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Showing posts with label Contract terms. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Contract terms. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 9, 2019

When it's not best left unsaid

Government contracting by implication. It's what you do when you've left home without it, it being a critical government contract clause, required by the procurement law, including its regulations. Now I know, thanks to Lexology and Attorney Edward Arnold and the article below.

The Christian Doctrine: The Double-Secret Contract Clause
The typical government contract contains a laundry list of standard Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) or Defense Federal Regulation Acquisition Supplement (DFARS) clauses that outline the requirements for the construction or services to be provided. These clauses are either expressly stated, i.e. written out in full length in the contract, or incorporated by reference to a particular provision which the contractor must research for the specific language. But contractors beware: not all contracts are what they seem. Since 1963, courts have held that certain clauses are so integral to public procurements that they are deemed incorporated by operation of law, even if they are omitted from the contract.

The “Christian Doctrine” arises from the Court of Claims’ 1963 decision in G.L. Christian & Associates v. United States.[1] The contractor there sought to recover anticipated profits on a contract that terminated by the U.S. Department of the Army. The government sought to avoid liability for anticipated profits, relying on the standard termination for convenience clause, which disclaims government liability for anticipated profits on unperformed work. Interestingly, the termination for convenience clause was not referenced or incorporated in G.L. Christian’s contract. The government argued that, despite its absence, the clause should be read into the contract as a matter of law. In support of its argument, the government relied on Section 8.703 of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (“ASPR”), which requires the termination clause be inserted in all fixed-price construction contracts such as the one at issue.[2] The Court agreed, stating that since World War I, the limitation on anticipated profits in a termination case was “a deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy.”[3]

Following this ruling, various boards of contract appeals and courts took a relatively broad view of the court’s holding, incorporating clauses and procurement regulations with little or no consideration for whether such provisions reflected a deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy. Thus, a series of ancillary clauses were deemed incorporated by operation of law, even though they were not in the contract. For example, one case from the Court of Claims held that the ASPR “Mistake in Bids” clause was incorporated by law into the contract based on a theory that: “If a regulation appears intended to define and state the rights of a class of persons, it is presumptively intended to benefit those persons.”[4] The Court ruled that the missing clause was intended to benefit bidders, without any analysis as to whether that end was a deeply ingrained in the federal procurement scheme.

In 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed the expanding scope of the Christian Doctrine in General Engineering & Machine Works v. O’Keefe.[5] Emphasizing Christian’s reliance on the significant and long-standing policy implemented by the termination for convenience clause, the Court re-iterated that “the Christian Doctrine does not permit the automatic incorporation of every required contract clause.”[6] Rather, “the Christian Doctrine applies to mandatory contract clauses which express a significant or deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy.”[7] In the wake of General Engineering, one set of commentators noted: “They [the courts and boards] have been saved for the last 20 years by being able to mechanically follow the Christian Doctrine to incorporate all mandatory clauses in the contract without analysis or thought. But that day is over. Under the guidance provided by the Federal Circuit, the boards of contract appeals now have to think through each case to determine if the clause meets the General Engineering tests.”[8]

Under the guidance of General Engineering, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) has invoked the Christian Doctrine only twice to incorporate clauses into contracts. And even so, the ASBCA only incorporated clauses that had been previously incorporated under earlier case law.[9] In that same time, the ASBCA has refused to invoke the incorporate various other clauses.[10]

In its most recent decision involving the Christian Doctrine, the Federal Circuit held for the first time that bonding requirements in FAR Part 52.228-15, “Performance and Payment Bonds—Construction,” were incorporated in every construction contract at the time of award.[11] Not only did the Court find that the purposes of the performance and payment bonds rendered them “a significant or deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy,” it was also persuaded by the fact that government property cannot be subject to subcontractors’ and suppliers’ mechanic’s liens.[12] Thus, protecting subcontractors and suppliers represents a deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy.

The lesson of K-Con: Federal contractors of all sizes must understand: (1) what type of contract is being contemplated by the government’s solicitation; (2) which provisions are found in those types of contracts; and (3) which provisions have been, or may be, deemed incorporated by operation of law even if not present in the contract. This will greatly impact how contractors price their proposals in competitive solicitations to better account for potential risks.
The article comes with a very organized and helpful matrix of over 40 administrative and judicial decisions, showing whether the decision followed or rejected the Christian Doctrine on the facts of the respective cases. This proved helpful to me as I was able to get a lead to two decisions concerning the incorporation of the standard federal and ABA Model Procurement Code Contract Dispute Clause models. Both of them followed the Christian Doctrine.

My interest arises from two separate procurement controversies that have been playing out here on Guam, that turned into binding arbitration train wrecks. I have been puzzled by that. Guam has the ABA MPC version of the contract dispute clause. Although the regulations elaborate, the essence is in the law, 5 GCA § 5427:
§ 5427. Authority to Resolve Contract and Breach of Contract Controversies.
(a) Applicability. This Section applies to controversies between the Territory and a contractor and which arise under, or by virtue of, a contract between them. This includes without limitation controversies based upon breach of contract, mistake, misrepresentation, or other cause for contract modification or rescission.
(b) Authority. The Chief Procurement Officer, the Director of Public Works, the head of a purchasing agency, or a designee of one of these officers is authorized, prior to commencement of an action in a court concerning the controversy, to settle and resolve a controversy described in Subsection (a) of this Section.
(c) Decision. If such a controversy is not resolved by mutual agreement, the Chief Procurement Officer, the Director of Public Works, the head of a purchasing agency, or the designee of one of these officers shall promptly issue a decision in writing. The decision shall:
    (l) state the reasons for the action taken; and
    (2) inform the contractor of its rights to judicial or administrative review as provided in this Chapter.
(d) Notice of Decision. A copy of the decision under Subsection (c) of this Section shall be mailed or otherwise furnished immediately to the contractor.
(e) Finality of Decision. The decision reached pursuant to Subsection (c) of this Section shall be final and conclusive, unless fraudulent, or the contractor appeals administratively to the Public Auditor in accordance with § 5706 of this Chapter.
(f) Failure to Render Timely Decision. If ... one of these officers does not issue the written decision required under Subsection (c) of this Section within sixty (60) days after written request for a final decision, or within such longer period as may be agreed upon by the parties, then the contractor may proceed as if an adverse decision had been received.
It seems to me that the requirement of mutual agreement by the parties precludes arbitration, and certainly the requirement that a disputed final agency decision must be appealed (first administratively, from which further appeal procedures are available, ultimately to the Guam Supreme Court), renders binding, non-reviewable arbitration clearly out of the question.

Yet, those two, very large (on Guam scale) contract disputes ended up in arbitration -- and litigation, adding insult to injury, and costs.

It should be noted Guam's Procurement Contract Disputes law is fortified by a strongly stated government policy in favor of resolution of "all controversies by mutual agreement without litigation", and backed up by a quite specific "Disputes" clause which "shall be inserted in all territorial contracts".

I could not square the arbitrations with that contract clause requirement. Obviously, someone(s) somewhere along the line neglected or resolved not to abide by the mandatory dispute resolution procedure explicitly mandated in law and regulation. A law and regulation, I might add, that has been ensconced in Guam's procurement law from the beginning of the comprehensive procurement law's adoption in 1982.

Needless to say, I have been plowing that Christian Doctrine field since coming across the article above and amassed a goldmine of resources should I ever need to have it to hand.

Such is the aspiration of a Procurement True Believer. Or nerd. Whatever.

Helpful to me, among others:
Yosemite Park v. United States, 582 F. 2d 552 - Court of Claims (1978)
SJ Amoroso Const. Co., Inc. v US, 12 F3d 1072, Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit (1993)
Bay Shipbuilding Company vs Dept. HomeLand Security, CBCA 54, 84 (2007)
US v Thomas K. Mills, MD, Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit,822 F.2d 373 (1987)



Wednesday, November 20, 2013

Transparency is collateral damage when major work is contracted out

I have previously mentioned the debated issue whether procurement transparency laws follow on to the contracts let for government work. See Will FOIA be foiled by outsourced subcontracting? 

The article cited below (click link)arises in Minnesota where its Supreme Court ruled, in the factual context of that case, that private contractors are immune from the State's equivalent FOIA law by a contract clause excluding them from the coverage of the law.

Minnesota high court: Business not subject to open-records laws
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled Wednesday that a private business that contracted with a northern school district to renovate buildings isn’t subject to state open-records laws. The high court reversed the Appeals Court’s October ruling, which had been viewed as a victory for public access to government contracts.

Under the law, private residents or businesses contracting with the government must comply with the state’s Data Practices Act “as if it were a government entity.” A notice of the requirement must be included in the contract. In this case, the notice was excluded. Without it, the Supreme Court concluded there wasn’t a provision in the Data Practices Act that made the contract between Johnson Controls and the architectural firm public.

In 2011, the state Department of Administration sided with Helmberger, but an administrative law judge threw out the request because the subcontract “did not involve the performance of a government function.” The Appeals Court disagreed, arguing that the planning of five public schools falls under state laws that mandate the duty of a school district to “furnish school facilities” to children, including constructing and renovating buildings.

The state Supreme Court’s ruling didn’t address the question of whether Johnson was performing a government function. In a concurring opinion, Justice Alan Page wrote that he didn’t agree with the court’s “blanket conclusion” that data held by an individual, corporation or association performing a government function are nonpublic. It should depend on whether the contract calls for the contractor to perform a government function.

“If the court had ruled on the question of government function, it may have gotten into Alice-in-Wonderland complexities that would have been extremely difficult to resolve from case to case,” said Anfinson.

Todd Wind, who represented Johnson, said the Supreme Court struck the right balance for the business community and citizens of Minnesota. The ruling recognizes the Data Practices Act doesn’t make all information public just because somebody does business with a government entity, he said. “The ruling makes the requirement of the notice abundantly clear,” he said. “But we believed Johnson wasn’t performing a government function anyway.”
It seems fairly well settled, on Guam, that a procurement contract executed with the government of Guam is a public record that must be disclosed to the extent it is not protected by provisions regarding proprietary information or trade secrets.

But notice that this case did not involve a question of a government contract, rather, a subcontract between the government contractor and a subcontractor. That becomes a more iffy question, but would probably be covered by a governmental function rule -- if there is a governmental function criteria applied to FOIA coverage.

Since government is now engaging in larger and more complex acquisitions than in times past, times need to keep up and legislate to include -- or exclude if that is the preferred policy -- subcontracts of government contracts within the scope of public record transparency requirements, subject, of course, to matters determined by the government to be proprietary information or trade secrets. Issues like the contract definitions and descriptions of the scope of work, as appeared to be at issue in this case, would hardly ever be considered proprietary information or trade secrets.

Saturday, June 29, 2013

Standardizing commercial goods and services but not contract terms

How often do you read the terms of your, say, phone contract, or equipment rental agreement? Are they even negotiable? Your standard commercial purchases come with industry standard terms, and you usually have the choice of taking it or leaving it.

Not so if you are a monopsony. The federal government is one, but small government entities most often are not. I am amazed at the way large manufacturers jam their own contract terms down the throat of our local government.

Lawyers Michael D. McGill and C. Peter Dungan from the firm Hogan Lovells have provided a note on the federal government's start to pushback on this idea. You should read the whole article at the link below.

New procurement rule is intended to limit the Government’s acceptance of standard commercial terms of service for social media applications
The interim rule, which is effective immediately, is specifically aimed to curb the practice of contracting officials agreeing to open-ended indemnification provisions in standard contracts for web-based social media applications. The Government will not agree to certain contract terms that are standard in the commercial space, and even when its officials agree to those terms, some of them may be unenforceable.

The impetus for this rulemaking can be traced back to a June 2011 letter from the Department of Commerce (Commerce) to the Department of Justice (DOJ) seeking the DOJ’s views on the application of the Anti-Deficiency Act to terms of service (TOS} agreements for social media applications.The Anti-Deficiency Act generally prohibits agencies from entering into contracts or other obligations in advance of or beyond the scope of appropriated funding.

In response, the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued an opinion indicating that the Anti-Deficiency Act is violated when a contracting official or other employee with authority to bind the Government agrees, without statutory authorization or an applicable exception, to an open-ended, unrestricted indemnification provision. The OLC opinion, and the Commerce letter that prompted it, focused specifically on web-based TOS agreements, such as “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” agreements. The Opinion describes a situation in which a Government official holding a purchase card consents to an online TOS agreement containing an open-ended indemnification clause in the course of registering for an account with a commercial social media service, and the Government, under the TOS, holds the service provider harmless for damages caused to a third party when the Government uses the application. The contracting officer’s agreement to such TOS creates an immediate Anti-Deficiency Act violation insofar as the agency, upon agreement to the indemnification provision, is legally liable—or at least potentially legally liable8—for an amount in excess of appropriations.

I think there is plenty of scope to expand this concept to other one-sided contract terms, many of which are found in the "standard" contract terms found in the GSA Schedule contracts. Certainly smaller governments may want this kind of protection by law, because they will rarely if ever get it by negotiation. 

 UPDATE: This subject has reached final regulation status. See articles below:

•  GSA Issues Final Rule Governing Negotiations of Common Commercial Terms 

•  GSA Regulation, Unenforceable Commercial Supplier Agreement Terms 

• Final GSA Rule on Commercial License Terms that Conflict with Federal Law