor by [deleted] percent per year, DZSP actually was reducing the rates of compensation for these employees by [deleted] percent during each year of contract performance. The contemporaneous record showed that the agency failed to recognize this decrease in DZSP’s proposed compensation, and that its cost realism evaluation failed to take it into account.

The record further showed that Fluor had been found technically superior to DZSP under the non-cost evaluation factors. While both firms received the highest ratings (substantial confidence and outstanding) under the past performance, occupational safety, staffing and resources, and small business utilization factors, Fluor’s proposal received an outstanding rating under the technical approach factor, while DZSP’s proposal was assigned a rating of good under that factor.

The agency’s selection of DZSP’s lower-rated proposal was based on its conclusion that it represented a savings of approximately $6.9 million over the life of the contract. However, we concluded, based on the error associated with the agency’s failure to recognize DZSP’s decrease in its exempt employee compensation, that this apparent cost savings was largely non-existent. We therefore concluded that the agency’s source selection decision was not reasonable.

Subsequently, the agency elected to allow Fluor and DZSP to make limited revisions to their proposals.
Both firms revised their proposals and the agency reevaluated them on the basis of those revisions. The agency made no changes to the adjectival ratings assigned to the offerors’ non-cost proposals (Fluor was again found superior under the technical approach factor). Both firms revised their proposed costs: Fluor proposed a total cost of $494,519,656, and DZSP proposed a total cost of $491,894,166. The agency made no adjustments to either firm’s proposed cost for purposes of evaluating realism. On the basis of these evaluation results, the agency again made award to DZSP, concluding that, although Fluor’s proposal was technically superior, it did not merit the approximately $2.6 million cost premium.

The focus of Fluor’s latest protest centers on a change in the proposed approach to managing and compensating its exempt personnel that DZSP introduced in response to the agency’s latest round of discussions. The agency had provided DZSP a discussion question relating to the fact that, in its earlier proposal, it had offered to reduce its exempt employees’ compensation by a net factor of [deleted] percent during each year of contract performance. The agency advised DZSP that such an approach was not considered by the government to be reasonable or realistic because it implied that every exempt position would be replaced with a new hire at a lower rate of compensation for each year of contract performance.

In response to the agency’s discussion question, DZSP essentially introduced an entirely new approach to how it would manage and compensate its exempt employees. In effect, DZSP’s new approach was that it would replace incumbent workers at a rate of [deleted] percent of its exempt workforce per year and hire new, lower paid, employees in their place. These new employees would be paid [deleted] percent of the hourly rates identified in DZSP’s proposal. The employees that were not replaced in a particular contract year would be given a [deleted] percent escalation to their hourly rates of compensation (until such time as they were replaced), and this would result in [deleted] hourly rates of compensation that would [deleted] over the life of the contract.

Fluor raises various challenges to the agency’s evaluation of DZSP’s proposed approach to maintaining [deleted] wage rates for its exempt employees. Among other arguments, Fluor alleges that the agency engaged in disparate treatment in connection with evaluating its proposal and DZSP’s proposal in the area of staff recruitment and retention.

For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the protester that the agency evaluated the two proposals disparately in connection with the question of recruitment and retention of staff. It is axiomatic that agencies are required to evaluate proposals on a common basis and in accordance with the terms of the RFP; agencies may not properly engage in disparate treatment of offerors in the evaluation of proposals.

Under the express terms of the RFP, the agency was required to evaluate the adequacy of the offerors’ staffing approach as it related to the recruitment and retention of staff.

The record shows that Fluor’s staffing approach for exempt employees involved recruitment of 95 percent of the incumbent staff. Fluor represented to the agency that it was confident in its ability to do this based on the wage rates it was proposing. Of significance, Fluor specifically represented that, in the event it was unable to attract the incumbent staff with the rates of compensation it was proposing, Fluor proposed to [deleted] for exempt employees. Notwithstanding this representation in the Fluor proposal, the record shows that the agency’s evaluators and source selection authority expressed a concern that Fluor would be unable to recruit the incumbent exempt employees at the wage rates it had proposed. The agency’s technical evaluators questioned Fluor’s ability to recruit the incumbent exempt staff based on the wage rates it had proposed, and suggested that Fluor’s approach could result in employee morale and retention issues. The agency’s cost evaluators echoed these same concerns.

In contrast, the evaluators did not give meaningful consideration to similar implications of DZSP’s proposed approach described above, or how it would impact the firm’s retention of employees, as required by the RFP. In this connection, the evaluators gave no consideration to the fact that DZSP expressly proposed to replace its incumbent staff at a rate of [deleted] percent per year for each year of the 8-year potential life of this contract. The agency technical evaluators confined their observations to consideration of whether or not it was realistic for DZSP to replace its existing, incumbent exempt employees, and concluded that it was “very realistic” for DZSP to do so because approximately [deleted] percent of DZSP’s overall workforce was comprised of an aging population. In addition, the technical evaluators observed only that DZSP’s claimed 95 percent retention rate for its exempt employees would “not be applicable” to future contract periods, but did not criticize the firm’s proposal for this reason. The cost evaluators, for their part, did not give consideration to DZSP’s proposed plan to replace its exempt workforce, and instead confined their observations to whether or not DZSP’s proposed rates of compensation were reasonable and realistic.

In addition to these inconsistencies, the agency’s source selection authority (SSA) specifically found the DZSP proposal superior to the Fluor proposal in the area of employee retention and used that as a discriminator for making her selection decision. In fact, she apparently was unaware of DZSPs’ proposed approach of essentially replacing its exempt workforce more than once over the life of the contract.

In sum, the record shows that the agency evaluated the offerors disparately under the staffing and resources factor, criticizing Fluor’s proposed approach as possibly involving a risk that it would not be able to recruit the incumbent workforce, while at the same time failing to meaningfully consider whether a similar risk was raised by DZSP’s proposed approach of repeatedly replacing its exempt employee workforce over the life of the contract. In light of these considerations, we sustain Fluor’s protest.

We recommend that the agency reevaluate proposals in a manner that is consistent with this decision and make a new source selection decision after performing that reevaluation. Should the agency conclude that DZSP is no longer in line for award, we further recommend that the agency terminate DZSP’s contract for the convenience of the government, and make award to Fluor, if otherwise proper.

Saturday, January 24, 2015

Protest of Navy's BOSS contract on Guam upheld

As of November 2017, this contract is still being protested.  For an update, see The laborious SAGA of the US Navy's BOSS contract on Guam.

Matter of: CFS-KBR Marianas Support Services, LLC; Fluor Federal Solutions LLC,: B-410486; B-410486.2; B-410486.3, January 2, 2015 (The redacted version was approved for public release. The version below is my own, unofficial version.)
DIGEST

1. Protest challenging agency’s cost realism evaluation of proposals is sustained where record shows that agency’s evaluation was based on the mechanical application of a government estimate that did not take into consideration each offeror’s unique technical approach, and therefore was not consistent with the terms of the solicitation and applicable procurement statutes and regulations.

2. Protest alleging that agency engaged in misleading discussions is sustained where record shows that agency’s discussions questions were based on the results of its underlying, irrational, evaluation of proposals.
CFS-KBR Marianas Support Services, LLC, of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Fluor Federal Solutions, LLC, of Greenville, South Carolina, protest the award of a contact to DZSP 21 LLC, of Hagatna, Guam, under request for proposals (RFP) issued by the Department of the Navy for base operations support services for the Joint Region Marianas on the island of Guam.

The RFP contemplates the award of a cost reimbursement-type contract. The RFP advised offerors that the agency would make award on a best-value basis, considering cost and several non-cost evaluation factors. For cost evaluation purposes, the RFP advised offerors that the agency would evaluate proposals for completeness, reasonableness, balance, and realism, and that all five non-cost factors, when combined, were approximately equal in importance to cost.

After performing an initial evaluation, the agency established a competitive range comprised of six concerns and engaged in discussions with those offerors. After conducting discussions, the agency solicited and obtained final proposal revisions (FPRs), which the agency evaluated. On the basis of that evaluation, the agency assigned the protesters and awardee the following technical ratings and evaluated costs:

On the basis of these evaluation results, the agency made award to DZSP, finding that its proposal offered the best value to the government.

After being advised of the agency’s selection decision and requesting and receiving debriefings, CFS and Fluor filed protests in our Office. CFS maintains that the agency misevaluated proposals and failed to engage in meaningful discussions; Fluor maintains that the agency misevaluated proposals and engaged in misleading discussions. We sustain Fluor’s protest and dismiss CFS’s protest as academic.

Fluor essentially argues that, because the agency’s initial evaluation was irrational, it led the agency to engage in misleading discussions with the protester which led, in turn, to Fluor adding unnecessary personnel to its proposal and, ultimately, to proposing a cost that made it uncompetitive. Secondarily, Fluor maintains that the agency’s cost realism evaluation after the agency engaged in discussions also was unreasonable.

Fluor asserts that, in its initial evaluation of proposals, the agency never performed a meaningful cost realism evaluation in connection with the offerors’ proposed staffing. According to Fluor, the agency mechanically applied a government estimate in evaluating the sufficiency of the offerors’ proposed staffing. Fluor argues that the agency’s actions were improper because any meaningful cost realism evaluation is required to take into consideration the offerors’ respective technical approaches to accomplishing the requirements.  [Remember, this is a best value evaluation for a cost-reimbursement contract, and cost alone does not determine who gets the award.]

When an agency evaluates proposals for the award of a cost-reimbursement contract, an offeror’s proposed estimated cost of contract performance is not considered controlling since, regardless of the costs proposed by the offeror, the government is bound to pay the contractor its actual and allowable costs. As a consequence, a cost realism analysis must be performed by the agency to determine the extent to which an offeror’s proposed costs represent what the contract costs are likely to be under the offeror’s unique technical approach, assuming reasonable economy and efficiency.   In addition to these broad considerations, while an agency can utilize a reasonably derived estimate of labor hours based on the government’s experience as an objective standard to measure the realism of proposed costs, an agency may not mechanically apply its own estimates for labor hours or costs--effectively normalizing cost elements of an offeror’s proposal to government estimates--without considering the offeror’s unique technical approach.

The record here shows that, in evaluating the offerors’ initial proposals, the agency mechanically applied a government estimate to evaluate the sufficiency of the offerors’ proposed staffing. In particular, the record shows that the agency evaluated all proposals against an undisclosed government estimate of the number of full time equivalent staff (FTE) that the agency considered sufficient to perform the requirements. In each instance where a proposal offered less FTEs than the agency had identified as necessary for any given part of the contract ("annex"), the agency evaluators described the offeror’s proposed staffing as unrealistic and insufficient to perform in the annex identified.

In performing this evaluation, the agency concluded that Fluor’s proposed staffing was insufficient.  The record thus shows that the agency’s initial evaluation was based on a mechanical application of the government estimate to the proposals that did not consider the offerors’ varying technical approaches. In the absence of a cogent explanation for the Navy’s actions, such a mechanical application of the government estimate in the evaluation of proposals is unreasonable. We therefore sustain this aspect of Fluor’s protest.

Fluor further argues that the mechanical application of the government’s estimate discussed above led the agency to pose misleading discussion questions to the firm regarding the sufficiency of its proposed staffing. The protester maintains that it initially proposed staffing that it considered sufficient to perform the contract in light of its proposed technical approach. Fluor argues that, when it attempted to respond to the agency’s concerns during the discussions that were based on the agency’s mechanical application of the government estimate, it effectively priced itself out of the competition.

It is a fundamental principle of negotiated procurements that discussions, when conducted, must be meaningful; that is, discussions must identify deficiencies and significant weaknesses in an offeror’s proposal that could reasonably be addressed so as to materially enhance the offeror’s potential for receiving award.  Here, the record shows that the agency asked each offeror a specific question that identified precisely the number of FTEs by which the agency considered the proposal deficient.  An agency may not mislead an offeror through the framing of a discussion question into responding in a manner that does not address the agency’s actual concerns, or otherwise misinform the offeror concerning a problem with its proposal.

The agency subsequently issued a clarification to these questions, stating that it was not the intent of the agency to dictate the number of FTEs proposed, but to verify that the offeror had a methodology to accomplish the work with the number of FTEs proposed.  Nonetheless, the agency did not retract its original discussion questions.

The record shows that Fluor revised its proposal to precisely the number of FTEs identified by the agency as lacking in its initial proposal.   Ultimately, Fluor’s high evaluated cost led the agency not to select it for award, even though its proposal had been ranked first from a non-cost standpoint.  Because the record shows that Fluor’s revised staffing was raised in direct response to the agency’s discussion question, we conclude that the firm was misled to its competitive prejudice.

As a final matter, Fluor maintains that the agency essentially abandoned the original staffing estimates that it used to evaluate the offerors’ initial proposals, thereby demonstrating the arbitrary nature of the original evaluation. Fluor maintains that the agency’s final evaluation confirms that its initial evaluation bore no relationship to the offerors’ unique technical approaches, and also demonstrates that the agency’s evaluation of revised proposals failed to meaningfully evaluate the offerors’ proposals for realism purposes.

Notwithstanding the fact that the other two firms also offered additional staffing in response to the agency’s initial evaluation and discussion questions, the evaluators nonetheless assigned DZSP an outstanding rating for its proposed staffing and resources, and assigned the CFS proposal a good rating for its proposed staffing and resources (both proposals originally had been rated unacceptable under this evaluation factor).

The agency’s technical evaluators articulated no reasoned analysis for why, despite the fact that these firms did not propose the staffing initially identified by the agency as inadequate, the firms nonetheless merited these better ratings.  For reasons unexplained in the record, the agency did not evaluate the realism of the offerors’ proposed staffing where it exceeded the government estimate.  The agency’s unexplained and inconsistent application of the government estimate further highlights the underlying irrationality of its evaluation.

In effect, the agency’s evaluators appear to have abandoned the initial government estimates, as well as their evaluation findings based upon those estimates. In addition, since the evaluators did not explain why they considered the offerors’ revised staffing adequate in light of their respective technical approaches, we have no basis to find the agency’s reevaluation of proposals reasonable.
In this connection, agencies are required to adequately document their evaluation results in order to facilitate our examination of the record; where, due to a lack of documentation, we are unable to understand the agency’s evaluation conclusions, we will sustain a protest challenging the agency’s evaluation.
We have carefully considered all of CFS’s allegations and find no basis to sustain the firm’s protest. We find no merit to its allegations concerning the agency’s evaluation of technical proposals, and we also find no merit to its allegation concerning the agency’s alleged failure to engage in meaningful discussions with CFS. In addition, while CFS arguably may be correct concerning the agency’s evaluation of cost proposals, we are not persuaded that CFS was prejudiced by the agency’s evaluation in that area, and therefore find no merit to that aspect of its protest.

In light of our discussion above, we sustain Fluor’s protest. We recommend that the agency reevaluate proposals in a manner consistent with our discussion above.  After performing its reevaluation, we further recommend that the agency afford the competitive range offerors meaningful discussions based on its reevaluation of proposals.

After engaging in discussions, we recommend that the agency solicit, obtain, and evaluate revised proposals and make a new source selection decision based on that reevaluation.  Notwithstanding our conclusions regarding the merits of CFS’s protest, we point out that the firm will, in fact, benefit from our recommended corrective action because it will be afforded an opportunity to participate in any reopened competition.

Finally, we recommend that the agency reimburse Fluor the reasonable costs of filing and pursuing its protest, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. The protester’s certified claim for costs, detailing the time expanded and costs incurred, must be submitted to the agency within 60 days after receipt of this decision.

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

Monopsony: monopoly through the looking glass

Government Should Leverage Its Size to Get Better Prices, Senators Say
“When Wal-Mart buys, I guarantee they get the best price, and when Honeywell buys, they get the best price,” said ranking member Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla.

Chairman Tom Carper, D-Del., called the Obama administration’s key procurement officers to respond to Government Accountability Office reports showing that the top four purchasing departments -- Defense, Energy, Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs -- were achieving only 5 percent of contracts using strategic sourcing’s careful analysis of spending needs and markets and rigorous monitoring of vendor prices. “Federal agencies appear to behave more like medium-sized, unrelated businesses than the largest purchaser in the world -- which is what the U.S. government is,” Carper said.

A defense of progress to date came from Joe Jordan, administrator of the White House Office of Federal Procurement Policy. The obstacles include “a decentralized process with a lack of visibility into what other agencies do,” Jordan said. But he cited progress in reducing what once was 4,000 separate wireless phone agreements with 800 plans to one contract vehicle, the saving of $600 million through shared contracts for janitorial services, and the General Services Administration’s office supplies contracts that have upped the rate of small business participation from 67 percent to 76 percent.

Dan Tangherlini, newly confirmed as administrator of GSA, said strategic sourcing in 20 agencies has saved $300 million since 2010. “Contractors are required to report transactional data on all program sales,” he said. “For the first time, this level of financial information collection provides us with a clear picture of agency spending behavior. Over the last several months, GSA has used this data to show contractors their pricing item by item, compared with their competitors in an anonymous fashion. This has empowered contractors to understand their competitive position, and in many cases offer better deals.”
I'm reminded of the post from a couple of days ago: Published benchmark costs bring procurement savings.

In the article in chief above, criticism of government procurement uniformly complained that the government did not achieve the market-leveraged savings of private business. Private business, of course, is not burdened with the many so-called "wealth distribution" programs (see, here) of the federal government, such as Buy American. And, WalMart acquires large parts of its product in China and other non-US production centers. Do we want our government to do likewise? We could do it.

America made a great leap forward economically at the start of the 20th century by dismantling the monopoly "trusts", a form of forced "creative destruction" of concentrated capital. The lesson learned is that too much concentrated market power is not good for the larger society or economy.

So, what is a Monopsony? According to Investopedia:
Definition of 'Monopsony': A market similar to a monopoly except that a large buyer not seller controls a large proportion of the market and drives the prices down. Sometimes referred to as the buyer's monopoly.

Investopedia explains 'Monopsony': People have accused Ernest and Julio Gallo (the big wine makers) of being a monopsony. They had such power buying grapes from growers, that sellers had no choice but to agree to their terms.

“The rule is, jam to-morrow and jam yesterday--but never jam to-day.'

'It MUST come sometimes to "jam to-day,"' Alice objected.

'No, it can't,' said the Queen. '
It's jam every OTHER day: to-day isn't any OTHER day, you know.'

'I don't understand you,' said Alice. 'It's dreadfully confusing!'

'That's the effect of living backwards,' the Queen said kindly: 'it always makes one a little giddy at first--'

'Living backwards!' Alice repeated in great astonishment. 'I never heard of such a thing!'

'--but there's one great advantage in it, that one's memory works both ways.'

‘I'm sure MINE only works one way,' Alice remarked. 'I can't remember things before they happen.'

'It's a poor sort of memory that only works backwards,' the Queen remarked.”
― Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There

Saturday, March 16, 2013

Can stand some improvement - Iowa, USA

State procurement chief concedes ‘lax’ enforcement of bid process rules
After cancelling three bid requests because of questions about the irregularities, the director of the Iowa Department of Administrative Services conceded to lawmakers Wednesday the process “can stand some improvement.”

Among the concerns prompting Carroll’s cancellation of the bid process were complaints from state legislators and law enforcement radio vendors that bid requests for communication radios for various state agencies have been intentionally uncompetitive with unusually exacting specifications.

Too often, he said, vendors approach employees in agencies in the process of buying goods or services in attempts to gain information that would improve their chances of winning bids. So he plans to enforce the prohibition against communication between vendors and any state employees other than the designated procurement officers.

The policy applies to communication from lobbyists, lawmakers and vendors to state employees, Carroll said. Even when the questions come from lawmakers, they can be traced back to vendors, he said.

At the same time, Carroll will institute a process to allow vendors to have anonymous communication with DAS internal auditors. That communication would be made public, but without the vendor’s identity attached.

Also, there will be a two-week protest period for vendors to raise questions about the vendor-neutrality of requests for proposals or the procurement process. That protest period will occur before the contract awarded, rather than after, Carroll said.

Chairwoman Sen. Janet Petersen, D-Des Moines, asked for more information about conflict of interest policies to prevent someone from leaving state employment to work for bidding on a state contract.

“I think Oversight would be interested in putting stronger fences around that,” she told Carroll.
I don't know. These seem like such basic matters that I suspect there would be quite a bit of more room for improvement.

Friday, February 8, 2013

Of tax breaks and bids

The following story would be a run of the mill bid protest except for one thing. The protestor had been promised significant tax breaks if it got the bid. Doesn't pass my smell test for impartiality.

Many states and towns, probably countries, offer investment and other tax breaks to encourage businesses to invest or operate in the jurisdiction. Doing that, of course, gives them a competitive leg up on other businesses, so it would be bad enough if one of the tax concession businesses bid against other bidders, it should be disallowed or the tax advantage factored out of the bid amount, otherwise they would be double dipping in the public trough; getting the tax break for bringing in it business, then costing other competitors either by way of forced lower bidding or loss of opportunity.

But when the offer of the tax break is a condition of winning a bid, it certainly will skew the contest. And it will drive out competitors. If government doesn't foster fair competition, it will not get it when they need it. Costs will rise where there is no competition.

Wisconsin-based Skyward files notice of protest over losing bid to Minnesota company
The [bid] process of soliciting and awarding the bid has been shrouded in controversy from the beginning. In March, Walker's semi-private economic development agency offered nearly $12 million in tax breaks to Skyward contingent upon it winning the bid to provide student information systems to Wisconsin's more than 440 school districts and non-district charter schools.

The day before the bids were due in June, Walker's administration said it was suspending the process because of concerns about the propriety of the offered tax breaks.

It then started the process over and hired an independent observer — former Democratic Gov. Jim Doyle attorney Cari Anne Renlund — to monitor the process. Last week, when the bid was awarded to Infinite Campus, Walker's administration released Renlund's report that found no problems.

"The procurement, evaluation, and selection processes were reasonably and appropriately geared to afford all vendors an equal opportunity to compete for this contract," Renlund wrote. "There was no bias in favor or against any bidder."

Skyward Inc., of Stevens Point, said in a statement that it had filed the protest with Gov. Scott Walker's administration, saying its bid was lower than that of the winner announced last week — Infinite Campus of Blaine, Minn. Skyward has threatened to leave Wisconsin if it loses the contract.

The company said based on its analysis of the two proposals, that its bid was $2.6 million less per year. Skyward also said that implementation costs identified by the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, which are the responsibility of each school district, were not considered in the evaluation.

Saturday, February 4, 2012

Procurement controversies -- The Philippines

Among other factors, the emphasis on best value in government contracting, and its high reliance on proven past performance, is driven by bureaucratic survival techniques such as risk aversion and inertia. Too much risk aversion impacts adversely on fostering competition, and creates an atmosphere of perceived if not actual favoritism and "old boy networking", a bad image for any government any where.

Of course, it is not always risk aversion or inertia that leads to old boy networks. The following story poses the possibility of other factors at work, perhaps more pernicious, though that may be debatable if the result is the same in either event.

Corruption in procurement process of firefighting equipment exposed
After failing to get satisfactory answers and actions from both the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) officials, Bayan Muna lawmaker Teddy Casiño now wants Congress to investigate what he said as the “dubious termination” of a government contract amounting to P243 million ($5.65 million) for fire fighting equipment allegedly to favor some regular suppliers of the BFP.

“It’s highly irregular for Perez to have delayed the awarding of the contract; and it’s more dubious still for him to have arbitrarily declared a failure of bidding on technical grounds belatedly raised in mere letters to him by two losing bidders who happen to be regular suppliers of the BFP,” he said.

In October 2010, the BFP opened for bidding various fire-fighting gears, namely helmets, coats and trousers, gloves and boots. On February 11, 2011, the BFP informed Kolonwel Trading that it won the bidding, having submitted the lowest calculated bid of P242,806,753.00. This was the first time the company participated and won in a BFP bidding.

Kolonwel Trading was then asked to submit various post-qualification papers. The company complied, but on April 20, 2011, the BFP again asked for additional documents. A month later, an additional request for test results on the quality and safety of their products was made. After submitting the pertinent documents, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the BFP finally came out with a resolution on October 17, 2011 and signed by DILG secretary
Jesse Robredo awarding the procurement of said Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to Kolonwel Trading.

Two losing bidders, Panpisco Technologies, Inc. and 911 Alarm, both long-time suppliers of the BFP then wrote Perez, and soon after he withheld the awarding of the contract to Kolonwel Trading. He later on declared a failure of bidding, but this was two months after the BFP BAC issued its resolution in favor of Kolonwel.

According to Casiño, the said suppliers did not avail of the prescribed protest mechanism as prescribed by the Procurement Law (RA 9184) but raised their concerns through mere letters to BFP Officer in Charge Samuel Perez.

That last statement resonates with me. In a still unresolved controversy I have been involved with, the low bidder's award was also delayed during an interim in which the incumbent higher bidder, rather than protesting, after bid opening sent unsubstantiated, "confidential" communications to the procurement officer intending specifically to undermine the low bid's responsiveness to specifications.

Had the matter been duly raised by protest, it could have been shown that, first, the bid specifications did not require that substantiating material be provided with the bid therefore it was not error for the low bid to not provide it, and, second, that the incumbent's claims were unfounded since third party add-ons, to be provided by the low bidder, rectified any alleged shortfalls.

Protestations to the agency and administrative review authority that such unfair and ex-party communications should not be considered went unheeded. In the result, the claims, never properly brought therefore improperly considered, tainted and poisoned the protest.

Thursday, August 18, 2011

Evaluating the evaluators

It should not be controversial to assert that bids and proposals should be evaluated fairly.

Taking that a step further, it should not be controversial to assert that an evaluation is not fair if the evaluator either doesn't know anything about what it is that is being evaluated, or if the specifications are so vague or "flexible" that the bidder/offeror doesn't know what is asked of it, or if the evaluator is so close to a bidder/offeror as to be partisan to a particular submission.

Some examples of this follow:

One Guam Superior Court case (trial court) involved a bid evaluation of technical samples of products submitted in response to a bid. The evaluation was conducted by a clerk in the procurement office. She testified she did not examine samples submitted because she “did not know much about” them. (L.P. Ganacias Enterprises, Inc., dba RadioCom v. GIAA and Guam Cell Communications, CV 1787-00).

The judge was not impressed. He said “the person charged with reviewing the bids should be an individual with some knowledge of the product which is the subject of the bid”.

The second case here is one recently reported from Bangladesh. This is an interesting case also for the apparent remedy: the Court set aside the contract awarded by the government agency, affirmed the administrative review that found the solicitation defective, and ordered a new solicitation to be held:

BTRC's telecom audit move illegal: HC
The High Court Division yesterday declared illegal the appointment of firms by the telecom regulator to open audits into mobile phone operators.

Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) did not follow public procurement rules (PPR) of 2008 in appointing the auditors for Grameenphone and Banglalink, the court said in a verdict on a writ petition.

The review panel had questioned BTRC's terms of reference and the methodology of work. It also said BTRC did not include any outside expert in the evaluation committee. The panel asked BTRC to cancel the bidding and go for a fresh one, but the telecom regulator had pressed on with its earlier plan.

The panel also said the advertisement given in the newspapers was not 'self-explanatory', which is a violation of the procurement rules.

“The BTRC had no pre-preparation regarding tender documents, no details of TORs (terms of reference), period of audit, how many mobile companies to be audited and no pragmatic methodology drawn to accomplish the work,” said the verdict of the panel.

The panel also found the evaluation method in the tendering process faulty.
The final example here has either nothing or everything (depending on your predisposition) to do with scientific evidence of global warming, in that it involves, incidentally, polar bear biologist Charles Monnett, who, according to this blog report, "was lead author of a 2006 study on drowned polar bears that helped turn the bear into an iconic victim of global warming. The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) cited Monnett’s study four times in its Jan. 2007 proposed rule to list Ursus Maritimus as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act."

Interior Watchdog Sees Potential Conflict in Suspended Biologist's Role Vetting Polar Bear Study
An Interior Department biologist potentially violated procurement rules when he helped another scientist prepare a proposal for an agency-funded study, according to a letter from Interior's inspector general.

Special Agent in Charge David Brown alleges that the biologist assisted Andrew Derocher in preparing a response to the government's request for proposal for a current study on polar bears. The sole-source contract was subsequently awarded to Derocher's employer, the University of Alberta in Canada.

Monnett was chairman of the Technical Proposal Evaluation Committee. By helping Derocher draft that proposal, Monnett essentially reviewed a document he helped write, according to the IG letter.

But Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, a group that aids government whistle-blowers, argues that Monnett had no authority to commit the government to contracts and was encouraged by the contracting officer to share information with the University of Alberta.

Saturday, February 19, 2011

Valuing the bid -- Timor Leste

I came across this easy to read and understand "DRAFT Best Practice Guide on Procurement Bid Evaluation" prepared for the government of Timor. The message here is on "value for money" determinations for bid selection. Here are some excerpts I've selected and edited for my own understanding.
Decisions on government procurement should be made on the basis of value for money. The tendered purchase price alone is seldom an accurate indicator for comparison of other the potential contractor’s ability to perform the required task, or the total cost of performing the task over time. Value for money requires a comparison of costs, benefits and alternative outcomes. An assessment of the best net overall outcome for government is to take account of all relevant ‘whole of life’ costs and benefits, that is the full cost of each good, service, construction or consultancy over its expected useful life, not just at time of purchase.

However this quantitative whole of life cost is only one consideration when selecting a government contractor. Other qualitative factors such as, the financial strength of the contractor’s business, their past performance and capacity for customer service, along with boosting local economic development are important matters which also must be considered when evaluating bids. The supplier must be able to provide the Government with a good and reliable service to ensure the smooth
running of government and lower the risk of any disruption or delay to public services. A detailed technical or professional capability assessment and a commercial and financial analysis of the bids, and the businesses tendering, must be made to determine which tender represents best value for government and the public interest.

To make this analysis, it is necessary to obtain all information on the goods or services tendered, and details of all significant costs associated, not just with the initial purchase, but also during the use or application of the goods and services along with any associated future costs.
The paper gives this example:
The Government Procurement Office was required to purchase five new trucks for the Water and Sanitation Department. Ten tenders were recieved and three were selected for consideration: Mobil Biru Motors (US$450,500); Truk Bot (US$465,000); Maria and Jose Imports (US$488,550). Even though the last bid was the most expensive it contained a significant number of benefits. They could supply quickly — a central requirement of Government, the trucks included the latest model with tipping technology. The company also offered to set up a truck service centre that would employ and train 20 Timorese mechanics. This bid was recommended dependent upon checks being made on the company’s compliance with local laws, financial strength and their having existing shipping orders for the latest model vehicles underway.
I have objections to this approach, however reasonable and seductive it appears at face value. This approach conflates evaluation of price and cost evaluation with the evaluation of the bidder's responsibility. Bidder responsibility can be a highly subjective matter, and when a decision is made mainly on that basis, the process moves away from objectivity to preference and favoritism. Care should be taken to segregate the evaluation of cost and price from the determination of bidder responsibility.

In the example, for instance, the point made was that one bidder had better delivery times. First, if a specific delivery time was part of the specifications, that bidder would have been preferred based on the tender, not on some post facto rationalization. Second, delivery times can be very easily manipulated, by, for instance, tipping a preferred bidder in advance so that he is prepared. Delivery times must be reasonably attainable by all bidder to have any fair and equitable competition. It is a very rare case where the Government could not foresee a need so far in advance that it needs an unreasonably short delivery time.

The example says, the preferred tenderer offered to set up a service and training centre. If that was part of the tender so that other tenderers had equal opportunity to make similar offers, then competition is fair. But if the offer was made outside the scope of the solicitation, it should be ignored. Just as a point of difference, the ABA Model Code/Guam procurement regulations say:
The Invitation for Bids shall set forth any evaluation criterion to be used in determining product acceptability.

The acceptability evaluation is not conducted for the purpose of determining whether one bidder's item is superior to another, but only to determine that a bidder's offering is acceptable as set forth in the Invitation for Bids.

Only objectively measurable criteria which are set forth in the Invitation for Bids shall be applied in determining the lowest bidder. Examples of such criteria include, but are not limited to, transportation cost, and ownership or life cycle cost formulas.

Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to permit contract award to a bidder submitting a higher quality item than that designated in the Invitation for Bids if such bidder is not also the lowest bidder. Further, this Section does not permit
negotiations with any bidder.
The determination of bidder responsibility, however, is conducted in a different time and manner, using different standards than those used to evaluate bid responsiveness. When done in this manner, it becomes more transparent as to what really motivated the award.

Value, like beauty, is too often in the eye of the beholder. That is not the best basis for treating bidders fairly and equitably, and if government fails to offer that impartial treatment, it will not receive the necessary competition to assure the government is getting best value for its money. In fact, it will just encourage the use of covert influence and back room deal pedaling.

Saturday, December 25, 2010

Blanket purchasing pulling the wool over our eyes?

Fair and equitable treatment of buyers and sellers is not a concern of free market economics, except, perhaps, to the extent that competition for demand and supply is externally disrupted. Fair and equitable treatment of buyers and sellers is, however, a democratic philosophy of due process.

It is the purpose of procurement philosophy in practice to balance the constantly shifting tensions between the invisible hand of Adam Smith and the democratic goals of the community. I am not, by the way, demeaning Adam Smith's vision of the pursuit of profit; indeed, I'm a great believer in almost free markets -- markets not so devoid of control that they become manipulated by powerful economic interests, but not so politically controlled that they become manipulated by powerful interests, either. It's a matter of degree in a democratic society, and not an absolute freedom, as even Adam Smith acknowledged:
"All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man or order of men. The sovereign [politician] is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient: the duty of superintending the industry of private people." (The Wealth of Nations, vol. II, bk. IV, ch. 9.)"
There are thus various tensions that must be accommodated for a fair and effective public procurement regime. The root of these tensions is found in the competition of economic theories of pricing and political theories of justice and governance; the balancing of the need to get bang for buck and of the need to maximize fair use of pubic funds for the overall best interests of taxpayers. See, for instance, prior posts here and here.

When, for instance, small purchases for things like office supplies become too frequent and involves "petty cash", the need for precise accountability gives way to a more fungible means of acquisition and accountability, to the law of averages and other sampling statistics.

Under Guam/ABA Model code law, one means of accommodating small purchases is the "blanket purchase agreement" (BPA) See 2 GAR § 3112.1. A similar regime exists for "credit card" type purchases under the US federal GSA regulations.

The BPA is essentially a pre-approved charge account. It is described as

"a simplified method of filling anticipated repetitive needs for supplies or services by establishing “charge accounts” with qualified sources of supply and is to be used only if the services or supplies cannot be properly identified as to the quantity and the type of services or supplies required."
BPAs are appropriate when
"there is a wide variety of items in a broad class of goods (e.g. hardware) that are generally purchased but the exact items, quantities, and delivery requirements are not known in advance and may vary considerably."
"BPAs should be made with firms from which numerous individual purchases will likely be made in the given period. For example, if past experience has shown that certain firms are dependable and have prices considerably lower than other firm as dealing in the same commodities, and if numerous purchases at or below the small purchase amount limitations are usually made from such suppliers, it would be advantageous to establish BPAs with those firms."

"If it is determined that BPAs would be advantageous, suppliers should be contacted to make the necessary arrangements for securing maximum discounts, documenting the individual purchase transactions, periodic billing, and other necessary details. However, quotations for the price of the supplies or services themselves are generally unnecessary."
This is intended to result in something like the GSA Schedules system whereby the government uses its purchasing power to get, in the GSA context, "best customer pricing", or, in the BPA context, "maximum discounts".

These requirements address the "bang for buck" element of government purchasing.

One part of the governance element is addressed by introduction of a competitive context:

"All competitive sources should be given an equal opportunity to furnish supplies or services under BPAs. Therefore, if not impossible, then to the extent practical, BPAs for items of the same type should be placed concurrently with at least three separate suppliers to assure equal opportunity."
"The existence of a BPA does not justify purchasing from only one source. Whenever possible, the Chief Procurement Officer, the Director of Public Works, or the head of a purchasing agency must provide for equal distribution of the blanket purchase to at least three separate vendors."
The accountability aspect of the governance element is established by the prescription of invoicing and monthly accounting and other review and auditing requirements.

The implementation of BPAs in an isolated place like Guam may also benefit local economies and return government funds to the taxpayers where BPAs are established with local providers.

Where this last element of political philosophy begins to run off that rail and head down the pure economic track is when bang for buck completely ignores the political needs. If bang for buck were the ideal, every government, indeed every citizen, would acquire needs in an online controlled auction from the likes of Wall-Mart, Amazon and Office Depot. Government would be operated just like a business.

This consequence becomes even more exaggerated when local governments "piggy-back" on other jurisdiction purchasing regimes, as is the recent trend in municipal purchasing in the US.

Under this "piggy-back" process, a local government is (and many non-profit organizations are) empowered to purchase from vendors selected under source selection methods and procedures approved by another government, local or otherwise, in a region, or within an entire country. This is an abdication of procurement responsibility to a big or better government brother.

A "piggy-back" method would, for instance, allow the Guam government to purchase under the local procurement regime, and from the vendors doing business in, say, North Dakota, without any consideration at all for local Guam providers and the boost they provide to the local economy.

Some of these consequences are illustrated in the following article from Florida, USA.

State official's profitable deal with Office Depot may cost governments and nonprofits nationally

Office Depot now will be allowed to lure government agencies and nonprofits nationwide to the 16,000 products the state competitively bid at low prices without telling those agencies their contract purchasing website will be blended by default with potentially more than 44,000 so-called “non-contract” products priced as the company chooses.

A Brentwood, Tenn., company, National Intergovernmental Purchasing Alliance (NIPA), will market the contract nationwide to governments and nonprofits, which can share it through a process known as “piggybacking.” The purchasing alliance will profit from the amendment, as will the state agency, which came under fire this year from legislators critical of South’s leadership.

The Daily News examined some of the non-contract products listed on the state contract’s purchasing website provided to the city of Naples. The Daily News found Office Depot is selling some of the products at prices higher than it charges the general public, as it has done in the past.

“The offering of our retail website assortment as non-contract items in this instance is not outside of the ordinary and provides a tremendous benefit to agencies that piggyback off of the state of Florida contract,” Office Depot spokesman Jason Shockley said of the amendment.

Office Depot won’t be required to provide a list of the non-contract products, and state purchasing officials haven’t yet released a list of the on-contract products, making it impossible to independently verify which category each product falls under.

For nearly two years, the Daily News has been investigating the contracting practices of Office Depot, spurred by Fort Myers resident David Sherwin, a former government auditor and Office Depot employee. Sherwin launched a nationwide campaign to inform government agencies of the company’s tactics after being fired from his job as an Office Depot account manager in April 2008.

“This lays the groundwork for a bait-and-switch,” Sherwin said of the recent amendment to the state contract.

Since 2007, Office Depot has been accused of selling items without a competitively bid price in an unauthorized manner by the Florida Attorney General’s Office, by auditors with the states of Georgia, Nebraska, California, and North Carolina, and by auditors with Fresno County, Calif., Los Angeles, Calif., Clearwater, Fla., and San Francisco, Calif.

The head of the National Association of State Procurement Officials (NASPO) said it is unusual for a government agency to allow non-contract items to be purchased, and called the Florida purchasing deal a good example of “price shopping.”

“Sounds like from this amendment that they’ve really modified the intent of this contract to allow it to become a nationwide contract,” association director Jack Gallt said. “Certainly, it’s something NASPO would not support.”

The whole story, which contains links to a wider investigation, is required reading if you want the whole "morality play".

Monday, November 29, 2010

Failure to award

This story was published today in the Marianas Variety, Guam Edition.

GDOE’s use of emergency power to buy copier machines questioned
A PROTEST has been filed with the Office of Public Accountability against the Guam Department of Education for abusing “emergency declarations” to procure copier machines instead of properly awarding contracts through the normal procurement process.

According to the complaint that Attorney John Thos. Brown, legal counsel for Island Business Systems & Supplies or Town House Department Stores, Inc., filed GDOE issued an invitation for bid in May, but failed to follow through with the rest of the procurement process and award a contract to the lowest bidder, IBSS.

Instead, Brown said GDOE Superintendent Nerissa Bretania Underwood used “emergency declarations” to purchase copiers from Xerox Guam.
There's more to the story, but that is the gist of it.

You can read the Notice of Appeal here.

The interesting aspect of this Appeal is that the Protest alleges that the award of the contract was withheld due to bad faith. Usually appeals are brought alleging a solicitation was conducted wrongly. Here, the allegation is that the solicitation was a good as far as it went, but that it just did not go far enough and award the contract to the low bidder.

There are reasons allowing a government to reject bids or cancel a solicitation, and no bidder has any beneficial or legal right to an award where the government has legitimate rights to end a solicitation. The operative point here is that the action of the government must be legitimate.

In the ABA Model Procurement Code, and Guam Law, there is a right that the bidder can rely on: all parties involved in the negotiation, performance, or administration of territorial contracts have a duty to act in good faith. Moreover, there is an overriding obligation to apply the procurement law "to ensure the fair and equitable treatment of all persons who deal with the procurement system". The government does not act legitimately if it denies a bidder its right to fairness and good faith consideration of contract award.

The Appeal in this case alleges certain facts which specifically draw into question whether the government administered the procurement in this case fairly and in good faith. The Appeal seeks an order that the government award the contract.

This raises an interesting question of remedies. When there is a finding that the solicitation is in violation of the law, the only practicable remedy to a protesting low bidder is to have the solicitation or proposed award "revised to comply with the law". (See 5 GCA § 5451.) In the typical case this would result in a revision of some specification, method of source selection, reconsideration of relevant evaluation criteria or contract term; that is, some error of judgment.

Here, there has been no award or proposed award, and the violation alleged is the failure to judge, not the error of judgment. Thus, the only available "revision" is to require that the decision making process be "revised" by determining the award that should have been made but was not; that is, to exercise the judgment that should have occurred but, for lack of good faith and fairness, was not.

On Guam, the Public Auditor has that authority implicitly by the grant of "the power to review and determine de novo any matter properly submitted". (5 GCA § 5703.)

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Why not run government like business?

What if we ran our governments like businesses? You know, user pays, profit value above social value. Economy of scaling out over scaling in.

Well, there are limits to that idea, obviously. It would be like applying the rules of business to art. The business bottom line is not society's bottom line. At some point quantity and quality diverge, and that is for the people to decide, in a democracy.

So far, anyway, we tend to strive for a democratic form of capitalism, where public matters are decided on a principle of one person, one vote; not one dollar one vote.

But in the UK, the government hired a very successful business person to have a look at how government conducts its business. And I think it is a very good idea to see how the other half does things where that can lead to improvements. But not all efficiencies are necessarily improvements, in different contexts. Which is not to say that inefficiency is a valuable goal of either government or business.

See, Is the economy of scale tipped against policy of competition?

And, government and big business are different contexts, let us not forget.

Philip Green: Govt procurement 'wasteful'
Sir Philip Green, the billionaire owner of Topshop and other clothing chains, was commissioned by prime minister David Cameron to carry out a review of spending to establish how better value for money can be obtained for taxpayers.

In his report, he claims that the government is not making the most of its size and credit rating to get the best deals from suppliers.

"The conclusion of this review is clear - credit rating and scale in virtually every department has not been used to make government spending efficient.

"There is no reason why government should not be as efficient as any good business."

Piles of waste in the minefield of public procurement
The UK has a tradition of doing everything strictly by the EU’s rules which means that the time from announcing a tender to awarding the contract can be rather long. It can also lead to complaints from those bidding for government work. They say there’s been a trend to “salami slicing” the contracts into far too small and thus wasteful portions.

As evidence of the government’s poor procurement, the document claims to have found an unnamed IT contract which still has six years left to run with no option to amend or end it. In Green’s eyes, the whole method of buying both hardware and software is of poor quality “with no provision in the contract to reduce the annual amount payable should the work not be required”.

Certainly, the figures Sir Philip found make interesting reading. His report points out that taxpayers paid out £38 million for a remarkable 400,000 hotel nights in London last year. He suggests that Government departments look at video conferencing instead, at least for some of their work.

He also says it’s been hard to get basic information. He says he was first told that transport cost £2 billion. When he queried this, a second estimate put it at £500 million and then a third came out at £768 million. The actual figure was £551 million.

He’s questioned the government’s management of property, currently costing £25 billion a year. The report describes how one agency had located from London to the Midlands. The agency has now been abolished but the contract left the state with a decades-long financial legacy. It had agreed a 20-year lease guaranteed for 15 years, leaving £18 million to pay in rent with no opt-out clause.

There are also clear signs of uncoordinated spending. Printing costs for instance varied wildly, with one department spending £1.31 a leaflet, compared with a market price of 26p. He found examples of departments paying anything between £8 and £73 for a box of paper and between £86 and £396 for printer cartridges. The prices paid for laptops varied from £353 to £2,000.

So he wants to see a centralised body to take responsibility for procurement of all kinds. He particularly wants much better control over the more expensive contracts, recommending an audit of everything with more than £100m of remaining value.

His report says that inefficiencies within government are there because “there is no process for setting and challenging detailed departmental budgets.” adding that: “Government acts as a series of independent departments rather than as one organisation.”

Telecommunications come in for particular criticism. He says that departments purchase telecoms separately from a range of different suppliers. A recent estimate claims that total government spending on phones is more than £2bn per annum, a figures he says “could be 30-40 percent cheaper” if the government bought its own capacity.

The report suggests that there is no standard specification across departments, adding that the government does not “leverage its buying power, nor does it follow best practices”. Amongst his recommendations include setting up a team of three to four individuals with financial and commercial expertise to review departmental spending “with an emphasis on efficiency and accountability”.

Personally, I think most of the observations made are quite valid issues, deserving of betterment. I simply caution against a blinkered profit motive business model for the delivery of government services. Democracy is a cumbersome process, and democratic capitalism an expensive one. It is a question of balance and fine tuning to get the proportions about right.

One of the debates that is consistent with and reflective of this concern is the one concerning which functions of the government are "core" or "inherent" or "governmental", as often discussed in this blawg. (See/click the Label, "governmental function".)

Sunday, August 15, 2010

Bulgaria's Financial Inspectors Fine Ex-Minister

Bulgaria's Financial Inspectors Fine Ex-Minister
The Bulgarian Public Financial Inspection Agency has fined the former Minister of State Administration, Nikolay Vasilev, over violations in public procurements.

According to the agency, the former minister had a double standard towards the companies that won the Ministry’s tenders for the installation of flagpoles at border posts and lifting platforms for disabled in public buildings.

Some companies were ordered by Vasilev to pay penalties for delays, and other companies were not.

It is not clear whether the Prosecutor’s Office will decide that there have been enough evidences for raising charges.

Sunday, May 23, 2010

Irish small businesses note large cost of procurement

Firms Seek Stronger Public Procurement Policy
The survey highlighted that 41% of small firms sold goods or services to the public sector in Ireland and 6% sold goods or services to public sectors abroad. Of the 41% of companies who sell goods to the public sector, 53% rated the process of selling to the public sector as either “poor” or “very poor”.

“One of the main concerns highlighted by small firms is the bureaucracy associated with current public procurement procedures. Tender documents can be lengthy with unnecessary information being sought. Tenders often require extensive financial and technical information which SMEs cannot always fulfil, as they may not have the in-house expertise and as a result the costs of preparing a submission are excessive,” added McNally.

“30% of firms selling into the public sector rate the process as ‘good’. These companies tend to have a strong track record of dealing with the public procurement process, however, a challenge for many of these firms is the length of time it takes for invoices to be paid from the public sector.”

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

Procurement controversies -- Malta

No hard evidence of corruption - Auditor
The Auditor General "did not come across any hard and conclusive evidence of corruption" in the inquiry concerning the tender issued by Enemalta Corporation for the supply of a new power generating plant at Delimara.

However, he complained of "the lack of cooperation from certain stakeholders who contended that they could not recall certain events or information" and questioned the undue haste with which the agreement was signed.

The auditor said that "a case in point is Mr J. Mizzi, local representative for the tenderer awarded this contract (BWSC), who was considered one of the key players throughout this inquiry. Although summoned by the National Audit Office on three separate occasions, he repeatedly cited lack of memory when asked certain questions".

In his report, the Auditor General noted that Enemalta chairman Alex Tranter had declared a conflict of interest, especially since, in his private capacity, he had business links with the local company entrusted with civil works in one of the bids under consideration (which eventually was selected and agreement signed with).

"It was noted that the chairman, prior to his declared conflict of interest, had appointed the members on the evaluation and adjudicating committees responsible for the evaluation of tenders."

"Considering the circumstances of this case it is felt that it would have been more prudent and appropriate had the Enemalta chairman resigned from his post at the time when he had declared a conflict of interest. This would surely have eliminated the extensive controversies which arose at a later stage, especially in view of the fact that the local company with whom the chairman had declared having professional connections with was actually sub-contracted the civil works of this tender."

COMMENT: Conflict of interest provisions of the Guam procurement Ethics Rules (modeled on the Amercian Bar Association Model Procurement Code) would have required the minister to recuse himself long before he finally declared his conflict. He should have recused himself from the appointment process in the first instance. 5 GCA § 5268.