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Showing posts with label Standing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Standing. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 3, 2018

Protest must be timely and protestor must show prejudice, and a footnote about issue of contract dispute vs solicitation dispute

The following is from a protest decision of the GAO. This protest involved two protests from two protestors in the same solicitation. One protest illustrates by example when a protest is not "timely". The other illustrates a protestor's lack of prejudice, and thereby standing to protest.

Bear in mind my proclivity to re-work the original articles, leave out critical citations, paraphrase and so on, so read the original decision at the link if you need to rely on it.

Matter of: AeroSage, LLC; SageCare, Inc., File: B-415607; B-415607.2; B-415607.3, January 3, 2018 AeroSage, LLC, and SageCare, Inc., protest the award of a contract to Tayrona Oil, Inc., issued by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), for 5,000 gallons of fuel to the Milwaukee Veterans Administration Medical Center (MVAMC).

The protesters primarily allege that DLA unreasonably modified the purchase request's delivery schedule without issuing an amendment. We dismiss SageCare's protest and deny AeroSage's protest.

MVAMC placed a purchase request with DLA for 5,000 gallons of fuel for delivery. The request (1) represented that the procurement was being conducted as a small business set-aside, (2) confirmed that delivery was for 5,000 gallons of fuel on Friday, October 13, (3) requested quotations by no later than 11:30 a.m. on Thursday, October 12, and (4) provided that award would be made on a lowest-priced, technically-acceptable basis. DLA timely received quotations from the three firms that it had solicited, Tayrona, AeroSage, and SageCare. Tayrona submitted the lowest-priced quotation of $2.3487 per gallon.

The contracting specialist represents that he notified Tayrona via telephone on the morning of October 12 that its quotation was selected for award. Shortly after contacting the awardee, however, the contracting specialist represents that he was contacted via telephone by an official with the Department of Veterans Affairs indicating that the delivery had to be rescheduled for Tuesday, October 17. The contracting specialist contacted Tayrona via telephone to confirm whether the company would agree to the revised delivery schedule at the same awarded price, and the awardee confirmed.

Following that telephone conversation, the contracting specialist then emailed Tayrona to confirm that DLA was going to award the order to Tayrona and indicated that the delivery date was now Tuesday, October 17. The contracting specialist then emailed AeroSage and SageCare respectively to indicate that neither firm submitted the lowest-priced, technically acceptable quotation. Those emails also indicated that the delivery date was now Tuesday, October 17.

AeroSage's protest:

Following receipt of the notice, AeroSage filed an agency-level protest with DLA on October 12. The primary protest allegation raised by AeroSage was that [t]he contracting officer solicited the RFQ for requirement delivery for Oct[ober] 13, 2017, but awarded the purchase order for delivery four days later, October 17, 2017 thus prejudicing the protester by changing the date, and thereby creating pricing uncertainty on the new delivery date. On Monday, October 23, AeroSage filed the instant protest with our Office.

AeroSage's protest decision:

AeroSage argues that the agency unreasonably changed the solicitation's delivery schedule without amending the solicitation and allowing all offerors to compete against the new schedule. The protester contends that "[a] four day change in a solicitation time can both dramatically impact price/availability and the risks quoters are able to accept to provide best prices to [the] government." "AeroSage was prejudiced in this solicitation with a significant change in the solicitation prior to award."

We have generally recognized that when the government changes its requirements prior to award, it must notify all offerors of the changed requirements and to afford them an opportunity to respond to the revised requirements. Moreover, a contract's period of performance is generally considered to be a material solicitation requirement.

Our Office will not sustain a protest, however, unless the protester demonstrates a reasonable possibility of prejudice, that is, unless the protester demonstrates that, but for the agency's actions, it would have had a substantial chance of receiving the award. Here, the protester has offered no evidence that it was in fact prejudiced by the agency's failure to amend the delivery schedule by four days through the issuance of an amendment. The protester has not asserted that, let alone substantiated how, it would have reduced its unit pricing by an amount that would have overcome the awardee's price advantage. AeroSage's unsupported speculation that the change in delivery schedule could have impacted its proposed price is insufficient to establish competitive prejudice.

There is another teachable moment in footnote 6: The Government argued that the change in delivery schedule was a matter of contract administration, and thus not a proper subject for a protest dispute. As discussed above, however, the change occurred after proposals were submitted and evaluated, but before the contract award was formally made on October 13. Therefore, we do not find that the schedule change can reasonably be considered as a matter of contract administration, and therefore would be proper subject matter for a protest, if only the protestor had standing.

AeroSage's protest is denied.

SageCare's protest:

On November 22, SageCare filed a request to intervene in AeroSage's protest. On the same day, our Office denied the request to intervene on the basis that SageCare was a disappointed offeror, not the awardee of the protested contract.[3] We further explained that "[t]o the extent that SageCare, a disappointed offeror, believes that there were errors in the procurement, SageCare must file its own protest subject to our Bid Protest Regulations." SageCare subsequently filed its protest on November 24.

DLA moved to dismiss SageCare's November 24 protest as untimely because it was filed more than 10 days after the protester's owner and president had actual knowledge that SageCare had not been selected for award and of the change to the delivery schedule. Our Bid Protest Regulations contain strict rules for the timely submission of protests. Under these rules, a protest based on other than alleged improprieties in a solicitation must be filed no later than 10 calendar days after the protester knew, or should have known, of the basis for protest, whichever is earlier.

SageCare's protest decision:

SageCare seems to measure the timeliness of its protest from when SageCare's president received the awardee's price information through the agency report submitted in response to AeroSage's protest. DLA's October 12 notice to SageCare's president, however, clearly indicated that the protester's quotation was not the lowest-priced, technically-acceptable quotation, and that delivery was moved to Tuesday, October 17. Thus, the protester was aware of the material facts relevant to its asserted protest ground related to the modification of the delivery schedule as of October 12. Its November 24 protest, filed more than 40 days later, is untimely, and therefore the protest is dismissed.

SageCare's protest is dismissed.

Friday, March 6, 2015

There's prejudice, and then there's prejudice

A few posts back, I reported on a Federal Court of Claims case, Universal Marine Co., K.S.C., v U.S, that held a protestor lacked standing if it could not support a claim of economic interest in a solicitation if it did not provide at least some facts alleging injury to itself from the mishandling of a solicitation, or as it is known, "prejudice". 

As the Court in that case concluded, "even though “proving prejudice for purposes of standing merely requires ‘allegational prejudice,’” Universal Marine has not alleged facts that, if true, would create a “substantial chance” that it would be awarded the contract."

Lawyers Alex D. Tomaszczuk and Alexander B. Ginsberg, from the firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, have expanded on the lessons from Universal Marine, in an article on the Lexology.com website, which I think you will find edifying. 

The lesson added is this: It's one thing to claim prejudice, and another to prove it.

As they put it:
It is important to note that the “allegational prejudice” relevant in Universal Marine is distinct from, but often confused with, a second variety of prejudice necessary for a protester ultimately to prevail on the merits of its protest. This second variety of prejudice—often referred to as “APA [Administrative Procedure Act] prejudice”—requires a protester to demonstrate that, but for any errors it identifies during the protest, it had a “substantial chance” of receiving the award. See Linc Govt. Servs., LLC v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 672, 695-96 (2010). (“In order to prevail in a bid protest, however, a plaintiff must satisfy a second type of prejudice requirement, one that has caused a good deal of confusion because it is often mistaken for its standing doctrinal fraternal twin. ...

The need for this second showing of prejudice is captured in section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act. ... In particular, the APA instructs that ‘due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error’ when determining whether to set aside any unlawful agency decision.”) Thus, the first variety of prejudice — that discussed in Universal Marine — relates to the protest as alleged, while the second variety of prejudice examines the effect of errors actually demonstrated on the merits. See USfalcon, Inc. v. United States, 92 Fed Cl. 436, 450 (2010). (“Since the prejudice determination for purposes of standing necessarily occurs before the merits of a protest are reached, the Court must accept the well-pled allegations of agency error to be true. ... Normally, if the protester's case rests on just one allegedly irrational action, or just one purported violation of a law or regulation, the finding of prejudice in the standing context will be replicated on the merits, once the asserted error is confirmed. But a different outcome is possible if more than one ground is raised, as multiple errors might cumulatively establish prejudice, but not a smaller combination of them.”)

Thus, a protester ultimately must show both types of prejudice for its protest to succeed. The Court, however, will never reach consideration of “APA prejudice” if the protester fails to allege—as Universal Marine failed to allege—that it is an interested party.

Wednesday, February 18, 2015

Prospecting for "interested party" status to sustain a protest

The two most recent posts prior to this one dealt with, in the earlier case, whether an actual bidder was an "interested party" such as to allow a protest, and the more recent post dealt with the question whether changes in contract requirements might require a new solicitation. This case deals both with standing as an "interested party" and changes in a contract requiring a new solicitation, in a twist on both topics: who is a "prospective" bidder or offeror.

The first case presented, deals with the usual situation of a protest of a solicitation in which there is no allegation of a change requiring a new solicitation, by an alleged "prospective" bidder, and concludes with one statement describing, in somewhat categorical language, that the timing of the protest determines whether a protestor is an "interested party" as a "prospective" bidder.

The second case presented deals with the case of a protest by an alleged "prospective" offeror which alleged changes in the contract that require a new solicitation. This protest was brought clearly outside the bounds of who is "prospective" as required by the first case, but the protest was allowed and the protestor was found have "interested party" status. It, in effect, articulates an exception to the usuall rule.

As usual, don't rely on the cases as presented here; read the original at the link.

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. US, 878 F. 2d 362 - Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit 1989
Believing that AT & T's proposal failed to conform with material, mandatory requirements of the solicitation, and that the GSA, after awarding that contract to AT & T, impermissibly waived mandatory contract requirements rather than resolicit the contract, MCI sought to challenge the award of the contract by bringing a protest before the GSA board. MCI did not participate in the bidding process.

The board is empowered to hear such protests upon request of "an interested party." [T]he term "interested party" means, with respect to a contract or proposed contract described in subparagraph (A), an actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.

MCI claimed that, although it was not an "actual offeror or bidder" with respect to the original solicitation, it is a "prospective bidder or offeror" in the event of a resolicitation, and that its economic interest is directly affected by the award to AT & T.

Accordingly, to establish that it is an interested party, MCI must convince us that it is a prospective bidder or offeror, under a correct legal interpretation of that term. This case, then, poses the question whether a would-be protestor wishing to bring about a resolicitation on which it says it intends to bid has the necessary status, even though it failed to either bid in response to the original solicitation or to protest before the close of the proposal period for the original solicitation.

The language of section 759(f)(9)(B) plainly establishes, by use of the word "prospective," that, in order to be eligible to protest, one who has not actually submitted an offer must be expecting to submit an offer prior to the closing date of the solicitation. After the date for submission of proposals has passed, however, the would-be protestor can no longer realistically expect to submit a bid on the proposed contract, and, therefore, cannot achieve prospective bidderhood [yes, bidderhood; a new one on me] with regard to the original solicitation.

Since the opportunity to qualify either as an actual or a prospective bidder ends when the proposal period ends, MCI's stated intention to submit a proposal in response to any resolicitation, and its efforts to secure resolicitation by filing a protest, can do nothing to create the necessary interested party status. Accordingly, no matter how well founded MCI's charges that the GSA waived
mandatory contract requirements and that a resolicitation should occur, MCI's argument that it is an interested party must be rejected.
Matter of: Poly-Pacific Technologies, Inc., B-296029, June 1, 2005
Poly-Pacific Technologies, Inc. protests the modification of contract. Poly-Pacific argues that the agency improperly relaxed the performance requirements in the contract beyond what was reasonably contemplated by the underlying solicitation.

The original solicitation sought proposals that required offerors to both lease plastic media and recycle the resulting SBM in compliance with regulations, and offerors were thus required to propose technical solutions and pricing for both the lease and recycling components of the work. Due to changes in EPA rules regarding the recycling of the plastic media, after work had begun on the awarded contract, the contract was modified to drop that requirement.

Poly-Pacific did not submit a proposal in response to the RFP, as it was not then on the list of qualified providers authorized to lease the plastic media, although it did become an authorized provider subsequently, and before the complained-of contract modifications.

Poly-Pacific argues that the modification of UST’s contract improperly relaxed the performance requirements, thereby changing the scope of work anticipated by the RFP and resulting in an improper sole-source contract of the modified work.

Once a contract is awarded, however, our Office will generally not review modifications to that contract, because such matters are related to contract administration and are beyond the scope of our bid protest function. An exception to this rule arises where a protest alleges that a contract modification changes the work from the scope of the original contract, since the work covered by the modification would otherwise be subject to the statutory requirements for competition absent a valid determination that the work is appropriate for procurement on a sole-source basis. [I usually refer to this exception as the "relation back rule", because it relates back to the essence of the solicitation, allowing a protest of the solicitation, and taking it out of the contract dispute processes (which do not allow a third party to protest).]

Although challenges to the relaxation of contract requirements are less common than challenges to contract modifications that enlarge a contract’s scope of work, our Office recognizes that both fall within this exception, and we will consider whether modifications of performance requirements result in work that should be subject to competition.

In assessing whether a contract modification is outside the scope of the original agreement, we examine whether the original nature or purpose of the contract is so substantially changed by the modification that the original and modified contracts are essentially and materially different. In assessing whether the modified work is essentially the same as the effort for which the competition was held and for which the parties contracted, we consider factors such as the magnitude of the change in relation to the overall effort, including the extent of any changes in the type of work, performance period, and costs between the modification and the underlying contract.

Where an agency has relaxed a contract’s performance requirements, our Office also looks to whether the change in requirements was the type that reasonably would have been anticipated under the solicitation, and whether the modification materially changed the field of competition for the requirement.

We disagree with the agency’s view that the modification does not materially change the requirements of the contract or result in a fundamental change to the nature of the work. The original solicitation sought proposals that required offerors to both lease plastic media and recycle the resulting SBM in compliance with regulations, and offerors were thus required to propose technical solutions and pricing for both the lease and recycling components of the work.

Furthermore, Poly-Pacific contends, and the agency does not dispute, that the costs of leasing plastic media with no recycling requirements is as much as 50 percent less than the costs of leasing plastic media with recycling requirements. An agency may not modify a contract by changing or relaxing requirements where the resulting work is fundamentally different from the work anticipated by the original solicitation. Evidence suggesting that proposals submitted on the basis of a modified contract’s relaxed requirements could result in more competition and lower prices generally weighs in favor of finding that the contract modification was improper.

In our view, the modification resulted in a material and fundamental change to the nature of the work that changed the field of competition and that work, therefore, should have been competed on a full and open basis.

Although the modification of UST’s contract occurred approximately 2 years ago, we find that Poly-Pacific’s protest is timely. Upon learning through news accounts that UST was under investigation for allegedly failing to recycle the SBM according to the contract, Poly-Pacific diligently pursued information regarding UST’s performance. Poly-Pacific made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain information from the agency regarding UST’s contract following the news accounts of the investigation of UST. The agency did not inform Poly-Pacific of the modification until February 25, 2005. We conclude that Poly-Pacific diligently pursued the information that forms the grounds for this protest, and its filing of the protest within 10 days of its notice of the modification is timely.

Finally, we find that the protester was prejudiced by the agency’s improper modification of the contract. As discussed above, Poly-Pacific is a qualified source to provide type V plastic media, and thus could participate in a competition for the work now required under the contract modification.
Under the ABA Model Procurement Code, a prospective bidder or offeror can protest provided it is "aggrieved". It is aggrieved if there was a material defect in the solicitation which wronged (prejudiced) the protestor. Such a protest must be filed within a time period (14 days under Guam law) from the time the aggrieved protestor knows or should have known of the facts by which it became aggrieved.

One protest case before the Guam Public Auditor, as with the Poly-Pacific case, involved a protest made years after the award of a contract. The Public Auditor decided, based on the facts of the case, that the protest was timely filed.

Standing at the end of the line is without prejudice

Well it's all right, even if they say you're wrong
Well it's all right, sometimes you gotta be strong
Well it's all right, As long as you got somewhere to lay
Well it's all right, everyday is Judgment Day

Well it's all right, riding around in the breeze
Well it's all right, if you live the life you please
Well it's all right, even if the sun don't shine
Well it's all right, we're going to the end of the line



In this federal US Claims Court case, the protestor thought it was all right being at the end of the line. It wasn't. It was not in sufficient competitive position to win, so was not "interested" in the solicitation.

There are a lot of instructive statements in this case covering a variety of subjects, and I've mentioned many of them, but without much context or elaboration. Read the whole case at the link, for context, accuracy and completeness; and to see where I'm paraphrasing and if correctly.


UNIVERSAL MARINE CO., K.S.C., v U.S., United States Court of Federal Claims No. 14-1115 C, February 10, 2015.
In March 2009, the United States Army (“the Army”) awarded Contract W52P1J-09-D-0025 to Universal Marine Co., K.S.C. (“Universal Marine”) for the operation of a container yard in Kuwait that repairs and refurbishes commercial shipping containers. On April 24, 2014, the Army solicited Request for Proposals No. W52P1J-14-R-0062 (the “RFP”) for the same services as the March 2009 Contract. The incumbent did not get up.

To select an awardee, the Army used a lowest price technically acceptable (“LPTA”) source selection process that evaluated three factors: Technical; Past Performance; and Price. The technical factors were rated on an "pass/fail" or "acceptable/non-acceptable" basis. In the event an Offeror had no recent, relevant past performance, a rating of Acceptable was assigned. Thus, an offeror must clear three successive hurdles to be awarded the contract: First, an offeror must obtain an “Acceptable” rating in Technical Capability and an “Acceptable” rating in Past Performance, and then must propose the lowest price.

In footnote 4, the Court explained that the LPTA procurement method was one form of "best value", but that price/value “[t]radeoffs are not permitted”, thus an LPTA proposal is per se the best value if it meets the selection criteria and proposes the lowest price.

In incumbent, Universal Marine, had the highest price amongst 4 final bidders, all of whom were evaluated to be "acceptable" on technical and past performance factors.

The Government argued that Universal Marine lacks standing, because it finished fourth and has not challenged the offerors who finished second and third. Thus, even if the low bidder's (KGL’s) award were disqualified, Universal Marine still “cannot show that it had a substantial chance of being awarded the contract when it proposed the highest price.” Universal Marine has alleged no error that would disqualify the second or third highest proposals, and therefore lacks standing, because it “has no substantial chance of being awarded the contract.”

Moreover, Universal Marine “cannot show that it was prejudiced by a significant error in the procurement process.” To show prejudice, a protestor must establish “that there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for th[e] error.” Universal Marine cannot show a substantial chance of receiving the award and consequently cannot demonstrate prejudice.

Universal Marine contends that “the issue is not whether an [o]fferor is ‘next in line,’ but whether the [o]fferor has a reasonable expectation to receive an award.” It claims, being “in line” for an award means “being able to meet the requirements such that the Plaintiff is an eligible bidder and potential awardee on the contract.”

Finally, Universal Marine argues that the Army and KGL “would like to make the calculus of standing and interest party overly simplified.” Determining standing, it claims, requires examining the merits of the protest, not just a “blind reliance on the stacking and arraying of the ‘acceptable’ proposals.” Universal Marine claims it is not required to “dissect each proposal in the array that is above it, especially if it demonstrates a systemic flaw in the evaluation process[.]”

As a threshold matter, a plaintiff contesting the award of a federal contract must establish that it is an “interested party” to have standing.

A two-part test is applied to determine whether a protestor is an “interested party.” The protestor must show that: “(1) it was an actual or prospective bidder or offeror, and (2) it had a direct economic interest in the procurement or proposed procurement.” A third test has added that a protestor must show the alleged errors in the procurement were prejudicial. (“It is basic that because the question of prejudice goes directly to the question of standing, the prejudice issue must be reached before addressing the merits.”)

A party demonstrates prejudice when “it can show that but for the error, it would have had a substantial chance of securing the contract.” Importantly, a proper standing inquiry must not conflate the requirement of “direct economic interest” with prejudicial error. ([E]xamining economic interest but excluding prejudicial error from the standing inquiry “would create a rule that, to an unsuccessful but economically interested offeror in a bid protest, any error is harmful”).

In this case, Universal Marine submitted a proposal in response to the RFP, and, as an actual bidder, it satisfies the first element of the “interested party” test. But, Universal Marine did not satisfy the second element, i.e., that it “had a direct economic interest in the procurement.” Universal Marine’s proposed price was the highest of the four proposals. Thus, to have standing, it would have to challenge the bona fides of each of the other three offeror’s eligibility or the solicitation as a whole. But it did not. Universal Marine’s challenges concern only the awardee -- KGL. Based on the four challenges, even if the court were to set aside the award to KGL, the award would go to the second-place offeror. Without any challenge to the intervening offerors, Universal Marine cannot prevail.

As for Universal Marine’s reliance on Hyperion, Inc. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 541 (2014), it is misplaced, even though some facts are similar to this case. Hyperion filed a post-award protest as the highest-priced of four “Acceptable” offerors in an LPTA solicitation. However, Hyperion “contend[ed] that all three [other] offerors failed to meet [certain provisions] and failed to include required [provisions].” Hyperion went on to allege particular defects in each of the other three proposals. “In Hyperion’s view, it was the only technically acceptable offeror and should have received the award.” This case, however, is distinguishable. Here, four out of Universal Marine’s five arguments are specific to KGL, and the problem identified with the solicitation was waived as untimely. Thus, even though “proving prejudice for purposes of standing merely requires ‘allegational prejudice,’” Universal Marine has not alleged facts that, if true, would create a “substantial chance” that it would be awarded the contract.

For these reasons, the court has determined that Universal Marine lacks standing to seek an adjudication of this bid protest.

Sunday, June 1, 2014

Switcheroo

This post covers a couple of instances in which an award is protested after it has been made. It concerns changes made to the contract awarded. But, because the basis of the protest is the disparity between what was bid and the contract made, it was determined that this was not a contract dispute but a valid protest of the award. In some other words, the contracting formation process begun by the solicitation was so tainted that the protest related back to solicitation, not to the contract itself.

The first instance is in a recent GAO decision. It was reported about in this article: GAO dinged the Army for swapping out requirements post award. The GAO decision itself is reported here. The following is taken from the GAO decision, but selectively and somewhat rearranged, so you need to read the whole decision to keep me honest in my characterization of it. I've also eliminated footnotes and citations, so a student or practitioner would definitely want to read the original.

Matter of: System Studies & Simulation, Inc., B-409375.2; B-409375.3, May 12, 2014
DIGEST: Protest that agency improperly made award of a contract for its actual requirements that differed significantly from the requirements solicited is sustained, where record shows that agency’s actual requirements are for less than 30 percent of the requirements solicited; agencies are required to accurately specify their requirements in a manner that affords offerors an opportunity to compete for the agency’s actual requirements.

The RFP contemplates the award of a fixed-unit-price, indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity requirements type contract to provide instructor pilots to perform flight training on a variety of helicopter airframe models. Award was to be made to the firm submitting the low-priced, technically acceptable proposal for a base year1 and up to three 1-year options. The agency could eliminate any proposal for offering unreasonably high/unrealistically low, unbalanced, inaccurate or incomplete prices.

The RFP included a pricing matrix that offerors were required to complete. In that matrix, offerors were required to calculate the fully burdened hourly rates for various labor categories (the labor categories were: program manager, alternate program manager, UH-60 instructor pilot, AH-60D instructor pilot, OH-58D instructor pilot, AH-64D maintenance examiner, UH-60M maintenance examiner, and UH-60A/L maintenance examiner). Offerors also were required to calculate extended prices for the contract based on quantity estimates included elsewhere in the RFP.

After receiving and evaluating the offerors’ revised proposals, the agency made award to M1, finding that it had submitted the low-priced, technically-acceptable proposal.

By letter dated December 5, the agency advised S3 of its award decision.

Systems Studies & Simulation, Inc., (S3), subsequently filed a protest in our Office alleging, among other things, that M1 had engaged in an improper bait and switch relating to its proposed key personnel (its program manager and alternate program manager), and that the agency had failed to evaluate M1’s price for realism. In response to that protest, the Army advised our Office that it would take corrective action and we dismissed the protest as academic on January 15, 2014.

The record shows that the agency investigated S3’s bait and switch allegation and also evaluated the proposals of S3 and M1 for price realism. After these activities, the agency affirmed its selection of M1 on January 27, 2014.

[Here another factor is interjected: S3 already held an existing contract similar to this one being solicited.] Also on January 27, the record shows that the agency’s cognizant commanding officer sent a memorandum to the agency’s administrative contracting officer directing him to partially terminate a significant portion of the agency’s then-current contract for pilot instruction services. These services--being provided under a predecessor contract being performed by S3--were reduced due to a change in the agency’s needs.

On January 28, S3 became aware of the agency’s changed requirements because, as noted, it was the incumbent contractor for the requirement, and was sent a letter dated January 28 partially terminating its contract. The record also shows that S3 inquired as to whether the change to the agency’s requirements was confined to its predecessor contract, or represented the agency’s needs going forward. S3 was advised that the revised requirements would remain in effect for the foreseeable future because of the availability of in-house Department of Defense personnel to perform the training in lieu of contractor personnel.

Finally, the record shows that, on January 31, the agency’s administrative contracting officer sent an e-mail to the agency’s procurement contracting officer (the individual actually conducting the current acquisition, and also serving as the source selection official here) advising her of the significant reduction in the agency’s requirements.

Here, the agency has determined that its actual requirements are significantly different from the requirements that it solicited, and for which the offerors competed. This change represents a reduction in the agency’s overall anticipated requirements of more than 70 percent. It also reflects a significant change in the types of instructors and maintenance examiners required. The record therefore shows that the agency’s current requirements bear little relationship to the requirements that it solicited, and for which the offerors competed.

S3 argues that the Army altered its requirements after making award of the contract to M1. S3 asserts that the change to the agency’s requirements is substantial, and that it would have altered its proposed staffing had it known about the agency’s revised requirements. S3 therefore contends that it was prejudiced by the agency’s failure to solicit its revised, actual, requirements once it became aware of those requirements.

The agency responds that the source selection authority/contracting officer (SSA) was unaware of the change to the agency’s requirements at the time she made her source selection and did not learn of the change until several days later. The agency therefore takes the position that it did not make award with a view to substantially altering the contract after award.

In the alternative, the agency argues that, because this is a requirements contract, there was no obligation on the part of the government to order the estimated quantities included in the RFP. The agency therefore reasons that any reduction in its actual requirement--as compared to the RFP’s estimates--was contemplated by the type of contract solicited.

As a general rule, agencies may not properly award a contract on a basis that is fundamentally different from the basis upon which the competition for the requirement was conducted. Where, for example, there is a significant change in the government’s quantity requirements, the appropriate course of action is for the agency to apprise the offerors of its revised requirements, and afford them an opportunity to submit proposals responsive to those revised requirements, even where, as here, a source selection decision has been made.

In addition, the fact that a requirements-type contract is being used does not relieve the agency of its fundamental obligation to conduct a competition on the basis of the most accurate or realistic estimates of the total quantity of goods or services likely to be ordered. This is because, without such realistic estimated quantities, firms cannot prepare offers that reflect the agency’s actual, anticipated needs.

In responding to the protest, the Army essentially relies on the temporal lack of knowledge on the part of its SSA concerning the agency’s revised requirements. The agency therefore maintains that the original award was proper, and that the change to its requirements is a matter of contract administration.

However, the agency’s reliance is misplaced, since the record shows that the organization as a whole--and more particularly, the agency’s cognizant commanding officer--had to have been aware of the Army’s changed requirements prior to the agency’s revised source selection decision. Nonetheless, the record compels the conclusion that the commanding officer was aware of the change to the agency’s requirements. As noted, the record includes his instruction to partially terminate the protester’s predecessor contract, which was executed on January 27, the same date on which the revised source selection decision was made. In any event, where an agency’s requirements change due to the passage of time occasioned by protest litigation, the agency is nonetheless still required to afford offerors an opportunity to submit proposals responsive to the agency’s revised requirements.

The agency also asserts, based on calculations it has performed, that S3 was not prejudiced by the agency’s failure to solicit its revised requirements because its price still would not have been low. The agency’s calculations are based on hourly rates proposed by the offerors in response to the earlier requirement. The protester maintains, however, that it would have changed its proposed staffing profile, as well as proposed personnel had it known of the agency’s actual requirements.

The agency’s calculations provide no basis for our Office to conclude that the protester was not prejudiced. As correctly noted by the protester, those calculations are based on personnel that the offerors may, or may not, have proposed had the agency advised them of its actual requirements (protest sustained where record showed reasonable possibility of prejudice to protester).

We recommend that the agency either amend its current solicitation to reflect its actual requirements, or cancel the current RFP and issue a new solicitation that reflects its actual requirements. Should M1 not be identified as the successful offeror, we further recommend that its contract be terminated for the convenience of the government, and that the agency make award to the firm identified as the successful concern, if otherwise proper.
This decision was characterized in a post by Nicholas T. Solosky of law firm Fox Rothschild LLP on the Mondaq website as follows:
GAO recently sustained a protest filed concerning the difference between the government's actual needs and what was solicited from contractors as part of the RFP. The protestor challenged the award of a fixed-unit-price, indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity requirements contract to provide instructor pilots to perform helicopter flight training. 

After the contract was awarded, however, the government made unilateral changes to its scope – reducing the agency's overall anticipated requirements by more than 70 percent. Based on these significant alterations, the GAO noted that: "The record therefore shows that the agency's current requirements bear little relationship to the requirements that it solicited, and for which the offerors competed."
After considering the reduced scope of services, GAO sustained the protest and recommended "that the agency either amend its current solicitation to reflect its actual requirements, or cancel the current RFP and issue a new solicitation that reflects its actual requirements." The basis for GAO's decision is the long-standing rule (well-established in GAO case law) that agencies may not properly award a contract on a basis that is fundamentally different from the basis upon which the competition for the requirement was conducted.

It may be helpful to remind here that a "requirements" contract is a particular variant of an indefinite quantity contract. A requirements contract obligates the government to acquire its actual needs. It is not a discretionary decision of the government. See 2 GAR 3119(i) of the Guam Procurement Regulations, based on the ABA Model Procurement Code and regulations for a description of and the requirements for an indefinite quantity contract (subsection ii), how it differs from a definite quantity contract (subsection i), and the description and requirements for a requirements contract (subsection iii).

The other case, promised above, is a Guam Public Auditor's appeals decision on a bid protest, OPA-PA-11-002. I will not discuss the details of this case (I represented the protestor and the case is still on appeal to the courts by the awardee) other than to point out that it involved a solicitation for a variety of pieces of copier equipment, ranging from lower to higher cost items. 

After the low bidder was determined and announced to be the intended awardee of the contract, the contract actually made increased the numbers of high cost items and reduced the numbers of lower cost items, with the result that the contract price increased roughly 25% over the bid amount. 

The Public Auditor found that the quantity changes were in violation of law and, by virtue of the remedies allowed by Guam law, terminated the contract. (As the matter continues through the court by virtue of the judicial appeal, the decision of the Public Auditor terminating the contract is stayed and the "terminated" contract looks at this point to become fully or at least mostly performed before a final decision is rendered.)

This highlights one distinction between federal GAO protest cases and local ones: a federal protest stays not just the solicitation but also contract performance; not so locally.








Friday, November 8, 2013

How to manufacture a bid protest?

Judge: IBM gamed procurement system in CIA cloud bid
A U.S. Court of Federal Claims judge said IBM "manipulated its pricing to create a bid protest" and "intentionally manufactured a protest argument" against Amazon Web Services, which went on to win a $600 million cloud computing contract from the CIA that Big Blue later protested. He overturned IBM's successful bid protest and ordered AWS to get back to work building a cloud computing infrastructure for the intelligence community.

"IBM appears to have intentionally manufactured a protest argument relating to the [scenario] pricing requirement, which it hoped to pursue if it lost the [cloud] competition with AWS," Wheeler wrote in his opinion. "Knowing full well from its pre-proposal questions what the [scenario] requirements were, IBM drastically departed from the approach followed in its initial proposal when it came to submitting its final proposal revision. If it did not win the award, IBM could argue that the agency did not evaluate . . . prices on a common basis."

Wheeler said GAO's decision to uphold IBM's bid protest was irrational because IBM "lacked any chance" to win the contract.
Amazon CIA cloud row: US judge slaps down IBM as 'manipulative', inferiorAmazon CIA cloud row: US judge slaps down IBM as 'manipulative', inferior
Amazon was awarded the contract on February 14, 2013. IBM formally protested this decision, claiming its offer should be reconsidered because Big Blue staff had failed to properly understand a key data-processing requirement.

But, far from not understanding that requirement, the court opinion indicates IBM grasped the requirement yet decided to submit a flawed proposal to give itself a chance to force a second evaluation if the contract went to AWS, as it did.

The contentious section asked the parties to price up a fault-tolerant cluster of 1,000s of commodity servers running a MapReduce scatter-gather job on about 100TB of data with a 100 per cent duty cycle. In other words, the CIA wanted Amazon and IBM to cost out a cloud cluster that would run MapReduce continuously for a year so spies could prod large chunks of data.

Both IBM and Amazon appeared to understand this in their initial bids, and submitted plans to do so, Judge Thomas C. Wheeler wrote in his court opinion. When it came to submitting its final official bid for the CIA contract, something curious happened: IBM handed in a "dramatically different interpretation" of the MapReduce cluster specification, by pricing out an analytics tool that would execute a single 100TB processing run. "There is no explanation in the record for this drastic IBM pricing change," the federal court ruled.

IBM's pricing dramatically reduced the apparent cost of its bid, but to effectively evaluate it against Amazon, which had priced out a full-year cost of a cluster, the government had to scale up IBM's cost to cover a 12-month period. It was this calculation that IBM subsequently disputed.

"It is obvious that when IBM deviated from its initial approach, it did so as a way to manipulate the situation in its favor," the court ruled. "Such gamesmanship undermines the integrity of the procurement process."
Selected and rearranged excerpts from In the United States Court of Federal Claims, No. 13-506C (Reissued for Publication: November 8, 2013)
At issue is the agency’s decision to take corrective action by inviting a new round of final proposal revisions from Plaintiff Amazon Web Services, Inc. (“AWS,” or “Amazon”) and Defendant-Intervenor IBM U.S. Federal (“IBM”). Previously, in its original evaluation of proposals, the agency had found AWS’s proposal to be far superior to IBM’s proposal, even though AWS had proposed a higher price. In a “best value” award decision, the agency determined that the higher price it would pay to AWS was justified. The agency awarded the C2S contract to AWS on February 14, 2013.

IBM filed a bid protest at the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) on February 26, 2013 challenging various aspects of the agency’s procurement including the evaluation process. The agency initially stopped AWS’s contract performance pursuant to the automatic stay provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(3) (“CICA”), but later issued an override of the stay on March 15, 2003 to allow AWS’s performance to proceed. The GAO bid protest was sharply contested. AWS contends that it handily won the competition with IBM, and that IBM suffered no prejudice and lacks standing because it has no substantial chance of receiving the contract award. Absent a legitimate, prejudicial procurement violation, AWS objects to competing again with IBM to win the same C2S contract, especially where so much information has been released to IBM during the debriefing process.

As a threshold matter, IBM lacked any chance of winning a competition with AWS for this C2S contract, and therefore IBM could not show any prejudice from either of the two grounds on which the GAO sustained IBM’s protest. The GAO’s decision does not even mention the existence of any “prejudice” to IBM, thus indicating that the GAO did not apply any “prejudice” requirement to IBM’s protest. Similarly, the GAO did not consider whether IBM had standing to bring the protest.  If IBM did not have a chance of being awarded the contract, it did not have the necessary standing as an interested party to pursue its bid protest. See Labatt Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.3d 1375, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2009).


Moreover, IBM appears to have intentionally manufactured a protest argument relating to the Scenario 5 pricing requirement, which it hoped to pursue if it lost the C2S competition with AWS. Knowing full well from its pre-proposal questions what the Scenario 5 requirements were, IBM drastically departed from the approach followed in its initial proposal when it came to submitting its final proposal revision. If it did not win the award, IBM could argue that the agency did not evaluate Scenario 5 prices on a common basis. IBM was the only offeror who appeared to “misunderstand” the Scenario 5 pricing requirements.

The GAO made no mention of IBM’s manipulation of the procurement process, but instead sustained the protest allegedly for lack of a common basis to evaluate the offerors’ Scenario 5 prices. Even if the proposals from AWS and IBM presented a closer “best value” award decision, the Court could not justify rewarding IBM with another chance of competing for the C2S contract under these circumstances.

Although IBM was not satisfied with the agency’s answers, it did not seek further clarification or file a bid protest. Instead, IBM submitted its initial proposal with a Scenario 5 data analytics solution that processed 100 TB of data continuously throughout the year, at a price of approximately $[. . .]. The other offerors, including Amazon, interpreted Scenario 5 in the same way, as requiring continual data analytics deployment for a full year, or 8,760 hours. IBM continued to price Scenarios 1 through 4, which also specified a 100% duty cycle, based on the continuous operation of the called-for servers for the year. During discussions with IBM, the agency identified each instance in which IBM failed to follow the pricing scenario directions. However, the evaluators did not identify any issue regarding IBM’s approach to Scenario 5, because IBM had offered a solution operating at a 100% duty cycle for 12 months, and IBM’s proposed price was consistent with the prices of the other offerors. AR 10388, Holloway Test.; AR 3120 (noting issues with IBM scenario pricing assumptions, but not Scenario 5). The agency thus effectively conveyed to IBM that it had correctly followed the Scenario 5 instructions.

If “the agency entirely fail[s] to consider an important aspect of the problem[ or] offer[s] an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,” then the resulting action lacks a rational basis and, therefore, is defined as “arbitrary and capricious.” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v. United States, 586 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) .

“[B]ecause the question of prejudice goes directly to the question of standing, the prejudice issue must be reached before addressing the merits.” Labatt, 577 F.3d at 1378 (internal quotation marks omitted). A bid protestor has been prejudiced when it can show that, “but for [a significant error in the procurement process], it would have had a substantial chance of securing the contract.” Id.

“De minimis errors in the procurement process do not justify relief,” and “[t]he protestor bears the burden of proving that a significant error marred the procurement in question.” Glenn Def. Marine (Asia), Pte Ltd. v. United States, 720 F.3d 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2013). This burden “is greater in negotiated procurement, as here, than in other types of bid protests because ‘the contracting officer is entrusted with a relatively high degree of discretion.’” Id. (quoting Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).

AWS’s offer was superior in virtually every way but price, and IBM’s advantage in that area was likely not as great as IBM attempted to make it appear. Nevertheless, the GAO sustained IBM’s protest on two grounds: (1) the agency’s Scenario 5 price evaluation lacked a common basis and was therefore unreasonable; and (2) the agency materially relaxed a solicitation requirement for AWS, but not for the other offerors. See AR 10706.

Regarding the first ground, the GAO makes no mention of prejudice whatsoever, despite its being raised and argued by both AWS and the agency. Regarding the second, the GAO notes—without any explanation—that “[i]n [its] view, IBM’s assertion that the level of risk to the contractor was reduced by this modification is sufficient to establish prejudice.” AR 10712 n.4, IBM U.S. Federal, 2013 CPD ¶ 142. In neither instance is there any consideration of the proper legal standard for prejudice, nor is there any evidence that IBM met its burden of proof for establishing such prejudice. Consequently, there is no justification for even reaching the merits of IBM’s protest.

The bottom line is that IBM did not lose the competition because of the Scenario 5 price evaluation or AWS’s post-solicitation negotiations, but because of the overall
inferiority of its proposal. This proposal contained numerous weaknesses, including some “significant” weaknesses, a technical deficiency, and an overall high risk rating.
AR 4638-69; AR 5065-67 (describing “multiple weaknesses,” a technical “deficiency,” and “multiple concerns” creating a high price risk).

“[S]tanding is a threshold jurisdictional issue,” and “prejudice (or injury) is a necessary element of standing.” Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002). To establish prejudice, IBM had to “show that there was a ‘substantial chance’ it would have received the contract award but for the
alleged error in the procurement process.” Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Alfa Laval Separation, Inc. v. United States, 175 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).

IBM failed to make such a showing, and the GAO failed to make relevant findings or apply the proper legal standards. In fact, other than the GAO’s unexplained acceptance of IBM’s speculation that it had suffered prejudice, see AR 10712 n.4, IBM U.S. Federal, 2013 CPD ¶ 142, the GAO made no mention of prejudice to IBM at all. Such a “fail[ure] to consider an important aspect of the problem” is, by itself, sufficient to render the GAO’s decision arbitrary and capricious. Ala. Aircraft, 586 F.3d at 1375 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n., 463 U.S. at 43).

Timeliness, like prejudice, is a threshold issue that must be addressed prior to reaching the merits of a bid protest. See, e.g., Goel Services, Inc., B-310822.2, 2008 CPD ¶ 99 (Comp. Gen. May 23, 2008) (“Our timeliness rules reflect the dual requirements of giving parties a fair opportunity to present their cases and resolving protests expeditiously without unduly disrupting or delaying the procurement process. In order to prevent these rules from becoming meaningless, exceptions are strictly construed and rarely used.” (citation omitted)).

Where, as here, an offeror misses its opportunity to fairly challenge the terms of a solicitation, it cannot then be allowed to avoid the timeliness bar by mischaracterizing its case as an evaluation challenge. This timeliness rule aptly describes what IBM attempted to do. Nevertheless, the GAO concluded that the agency’s “price evaluation” method was unreasonable and sustained IBM’s protest on that ground. AR 10707-10. This conclusion, however, completely ignored the blatant manner in which IBM manipulated the situation to its advantage.

IBM filed its protest and feigned ignorance of the reasons for the agency’s actions, pretending not to understand why “the agency determined that the solution should be available throughout the year.” In reality, IBM was well aware that the agency had made this determination long before its final price evaluation. Such gamesmanship undermines the integrity of the procurement process and should not be rewarded with circumvention of the timeliness requirement.

There is no such thing as a perfect procurement. Thus, a bid protestor must show prejudice, not mere error, for “[n]ot every error compels the rejection of an award.” Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.3d 990, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Rather, it is “the significance of errors in the procurement process [that determines] whether the
overturning of an award is appropriate,” and it is the protestor who “bears the burden of proving error in the procurement process sufficient to justify relief.” Id. IBM never met that burden, and the GAO neglected to address it. Even if IBM’s arguments regarding the price evaluation and modified solicitation requirement were persuasive, it remains implausible that there would be any effect on the outcome of the procurement. AWS’s offer was superior, and the outcome of the competition was not even close.
So, was this a "frivolous protest"?