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Showing posts with label Methods of source selection. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Methods of source selection. Show all posts

Monday, May 27, 2019

When Commercial Off the Shelf became a Cockup Off the Cuff

The Project On Government Oversight (POGO, as it is called) has an interesting, and somewhat disturbing, report out. This post will only go into parts of it. The whole report is well worth the read. Read it at the link below.

The Pentagon relies on the obscure Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to negotiate and administer $5 trillion contracts across the Defense Department as an average of $455 million In taxpayer dollars are paid out each day to contractors. DCMA undertook to modernize its procedures and processes and contracted professionals to design and build a system. The result was a software system created to help review, implement, and track defense contracts a, a project, called the Integrated Workload Management System.

The project appears to have been a colossal cockup. But that, and the investigation it appears to have instigated, is not what this post is focused on. For that story, you must read the POGO report at the link above. The bouncing ball that traces this post is a golf ball that seems never made it onto the fairway; it was in the weeds from the gitgo. This is a tale of “Do as I say, not as I do”.

Pentagon’s Contracting Gurus Mismanaged Their Own Contracts
 In 2011, the agency got the ball rolling with a contract paying a company called Apprio to conduct a study on what a “Model Contract Management Office” would look like and to “identify relevant technology” it would use. The next year, Apprio’s contract was expanded to envision a replacement for the Electronic Document Workflow system.

Things started going south for the software project in mid-2013, when Apprio won a contract worth more than $3 million to begin testing and developing software as the replacement system. But because the agency had previously hired Apprio to help lay out the requirements for this work, under federal acquisition regulations the company was ineligible for contracts implementing its prior recommendations. Regulations specifically prohibit this so that a contractor is not tempted to misrepresent the needs of the agency in order to sell more of its own products or services. The “organizational conflict of interest violation” raised “serious concern over contracting practices and processes within DCMA.”

Because the contract involved spending more than $1 million on a system the Defense Department uses to manage its resources, then-Director of Information Technology Haynes needed approval from the Pentagon’s deputy chief management official. The official rejected Haynes’ initial request, citing missing documentation and other flaws, and asked him to resubmit it. Despite not having the Pentagon’s approval, the contract was awarded to Apprio. But during testing over the next several months, Apprio’s software “failed to properly integrate” with the agency’s other systems.

The agency turned to another company, Discover Technologies, to develop a software solution. It appears that the documents provided to the Services Acquisition Review Board to get approval for the contract were misleading. The documents, submitted just two days before the end of the fiscal year, listed the upcoming year’s projected expenses as $960,000. There was no mention of the estimates that the contract would likely cost up to $40.5 million over its lifetime. Evidently, the Pentagon had not approved the funds necessary to cover that much larger estimate. In the event, the board received and approved the contract on September 28, 2013, and reapproved it each year through 2017.

Additionally, the board failed to conduct a formal review of the Discover Technologies contract before approving it. It didn’t seem to know what the contract was intended to deliver. Personnel consistently did not understand what was being communicated by Haynes and others in the IT department, and therefore either stopped asking questions or failed to ask any at all. In the absence of any questions or objections, approvals were essentially rubber stamps, with the board approving 95 percent of IT submissions on first attempt.

If it had done a thorough review of the Discover Technologies contract before approving it, the review board might have caught numerous problems. For example, the agency used the wrong type of contract: a “Blanket Purchase Agreement,” which is intended for recurring needs for straightforward supplies or services, not the type of complex software modifications Discover Technologies would be performing. The agency mischaracterized the software as a “commercial off-the-shelf” product, which requires less oversight, despite the fact that those involved knew it required a significant amount of coding and development work. The contract’s requirements were also vague, with some overlapping with work already assigned to Apprio. In many cases, task orders within the contract were missing key components, such as statements of work and standards by which to measure performance, and the document detailing the work requirements didn’t include a list of specific objectives.

On the last day of the fiscal year, two days after the review board approved the Discover Technologies contract, the Pentagon approved spending about $6.3 million on the software project over the next year. Hours later, the agency awarded the contract. It appears there was “pressure in contracting to get contracts awarded at year end,” leaving insufficient time to plan and properly craft the project’s requirements. In summary, some of the project’s most significant problems stemmed from the structure and administration of the contract. The lack of clear objectives in the contract directly impacted performance, and the lack of planning and strategic vision led to money being wasted through duplicative work and cost overruns.

Worse, the government did not provide any oversight focused of the project. There were “essentially two budget offices with a separate one in IT, and there was no oversight of the IT budget personnel by the [agency] budget office. This meant the agency’s own budget office didn’t know the agency was spending more money than it was authorized to. In a similar vein, Pentagon budget officials didn’t adequately keep track of the numbers or talk to each other, so one office kept giving away more money than the other had authorized.

The project had become a runaway train until the agency director put a halt to things and requested both an Inspector General audit and an independent investigation into the suspected Antideficiency Act violations. By then, the agency had spent around $45 million on the project, not including government labor costs.

In 2009, the congressionally created Commission on Wartime Contracting wrote, “DCMA is not aggressive in motivating contractors to improve business systems,” which it described as “the first line of defense against waste, fraud, and abuse.” The agency’s “conservative approach results in little, if any, motivation for contractors to improve their business systems, and ultimately has a direct impact on the warfighting mission.” In 2011, the Government Accountability Office attributed many of the agency’s struggles to “a seriously eroded workforce” stretched thin by the surging number and value of contracts in prior years due in part to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; a decentralization initiative that led to inconsistent guidance and practices across the agency that one official called a “free for all”; and the challenges posed by defense contractors’ increasing reliance on subcontractors.

While the agency has in many cases not been zealous enough in protecting taxpayer interests, the shortcomings are not across the board, and parts of the agency have at times seemed more willing to hold contractors accountable. The agency’s hard-hitting findings that Lockheed Martin had used a significantly flawed business system for the F-35 program, and the Pentagon’s subsequent willingness in 2012 and 2013 to withhold some payments from the company, is one example. Last year, it did the same with helicopter manufacturer and major defense contractor Sikorsky.

But the extent to which the agency was failing to properly manage contracts for even its own internal systems is coming into focus this year with the April Inspector General report and the documents POGO obtained.
As mentioned above, this post presents only part of the story, the mistakes made. There is another story in the article about the investigation(s) and information obtained by POGO regarding the project and loosely related others. Here, I focus on what went wrong. The rest of the story focuses on the investigation and remedies. And that's the main point of the procurement system.

While we're here, let me put in a plug for the Project On Government Oversight. Our procurement system requires the essential efforts of the private sector to police government spending in real time. POGO is one of those many sentinels along the watchtowers we rely on to keep the game clean, as best we can.

Monday, May 14, 2018

Reigning in the cozy relationships

The following article is interesting for the revelation of a statewide undeveloped procurement system that is finally seeing the light. It heralds new procurement reforms in the State of Arizona, "massive changes to how public schools will be allowed to hire builders for large construction projects, as well as harsh new penalties for malfeasance that occurs during the selection process". 

The things discussed in this article were mostly already dealt with long ago under Guam's procurement laws, taken from the ABA Model Procurement Code.

I only make reference to parts of this for its procurement lessons, so you should read the full article at the link.

Arizona upends school procurement laws in effort to cool cozy relationships with builders
Some in the construction industry, which was not consulted on the changes and fears a return to a system that prioritizes cost above outcomes, say the changes are a legislative overreaction to scandals that have roiled the Scottsdale Unified School District since late 2017.

The most significant change involves how construction companies will be selected. Beginning July 2019, instead of using a process that allows districts to subjectively score and select a construction manager to manage the entire project, builders will be selected based solely on who promises the lowest cost.
Comment: The new system can provide a lot of the accommodations allowed by the old one by use of the "multi-step" competitive sealed bid procurement method. It has been used extensively in recent times (some say too much so), which is known as the LPTA (Lowest Price, Technically Acceptable) source selection method. It involves two phases, the first of which is to assess the offers of the bidders to determine which qualify, followed by opening of sealed price bids. The first phase allows discussion to enable "potentially acceptable" bidders submit an acceptable bid.
Other provisions aim to prevent undue influence over the procurement process by restricting who gets to be part of the selection process and banning gifts given by contractors to district officials. Gifts from contractors to district procurement officials will be prohibited. “It was all aimed at trying to address corruption in financial management and procurement practices,” said House Speaker J.D. Mesnard, R-Chandler.
Comment: Guam law's ethics provisions prohibit the giving of gifts, gratuities and even "favors", deminimus benefits that may not even benefit a person but the organization. It is meant to stem paying to play relationships.
•Contracts will be awarded based on lowest price from a qualified bidder
•No contractor or subcontractor providing services to a district will be allowed to serve on a procurement selection committee
•Procurement officials will be prohibited from receiving a benefit to create a procurement specification in a particular way, such as to benefit a single company
•School districts must keep records that prove construction vendors are properly licensed.
The competitive sealed bid method is the preferred source selection model. Conflicts such as this are prohibited by ethics rules, and rules preventing non-government who consult in the preparation of specifications from being allowed to bid or have an interest in the bid. Procurement officials are required to keep extensive records related to procurements, which are public documents.
The Guam Supreme Court just published today a decision that held a solicitation had to be cancelled for failure to keep a the required record, thereby impeding a proper review of the conduct of the solicitation. Teleguam Holdings LLC v. Guam, 2018 Guam 5.
Charter schools will be exempt from the new rules.
Not on Guam, where the bulk of their money comes from public funds. Guam professes its purposes and policies of procurement to include to provide for increased public confidence in the procedures followed in public procurement; to ensure the fair and equitable treatment of all persons who deal with the procurement system; to provide increased economy in territorial activities and to maximize to the fullest extent practicable the purchasing value of public funds of the Territory; to foster effective broad-based competition within the free enterprise system; and, to provide safeguards for the maintenance of a procurement system of quality and integrity.

Tuesday, March 27, 2018

For the times, they are a'changing -- or are they?

Here is the first of a couple of intriguing and thought-provoking current articles, each from very good sources (or so I've observed), considering aspects of the current "changes" in federal government acquisition. The second will be in the next post (see here). 

Remember, I take indecent liberty with articles advanced here, to provide context to students of local government procurement, and Guam's in particular. Thus, I slice and dice, omit great swaths of critical data, paraphrase, rearrange, and perhaps tilt to one side or the other, the original information in these articles. It is imperative that you read the articles in their original form and the authors' intent, and not rely on my iteration of them.



“Other Transaction Authorities” might seem like a risky new acquisition method, but it’s been around longer than the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
Before there was a Federal Acquisition Regulation regime describing the many procurement laws adopted at the federal level in the last three decades plus, there were “other transaction authorities,” also known by the shorthand OTAs or OTs. This contracting method, outside the usual federal process, is not widely used and even less understood. But that’s beginning to change. “Even though it’s been around for a fairly lengthy period of time, it’s just not been used very much. So, people are afraid of it because they haven’t seen how it’s worked,” Douglas Maughan, director of the Homeland Security Department's Science and Technology Directorate’s Cyber Security Division, told Nextgov.

It comes across as new and scary but is potentially a game-changing acquisition model and it is catching fire across government. After all, it has no structure, no built in roadmaps, accountability or paper trails. But, it doesn’t have to be scary and is not really all that new, if you are a big believer in getting to the future by going back before the dawn of modern procurement rules-based practices. It has roots going back to the 1950's, long before the FAR and the Competition in Contracting Act. Three decades later that same language came to be used to grant the Defense Department similar authorities. “Under these authorities, agencies may develop agreements that are not required to follow a standard format or include terms and conditions that are typically required when using traditional mechanisms,” according to a Government Accountability Office definition. In other words, OTAs rely more on principles than rules.

By 1994, that authority had been broadened beyond research to include prototyping and then updated again in 2017 to enable contracts to move into production after successful prototypes. Over that time, several departments have been granted other transaction authorities, including Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security and Transportation. Under these departments, five component agencies have also been given explicit OT authority: the Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation Security Administration, National Institutes of Health, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy, or ARPA-E.

Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate awarded its first OT contract for cybersecurity in February 2016 after launching its Silicon Valley Innovation program. While the primary focus for OTs is on research and development, not all agencies are using them for that express purpose. For instance, TSA and NASA use them for other services, such as airport security, education and outreach, according to GAO.

The reluctance to use OTs is based on “fear of giving people a lot of discretion,” said Nash, the procurement law expert. “If you’re in a government agency and you’ve got an inspector general and you’ve got congressional oversight … there’s a tendency to be pretty cautious about how you do business.”

That said, “It’s the same oversight you have over any other transaction where you’re giving a company money,” Nash said. “The problem is, if you have a lot of discretion, you take away a lot of the rules, but you still have basic ethics problems. If you gave an OT to your father without telling anybody else about it, you’d have the same ethical violation you’d have with a contract or a grant.”

The other major roadblock is the fear of funding projects that don't pan out, Nash said. “People have a hard time understanding that when you fund research, over half the time you’re funding failure,” Nash said. “You do not get 100 percent payout from research; and you shouldn’t expect it.” If you were to see a 100 percent success rate in funding research, that would just mean you weren't looking far enough into the future. “There’s nothing wrong with failure,” Nash said.

Homeland Security’s Maughan agreed. “We have a lot of successes we can talk about with return on investment, but even the failures” have some return, he said. He cited a program to downsize a Defense Department radar system to fit on smaller drones used by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The company awarded a contract ultimately failed to produce a working prototype, but everyone involved still consider it a successful venture. The company was able to get funding to move their research forward and CBP learned what is feasible for the size of drones they use. “They were still really happy about being part of the program,” Maughan said. “We helped them move the technology down the roadmap toward a smaller device and that will help them in some of their DOD missions.”

“I think there’s still some return on investment," Maughan added. "Our investment was less than $400,000 with them, so I think it falls into the category of: If you’re going to fail, fail quickly."

Had the office used a traditional contracting method for this project, it likely would have taken six to 12 months just to make an award, let alone discover that the idea would not work. Under the Science and Technology Directorate's OT authority, the time from application to award can be as short as 60 to 90 days.

Broadening OTs beyond research seems to increase their use accordingly. GAO reports that while most agencies do fewer than 75 OT transactions a year, TSA and NASA conducted 640 and 3,220, respectively, in 2014 alone.

Many in government have been reluctant to use their OT authorities precisely because of the lack of regulations governing their use. Since the contracts exist outside of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, they can be written with far less stringent requirements. But that also means there are fewer protections along the way to avoid a catastrophic contracting failure—one that could land a government official in front of a congressional committee.

“Even though it’s not FAR-based, we still have to do procurement documentation, we have to do a source-selection plan that says what are the criteria by which we’re going to evaluate proposals. For the most part, it’s the same as a traditional FAR-based contract, it’s just that the vehicle you’re using is not a FAR-based vehicle,” Maughan said. Despite appearances, “It’s not the wild, wild west,” Maughan added. “You still have to make sure the government is making the decisions on what gets awarded. Even still, we have a contracting officer—who’s called an ‘other transaction authority officer’—so you’re still doing the same kinds of things with the contracting folks as part of the team.”

The company was able to get funding to move their research forward and CBP learned what is feasible for the size of drones they use. “They were still really happy about being part of the program,” Maughan said. “We helped them move the technology down the roadmap toward a smaller device and that will help them in some of their DOD missions.”

“I think there’s still some return on investment," he added. "Our investment was less than $400,000 with them, so I think it falls into the category of: If you’re going to fail, fail quickly."

Had the office used a traditional contracting method for this project, it likely would have taken six to 12 months just to make an award, let alone discover that the idea would not work. Under the Science and Technology Directorate's OT authority, the time from application to award can be as short as 60 to 90 days.

“It’s not a solution for every case,” Maughan said. “It’s not the answer for all things,” he added. “If you’re trying to get startups with new innovation, then an OT might be good for you as an organization. There’s a little bit of risk working with a startup company—if you’re really just looking for a solutions provider and you’re not willing to take some risk, then an OT might not be for you.”

Nash agreed and offered some advice to agencies interested in getting in on OTs. “Let’s say you find a company out there that’s never done business with the government and that has some fascinating technology. You go to them and you say, ‘How could we sponsor you to do this? And we’ll give you all the money.’ Well, they may say, ‘The only way we’ll deal with you is this, this, this and this,’” Nash said. “We’re talking about intellectual property issues; we’re talking about accounting issues. And a normal contracting office might be pretty darn uncomfortable when they hear that because that’s not their norm.”

“You’ve got accounting problems. You want to make sure the company spends the money for what you gave them the money,” which can be particularly difficult, as one advantage of an OT contract is the company does not have to abide by government accounting standards. “But you need to make sure they have some systems.

“You need to worry about intellectual property—who’s going to have rights to it. And that would mean that if they said, ‘We’ll only do it if you take zero rights,’ that would be a problem. You might do it but you certainly would know that that’s a flashpoint that you would worry about. And then, of course, you’ve got to worry about audit rights because the government always wants to be able to audit and the contractor might not want to be audited.
Additional reading for this subject: Acquisition Disruption - Innovative Concepts in Government Contracting
Excerpt:  "This term is not defined by statute or regulation; it is best defined by what it is not. An OTA is not a procurement contract, grant, or cooperative agreement. It is a different type of agreement with the government – one that is not subject to the strict regulatory regimes that characterize other types of contracting." 

In my mind, adherence to principles is absolutely necessary for a successful procurement regime, but principles are not, in themselves, sufficient, any more than rules alone are.  See, The ethics of paper work.

Monday, March 19, 2018

Procurement Controversy du jour - Australian government 'consultants'

Experts flag lack of accountability in procurement contracts
Current contract arrangements often prevent consultants from being held accountable for the advice they give to government while ambiguous reporting makes it difficult to determine the value for money of outsourced work. That’s according to the Melbourne School of Government, which has told a parliamentary committee into government procurement contract arrangements that the commercial-in-confidence privileges often attached to consultants’ work has given rise to concerns about accountability and transparency.

“This is different to advice provided by, for instance, a government department, which forms part of the public record,” the school says in its submission to the inquiry.

Last week Government News reported on calls for the Department of Finance to carry out a detailed investigation into whether there is “systematic flouting” of the procurement rules, given the high use of government contracts below $80,000, which are not required to be put to market. The Melbourne School of Government said the way in which value for money is reported by Commonwealth agencies is not specified under procurement contracts and often remains unclear. “This means it is not possible to understand the ways in which value-for-money was assessed for specific consultant engagements, and the extent to which a particular engagement did, in fact, deliver that value.”

The school also pointed out the lack of formal accreditation for becoming a consultant or professional body ensuring practitioners meet basic professional or ethical standards.

“This means that there are no generally accepted rules regarding who can legitimately call themselves a consultant,” it said.

The school also highlighted that more than two-thirds of the public service’s consulting work is completed by five organisations, four of these being the Big Four accounting firms. “It would be helpful to understand why exactly this is.”

Dean of engagement at Griffith Business School, Professor Anne Tiernan, who has been involved in several projects examining public service capability, said successive “reforms” had eroded institutional memory and capacity for long-term thinking.

KPMG, which earned $620 million in government contracts from 2012 to 2017 according to the national auditor, argued it was unrealistic to expect public service to possess in-house the myriad technical skills needed to meet rising demands. Departments and agencies required specialist skills including data and analytics, artificial intelligence and business and technology transformation, it said.

While only the primary organisation in a contract is currently reported, the consultancy argued that the reporting of subcontractors would provide an increased level of transparency, particularly for smaller enterprises working as part of a consortium. KPMG also proposed that AusTender should provide information on other companies and consultants that unsuccessfully tendered for a contract, and not just the winner, to provide “an additional level of transparency” to the procurement process.
Read more at the link.

Sunday, March 18, 2018

Putting brakes on a mule. Whoa, Mule!!

US military says robotic pack mules are too noisy to use (2015)
The US military has reportedly shelved development of its robotic pack mule — the Boston Dynamics-built Legged Squad Support System or LS3. According to a report from Military.com, there are no "future experiments or upgrades planned" for the mechanical beast of burden, with the program in need of new contracts or support from senior military figures before it can be resurrected. And the reason for this parting of ways? LS3 was apparently too noisy to make a good soldier. Over the course of its development, LS3 was given updates to make it more autonomous, able to automatically follow humans and even respond to basic voice commands like "follow," "sit," and "stay." But, it seems it never really became all that quiet. In videos of the barrel-chested robot in action during military trials last summer, it sounds as loud as a sit-on lawnmower — definitely not the sort of companion you'd want bumbling alongside you on a nighttime patrol.

Army on Accelerated Path to Buy as Many as 5,700 Robotic Mules (2/9/2018)
Requirements for robotic mules go back at least to 2001 when the now canceled Future Combat Systems was conceived.An autonomous multifunctional utility logistics and equipment vehicle survived the FCS cancelation and was transferred to the follow-on Brigade Combat Team Modernization program, but that effort was eventually scrapped as well. Since then, development of robotic mules continued, with four of the vehicles reaching Afghanistan in 2012 for a battlefield assessment. The Lockheed Martin-built squad mission support system was deployed there for about five months. When the Army put out a call for robotic mules to take part in a vendor solution assessment in September and October, seven robot manufacturers were able to bring technically mature, off-the-shelf robotic mules.

After more than a decade of experimenting with robotic mules designed to take the load off overburdened foot soldiers, the service is on an accelerated path to field up to 5,700 squad multi-purpose equipment transport robotic vehicles in a winner-takes-all competition that may wrap up as early as 2019. Over the course of its development, LS3 was given updates to make it more autonomous, able to automatically follow humans and even respond to basic voice commands like "follow," "sit," and "stay." But, it seems it never really became all that quiet. In videos of the barrel-chested robot in action during military trials last summer, it sounds as loud as a sit-on lawnmower — definitely not the sort of companion you'd want bumbling alongside you on a nighttime patrol.

The program is using an “other transaction authority” contracting vehicle to rapidly transition the technology from experiments to a program of record. OTAs are normally used to bring in nontraditional contractors to make prototypes. The Army is in the middle of selecting a contractor after bringing in seven vendors with eight different vehicles in 2017 to perform operational tests. “That is significantly faster than we have been able to do previous efforts,” Maj. Gen. John George, director for force development, Army G-8, told reporters. “That is the beauty of the new OTA process. If you have a competition though OTA, you can go to procurement and turn it into a program of record,” George said. A typical program of this kind would take upwards of 10 years, he said. “The Army wants to go faster. It wants and needs to go faster,” he added.

But this is a “good news story,” he said. “We are doing that because we have learned to hack our own system” and by using the revised other transaction authority rules. “What has changed is that the transition mechanism provided in 10 USC 2371b (h), added by the 2016 NDAA, provides a greatly simplified way of transitioning the contracting. The follow-on production effort after a successful prototype OT can be executed as a production OT or awarded as a non-competitive procurement contract,” according to Richard Dunn, founder and consultant with the Strategic Institute for Innovation in Government Contracting.
Army Revamps Strategy to Acquire Robotic Mules (3/24/2017)
The Army intends to buy 20 robotic mules from manufacturers and send them out with brigades for a year-long operational test and evaluation, the service’s program manager in charge of unmanned ground systems said March 23. Bryan McVeigh, project manager for force protection, said a recent Army Requirements Oversight Council looking at the squad multipurpose equipment transport (SMET) vehicle put the breaks on the program, which was heading for fielding in the early 2020s. The council said, “Wait a minute guys, You’re laying out a standard program of record. This is taking too long. This is way too much testing. We’re not even sure this is what we want,” McVeigh said. Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Mark Milley instructed the PEO to go back and look at the things that really matter and get rid of the rest, McVeigh said.

Earlier in the conference, a senior service official said the proposed prices they had seen for SMETs had given officials “sticker shock.” “I’m not telling you what to bid on your price. But I am telling what we think it should cost,” McVeigh said. The vehicle after it reaches its assembly point will then have to switch over to an unmanned mode. “How do I pull what seems to be mutually exclusive design characteristics together?” McVeigh asked. That will be a tough problem for the manufacturers, he acknowledged.

The Army wants two basic configurations: one similar to the vehicles that have been tested and another that will have a seat and steering wheel so it can be optionally manned, he said. The reason for the optionally manned version is one of logistics. “How do I get from an airport to an assembly area? That kind of leads me to an optionally manned solution. There are not enough prime movers to tow all the systems that are supposed to be issued to the brigade,” he said.PEO force protection will proceed with an SMET rodeo as early as August, McVeigh said at the National Defense Industrial Association’s Robotic Capabilities conference in Springfield, Virginia. How is it going to be operated? Will it use a cord, a joystick or follow soldiers using breadcrumbs? Can it be towed at 20, 30 or 50 miles per hour without flipping over? The more capability the robot makers offer, the higher the score on their evaluation, he said.

A request for information will be published “shortly,” he said. “I need your feedback to make sure what I have in mind is executable. This is absolutely critical.” He needs to know how long it will take to get a prototype built. As for delivering the models by August: “I need you to tell me if I’m on drugs,” he said. Companies participating will be reimbursed for their expenses.

There are four possible scenarios, McVeigh said. The first is that one of the manufacturers “hits it out of the park” and gives the Army exactly what it wants. He has the authority to then go into limited production with a traditional acquisition contract. Another scenario is that a couple of the models do well, but are not quite right. There would be new requirements written, some changes, and then a down-select to one vendor. The third outcome is: “Thank you all for playing. Pick up your trophies on the way out. We learned that what we were asking for isn’t in the art of the doable.” The Army would return to an engineering, manufacturing and development phase and open up the contract again. The fourth option simply is that the Army decides it doesn’t need this capability, he said.
A note to newbies to this blog: I almost always slice and dice articles, leave out critical material, paraphrase, and add comment for purposes of turning real life situations into teachable procurement examples. Do not rely on my renditions to know the full story, or intent, of the article -- read the original at the link(s) provided.

Tuesday, June 6, 2017

Own up to those mistakes; don't put lipstick on that pig

Jason Miller is an astute federal procurement journalist with Federal News Radio, with a knack for making arcane and difficult matters interesting and graspable. I don't read him regularly, but when I do I wonder why not. (Not enough time in a day comes to mind.)

Jason wrote the following article, and his respect for action of the protagonist in the unfortunate circumstances of the story is palpable, and deserved. You may just want to click the link to the article and get it from the horse's mouth. Or you can stick around with me and my rendition, and be sorry.

What happened in a nutshell is that the Department of Homeland Security solicited, and then cancelled (after protests began), a solicitation for certain technical services, known as "Flexible Agile Support for the Homeland" ('FLASH'). It was framed as a small business set-aside procurement focused on agile development methodologies. (That's another story; read it, too.)

As Jason explained in a prior article, DHS' Procurement Innovation Lab (PIL) set out to get its arms around one of the problems of federal acquisition — the need to close out low-risk, low-dollar contracts. Too often these contracts are forgotten or under prioritized, and a backlog builds up. At DHS, for example, its backlog grew to more than 350,000, and 92 percent of the contracts had been completed more than a year ago. PIL took an innovation risk and re-engineered the business processes a simplified means for contract closeout. (Look, as I said he can explain better than I, so read that article, too.)

To re-engineer the business processes, DHS first created PIL, a cross-functional team of policy, finance, general counsel, contracting and industry and then had to identify the low-risk contracts. It was all about coordinating, good communications and making sure that all the people that could be involved and are looking at the process to collaboratively understand what to do and all the appropriate steps to do it. PIL completed nine projects and is working on others.

One of the PIL's biggest experiments was FLASH.   As Soraya Correa, the chief procurement officer at DHS, described it, FLASH was meant to take care of "contracts that are typically small dollar value, generally firm fixed price, no activity over the last 12-to-24 months, final goods and services have been delivered so we know they are probably ready for close out. What we are doing is a streamlined approach trying to close them in one fell swoop.”

Correa explained, “Everything we’ve done on FLASH has been very different from what we’ve done in the past. Start with our industry day where our communications were more of a discussion where we provided the ability to do speed teaming or speed dating, but also an opportunity for vendors to meet with government officials and ask questions,” she said. “We also had experts in various business areas like small business, digital services and others so industry could come up to speed on what we were doing in those areas. It was a very interactive day that focused a little more on the business processes around bidding as opposed to focusing on the requirements that would be contained in the solicitation.”

DHS evaluated contractors based on a technical challenge where the bidders had to present to the agency how they would go through an agile development process. Correa said the bidders then had 4-to-6 hours to actually complete and then did a presentation. DHS received 114 proposals.

Now, flash forward a bit to last month when Jason reported "DHS cancels $1.5B contract for agile services".
DHS has been working on the multiple award vehicle for the better part of a year. The goal of FLASH was to give department components access to innovative methods and industry best practices to acquire agile design and development support services. DHS said in the solicitation it was seeking to develop an acquisition contract that includes the concepts from the U.S. Digital Services Playbook such as user-centered design, dev/ops, automated testing and agile. DHS’s Procurement Innovation Lab (PIL) was running FLASH.

But since November when DHS awarded FLASH to 13 companies, it faced an uphill battle to get the contract off the ground. Eight vendors who didn’t make the cut submitted protests to GAO. DHS decided to take corrective action instead of letting GAO decide the protests and reopened bidding.

Then in early March, DHS announced 11 new winners under the FLASH contract, and 12 unsuccessful bidders protested to GAO again.

The decision to cancel FLASH comes as more and more agencies are developing contract vehicles to buy agile services. Along with the DHS, the General Services Administration’s 18F organization also struggled to award and ultimately cancelled the second and third contracts under its agile blanket purchase agreement. 18F awarded 16 vendors a spot in part one of its agile BPA in August 2015.

It’s unclear what comes next for FLASH — whether DHS will try again with a new procurement or give up entirely on a separate contract vehicle for agile services and rely on an existing one like EAGLE II.
So, now for the denouement:

DHS’ internal assessment of its $1.5B agile contract: ‘significant errors and missteps’
If the Homeland Security Department’s decision to cancel its $1.5 billion contract for agile services wasn’t shocking enough, the details of the missteps and problems the agency detailed in its “motion to dismiss” left long-time federal procurement attorneys and vendors with their collective mouths agape.

“DHS has determined that cancellation of the FLASH solicitation, HSHQDC-16-R-00118, is the only viable option to address the many issues that DHS has identified as problems with the requirement and the record,” DHS lawyers wrote to GAO in the document, which Federal News Radio obtained. “The integrity of the procurement process will be served by this cancellation.”

Barbara Kinosky, managing partner with Centre Law and Consulting LLC, said she was “floored” by DHS’s honesty and the level of detail it provided.

“They did everything but name names,” she said. “It is absolutely draconian to cancel the contract at this point. It means it is so flawed that they couldn’t tweak this, or conversely they decided not to let all the protestors on to the vehicle. I suspect the whole methodology was flawed and even if they tweaked the evaluation factors it was still susceptive (sic) to more protests.”

In the motion to dismiss, DHS said the problems with FLASH ranged from the evaluation criteria and adjectival ratings to the price evaluations and best value tradeoffs to lacking the expertise in agile software services to do a proper evaluation.

“DHS has also determined that the evaluation of the offerors may have resulted in unequal treatment of offerors’ weaknesses and risks. This is partially due to the adjectival ratings that were used, but also due to the evaluation process used to evaluate and assess offerors during the technical challenge exercises,” DHS stated in its motion.

“DHS has identified issues in the price evaluation report (PER) and best value tradeoff analysis (BVTA) which do not adequately support its award decisions. The methodology by which the price evaluation team evaluated price realism is not identified in the PER. Nor is it evident in the PER itself what DHS reviewed and evaluated to determine whether prices were reasonable and realistic.”

Christoph Mlinarchik, a government contracts expert and owner of Christoph LLC, a consulting firm, said DHS’s self-assessment of the FLASH procurement resulted in a firm vote of “no confidence” due to a “comedy of errors: poorly executed technical challenge evaluations, sparse price analysis, inadequate tradeoff analysis and more.”

“The most glaring admission by DHS is that critical documents were altered after award, like the technical evaluation report and best value tradeoff analysis. These critical documents were changed after submission to the GAO as part of the official record– a flagrant foul that undermines the bid protest system,” Mlinarchik said. “In summary, DHS rolled over, showed its belly, and provided ample reasons that the FLASH procurement was a total failure.

This does not look good for DHS, but it shows courage in admitting fault and starting from scratch instead of putting lipstick on a pig.”

The decision to cancel FLASH left vendors both relieved and in disbelief. One industry source, who requested anonymity for fear of retaliation from DHS, said it was a painful process from the beginning.

As Soraya Correa, DHS chief procurement officer, said in December in a NextGov article after the initial set of protests delayed FLASH:

“We’ve got to start getting rid of that fear,” Correa said. “We’ve got to start making it OK to sometimes make a mistake, as long as you’re making an intelligent mistake. It’s OK to take a few chances, and you know what? Every now and then, we’re going to stub our toe.”

Sunday, October 30, 2016

It's sticking to "the letter and spirit of the evaluation procedures" that counts

These articles, which I've sliced and diced to my own ends, discuss the ramifications of looking at bid protests from a practical, not pendantic, view point. You can read the case discussed here; you should read the full stories at the links provided, lest my version taint your perspective.

OPINION: Contractors must recognise new US procurement rules
Nothing illuminates the essential characteristics of this new era better than the Government Accountability Office’s stinging and even humiliating rejection of Boeing’s protest at the US Air Force’s decision to award the long range strike-bomber (LRS-B) contract to Northrop Grumman a year ago; the GAO’s newly-released decision offers valuable instruction for competing in this new era.

The most surprising revelation in the report is how the USAF structured the LRS-B competition. It may be the first time it has acquired a combat aircraft based on a lowest-cost, technically compliant bid. Northrop heavily invested corporate funds in classified risk-reduction efforts, a fact the GAO says played a key role in reducing the USAF’s estimated price for its proposal. As bidders line up for a host of new USAF contracts, upfront investments by contractors are essential.

It is fair to say that Boeing did not like how the USAF evaluated both proposals on cost. Boeing quibbled over which historic programmes should be used as the baseline to forecast production costs on LRS-B. According to the GAO, Boeing submitted cost data based on derivative programmes, but the USAF preferred clean-sheet aircraft developments. Boeing sent the USAF a rebuttal, but apparently used inaccurate labour cost data, which, the GAO passive-aggressively notes, “did not enhance the credibility of Boeing’s estimate”.

Despite Boeing’s multiple objections, the GAO laid out a clear case that the USAF stuck to the letter and spirit of the evaluation procedures.
Game Over: GAO Protest Reveals Cost Was Deciding Factor in B-21 Contest
The Air Force in October 2015 awarded Northrop the contract to develop and produce its newest bomber, now designated the B-21 Raider. Northrop beat out a Boeing-Lockheed Martin team for the two-pronged contract that covers the engineering, manufacturing and development phase of the program as well as the first five low-rate initial production lots.

According to the GAO decision, Boeing argued that the Air Force did not effectively measure the risk of Northrop’s bomber. The company contended that if the service had followed definitions set in the request for proposals, Northrop would not have met four out of seven unnamed technical capability subfactors. Boeing also stated that Northrop’s proposal was “inherently high risk” with regard to certain requirements in a way that should have rendered its offering unacceptable.

GAO shot down those claims, saying its review found the Air Force evaluated Northrop’s bid in a way that was “reasonable and consistent” with the RFP.

Boeing also alleged that the service overestimated the price of its own offering and relied too heavily on independent government estimates. Again, the GAO disagreed.

“We see no error in the Air Force’s rejection of supporting cost data presented in Boeing’s proposal, or its upward adjustment to Boeing’s proposed EMD costs,” it wrote.

The office noted that both Northrop’s total weighted price and total estimated price were lower than Boeing’s. Although Boeing calculated that its proposal price had been overestimated, the decision noted, even if Boeing’s proposal was adjusted by that figure, it would have not been enough to topple Northrop, which would have nabbed the contract on the basis of its lower total weighted price. Thus, GAO said Boeing could not demonstrate that the Air Force had demonstrated competitive prejudice — a situation where the company would have won the contract if not for the government mismanagement or wrongdoing.

the decision sheds light on many interesting aspects of the competition. After the companies submitted their proposals to the Air Force in 2014, the service found both offerings technically unacceptable and held eight rounds of discussions where the competitors worked through deficiencies, although the GAO noted that some risk still remained with each proposal.

Those discussions failed to resolve questions about ​both Boeing and Northrop’s cost estimates for the EMD phase of the program, which Air Force found to be overly optimistic when compared with its own independent government estimates. Even after eight rounds of talks, neither company was able to put forward a proposal that could be considered realistic with respect to the majority of the cost categories.

But while Northrop increased its own estimates, Boeing kept its own cost data at the same level, the GAO said. And, partially because Northrop offered to pay for certain expenses internally on its own dime, the company was able to keep EMD costs below Boeing’s throughout the duration of the discussion process.
How the Air Force's $55B bomber contract became an LPTA competition
Information on the bomber program is apparently a touchy subject for the Air Force, which has steadfastly refused to release the value of Northrop Grumman’s bid. The $55 billion price is based on price estimates prior to the competition.

U.S. Sen. John McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has been especially vocal with his criticism that the contract is a cost-plus contract and subject to overruns that the government will be on the hook for. He has threatened to withhold funding for the bomber.

To be fair to the Air Force, initial development of the first 21 planes is cost-plus, but once the craft moves into full production of up to 100 planes the contract switches to fixed price.

In a footnote, GAO describes how Northrop’s engineering and manufacturing development costs were significantly lower than the Boeing-Lockheed proposal because of investments Northrop had made but did not pass on to the government. What those investments were is redacted from the decision and Northrop declined to comment.

Northrop also had lower labor rates and labor escalation rates. Northrop also declined to comment on how they made their labor rates lower.

Because of Northrop’s investments and lower labor rates, the independent government estimates of costs for Northrop’s proposal was lower than the Boeing-Lockheed proposal.

This is significant because both teams were deemed to be technically acceptable.
The solicitation’s selection criteria stipulated that if the higher bid was greater than 103 percent of the lower bid than the lower bid would be deemed best value. The bid by the Boeing-Lockheed team was more than 103 percent so the Air Force picked Northrop.

The argument is that this is best value because why should the Air Force pay a higher price if both proposals were found technically acceptable?

As GAO said, Northrop’s price “created a near-insurmountable obstacle to Boeing’s proposal achieving best value.”

Saturday, July 18, 2015

PPPs: Extolling the virtues, examining the risks

I am usually skeptical of those who trumpet the virtues of PPPs. While they can certainly be a tonic for a cash strapped state or municipality, they can also be a toxic waste.  It takes a careful and sober analysis before rushing into one.

The following article, published on the Lexology website and elsewhere, offers a balanced perspective. I offer highlights, but you should read the whole piece.

P3S: managing risks and rewards by attorney Barbara A. Geisman of the firm Thompson Coburn LLP.   Interest in P3s is growing as governments search for ways to access expertise, deflect risk, speed up project completion, lower capital and operating costs, avoid public votes and increased taxes, and keep what might otherwise be counted against public debt limits “off the books.”

Successful P3s — Public-Private Partnerships — can be blessings for state and local governments searching for new ways to finance many types of critical “infrastructure”—roads, schools, prisons, and more—and control operating costs. Success or failure depends on how well each partner plans ahead and how realistic each partner can be.

In all P3s the government partner attempts to tap private sector expertise and financial resources while the private partner hopes to make a profit. Successful and unsuccessful partnerships of the past offer valuable lessons and can help both private and public partners considering P3s negotiate deals that make sense for both.

This tool is worth a hard look for any capital-strapped governmental entity in need of new infrastructure. But public officials must approach potential P3 arrangements with eyes wide open and a clear understanding of both prospective benefits and prospective risks.

Similarly, P3s can be a source of profit and accolades for private partners in a P3 venture. But private partners, too, must carefully evaluate potential benefits against a variety of risks: If a private entity accepts responsibility for long-term situations it cannot control or pledges too much of its capital and borrowing power to a single project, then the entity places its overall future at risk.

These arrangements must be carefully structured from both sides of the partnership to create the desired “win-win.” Without well-informed attention to detail and more than a modicum of foresight, a P3 can cause significant damage to both public and private reputations and balance sheets. Structuring a P3 is very challenging because P3s come in an almost unlimited variety of flavors, depending on the public entity’s goals.

Some types are familiar, like the federal low-income housing tax credit, or LIHTC. That program was intended in part to shift responsibility for providing affordable housing for the nation’s working class families from traditional “housing authorities” to the private sector. The LIHTC program shifts cost, operating, and financing risks to the private developer. It accomplishes its goal of providing affordable residential rental units by subsidizing annual debt service and operating costs with federal tax credits and limiting the rent the private developer can charge. Because this specific type of P3 has a sufficiently long history and is appropriately targeted to one particular purpose, most of the potential “bugs” have been worked out of the structure, and the program is generally considered a success.

At the other end of the spectrum, some P3s are essentially “one offs” — that is, there is no universally accepted and time-tested model for the contract arrangement. Those P3s present greater uncertainties and risks for public and private partners alike.

The risk that both sides may lose in a P3 deal can increase if the deal is “too good” for either side. An important key to successful P3s is responsible management of risks and benefits—that is, an allocation that is fair to both parties.

In a P3 whose structure is relatively “simple” — for example, the public sector seeks to shift only construction cost and possibly operating cost risk to the private sector — associated public sector risks can be mitigated to a significant extent by careful up front due diligence and by incorporating protections like net worth maintenance requirements or letters of credit into the construction and operating documents. Associated private sector risks can be mitigated by including clear parameters for design and construction outcomes, sharing arrangements for mitigation of unforeseen circumstances, and fair, carefully drafted cost-escalation provisions in the agreements. In long-term arrangements, both partners must recognize that the future is uncertain and that innovation or public policy changes may impact the validity of demand or cost projections.

In P3s that rely on the private sector to generate all of the income required to pay project-related debt, due diligence becomes much more complex.

Equally important, both private and governmental entities moving down the path toward a P3 partnership must have the courage to pull off the road when a collision of interests is imminent. That can be very hard when a company or a government has invested significant amounts of time and money in documenting a deal that has been essentially “promised” to shareholders or constituents. Deal momentum snowballs in the rush to schedule the groundbreaking, fill a gaping budget hole, or announce a big contract to shareholders and deal documentation can easily pick up unintentional debris in the dash to the finish line. If obstacles to a successful relationship seem insurmountable or the deal presents risks that have not or cannot be reasonably allocated or shared in a manner that adequately protects each party’s interests, it may be time to put on the brakes regardless of how near the finish line may seem.

Government officials and private decision-makers must carefully consider the long-term public policy implications of the deal under consideration. Will it unacceptably limit the government’s ability to monitor and refine long-term strategies to address changing needs? If an agreement prohibits the development of new roads in an area served by a P3 toll road, citizens may be forced to endure unacceptable traffic congestion for the term of an agreement which may last many decades. If an agreement prohibits expansion of a region’s mass transit system to preserve demand for a toll road, that region’s sustainability efforts may be intolerably hampered—and the only remedy may be for the public sector to “buy back” the project at significant cost and re-assume the operating and maintenance burden when the public sector’s primary interest in the agreement in the first place was to shed that burden. If an agreement requires a private company to operate and pay for operating a facility when that private entity cannot control the market for the facility’s “outputs,” the company’s assets can be decimated even to the point of bankruptcy.

The operating pro forma must make sense for each party and the P3 agreement must allow for changes in that pro forma as new situations develop. New technologies are coming on the market every day and public polices change over time. Such issues can be addressed by reasonable partners: for example, instead of inking a 75-year “all or nothing” term, the partners can agree to 5-year or 10-year agreement increments where each partner may decline to renew the agreement at the end of the incremental term but once the agreement is renewed neither can terminate during the renewal period. That arrangement strikes a balance between predictability and inability to foresee what tomorrow will bring: either party can completely bow out when the agreement comes up for renewal but, if the working relationship has been a good one, it is more likely that each party will view the renewal as an opportunity to tweak the agreement and work out bugs.

Each partner must understand, empathize with, and fairly respond to the legitimate concerns of its counterpart. Risk allocation imbalance is dangerous for both sides. If the government unreasonably over-allocates risk to the private sector partner, either no one will respond to the request for proposals or those who do respond will be more likely to fail because they have little experience in evaluating and quantifying P3 types of risks. If the private partner loads too much risk on the public partner, the government will be criticized by its constituents. Appropriately balanced risk is the hallmark of a win-win deal.

A corollary here is that the private sector partner must always remember that all of the terms of a P3 deal are [-- or should be, see here and here --] public. Virtually all governments are subject to some type of “Sunshine law” that enables reporters and others to access virtually all of the final documents involved in any deal. Each P3 deal must withstand public scrutiny — if a big or even medium-sized deal cannot pass a “smell test,” it is likely that some reporter will discover the deal’s flaws by poring through the public record.

Each party should think hard before it agrees to overt or “disguised” non-compete provisions. For example, a trash-to-energy arrangement may require the public sector to deliver a minimum volume of trash each month to a privately owned incinerator at a set price for a multi-decade term. Prospectively, that may look like a reasonable private sector “ask” but, in hindsight, such a provision could prevent the government from competing with the private incinerator by diverting part of its waste stream to a recycling facility.

Both parties must choose their partners carefully. A government with an unstable political climate will be a bad partner for an established private company because political battles can lead to capricious reconsideration of decisions and generate bad publicity for the company as political opponents seek to discredit each other. A government with an unfriendly business climate may, wittingly or unwittingly, hamper the project’s success. Careful due diligence on both sides of the partnership is essential for P3 success: mistakes are inevitable and each partner must be able to responsibly and successfully shoulder its negotiated share of responsibility for those mistakes.

Both parties must also look carefully at the quality of the public sector “assets” upon which the deal is predicated. Is there a market for the asset or service? Is that market likely to grow or decline? Will the government partner support or thwart private efforts to sustain and grow the market? Can and will the private partner invest sufficiently in the asset to fulfill the government partner’s goals? What happens if the market assessment was “off”?

Each party should approach untested technologies with a large grain of salt. P3s should not be viewed by either party as opportunities to experiment: risks associated with experiments are difficult if not impossible to allocate and a failed experiment will inevitably generate bad press.

Beware of projects that attempt to address too many goals by placing unrealistic burdens on the private partner. If a project is overburdened with requirements that do not relate directly to the core purpose of the project—e.g., excessive minority participation, local training, and workforce requirements—the cost of the project will escalate.

While local government charters and other organizational documents are often flexible as to the types of contracts permitted, a local P3 will almost certainly require passage of a specific law that authorizes the particular P3 agreement. On the federal and state levels, special legislation empowering agencies to enter into P3 types of arrangements is almost always required, although many states and the federal government have recently enacted legislation authorizing some types of P3s.

Each party must be willing to invest in good professional help in structuring the P3 agreement—and must be willing to pay for that help, even if it ultimately decides to crater the prospective deal. Private parties unused to dealing with prevailing wage, public bidding, and local benefit concerns may find themselves saddled with unanticipated costs and negative media coverage. Public parties unused to negotiating with sophisticated businesspeople may lose on key points if they cannot benefit from equally sophisticated help.


Wednesday, February 18, 2015

Standing at the end of the line is without prejudice

Well it's all right, even if they say you're wrong
Well it's all right, sometimes you gotta be strong
Well it's all right, As long as you got somewhere to lay
Well it's all right, everyday is Judgment Day

Well it's all right, riding around in the breeze
Well it's all right, if you live the life you please
Well it's all right, even if the sun don't shine
Well it's all right, we're going to the end of the line



In this federal US Claims Court case, the protestor thought it was all right being at the end of the line. It wasn't. It was not in sufficient competitive position to win, so was not "interested" in the solicitation.

There are a lot of instructive statements in this case covering a variety of subjects, and I've mentioned many of them, but without much context or elaboration. Read the whole case at the link, for context, accuracy and completeness; and to see where I'm paraphrasing and if correctly.


UNIVERSAL MARINE CO., K.S.C., v U.S., United States Court of Federal Claims No. 14-1115 C, February 10, 2015.
In March 2009, the United States Army (“the Army”) awarded Contract W52P1J-09-D-0025 to Universal Marine Co., K.S.C. (“Universal Marine”) for the operation of a container yard in Kuwait that repairs and refurbishes commercial shipping containers. On April 24, 2014, the Army solicited Request for Proposals No. W52P1J-14-R-0062 (the “RFP”) for the same services as the March 2009 Contract. The incumbent did not get up.

To select an awardee, the Army used a lowest price technically acceptable (“LPTA”) source selection process that evaluated three factors: Technical; Past Performance; and Price. The technical factors were rated on an "pass/fail" or "acceptable/non-acceptable" basis. In the event an Offeror had no recent, relevant past performance, a rating of Acceptable was assigned. Thus, an offeror must clear three successive hurdles to be awarded the contract: First, an offeror must obtain an “Acceptable” rating in Technical Capability and an “Acceptable” rating in Past Performance, and then must propose the lowest price.

In footnote 4, the Court explained that the LPTA procurement method was one form of "best value", but that price/value “[t]radeoffs are not permitted”, thus an LPTA proposal is per se the best value if it meets the selection criteria and proposes the lowest price.

In incumbent, Universal Marine, had the highest price amongst 4 final bidders, all of whom were evaluated to be "acceptable" on technical and past performance factors.

The Government argued that Universal Marine lacks standing, because it finished fourth and has not challenged the offerors who finished second and third. Thus, even if the low bidder's (KGL’s) award were disqualified, Universal Marine still “cannot show that it had a substantial chance of being awarded the contract when it proposed the highest price.” Universal Marine has alleged no error that would disqualify the second or third highest proposals, and therefore lacks standing, because it “has no substantial chance of being awarded the contract.”

Moreover, Universal Marine “cannot show that it was prejudiced by a significant error in the procurement process.” To show prejudice, a protestor must establish “that there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for th[e] error.” Universal Marine cannot show a substantial chance of receiving the award and consequently cannot demonstrate prejudice.

Universal Marine contends that “the issue is not whether an [o]fferor is ‘next in line,’ but whether the [o]fferor has a reasonable expectation to receive an award.” It claims, being “in line” for an award means “being able to meet the requirements such that the Plaintiff is an eligible bidder and potential awardee on the contract.”

Finally, Universal Marine argues that the Army and KGL “would like to make the calculus of standing and interest party overly simplified.” Determining standing, it claims, requires examining the merits of the protest, not just a “blind reliance on the stacking and arraying of the ‘acceptable’ proposals.” Universal Marine claims it is not required to “dissect each proposal in the array that is above it, especially if it demonstrates a systemic flaw in the evaluation process[.]”

As a threshold matter, a plaintiff contesting the award of a federal contract must establish that it is an “interested party” to have standing.

A two-part test is applied to determine whether a protestor is an “interested party.” The protestor must show that: “(1) it was an actual or prospective bidder or offeror, and (2) it had a direct economic interest in the procurement or proposed procurement.” A third test has added that a protestor must show the alleged errors in the procurement were prejudicial. (“It is basic that because the question of prejudice goes directly to the question of standing, the prejudice issue must be reached before addressing the merits.”)

A party demonstrates prejudice when “it can show that but for the error, it would have had a substantial chance of securing the contract.” Importantly, a proper standing inquiry must not conflate the requirement of “direct economic interest” with prejudicial error. ([E]xamining economic interest but excluding prejudicial error from the standing inquiry “would create a rule that, to an unsuccessful but economically interested offeror in a bid protest, any error is harmful”).

In this case, Universal Marine submitted a proposal in response to the RFP, and, as an actual bidder, it satisfies the first element of the “interested party” test. But, Universal Marine did not satisfy the second element, i.e., that it “had a direct economic interest in the procurement.” Universal Marine’s proposed price was the highest of the four proposals. Thus, to have standing, it would have to challenge the bona fides of each of the other three offeror’s eligibility or the solicitation as a whole. But it did not. Universal Marine’s challenges concern only the awardee -- KGL. Based on the four challenges, even if the court were to set aside the award to KGL, the award would go to the second-place offeror. Without any challenge to the intervening offerors, Universal Marine cannot prevail.

As for Universal Marine’s reliance on Hyperion, Inc. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 541 (2014), it is misplaced, even though some facts are similar to this case. Hyperion filed a post-award protest as the highest-priced of four “Acceptable” offerors in an LPTA solicitation. However, Hyperion “contend[ed] that all three [other] offerors failed to meet [certain provisions] and failed to include required [provisions].” Hyperion went on to allege particular defects in each of the other three proposals. “In Hyperion’s view, it was the only technically acceptable offeror and should have received the award.” This case, however, is distinguishable. Here, four out of Universal Marine’s five arguments are specific to KGL, and the problem identified with the solicitation was waived as untimely. Thus, even though “proving prejudice for purposes of standing merely requires ‘allegational prejudice,’” Universal Marine has not alleged facts that, if true, would create a “substantial chance” that it would be awarded the contract.

For these reasons, the court has determined that Universal Marine lacks standing to seek an adjudication of this bid protest.

Friday, January 30, 2015

Reverse all auctions, full steam ahead

There is one main theme here, and a case study that gave rise to it. The main theme is the light shown on the so-called "reverse auction" fad. 

The business about the FedBid business is just to add a bit of salacious spice to the otherwise drab story line. Most procurement story lines are drab. But that doesn't diminish their importance, as this blawg hopes to point out.

First, the juicy bits:

Air Force moves to debar FedBid
On Jan. 26, the Air Force suspended and moved to debar FedBid from providing reverse auctions for federal agencies contracts, on the grounds that there was "adequate evidence" of a "lack of business honesty or integrity" at the company.

Most recently, the company split its federal auction and commercial operations into separate companies. FedBid founder and former chief executive Ali Saadat is now head of the private sector business, but remains chairman of the FedBid board, while Jordan was named CEO of the federal side.

Saadat was also suspended by the Air Force while the service considers whether to debar the company.

In the immediate wake of the report, the company's board of directors appointed a special committee to determine any response or actions the company should take related to the report. That committee retained the law firm Arnold & Porter as outside counsel to conduct an independent review of company employees' actions. That review is said to have found "no legal wrongdoing by FedBid or its employees," though it did raise some concerns about how the company's internal culture dealt with third-party relationships.
So far, this is not that juicy. Just how juicy is a "cultural" problem, anyway? Blaming the culture means no one is at fault. Can't convict a culture, can we?

So, read on.

The real dirt:

FedBid barred from new government contracts after watchdog report
The federal government has barred a fast-growing Northern Virginia contractor with deep ties to the Washington establishment from winning new work because of “conduct indicating a lack of business honesty or integrity.”

Last year, the company was the subject of an investigation by the Veterans Affairs inspector general, which found that an agency contracting official helped steer a contract to the company. When a more senior VA official became concerned about the contract and put a hold on it, FedBid mounted an aggressive campaign to have the moratorium overturned, the IG found. It concluded that FedBid executives were part of an effort to discredit the VA official who put the hold on the contract and to “unduly influence VA decision makers.”

“Need to assassinate his character and discredit him,” read an e-mail from a top executive in 2012, according to the IG. The firm also vowed to “unleash the hounds” and “take off the gloves” in its “storm the castle” campaign to win back the business.
The theme -- Reverse Auctions:

Continuing with the WaPo story immediately above:
FedBid has built a thriving business over the past decade helping the government hold what are known as reverse auctions. Through FedBid Web sites, federal contracting officials post solicitations for items such as office supplies, computer equipment or furniture. Companies submit bids for the work and are told through the site whether they are the lowest bidder. If they aren’t the lowest bidder, they can try again with a reduced price, which ultimately should save taxpayer money.

The government’s reliance on reverse auctions has recently exploded, with FedBid leading the way. The company said that from 2007 to last year, the federal government made 131,623 awards through FedBid, totaling $8.2 billion, which represented nearly $1 billion in savings. In 2013 alone, FedBid said, $1.8 billion in government contracts were awarded through its system.
VA rips FedBid, questions value of reverse auctions
FedBid's claims of sizable savings generated by the reverse auctions the firm provides for federal contractors are overblown and misleading, according to the Department of Veterans Affairs' Office of Inspector General. Furthermore, Maureen Regan, counselor to VA's IG, told FCW that reverse auctions can unduly complicate the contracting process and limit competition by squeezing out potential vendors.

What Regan told FCW echoed a second IG report that says reverse auctions can inadvertently derail federal efforts to properly record contract documentation.

More significant, however, was the assertion by the OIG that the main purpose of reverse auctions -- to save money -- can be negated by multiple factors, including FedBid's fees and the Industrial Funding Fee customers paid to cover the General Services Administration's operation of the Federal Supply Schedules program.

Furthermore, the formula that reverse auction providers use to calculate savings -- subtracting the final award price from the "independent government cost estimate" -- was not reliable, the OIG argued, in part because of frequent mismatches between that independent estimate (which is required by VA policy) and the target price set by agency contracting officers. In addition, contract prices represent funds obligated at the time a contract was awarded, but many purchases were not fully funded at that time, resulting in inflation of the reported savings.

"We are enormously proud of the role that FedBid is playing, and will continue to play, in facilitating millions in cost savings for U.S. taxpayers," a FedBid spokesperson said in an emailed statement -- noting that "last year alone," the FedBid marketplace "enabled an estimated $160 million in savings for the government and taxpayers."

Regan, however, asserted that reverse auctions contain other costs, including GSA's Industrial Funding Fee, that might not be readily apparent to agencies.

The federal contracting schedules offer baseline pricing that agencies can use to negotiate lower costs, she said, adding that "it's not uncommon to get price reductions on schedule items," often by conducting a limited competition among schedule vendors. Regan said the OIG has had complaints from vendors, including a substantial number from health care supply companies, that FedBid's reverse auctions set up a "pay-to-play" system that is cost-prohibitive.

At the same time, other reverse auction vehicles might be getting short shrift. Regan said GSA offers services that comply with federal contract documentation requirements and include items on federal schedules.

Regan recommends that agencies "look at contracts and how people are buying things" before committing to the approach. "Reverse auctions were something of a fad in the 1990s," she said. "Everyone decided at the time they weren't really worth it."
Review of the Veterans Health Administration’s Use of Reverse Auction Acquisitions (RAs)
We found that priority sources such as the FSS (Federal Supply Schedule) are not utilized as required by VA policy and VHA’s SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) for all RAs.  Further, when RAs are used for FS S purchases, VHA is paying the Industrial Funding Fee (IFF) in addition to the FedBid RA fee when FedBid’s RA fee is not waived by FedBid. 
We found instances where the CO would identify an FSS source for the required products; however the Invitation for Bid (IFB) would subsequently be issued for open market bids. These situations occurred without any documentation in the contract file to justify the use of other than priority sources. In addition, if the awardee is an FSS vendor, these sales may be considered non-FSS sales which deprive the Government of the IFF.

We found that the reported claimed savings, computed by subtracting the final award price from the target price, was not reliable in determining the success of using RAs for several reasons. 
First, although the target price set by the CO should be equal to the Independent Government Estimate (IGE) as stated in VA policy and the implementing VHA SOP, we found that the target price was not always equal to the IGE, and that the basis for the target price was often not documented within the contract file.

Second, we found that the award price represented funds obligated at award and that many buys were not fully funded at the time of award, thereby inflating the reported savings. Lastly, we found that the target price could be changed by the CO during an active RA via a reposting of the IFB. Such changes were not always documented and justified within the eCMS contract file.

We also determined that COs run the risk of acquiring gray market items through RAs, because sellers are only required to self-certify that they are authorized distributors of the procured items. We found VHA was procuring items from unauthorized distributors through the use of RAs.

Sunday, January 11, 2015

Best buy based on price or value?

When you are standing in that long isle looking at all the shampoos available to you on the five shelves of product (as I experienced this last weekend), what moves you to choose one of them? (In my case, I just moved on, overwhelmed, deferring to whatever my wife decides to buy.)

Presumably, if you are a rational, frugal, person, you would choose the one that you needed, at the lowest cost. That requires filtering all the brand and other marketing temptations, of course, and knowing if you have oily hair, itchy scalp, or other conditions you are trying to address (adding color, conditioning, or ego boosting marketing imagery). Thus, you really do need to know what you need if you are going to be a smart shopper, before you go to the store.

But when your requirements are novel, either because you are going where no man has gone before, or whether the vehicle by which you want to get there is in the flux of major technological changes, you need to do more homework, have an open mind about what you do in fact need, and be prepared to pay more than one particular product costs in order to get what you think will better suit your anticipated but unarticulated circumstances.

That is the main reason for a variety of government contracting procurement methods: one size does not fit all.

But, it is important to understand why one method is superior to another, and, critically, to understand the role price pays in each different method. The article below is about what the US federal contractors call the low-price/technically acceptable source selection technique, known as LP/TA. Those of us more closely aligned to the ABA Model Procurement Code refer to it as the "multi-step" bid process. 

Don't be confused by the terminology. Under an Invitation for Bid and under the LP/TA price is the ultimate determiner for award: low price wins. The difference is that in the plain vanilla IFB, the final specifications are in the bid package (subject to minor changes along the way), whereas under the multi-step bid process, the government first solicits "unpriced technical offers" and the means is established whereby both the technical offers and specifications can be fine-tuned (within the scope of the original solicitation) before a call for final prices.

This is why it is absolutely essential in every method of source selection, especially low-price bids, to carefully identify the absolute minimal needs requirements and clearly communicate that to vendors by translating that into specifications that can be understood by the lowest common denominator of experienced reader -- the judge.

The low price scheme differs from the negotiated contract/"best value" procurement method, where low price is not determinative, with price being only one of several factors in determination of award. To the extent that the non-price factors are more subjective than objective, fairness and accountability for award determinations are more problematic than with low-price bids.

The risk factor must also be considered in making the choice of procurement method. Under the low-price method, the government bears the risk of identifying its need and translating that into specifications. Under the "best value" method, the government bears the risk of paying too much for something it doesn't understand, ending up with something it may not need. 

(It's having that kind of risk that led me to walk out of the store and "let" my wife select the shampoo.)

With that backgound, read the following articles in point and counter-point; don't just take my rendition of it, though -- read the articles for stuff I leave out, rearrange and paraphrase, etc.

Finding a Bargain for Government Buyers Shouldn’t Be a Crime, by J. David Cox J. David Cox Sr. is national president of the American Federation of Government Employees.
Contractors, who bill taxpayers a whopping $500 billion annually for goods and services, hope to use the “acquisition reform” moniker to minimize the importance of cost-efficiency in the federal acquisition process.

The No. 1 objective of contractors is to demonize the low-price/technically acceptable source selection technique, known as LP/TA, so that its use is greatly limited if not proscribed.

Contractors would prefer that DOD use a more expensive process called “best value,” which allows them to charge more for features that warfighters usually don’t need. A contractor who believes DOD should be asking for more can suggest additional features to the contracting officer, who can then include them in a new or revised solicitation, if necessary, so the most cost-efficient qualified contractor can then be identified.

The Government Accountability Office reports that DOD is using LP/TA more frequently to generate savings. GAO, however, dismisses contractor allegations that such savings come at the expense of quality: “Best value processes continued to underlie the vast majority of DOD’s new, competitively awarded contracts. DOD has increased its use of the LP/TA process in recent years for higher value contracts, and its decision-making regarding which source selection process to use did not appear to be ill-advised.”

Solicitous lawmakers profess fear that LP/TA’s emphasis on costs will erode contractor confidence and undermine the industrial base. Think tanks produce paid-to-order research that purports to demonstrate a link between LP/TA and poor goods and services. Helpful trade publications breathlessly report every contractor complaint about LP/TA, however unfounded. The goal of this public relations campaign is to enact prohibitions on the use of LP/TA or to at least make the technique so controversial that acquisition personnel will use the best-value technique instead.

There is a consensus in the so-called “acquisition reform” debate that the Pentagon needs to issue better and more detailed solicitations, which is another argument for preserving the LP/TA technique because it requires discipline and knowledge to write quality specifications and/or statements of work. In contrast, “best value” is often used as a crutch by agencies to allow contractors to tell DOD what to buy.

The key to successful use of LP/TA is for contracting officers to specify the critical acceptability criteria, which can often be easily accomplished with military equipment and services. Best value may be the appropriate technique when DOD doesn’t know precisely what it is seeking to purchase, or when the work is inherently difficult to describe. Acquisition personnel represented by the American Federation of Government Employees believe that the LP/TA technique provides the necessary level of performance at a lower cost to the government.
Acquisition 101: When a Bargain Isn’t a Bargain by Eric S. Crusius, a partner with Fed Nexus Law, who focuses on government contracts, cybersecurity, employment law and complex litigation.
LPTA certainly has its admirers, but even the most ardent supporters in the contracting community recognize its severe limitations. Nevertheless, J. David Cox, national president of the American Federation of Government Employees, offered a full-throated endorsement of LPTA in a recent column in Government Executive. Mr. Cox stated the reasons why LPTA is preferred to the “best-value premium” approach to acquisition.

LPTA is simply a road leading to mediocrity.

Here are several reasons he is wrong:

“Best-value premium” is a misnomer because these procurements still allow agencies to choose the lowest cost option. With any best-value procurement, the agency always has the discretion to choose the lowest bid unless something compelling exists that is worth a premium. This approach allows agencies the flexibility to pick the option that best suits their needs.

LPTA is often used where it should not be used. “Lowest price/technically acceptable” can be an appropriate mechanism in highly regulated or commoditized industries, where there is little differentiation between minimally acceptable products [such as the vacuum cleaners he mentions in the article??]. The approach, however, is popping up in situations where marginal product quality is a differentiator (such as medical products used to care for soldiers) and in the outcome-based services industry. A long dissertation is not necessary to explain why that approach is highly problematic. Would you like it if your children’s school hired its teachers on an LPTA basis?

LPTA often ends up costing more. This contracting method frequently attracts contractors who are unable to fulfill the requirements or complete the work without great assistance from the government customer. (This can be the case especially when past performance is not evaluated.) Eventually, drives up costs. It has held true through time with products that are minimally acceptable—the example of the vacuum cleaner is illustrative. In addition, this contracting method is driving responsible contractors away from doing business with the federal government, resulting in less competition. In fact, the number of small businesses participating in the federal marketplace has declined over the past few years.

There are also social reasons to shy away from using LPTA, such as lower wages and benefits for contractor employees and the exclusion of small businesses from government contracting, all of which drives down the overall economy.

While LPTA certainly has its place in federal contracting, that place is a small defined box with highly commoditized requirements. Anything larger robs agencies of much needed discretion, drives valuable contractors away from the federal marketplace, and enriches lawyers like me with more potential clients seeking assistance in filing bid protests.