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Showing posts with label Best value. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Best value. Show all posts

Monday, December 25, 2017

Crikey! Wot a rort!

I remind my reader to click the links to the articles presented and read the originals, as I slice and dice the material for didactic purposes in order to try to present a "teachable moment". These posts are mostly to be considered as hypothetical procurement case studies, not news or other literary content, and omit, paraphrase and rearrange a lot of original material. You've been warned, again.

Allegations of systemic fraud sparked Defence Department internal audit
Confidential documents drafted by a senior defence department investigator reveal allegations of systemic fraud spanning several years inside the government's biggest spender. The 10-month investigation, which finished in February this year, was prompted by an anonymous disclosure about fraud and corruption made to the department in April 2016.

One of the most concerning aspects involved the department awarding companies contracts without a competitive tender process and only a flimsy justification they met "value for money" requirements. In other cases the department was unable to tell whether a contract breached procurement rules or not because important paper work could not be found.

In 2015-16 the Department of Defence reported the largest yearly contract spend of any agency within the public service. The department dialled-up a bill of $30.5 billion on contracts, amounting to 54 per cent of total government contractor spending.

The investigation raised serious questions about the department's use of "single source" tenders, where a single company is awarded a contract without having to compete against other providers. "It is questionable whether true value for money is achieved when [redacted] continually conduct single source limited tenders," Dr Clarke wrote. "Whilst there is less administration and quicker decision making with this approach, it provides limited opportunity for Defence to achieve the best possible outcome. "Single source limited tenders increase the risk of contractor underperformance and corruption."
Defence spending data unreliable, incomplete, national audit office says
Transparency and accountability for billions of dollars of annual defence spending remains suspect despite recent reforms, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) has found.

Last year, the Defence Department spent $8.3 billion on keeping its equipment in working order, known as "sustainment" in military jargon. Yet, the audit office found that despite small recent improvements, information about where that money went and whether it was being spent wisely was often unreliable or not available.

The report also questions a claim from Defence that reforms to its sustainment policies had saved $2 billion. "Defence has not been able to provide the ANAO with adequate evidence to support this claim, nor an account of how $360 million allocated as 'seed funding' for Smart Sustainment initiatives was used," it read.

Auditors were also critical of inconsistencies between figures given to the Government during the budget process and those provided in the department's annual report. "It's absolutely not good enough," Andrew Davies, director of defence and strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, told AM.
Oz military megahack
An Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) presentation to the Australian Information Security Association (AISA) conference yesterday detailed the hack. Suffice to say that a medium-sized defence contractor was breached and gigabytes of aerospace data and commercial arrangements for military aircraft and naval vessels were delivered into the hands of the attackers. The ASD used it as a case study for the AISA conference yesterday.

The government has since said the information was commercial-in-confidence, but not classified. This is not an isolated incident: in Australia, as elsewhere, attackers thwarted by a network's defences then seek out third-party contractors as an easier mark.

This suggests a problem in sub-contractor oversight – you can win a government contract without proving you have adequate network security.

Minister for Defence Industry Christopher Pyne seems to agree. This morning, he told Radio National's Breakfast programme that the government can't be held responsible for a contractor's lax security.
Fat and mismanaged public sector is eating us alive
In a Crikey article, carried by the Community and Public Services Union, Eric Beecher chronicles appalling mismanagement in service delivery.

Then there’s the $11 billion spent by the Defence Department managing 119 bases around Australia which the ANAO says is well in excess of the $9.3bn “expected value” of the 10 services contracts, signed in 2014, to do the work. The department has defended its performance, saying the vast project to renegotiate the contracts has delivered value for money, when considered against increased service demands and changing expectations of the ADF. Yet a new $120 million IT system, meant to manage contracts ­between Defence and the private companies servicing the bases, was $39m over budget and five years late.

There’s also the flawed tendering and contracting processes overseen by the Immigration ­Department, which resulted in the waste of “tens and possibly, hundreds of millions of dollars”. Given these practices were subject to a scathing ANAO report, they could hardly be ignored.

We’re reminded of last year’s Australian Bureau of Statistics census “stuff-up”, the Australian Taxation Office’s massive and damaging IT outage, the Department of Health’s decade-long mismanagement of e-health records, and the embarrassing release of identifiable Medicare information. There’s also the Department of Finance’s lax oversight of ministerial travel arrangements. But not raised is the $576m public service travel bill — a blowout of $75m in just four years.

While this shocking record is acknowledged, Beecher argues the blame lies mainly with outsourcing to powerful private contractors.
Outsourcing failures expose weaknesses in both government and business
The problems of dealing with private sector providers and contractors are a persistent theme in the analysis of government shortcomings. For example, recent Australian National Audit Office reports highlighted contracting problems in Air Services Australia, the Defence Department and the Immigration Department. Contract management issues were at the heart of last year's failed online census and have been a constant factor in the turbulent administration of Australia's controversial offshore detention centres. Over-reliance on contracted consultants was a major cause of the botched home insulation scheme.

Given the extent to which governments rely on private contractors for a large range of goods and services, it is unsurprising that contractors are often in the frame when things go wrong. But many of the recurring issues arise out of factors specific to the contracting process.

A common complaint is that the use of contractors has caused agencies to run down their in-house expertise and technical resources. As a result, it can be argued, agencies lack the capacity to assess whether the contracts they are agreeing to give the government and taxpayer adequate value for money. Without their own professional judgment, grounded in technical knowledge and practical experience of the area in question, public service managers are ill-equipped to decide matters of all-round quality. Instead, they tend to fall back on generic checklists of assessment criteria that emphasise easily specifiable factors, such as cost and timeliness.

Alternatively, if funds allow and time permits, they may contract in an external consultant or commissioner to give an expert opinion on a proposed contract. But such advice carries the risks of perverse incentives attached to all forms of external contracting and consulting. The consultants' objective is to gain future contracts, which encourages them to say what they think governments want to hear in preference to what they ought to hear. Once again, without the professional judgment to tell the difference and without their own in-house, trusted staff to advise them, public service managers are at the mercy of self-interested outsiders. This vulnerability is compounded by the lack of transparency that surrounds contracting. Overuse of commercial-in-confidence provisions has shielded public servants from the bracing effects of public scrutiny.

The lack of in-house capacity can affect not only the initial process of drawing up contracts but also the oversight of how contracts are implemented. However, as the constant stream of scandals illustrates, many commercial providers are more interested in profit than in good service and cannot be trusted to do the right thing. As a result, governments are being driven to impose tighter controls and regulations. Even then, in the face of determined rorting and corner-cutting, most government agencies lack the resources to prevent opportunistic contractors from wrongfully expropriating public funds.

After two decades of wholesale outsourcing, some general conclusions are clear. Contracting out is an efficient and effective alternative to in-house provision where the objectives are clear and easily monitored, and where there is a competitive market of alternative providers. It also works well for more complex services where providers can be trusted to pursue public-interest objectives for their own reasons. However, where these conditions of either simplicity or trust do not apply, the risks that governments will not receive value for money start to build. Moreover, extensive experience with outsourcing has itself compounded these risks by reducing governments' capacity to effectively draw up and monitor outsourcing contracts. Some complex service contracts that could have been safely contemplated a generation ago are now beyond the professional expertise of public servants to administer.

politicians need to recognise that outsourcing complex government services requires the development of trust between the parties, which means looking beyond the short-term bottom line and not always preferring the cheapest option. In addition, successful contracting depends on well-resourced government agencies with the skills and experience necessary to manage ongoing relationships with contractors. Running down government staffing levels while relying more on private contractors is a recipe for continuing policy failure.

Contractors, for their part, must earn the right to be treated as trusted partners. They must be prepared for the long haul and willing to learn from experience. They must also be ready to submit to the level of public scrutiny and accountability that public servants take for granted. Indeed, given that the commercial private sector is not imbued with the same commitment to serving the public interest, there is a case for subjecting private contractors to more scrutiny than the public service, not less.

Thursday, September 1, 2016

For-proift out of state company beats non-profit in state organizations to fountain of youth services funding

Youth services providers protest bidding process
Two Arkansas companies that operate seven Youth Services Division facilities submitted protests Friday to the state’s intention to award a contract to run the facilities to an out-of-state company that has said it will charge the state more than the current operators charge. Bidders have 14 days to submit a protest after learning of an alleged flaw in the process.

Every seven years, the state is required to seek proposals from organizations interested in operating the juvenile treatment and juvenile offender facilities. Department of Human Services spokeswoman Amy Webb said it has been eight years since bids were taken because of a previous one-year extension. Youth Opportunity Investments of Carmel, Ind., proposed charging the state $232 per bed per day, up from the $147 the state pays now per day for each of the 249 beds in the facilities.

Sen. Terry Rice, R-Waldron, whose district includes the Mansfield facilities, said Friday he has “a great deal of concern” about the plan to switch to an out-of-state provider at greater cost to the state. The current operators “have not received a dime’s increase in three years,” he said.

Sen. Stephanie Flowers, D-Pine Bluff, chairman of the Senate Children and Youth Committee, also said she has questions. “A lot of the intake providers have been asking for more money for years and we haven’t given it to them. It seems quite odd to have an out-of-state contract and offer them more money,” she said.
2 protest youth services contract; ‘robbed’ of fair shot, current operator’s letter to state says
Two nonprofits running seven Arkansas juvenile treatment and detention centers say state officials failed to document why a for-profit, out-of-state company will replace them, even though the new company's bid was more expensive.

Both Consolidated Youth Services Inc. and South Arkansas Youth Services, which have operated the centers for more than a decade, are challenging the decision. The operators are mostly concerned with how their proposals and Youth Opportunity's were reviewed and the quality of the new company's youth services program.

"They robbed the entire bidding process of equity," state Sen. Jeremy Hutchinson* wrote in a protest letter on behalf of South Arkansas Youth Services. The director of the Department of Human Services is currently drafting a "formal written response" to both organizations, Amy Webb, a department spokesman, said Monday.

In its protest letter, Consolidated Youth Services stated it held "no assurances" that the selection process was consistent. The state agencies did not provide individual score sheets used by evaluators to show how they weighed the proposals in each technical category and only a cumulative score was available, according to both nonprofits' letters. Evaluators appeared to have little experience in the youth services field, and there was no proof they attended training beforehand, the letters said.

Consolidated Youth Services' letter, written by attorney Debby Thetford Nye, called for a new evaluation -- one "untainted by significant procedural deficiencies and bias."

Both nonprofits said that Youth Services Division officials held post-bid discussions with Youth Opportunities Investments, even though post-bid conversations can disqualify vendors competing for a contract. The new company was also permitted to change its proposal and circumvent the criteria laid out in the state's request for services, the current contractors said.

Leaders of the Arkansas-based organizations say their programs cost less, strengthen communities and do not slash services. "We are a community program," said Jerry Walsh, chief executive officer of Magnolia-based South Arkansas Youth Services. His organization runs the Dermott Juvenile Correctional Facility and juvenile treatment centers in Dermott and Mansfield. "We know how to approach the community and how to work with them and to get them to support the program."

Youth Opportunities Investments plans to hire subcontractors from Louisiana and Nashville, Tenn., to carry out services, according to its proposal. The Youth Opportunities plan appears to dedicate fewer staff members to special education, GED and technical-vocational coursework and relies more on online learning, Walsh said.

"There is nothing in their proposal to suggest they would enhance the program," said Bonnie Boon, executive director of Jonesboro-based Consolidated Youth Services. Boon also said that she found the state's ability to find the extra dollars for the increase under the new company "curious."

Youth-services advocates have asked for additional funds for years, which Boon and Walsh said has been frustrating.

"It says a lot about their financial management and not funding youth services. Now all of a sudden you're throwing tons of money in this? Unbelievable," Walsh said.

Thursday, July 9, 2015

Incumbency as a double edged sword

Aha, aha, mmm, hmm, mmm, hmm
Gonna get along without you now
Aha, aha, mmm, hmm, mmm, hmm
Gonna get along without you now

Got along without you before I met you
Gonna get along without you now
Gonna find somebody that's as twice as cute
'Cause I didn't like you anyhow

--- Popularized by Patience and Prudence, lyrics by MetroLyrics


This is a decision of the GAO. It involved the eventually unsuccessful protest of a best value award of a contract to provide security-rated linguists. It was noted in the RFP that the grant of security status was not under the control of the using agency, and experience in passing though that minefield, and managing the flow of applicants through the process, would be essential.

The protester is "SIG", the incumbent under the existing contract. The award was made to "CWU". As usual, this is not a complete or necessarily accurate rendition of the decision and you are most encouraged to read the original at the link below rather than rely on the presentation here. There are other interesting comments and issues in the decision not here presented.

Matter of: Strategic Intelligence Group, LLC, B-410881.3, June 23, 2015
The RFP provided for award on a best-value basis, considering the following factors (in descending order of importance): (1) technical, including subfactors for technical approach and management approach; (2) past performance; and (3) cost/price.

The final evaluation matrix looked like this:


In comparing the proposals, the SSA ("source selection authority") noted that SIG’s proposal was the second highest-priced proposal and one of the lowest-rated proposals, while CWU’s and another offeror’s proposals were both higher-rated and lower-priced than SIG’s.  The SSA selected CWU’s proposal for award, noting with respect to SIG’s proposal that “it would not be in the best interest of the Government to justify paying a higher price [for SIG’s proposal] than proposals that were rated as OUTSTANDING and are lower priced.”

With regard to past performance, the solicitation specified that the agency would assign a performance confidence assessment based on the relevancy and quality of offerors’ performance on recent efforts.

CWU’s proposal was rated overall outstanding under the technical factor based upon an outstanding rating under the technical approach subfactor and a good rating under the management approach subfactor. CWU’s outstanding technical approach rating was based on several evaluated strengths. The SSA concluded that CWU's“[e]xceeding the minimum requirements to facilitate security processing identifies a level of preparedness to ensure successful transition and to maintain a higher pipeline capacity.”

In contrast, SIG’s proposal received only a single strength under the technical approach subfactor, based on SIG’s approach to transition (that is, start-up and continuity of services in transition from an existing contract to the new contract). Specifically, the SSA noted that, since SIG is the incumbent contractor, transition would involve minimal phase-in activities. Thus, SIG’s proposal was rated only acceptable under the technical factor overall.

SIG challenges the agency’s evaluation under each of the evaluation factors, and argues that the resulting selection decision was unreasonable because it was based on a flawed evaluation. In reviewing protests challenging an agency’s evaluation of proposals, our Office does not independently evaluate proposals; rather, we review the agency’s evaluation to ensure that it is consistent with the terms of the solicitation and applicable statutes and regulations. In this regard, the evaluation of proposals is a matter within the discretion of the procuring agency; we will question the agency’s evaluation only where the record shows that the evaluation does not have a reasonable basis or is inconsistent with the RFP. Here, we find the evaluation and source selection decision to be reasonable.

As an initial matter, SIG challenges the agency’s equal rating of both SIG’s and CWU’s past performance as satisfactory confidence, asserting that the past performance evaluation was unreasonable and failed to recognize differences in the offerors’ past performance. Our Office will examine an agency’s evaluation of an offeror’s past performance only to ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria and applicable statutes and regulations, since determining the relative merit of an offeror’s past performance is primarily a matter within the agency’s discretion. While an agency may provide for an evaluation of relevance, the agency is not required to evaluate the past performance of the incumbent contractor as superior to its competitors simply because the incumbent has the most relevant past performance.

Here, we find the agency’s past performance evaluation to be reasonable. Of the several contracts cited by SIG for proof of its past performance, only the incumbent contract was rated as relevant, because of the gross difference between the price (well over $100 million) of the new contract compared to the other proposed contracts. And, in considering the past performance of the incumbent contract, it was noted that the performance was less than stellar. For example, when asked whether SIG satisfied performance requirements, the reviewer stated:
Overall, I find this vendor’s performance acceptable. That said, as discussed below there were, are, and continue to be both cost and schedule concerns associated with executing this effort, however at this time they have not risen to the level of unacceptability.
Likewise, in the area of meeting required performance schedules, the reviewer stated as follows:
Rated overall acceptable, however this vendor is on the low end of the scale [with regard to] fulfilling all CME [Contract Manpower Equivalent] requirements under this task order. The government did issue the vendor a letter of concern to ensure an acceptable number of candidates was routinely submitted for government consideration. That said, the untimely nature of government security vetting processes continues to be a major impediment to vendor success
.
Similarly, when asked whether SIG stayed within cost estimates, the reviewer stated:
Rated overall acceptable, however this vendor is on the low end of the scale [with regard to] cost performance under this firm fixed price contract. While the government arguably neglected to articulate a number of issues in the solicitation that ultimately required an equitable adjustment, at the same time, the government was forced to take action (above and beyond the equitable adjustment issues) to facilitate the vendor’s ability to maintain their current level of performance (see schedule above) by providing increased contract reimbursable compensation to their employees. One could argue that the vendor proposed less than market competitive compensation rates to win the solicitation.
SIG does not challenge the agency’s conclusion that its performance under the “very relevant” incumbent contract merited a rating of satisfactory confidence.

With regard to the disregard of the other proposed contracts, deemed to be less than relevant, even if the agency erred in its evaluation of SIG’s non-incumbent contracts, there is no basis to question the agency’s overall rating of SIG’s past performance as satisfactory confidence given SIG’s performance problems on its “very relevant” incumbent linguist contract.

In any case, prejudice is an essential element of every viable protest, and we will not sustain a protest when it is clear from the record that a protester has suffered no prejudice as a result of an agency evaluation error.

SIG also challenges the agency’s evaluation under the technical factor, which included an evaluation "to determine the extent to which successful performance is contingent upon proven devices and techniques.

SIG complains that the agency unreasonably failed to assign a strength to SIG’s technical proposal as a result of its experience as the incumbent contractor. Specifically, SIG contends that it deserved a strength due to its “well-developed process and procedures for recruiting, qualifying, and retaining linguists,” that were developed through its incumbency. SIG further argues that the agency erred by failing to recognize that the firm is “uniquely positioned” as the incumbent to process linguists using an approach the firm developed under the incumbent contract, and that SIG’s “significant experience” as an incumbent indicated a better understanding of the recruitment and approval cycle. The protester also contends that the agency engaged in unequal treatment by assigning a strength to CWU’s proposal for its “robust pipeline” of qualified linguist candidates while ignoring the fact that SIG already has many of the needed linguists vetted and in place due to its incumbency.

SIG’s arguments are without merit. As noted, the evaluation was to include consideration of whether offerors had proposed “proven devices and techniques.” The record reflects that SIG has struggled to meet the requirements of the incumbent contract, thus belying the claim in its proposal that “our current pipeline . . . along with continued recruiting efforts, is sufficient to meet the . . . levels required.”  For example, SIG’s technical proposal acknowledged that, under SIG’s incumbent contract, there are currently unfilled category III linguist positions.   Given SIG’s acknowledged, significant shortfall in satisfying the linguist requirements under its incumbent contract, we find that the agency reasonably concluded that SIG’s proposed approach, based on its incumbent contract, did not exceed the solicitation’s requirements so as to warrant the assignment of a strength.

In contrast, the evaluators found that CWU’s proposal provided “very detailed information” demonstrating its ability to meet the solicitation’s requirement to provide the required number of linguists. For example, CWU’s proposal indicated that the firm already has linguists that have been security vetted and would be available to perform under the contract. The evaluators also noted that the awardee’s proposal indicated that CWU’s pipeline of linguists contains hundreds of linguists who previously held or currently hold security clearance. In addition, CWU’s proposal stated that the firm anticipated hiring some of the incumbent workforce. In these circumstances, we find that the agency reasonably concluded that, although CWU is not the incumbent, its proposal exceeded the solicitation’s requirements for filling the linguist positions required under this contract.

Next, SIG challenges the agency’s decision to assign equal strengths to both SIG and CWU in evaluating offerors’ transition risk. In this regard, SIG contends that its proposal was superior because only SIG, as the incumbent, could offer a "no-risk" transition. The protester contends that the agency’s assignment of a strength to CWU’s proposal for offering a low risk transition essentially and unreasonably treated SIG’s transition risk as equivalent to CWU’s transition risk.

Evaluation ratings and the number of strengths and weaknesses assessed are merely a guide to, and not a substitute for, intelligent decision making in the procurement process.   The relevant question is whether the record shows that the agency fully considered the actual qualitative differences in vendors’ proposals.

Here, the record provides no support for the protester’s challenge to the agency’s assessment of strengths for both offerors’ transition approaches. First, the evaluation report and selection decision show that the evaluators and the SSA were aware of, and acknowledged, the differences in the offerors’ proposals with regard to transition. Specifically, with regard to SIG, the evaluators acknowledged that as the incumbent, it would have minimal transition risk, which SIG described as a “no risk” solution. With regard to CWU, the agency concluded that CWU’s detailed proposals increased the likelihood of an early transition without any degradation of service, thereby exceeding the solicitation requirements such as to merit a strength. While SIG may disagree with the agency’s assessment that this proposed approach to transition merited a strength, the protester has failed to demonstrate that the agency’s evaluation in this regard was unreasonable or inconsistent with the record.


Tuesday, May 5, 2015

Unusual confluence of 3 separate GAO protests, all involving one contractor

You can View Recent Bid Protest Decisions of the GAO on its website. My recent visit to the site came up with the unusual coincidence of three separate protests, each involving one contractor, SupplyCore Inc. 

As always in the blawg, do not rely on the rendition of the cited piece presented; read the full piece at the link provided, to keep me honest, first of all, and to learn more than what is presented, secondly, including internal citations. I cut, rearrange, paraphrase and generally conduct mayhem with the material to suit my own purpose in presenting a view point for a teachable moment; for right or wrong.

Matter of: SupplyCore Inc., File: B-409418.4; B-409418.5; B-409418.6, April 16, 2015
DIGEST: Protest challenging the agency’s decision to cancel a solicitation is denied where the agency reasonably concluded that continued in-house performance would result in cost savings and efficiencies.

DECISION: SupplyCore Inc., of Rockford, Illinois, protests the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) cancellation of request for proposals (RFP) No. SPM7LX-14-R-0029, for supply chain integration and management of lead-acid batteries. SupplyCore contends that DLA’s decision to cancel the solicitation was unreasonable. We deny the protest.

DLA issued the RFP with the intent of eliminating and reducing its current inventory of lead-acid batteries through attrition, and transfer of the responsibility for supply chain management functions such as forecasting, acquisition, storage, distribution, and transportation to a supply chain integrator. The RFP solicited proposals for a supply chain integrator to manage and perform all responsibilities required under the supply chain for worldwide support of current and future Department of Defense lead-acid batteries customers.

Based upon the agency’s evaluation of the offerors’ final proposal revisions, the SSAC and the contracting officer unanimously recommended the award of a contract to an offeror other than SupplyCore. Thereafter, the agency sent the presumptive awardee’s price information to a DLA business analyst to conduct an acquisition business case analysis (BCA) in accordance with DLA procedures. The final analysis found that it would cost the agency $13.8 million more to award a contract as compared to keeping the requirement in house. DLA also requested a BCA be performed by a private firm, which used a proprietary methodology distinct from the VSRM model used by DLA. The private firm’s BCA found an approximately $7 million cost of awarding the contract, as compared to continuing in-house performance, after accounting for transportation and contract costs. Thereafter, the agency determined that it would cancel the solicitation.

SupplyCore challenges the agency’s decision to cancel the procurement. The protester contends that the agency’s rationale for cancelling the RFP is pretextual because DLA does not want to award it a contract. SupplyCore alleges that the cancellation is unreasonable because the final BCA was based on faulty information and improper assumptions. Based upon our review of the record, we find that the agency’s cancellation was reasonable.[5]

As a general rule, our Office does not review agency decisions to cancel procurements and instead perform the work in-house, since such decisions are a matter of executive branch policy. However, where, as here, a protester argues that the agency’s rationale for cancellation is but a pretext -- that the agency’s actual motivation is to avoid awarding a contract -- we will examine the reasonableness of the agency’s actions in cancelling the procurement.

The protester makes three primary assertions in support of its allegation: the BCA improperly relied upon the price of the presumptive awardee, instead of SupplyCore’s lower-priced proposal; the BCA unreasonably assumed a 10‑percent decrease in demand; and the BCA failed to consider that the contract would be awarded on a fixed-price basis without an economic price adjustment, while the agency’s costs of in-house performance are not fixed. SupplyCore contends that these flaws led the agency to skew its cost analysis in favor of in‑house performance.

With regard to SupplyCore’s first assertion -- that it was unreasonable for the BCA to use the presumptive awardee’s price, while there may have been other methodologies the agency could have chosen to calculate costs for its final BCA, had the final BCA recommendation used the lowest-priced offer instead of the best-value offeror as the protester argues, such analysis would have been of little value to the agency given the solicitation’s best‑value award criteria, which placed significantly more importance on the non‑price factors. We find nothing unreasonable about the agency’s decision.

With regard to SupplyCore’s challenge to the agency’s assumed decrease in demand, we likewise find the agency’s evaluation unobjectionable. In this regard, the agency states that offerors were provided with demand history and briefing charts from an industry day, which showed declining demands and divestiture schedules. The agency also explains that its BCA included a sensitivity analysis that covered a range of demand scenarios, including a 10-percent increase in demand, which demonstrates that a savings would not be realized even if the BCA assumption of a 10-percent reduction was removed.

Finally, we also find unpersuasive SupplyCore’s argument that the final BCA did not consider differences between the fixed-price nature of the contract and in-house performance costs that would not be fixed. In fact, the BCA cost analysis summary clearly notes that the absence of an economic price adjustment in the fixed-price contract is “a further cost benefit” of contract award.

Matter of: Al Raha Group for Technical Services, Inc.; Logistics Management International, Inc., File: B-411015.2; B-411015.3, April 22, 2015
DIGEST: 1. Protests challenging the agency’s evaluation of the awardee’s past performance are sustained where the record shows that the evaluation was inconsistent with the terms of the solicitation and not adequately documented.

2. Protests challenging the agency’s evaluation of the protesters’ past performance are sustained in part, where the record shows that, for one protester, the agency unreasonably failed to consider information verifying the protester’s claimed past performance, and where the agency did not have a reasonable basis to discount positive past performance references.

DECISION: Al Raha Group for Technical Services, Inc. (RGTS), of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and Logistics Management International, Inc. (LMI), of Eastman, Georgia, protest the award of a Foreign Military Sales contract to SupplyCore, Inc., of Rockford, Illinois, by the United States Air Force under request for proposals (RFP) No. FA8505‑13‑R-31138, for F‑15 fighter jet transportation support services (TSS) for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). RGTS and LMI challenge the agency’s evaluation of the offerors’ past performance, and LMI challenges the agency’s tradeoff determination. We sustain the protests in part, and deny them in part.

The RFP sought proposals for comprehensive fleet management for various special-purpose vehicles and trailers to support base stand-ups and continued RSAF operation of F-15s. The contractor will provide all transportation and support services required to source, procure, track, warehouse, and deliver assets needed within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to support RSAF F-15 operations.

For purposes of award, the Air Force was to evaluate proposals under the following three factors: technical; past performance; and cost/price. With regard to past performance, the Air Force was to assess an offeror’s ability to successfully accomplish the proposed effort based on its demonstrated present and past work record. In addition to the present/past performance FACTS sheets prepared by offerors for four past performance references and the associated past performance questionnaires (PPQ) obtained by offerors, the agency also expressly reserved the right to obtain performance information from other sources. The RFP further provided that the agency was to evaluate the number and severity of performance problems, the appropriateness and effectiveness of corrective actions taken, and the overall work record; the solicitation warned that prompt corrective action in isolated instances might not outweigh overall negative performance trends.

The RFP advised offerors that the Air Force would evaluate the recency and relevance of each past performance reference. Recency was defined as active or completed efforts performed within the past 5 years from the issuance date of the RFP. For purposes of evaluating relevance, the RFP provided that the Air Force would evaluate the scope, magnitude of effort, and complexities for each reference. The RFP provided that the evaluation would include logistical and programmatic considerations, including but not limited to, the quantity procured, length of effort, complexity of the required delivery timeline, and dollar values of efforts submitted. The relevance rating was dependent on the degree to which the past performance references reflected similar scope, magnitude of effort, and complexities as compared to the solicitation’s requirements. For example, if the submitted contract met essentially the same technical complexities, but involved only some of the programmatic and logistical scope and magnitude of effort, a lesser relevancy rating was to be assigned.

the Air Force was also to evaluate whether an offeror’s past performance references demonstrated experience with the following: (1) foreign military sales or direct commercial sales material procurement; (2) procurement negotiations; (3) electronic asset visibility tracking and reporting; (4) subcontractor management; (5) international teaming agreements and/or international operations management; (6) packing, handling, shipping, and transportation management; and (7) quality assurance management. The RFP stated that the relevance rating for each reference would be based on the scope, magnitude, and complexity of the effort, and whether the reference demonstrated experience in the seven enumerated areas of experience.

Under the technical factor, the Air Force was to evaluate an offeror’s proposal for acceptability--essentially, a pass/fail evaluation. Among the technically acceptable proposals, the Air Force was then to make a best value tradeoff between past performance and cost/price, wherein past performance was to be significantly more important than cost/price.

After evaluating the recency, relevance, and quality of an offeror’s past performance, the Air Force was to assign an overall past performance confidence assessment using the following ratings: Substantial Confidence, Satisfactory Confidence, Limited Confidence, No Confidence, and Unknown Confidence (Neutral). The following matrix was established:


The Source Selection Authority (SSA) determined that SupplyCore’s proposal, based on its “Substantial” confidence past performance assessment, warranted paying a price premium of 4.18 percent over LMI’s proposal and 2.15 percent over RGTS’s proposal, both of which received “Limited” confidence assessments. Based on the tradeoff, the SSA determined that SupplyCore’s proposal offered the best value to the government, and selected the proposal for award.

 RGTS and LMI both challenge the Air Force’s evaluation of SupplyCore’s past performance as warranting a “substantial confidence” assessment, and each separately challenges the agency’s evaluation of its past performance as warranting a “limited confidence” assessment.

As a general matter, the evaluation of an offeror’s past performance is within the discretion of the contracting agency, and we will not substitute our judgment for reasonably based past performance ratings.   However, we will question an agency’s evaluation conclusions where they are unreasonable or undocumented.  The critical question is whether the evaluation was conducted fairly, reasonably, and in accordance with the solicitation’s evaluation scheme.  Here, we find that the agency’s evaluation with respect to SupplyCore’s and LMI’s past performance was unreasonable, inconsistent with the terms of the RFP, and not adequately documented and sustain these protest arguments.  We find that the agency’s evaluation with respect to RGTS’s past performance was reasonable and in accordance with the terms of the RFP and deny these protest arguments.

As discussed above, our Office will question an agency’s past performance evaluation where the record indicates that the agency either failed to evaluate, or otherwise unreasonably considered, the relevance of past performance references in accordance with the solicitation’s stated evaluation criteria. As relevant here, an agency’s evaluation of an offeror’s past performance is unreasonable where the solicitation requires the agency to consider the value of the offerors’ references as compared to the value of the solicited requirement, and the agency fails to reasonably explain why comparatively small-value references provide a basis to justify a high past performance rating, or in this case the highest possible rating.

Additionally, where an agency fails to document or retain evaluation materials, it bears the risk that there may not be an adequate supporting rationale in the record for us to conclude that the agency had a reasonable basis for its source selection decision.

 In sum, based on the fact that SupplyCore’s past performance submitted for evaluation was with respect to references that were small fractions of the size of the effort required by the RFP and the Air Force’s reliance on other past performance information did not adequately evaluate relevance pursuant to the RFP’s applicable criteria, the agency’s decision to assign SupplyCore the highest past performance confidence assessment of “substantial confidence” is not supported by the record.

Notwithstanding that the past performance information claimed for LMI’s CEO was verified by knowledgeable agency officials in the written PPQs,  the Air Force effectively elected to “verify” the verification set forth in the PPQs by seeking further information from the subsequent program manager.  That individual, who was not the program manager for two of the three cited references, could not verify certain aspects of the LMI CEO’s performance. The agency, however, has failed to advance any reasonable explanation for how the subsequent program manager’s inability to verify the LMI CEO’s performance negates the verification provided by knowledgeable agency officials in the PPQs.   We have held that an agency is required to consider PPQs in its possession.  The agency’s wholesale discounting of the verification provided by the PPQs, on the basis that it could not confirm LMI’s past performance information through yet an additional source, was unreasonable.  As a consequence, the Air Force failed to meaningfully consider available agency information regarding LMI’s past performance of similar requirements for the Air Force, and therefore we sustain the protest on this basis.

 In summary, we find that the Air Force’s evaluation of SupplyCore’s past performance was inconsistent with the relevancy requirements of the RFP and not adequately documented. Because the reevaluation of SupplyCore’s past performance could result in a new rating for that offeror, which could in turn require a new source selection decision, we conclude that RGTS and LMI, both of whom submitted lower-priced offers, were prejudiced by this error.  We also find that the agency unreasonably failed to consider information regarding LMI’s past performance on similar efforts for the agency, and that the protester was also prejudiced by this error.

We recommend that the Air Force, consistent with our decision, reevaluate offerors’ past performance information. Based on that reevaluation, we recommend that the agency make a new source selection determination. We also recommend that the agency reimburse the protesters their respective costs associated with filing and pursuing their protests, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.

[Note:  there is a considerable amount of fact and application of particular elements of the RFP requirements that is analyzed to reach the decision made.  You have to look to the source cited above to read it.]

Matter of: Dalma Tech2 Company, B-411015, April 22, 2015
DIGEST: 1. Protest challenging the agency’s evaluation of the awardee’s proposal as technically acceptable is denied where the agency’s evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation.

2. Protest challenging the agency’s evaluation of the awardee’s past performance is denied where the evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation.

DECISION: Dalma Tech2 Company (DTC), of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, protests the award under request for proposals for F‑15 fighter jet transportation support services (TSS) for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). DTC challenges the agency’s determination that SupplyCore’s proposal was technically acceptable, and the agency’s evaluation of DTC’s past performance. We deny the protest.

DTC challenges the Air Force’s determination that SupplyCore’s proposal was technically acceptable, arguing that SupplyCore failed to meet In-Kingdom licensing and facility requirements. The protester also challenges the agency’s evaluation of its past performance as warranting only a “satisfactory confidence” assessment. For the reasons that follow, we find that none of DTC’s challenges provides a basis to sustain the protest.

DTC alleges that SupplyCore cannot satisfy the RFP’s requirement to present a valid Saudi Arabian business license because SupplyCore is not a registered company or legally affiliated with an agent, distributor, joint venture partner, or teaming partner under Saudi Arabian law. See Protest at 2; Comments at 2.

Ordinarily, a solicitation requirement for a contractor to warrant that it possesses, or will otherwise obtain prior to performance, licenses required to conduct business in a foreign country is a matter concerning a contractor’s responsibility. In most cases, responsibility is determined based on standards set forth in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 9.104-1, and involves subjective business judgments that are within the broad discretion of the contracting activities. Our Office generally will not consider a protest challenging an agency’s affirmative determination of an offeror’s responsibility.

Here, however, the Performance Work Statement in the RFP (PWS) explicitly required that offerors “include [a] copy of [an] actual Saudi business license” with their In-Kingdom Execution Plans, effectively imposing what amounted to a “definitive responsibility” criterion. Definitive responsibility criteria are specific and objective standards designed to measure a prospective contractor’s ability to perform the contract. Such criteria, which must be met as a precondition to award, limit the class of contractors to those meeting specified qualitative and quantitative qualifications necessary for adequate performance, e.g., unusual expertise or specialized facilities. Where an agency includes a definitive responsibility criterion in a solicitation, we will review the record to ascertain whether evidence of compliance has been submitted from which the contracting officer reasonably could conclude that the criterion has been met; generally, a contracting agency has broad discretion in determining whether offerors meet definitive responsibility criteria since the agency must bear the burden of any difficulties experienced in obtaining the required performance.

Based on our review of the record, we find nothing objectionable about the Air Force’s determination that SupplyCore met the RFP’s licensing requirement. The RFP did not require that the offeror itself have a Saudi Arabian business license. Rather, the RFP specifically contemplated that an offeror could satisfy the licensing requirement by maintaining a sponsorship or teaming effort with a Saudi Arabian company. SupplyCore’s proposal states that the awardee’s proposed subcontractor, Arwadh Establishment, is a Saudi Arabian company licensed in accordance with applicable Saudi law. SupplyCore’s proposal included copies of Arwadh’s business licenses. Id. The Air Force found that Arwadh will conduct the In-Kingdom TSS requirements, and the SupplyCore team will utilize Arwadh’s stand-alone In-Kingdom Operations department to ensure that the company maintains and adheres to the local laws and customs for Saudi Arabia and to ensure that foreign personnel maintain a legal work status. Thus, the agency reasonably concluded that SupplyCore demonstrated compliance with the RFP’s licensing requirement through its teaming arrangement with a licensed, Saudi Arabian company.

To the extent DTC argues that the teaming agreement between the awardee and its subcontractor is inconsistent with Saudi Arabian law, the protester’s argument is misplaced. Our focus is limited to whether SupplyCore met the eligibility requirements under the terms of the RFP. In this regard, the RFP did not require offerors to demonstrate that their proposed teaming approaches were approved under Saudi Arabian law; rather, the RFP required evidence of an “actual Saudi business license,” which, as noted above, SupplyCore provided through its subcontractor, Arwadh. Under these circumstances, we find that the Air Force reasonably found that SupplyCore satisfied the RFP’s licensing requirement.
















Wednesday, February 18, 2015

Standing at the end of the line is without prejudice

Well it's all right, even if they say you're wrong
Well it's all right, sometimes you gotta be strong
Well it's all right, As long as you got somewhere to lay
Well it's all right, everyday is Judgment Day

Well it's all right, riding around in the breeze
Well it's all right, if you live the life you please
Well it's all right, even if the sun don't shine
Well it's all right, we're going to the end of the line



In this federal US Claims Court case, the protestor thought it was all right being at the end of the line. It wasn't. It was not in sufficient competitive position to win, so was not "interested" in the solicitation.

There are a lot of instructive statements in this case covering a variety of subjects, and I've mentioned many of them, but without much context or elaboration. Read the whole case at the link, for context, accuracy and completeness; and to see where I'm paraphrasing and if correctly.


UNIVERSAL MARINE CO., K.S.C., v U.S., United States Court of Federal Claims No. 14-1115 C, February 10, 2015.
In March 2009, the United States Army (“the Army”) awarded Contract W52P1J-09-D-0025 to Universal Marine Co., K.S.C. (“Universal Marine”) for the operation of a container yard in Kuwait that repairs and refurbishes commercial shipping containers. On April 24, 2014, the Army solicited Request for Proposals No. W52P1J-14-R-0062 (the “RFP”) for the same services as the March 2009 Contract. The incumbent did not get up.

To select an awardee, the Army used a lowest price technically acceptable (“LPTA”) source selection process that evaluated three factors: Technical; Past Performance; and Price. The technical factors were rated on an "pass/fail" or "acceptable/non-acceptable" basis. In the event an Offeror had no recent, relevant past performance, a rating of Acceptable was assigned. Thus, an offeror must clear three successive hurdles to be awarded the contract: First, an offeror must obtain an “Acceptable” rating in Technical Capability and an “Acceptable” rating in Past Performance, and then must propose the lowest price.

In footnote 4, the Court explained that the LPTA procurement method was one form of "best value", but that price/value “[t]radeoffs are not permitted”, thus an LPTA proposal is per se the best value if it meets the selection criteria and proposes the lowest price.

In incumbent, Universal Marine, had the highest price amongst 4 final bidders, all of whom were evaluated to be "acceptable" on technical and past performance factors.

The Government argued that Universal Marine lacks standing, because it finished fourth and has not challenged the offerors who finished second and third. Thus, even if the low bidder's (KGL’s) award were disqualified, Universal Marine still “cannot show that it had a substantial chance of being awarded the contract when it proposed the highest price.” Universal Marine has alleged no error that would disqualify the second or third highest proposals, and therefore lacks standing, because it “has no substantial chance of being awarded the contract.”

Moreover, Universal Marine “cannot show that it was prejudiced by a significant error in the procurement process.” To show prejudice, a protestor must establish “that there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for th[e] error.” Universal Marine cannot show a substantial chance of receiving the award and consequently cannot demonstrate prejudice.

Universal Marine contends that “the issue is not whether an [o]fferor is ‘next in line,’ but whether the [o]fferor has a reasonable expectation to receive an award.” It claims, being “in line” for an award means “being able to meet the requirements such that the Plaintiff is an eligible bidder and potential awardee on the contract.”

Finally, Universal Marine argues that the Army and KGL “would like to make the calculus of standing and interest party overly simplified.” Determining standing, it claims, requires examining the merits of the protest, not just a “blind reliance on the stacking and arraying of the ‘acceptable’ proposals.” Universal Marine claims it is not required to “dissect each proposal in the array that is above it, especially if it demonstrates a systemic flaw in the evaluation process[.]”

As a threshold matter, a plaintiff contesting the award of a federal contract must establish that it is an “interested party” to have standing.

A two-part test is applied to determine whether a protestor is an “interested party.” The protestor must show that: “(1) it was an actual or prospective bidder or offeror, and (2) it had a direct economic interest in the procurement or proposed procurement.” A third test has added that a protestor must show the alleged errors in the procurement were prejudicial. (“It is basic that because the question of prejudice goes directly to the question of standing, the prejudice issue must be reached before addressing the merits.”)

A party demonstrates prejudice when “it can show that but for the error, it would have had a substantial chance of securing the contract.” Importantly, a proper standing inquiry must not conflate the requirement of “direct economic interest” with prejudicial error. ([E]xamining economic interest but excluding prejudicial error from the standing inquiry “would create a rule that, to an unsuccessful but economically interested offeror in a bid protest, any error is harmful”).

In this case, Universal Marine submitted a proposal in response to the RFP, and, as an actual bidder, it satisfies the first element of the “interested party” test. But, Universal Marine did not satisfy the second element, i.e., that it “had a direct economic interest in the procurement.” Universal Marine’s proposed price was the highest of the four proposals. Thus, to have standing, it would have to challenge the bona fides of each of the other three offeror’s eligibility or the solicitation as a whole. But it did not. Universal Marine’s challenges concern only the awardee -- KGL. Based on the four challenges, even if the court were to set aside the award to KGL, the award would go to the second-place offeror. Without any challenge to the intervening offerors, Universal Marine cannot prevail.

As for Universal Marine’s reliance on Hyperion, Inc. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 541 (2014), it is misplaced, even though some facts are similar to this case. Hyperion filed a post-award protest as the highest-priced of four “Acceptable” offerors in an LPTA solicitation. However, Hyperion “contend[ed] that all three [other] offerors failed to meet [certain provisions] and failed to include required [provisions].” Hyperion went on to allege particular defects in each of the other three proposals. “In Hyperion’s view, it was the only technically acceptable offeror and should have received the award.” This case, however, is distinguishable. Here, four out of Universal Marine’s five arguments are specific to KGL, and the problem identified with the solicitation was waived as untimely. Thus, even though “proving prejudice for purposes of standing merely requires ‘allegational prejudice,’” Universal Marine has not alleged facts that, if true, would create a “substantial chance” that it would be awarded the contract.

For these reasons, the court has determined that Universal Marine lacks standing to seek an adjudication of this bid protest.

Sunday, January 11, 2015

Best buy based on price or value?

When you are standing in that long isle looking at all the shampoos available to you on the five shelves of product (as I experienced this last weekend), what moves you to choose one of them? (In my case, I just moved on, overwhelmed, deferring to whatever my wife decides to buy.)

Presumably, if you are a rational, frugal, person, you would choose the one that you needed, at the lowest cost. That requires filtering all the brand and other marketing temptations, of course, and knowing if you have oily hair, itchy scalp, or other conditions you are trying to address (adding color, conditioning, or ego boosting marketing imagery). Thus, you really do need to know what you need if you are going to be a smart shopper, before you go to the store.

But when your requirements are novel, either because you are going where no man has gone before, or whether the vehicle by which you want to get there is in the flux of major technological changes, you need to do more homework, have an open mind about what you do in fact need, and be prepared to pay more than one particular product costs in order to get what you think will better suit your anticipated but unarticulated circumstances.

That is the main reason for a variety of government contracting procurement methods: one size does not fit all.

But, it is important to understand why one method is superior to another, and, critically, to understand the role price pays in each different method. The article below is about what the US federal contractors call the low-price/technically acceptable source selection technique, known as LP/TA. Those of us more closely aligned to the ABA Model Procurement Code refer to it as the "multi-step" bid process. 

Don't be confused by the terminology. Under an Invitation for Bid and under the LP/TA price is the ultimate determiner for award: low price wins. The difference is that in the plain vanilla IFB, the final specifications are in the bid package (subject to minor changes along the way), whereas under the multi-step bid process, the government first solicits "unpriced technical offers" and the means is established whereby both the technical offers and specifications can be fine-tuned (within the scope of the original solicitation) before a call for final prices.

This is why it is absolutely essential in every method of source selection, especially low-price bids, to carefully identify the absolute minimal needs requirements and clearly communicate that to vendors by translating that into specifications that can be understood by the lowest common denominator of experienced reader -- the judge.

The low price scheme differs from the negotiated contract/"best value" procurement method, where low price is not determinative, with price being only one of several factors in determination of award. To the extent that the non-price factors are more subjective than objective, fairness and accountability for award determinations are more problematic than with low-price bids.

The risk factor must also be considered in making the choice of procurement method. Under the low-price method, the government bears the risk of identifying its need and translating that into specifications. Under the "best value" method, the government bears the risk of paying too much for something it doesn't understand, ending up with something it may not need. 

(It's having that kind of risk that led me to walk out of the store and "let" my wife select the shampoo.)

With that backgound, read the following articles in point and counter-point; don't just take my rendition of it, though -- read the articles for stuff I leave out, rearrange and paraphrase, etc.

Finding a Bargain for Government Buyers Shouldn’t Be a Crime, by J. David Cox J. David Cox Sr. is national president of the American Federation of Government Employees.
Contractors, who bill taxpayers a whopping $500 billion annually for goods and services, hope to use the “acquisition reform” moniker to minimize the importance of cost-efficiency in the federal acquisition process.

The No. 1 objective of contractors is to demonize the low-price/technically acceptable source selection technique, known as LP/TA, so that its use is greatly limited if not proscribed.

Contractors would prefer that DOD use a more expensive process called “best value,” which allows them to charge more for features that warfighters usually don’t need. A contractor who believes DOD should be asking for more can suggest additional features to the contracting officer, who can then include them in a new or revised solicitation, if necessary, so the most cost-efficient qualified contractor can then be identified.

The Government Accountability Office reports that DOD is using LP/TA more frequently to generate savings. GAO, however, dismisses contractor allegations that such savings come at the expense of quality: “Best value processes continued to underlie the vast majority of DOD’s new, competitively awarded contracts. DOD has increased its use of the LP/TA process in recent years for higher value contracts, and its decision-making regarding which source selection process to use did not appear to be ill-advised.”

Solicitous lawmakers profess fear that LP/TA’s emphasis on costs will erode contractor confidence and undermine the industrial base. Think tanks produce paid-to-order research that purports to demonstrate a link between LP/TA and poor goods and services. Helpful trade publications breathlessly report every contractor complaint about LP/TA, however unfounded. The goal of this public relations campaign is to enact prohibitions on the use of LP/TA or to at least make the technique so controversial that acquisition personnel will use the best-value technique instead.

There is a consensus in the so-called “acquisition reform” debate that the Pentagon needs to issue better and more detailed solicitations, which is another argument for preserving the LP/TA technique because it requires discipline and knowledge to write quality specifications and/or statements of work. In contrast, “best value” is often used as a crutch by agencies to allow contractors to tell DOD what to buy.

The key to successful use of LP/TA is for contracting officers to specify the critical acceptability criteria, which can often be easily accomplished with military equipment and services. Best value may be the appropriate technique when DOD doesn’t know precisely what it is seeking to purchase, or when the work is inherently difficult to describe. Acquisition personnel represented by the American Federation of Government Employees believe that the LP/TA technique provides the necessary level of performance at a lower cost to the government.
Acquisition 101: When a Bargain Isn’t a Bargain by Eric S. Crusius, a partner with Fed Nexus Law, who focuses on government contracts, cybersecurity, employment law and complex litigation.
LPTA certainly has its admirers, but even the most ardent supporters in the contracting community recognize its severe limitations. Nevertheless, J. David Cox, national president of the American Federation of Government Employees, offered a full-throated endorsement of LPTA in a recent column in Government Executive. Mr. Cox stated the reasons why LPTA is preferred to the “best-value premium” approach to acquisition.

LPTA is simply a road leading to mediocrity.

Here are several reasons he is wrong:

“Best-value premium” is a misnomer because these procurements still allow agencies to choose the lowest cost option. With any best-value procurement, the agency always has the discretion to choose the lowest bid unless something compelling exists that is worth a premium. This approach allows agencies the flexibility to pick the option that best suits their needs.

LPTA is often used where it should not be used. “Lowest price/technically acceptable” can be an appropriate mechanism in highly regulated or commoditized industries, where there is little differentiation between minimally acceptable products [such as the vacuum cleaners he mentions in the article??]. The approach, however, is popping up in situations where marginal product quality is a differentiator (such as medical products used to care for soldiers) and in the outcome-based services industry. A long dissertation is not necessary to explain why that approach is highly problematic. Would you like it if your children’s school hired its teachers on an LPTA basis?

LPTA often ends up costing more. This contracting method frequently attracts contractors who are unable to fulfill the requirements or complete the work without great assistance from the government customer. (This can be the case especially when past performance is not evaluated.) Eventually, drives up costs. It has held true through time with products that are minimally acceptable—the example of the vacuum cleaner is illustrative. In addition, this contracting method is driving responsible contractors away from doing business with the federal government, resulting in less competition. In fact, the number of small businesses participating in the federal marketplace has declined over the past few years.

There are also social reasons to shy away from using LPTA, such as lower wages and benefits for contractor employees and the exclusion of small businesses from government contracting, all of which drives down the overall economy.

While LPTA certainly has its place in federal contracting, that place is a small defined box with highly commoditized requirements. Anything larger robs agencies of much needed discretion, drives valuable contractors away from the federal marketplace, and enriches lawyers like me with more potential clients seeking assistance in filing bid protests.

Thursday, December 18, 2014

Are we bidding on supplies or suppliers?

The article for this post is very long, and very good and worth the read in its entirety. You probably would do well to just skip this post and go directly to the article at the link, although I have offered a few comments down below, after presenting bits of the article in my usual fashion of slicing and dicing it beyond recognition of its author. 

The author is Charles Shafer, a principal consultant with Red Team Consulting, a consulting, capture and price strategy consulting firm.

Why big procurements struggle and what can be done about it
There’s a wealth of constantly evolving IT products available that can be leveraged to answer some of the most difficult missions in government. Six different government entities took similar approaches to that business problem by creating large, long-term, high-volume, billion-dollar contracts by essentially vetting an initial group of government-savvy manufacturers and resellers. This process gave them each a contract where these companies compete on a daily basis for government IT commodity requirements by offering the latest technology at the best prices.

These contracts, which are task order contracts, have long been a very successful and useful tool. Many of these contracts are in their second or third iteration. And all of these contracts were opened again for competition in this decade, offering an opportunity for new technology resellers and manufacturers to earn a spot on these contracts and force existing awardees to compete again to maintain their position.

These procurements were conducted by six different contracting offices, working with completely different program offices, over the course of four years. Some of the solicitations contained traditional evaluation factors such as past performance and management approach, and some discarded with these factors entirely. Some used a multi-phased approach that rejected proposals in stages and others attempted to do all their evaluations at once. Some of these procurements were made up of smaller contracts that separated businesses based on their size and socio-economic profiles, while others lumped all contractors together.

However, there are a few commonalities that each of these procurements share. Each procurement required bidders to propose products that fit a profile of specifications given by the government. In each solicitation, the products covered a wide spectrum of technology, from basic personal computers to enterprise-class equipment. Many of the procurements had a long list of products, sometimes hundreds of items long.

The flexible nature of these contracts means the government is not obligated to buy any item from that original list, and it is widely known that proposing items against this list is done primarily for proposal evaluation purposes, and has little to do with post-award activities. Because these contracts allow you to regularly change your catalog post-award, you can propose a product with the initial submission that is compliant and cheap, but you know to be inferior and undesirable, with the intention of replacing it or putting another item on the contract post-award.

That’s because each of these contracts has a mechanism known as “technology refresh” and “technology insertion,” which allows bidders to update the list of products they offer after award. These mechanisms are necessary to keep pace with a rapidly changing technology market. It is important to remember that the government is not buying any initial products with the creation of these contracts. They simply serve to initiate the vehicles that will later fulfill billions of dollars of competed delivery orders after award. This creates an environment where the initial pricing submission has little basis in reality. [See, Are we hard wired to corrupt our procurement systems?]

In every case, the government used this initial list of products as a pass or fail measure for the technical evaluation factor. That means a bidder had to provide a combination of technology products that met every single specification the government marked as mandatory to be eligible for an award. The list of requirements attached to a single product could sometimes be 20 or 30 specifications long. When you multiply this list by the dozens or sometimes hundreds of products, you end up with individual pass/fail elements that can go well into the thousands.

The vast number of requirements caused significant delays during the proposal phase and much longer delays during the government’s evaluation and award periods. In many cases, the technical requirements for a product were initially unclear, impossible to fulfill, or specific to a single manufacturer.

Because these were pass/fail requirements that could invalidate an entire bid with one deficient response, bidders asked questions to clarify requirements. The delays and frustrations during the proposal period were nothing compared to what actually happened when the government began evaluating proposals. In a perfect world, with plentiful and skilled resources and no gray areas, it would take an evaluation team several months to properly evaluate and document the number of proposals received. At best, the products list evaluation method is a time consuming endeavor, and at its worst, it’s a liability for litigation.

Most often, evaluators compare the prices of bids by looking at the entire price of a bid, known as a total evaluated price (TEP). Because the price of some products are significantly less than others (for example, an LCD monitor and an enterprise-class storage system), certain products, based on their price and quantity, end up contributing much more to the TEP than other products.

In industry, we call this “weighting,” meaning that one product “weighs” more than others as far as its impact on pricing. Extreme weighting give rise to a pricing methodology known as gaming.   All of these procurements had weighting issues.

With these options, each bidder is presented with a much lower risk when understating prices. Bidders know to understate the price on the most heavily weighted items - it’s grade-school math.

This gaming approach has become the standard rather than the exception on these large procurements. This has created a downward spiral with each bid, as prices move lower and lower, becoming less and less realistic while testing business ethics.

The government is fully aware that gaming happens. It’s not a practice that was created by the technology commodity industry and it has been practiced for some time. There is an entire acquisition regulation dedicated to gaming, which the government addresses as “unbalanced pricing.”

They define this in FAR 15.404-1: “Unbalanced pricing exists when, despite an acceptable total evaluated price, the price of one or more contract line items is significantly over or understated as indicated by the application of cost or price analysis techniques.” The government has the right to reject offers for unbalanced pricing.

Once the government makes it over the solicitation hump and has an actual contract these contracts can be greatly beneficial to the government. They are dynamic and responsive to technology needs and can often be updated much faster than a GSA schedule. The competitive aspects of the contract drive down prices on products while also offering technology solutions the government might not have previous considered.

I believe there is a middle ground.

The proposed list of products should be vastly simplified, in both number of products and specifications. If the likelihood of a contractor having to deliver on their initial list of products is very low, then it should be reduced to a simple exercise for both industry and government. Using a much shorter list of products that are widely available and compliant with government standards, like laptops and monitors and servers, will ease several pre-award problem areas.

The key is to make the product evaluation portion simple. The government should rely more heavily on subjective evaluation factors like corporate experience, past performance, and written technical and management approaches. Detailed corporate experience and past performance information are reliable sources for evaluation in this industry as it’s not something that is often fabricated.
To me, the difficulty with this approach is that the government has given up trying to get the supplies it needs, because it cannot specify the products needed in the quantities needed fast enough to meet the demands of the consuming end users. The information from the using agencies is streaming at the procurement officers through a fire hose, or the pit stop re-fueling systems used in the Indy 500 races. With the scale down of procurement staff, there is not enough procurement broadband to deal with it all.

To deal with it, the government has turned to trying to get the supplies it needs to getting intermediaries, who get the supplies it needs. Thus, a solicitation for things turns to a solicitation for services. This may be a thoroughly rational approach, but it has flow on consequences that should be ameliorated. (Not to mention the hint of a inherently governmental function factor: see, To procure or not to procure: is that the question?

Mr. Shafer says, "Anyone who has spent time developing proposals for federal contracts will tell you that much of the evaluation process is subjective, except when it comes to pass/fail evaluation factors. Those should, by definition, be black or white." What is really being said here is that product evaluation for supplies is more objectively testable ("black or white") than the evaluation of service providers (which "is subjective").

Mr. Shafer endorses this approach because it focuses on the old-boy network of tried and true service providers. The problem I have with that is there is nothing in this approach that weeds out the gamers he mentions, and the more the same network is relied upon the narrower that network gets. 

To provide the integrity that is essential to have confidence in outsourced procurement services, critical solicitation and contract administration over the service-providers should be ramped up, and the mix of service providers should be competed far more than once a decade or so ("all of these contracts were opened again for competition in this decade"). And, maybe, it would not hurt to decentralize some of the commodity purchases ("IT commodity requirements") to more users.

Sunday, January 12, 2014

Unfair and reasonable price and ranking conditions in solicitations

It is one thing to carefully tailor specifications to meet minimum needs. Another to tailor competition. And yet another to tailor out any judgment or consideration process. The following is another from Lexology.com (reg. req'd.), in association with the Association of Corporate Counsel, and its excellent coterie of contributors. It involves US federal government contracts and its laws and regulations.

This is a selection of excerpts from the article. You will need to read the whole article for context, citations, sources, etc.

Beware of protest-proof procurements by Thomas P. Barletta , Peter L. Wellington, Paul R. Hurst , Michael J. Navarre and Anthony Rapa, of the firm Steptoe & Johnson LLP
Some federal government agencies are taking extraordinary steps to try to insulate their source selection decisions from the bid protest process. Below, we discuss three examples of this phenomenon: (1) solicitations that call for awarding the contract to the highest technically rated offeror who proposes a “fair and reasonable” price; (2) solicitations that prescribe specific point scores for various technical features and call for ranking the technical merits of the proposals based solely on the total points earned; and (3) solicitations that provide for very limited, highly circumscribed cost/price evaluations.

Occasionally solicitations will provide for award to the highest technically rated offeror who has proposed a “fair and reasonable” price. Under such an approach, all proposals are subject to a threshold determination as to whether their proposed prices are “fair and reasonable.” Proposals that clear this bar are then evaluated strictly according to their respective technical merits. Price does not otherwise factor into the agency’s analysis of which proposal offers the best value to the government. The solicitation may even explicitly assert that the agency will not engage in a price/technical tradeoff analysis in evaluating proposals. An offeror who waits until after award to file a protest asserting that its price advantage outweighed the awardee’s technical advantage will likely be met with a motion to dismiss the protest as an untimely challenge to the terms of the solicitation. Therefore, potential offerors who believe that their pricing is likely to provide them with a competitive advantage should consider filing pre-award protests on the ground that this approach is contrary to fundamental principles of procurement set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), statutes and case law.
[I point out here that this RFP format is specifically authorized in Guam procurement law (5 GCA §§ 5216, and 5121) for the procurement of professional services. Indeed, it is the form prescribed for the method of source selection for professional services first adopted, and later abandoned, by the ABA Model Procurement Code.]
It is well-established that source selection officials are required to meaningfully consider price in making source selection decisions. The FAR provides that "[w]hile the SSA may use reports and analyses prepared by others, the source selection decision shall represent the SSA’s independent judgment. The source selection decision shall be documented, and the documentation shall include the rationale for any business judgments and tradeoffs made or relied on by the SSA, including benefits associated with additional costs." See FAR § 15.308.

Furthermore, agencies are required by statute to make award “to the responsible source whose proposal is most advantageous to the United States, considering only cost or price and the other factors included in the solicitation.” See 41 U.S.C. § 3703(c) (formerly 41 U.S.C. § 253b(d)).

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has consistently upheld these principles in requiring agencies to consider price when making best value determinations, and has sustained protests where agencies have failed to engage in price/technical tradeoff analysis.

In Cyberdata, GAO sustained a protest where a solicitation provided for downselecting quotations based on technical factors only. Offerors were to be ranked strictly based on their technical scores without regard to price, and the top twelve were to be invited to give oral presentations. Price was to be considered only when a smaller number of quotations were chosen from among the top twelve as offering the best value. GAO sustained the protest, holding that
"a best value analysis necessarily encompasses consideration of an offeror’s price or cost since, to be meaningful, a best value determination requires a weighing of the value and benefits associated with a firm's approach against their associated cost to the government. In a best value procurement, it is the function of the source selection authority to perform a tradeoff between price and non-price factors, that is, to determine whether one proposal's superiority under the non-price factor is worth a higher price. Even where, as here, price is stated to be of less importance than the non-price factors, an agency must meaningfully consider cost or price to the government in making its selection decision. Thus, before an agency can select a higher-priced proposal that has been rated technically superior to a lower-priced but acceptable one, the decision must be supported by a rational explanation of why the higher-rated proposal is, in fact, superior, and explaining why its technical superiority warrants paying a price premium."
It is also noteworthy that GAO invoked the “significant issue” exception to its timeliness rules in the Cyberdata protest, which had been filed after award, because the subject was “one of widespread interest to the procurement community.” However, there can be no assurance that GAO would invoke this rarely-used exception again in a similar situation, so it would be prudent for potential offerors to file pre-award protests when faced with solicitations that provide for award to the highest technically rated offeror with a “fair and reasonable” price.

We have also seen examples of solicitations that prescribe specific point scores for various technical features and call for ranking the technical merits of the proposals based solely on the total points earned. Under such an approach, the agency will merely confirm the presence or absence of the prescribed technical features in each proposal, add up the prescribed points for each feature found to be present, and select the proposal(s) with the highest point total(s). In some cases, the offerors may even be instructed to score themselves by submitting self-scoring worksheets. In any event, under this approach, the technical evaluation consists merely of mechanically comparing offerors’ point scores, without any judgments or analyses regarding the actual qualitative differences between the technical proposals. An offeror who waits until after award to file a protest asserting that its technical proposal is qualitatively better than other proposals regardless of their respective point scores will likely be met with a motion to dismiss the protest as an untimely challenge to the terms of the solicitation. Therefore, potential offerors who believe that their technical proposals will contain qualitative advantages not adequately captured by the point scores should consider filing pre-award protests on the ground that this approach is contrary to fundamental principles of procurement law.

In a number of post-award protests, GAO has strongly criticized technical evaluations that relied exclusively on point scores. It has consistently held that “[a]n award decision is not reasonable . . . where the agency makes its award decision based strictly on a mechanical comparison of the offerors’ total point scores.”

Friday, January 3, 2014

Behold the best value

I have had a continuing discomfort with the rush to embrace best value, for at least a couple of reasons. Mind you, this is just the opinion of an observer.

Chiefly, "best" is always in the eye of the beholder, as in a beauty contest. It makes an objective review of the decision practically redundant, given the need to almost have to prove fraud to set aside an agency decision on the matter. An in awarding any contract, but particularly large contracts, it's the little things that appeal to one eye and not another that makes it a rich environment for dissatisfaction among participants and observers alike. If every finish is perceived to be a photo finish, suspicion turns on the judges by human nature.

Secondly, as practiced, best value has tended to turn to proven performance as the deciding factor to provide some degree of objectivity to ameliorate the first concern. While that is an necessary factor to be determined, when it becomes the essential factor it leads to an old boys network of routine providers who then become too big to jail. Ultimately, relying on the records of those who have survived early contest bouts tends to become anti-competitive.

But I have detected recently a few signs of new focus under the best value rubric, back towards price as an objectively supportable criteria when others tend to fail. What was becoming overlooked is the relevance of price in determining not just best value but best interest of the government. "Best" value is now becoming to be seen as "in a range of best" with price becoming more critical; the government is once again concerned with fiscal stress.

This takes us back to an earlier concept of lowest price, technically acceptability; what the ABA Model Code world recognizes as "multi-step" competitive bidding. On Guam, that is allowed by code in 5 GCA §5211(h), and more usefully described in regulation 2 GAR §3109(r).

The following GAO protest appeals case, as excerpted and reported below, is representative of what I'm talking about here.

Matter of: M&N Aviation, Inc., B-409048, December 27, 2013
M&N Aviation, Inc. (M&N), of San Juan, Puerto Rico, protests the award of a contract to Tradewind Aviation, LLC, of Oxford, Connecticut, by the Department of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), under request for quotations (RFQ) for air charter services in support of the agency’s Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS). M&N argues that the agency made award based on lowest price, rather than based on best value, as required by the solicitation. M&N asserts that had the agency conducted a proper price/technical tradeoff, it would have received award of the contract, and not Tradewind.

Quotations were to be evaluated based on technical, price and past performance criteria, with a contract to be awarded to the offeror whose quote, conforming to the RFQ, represents the best overall value to the government. When combined, technical and past performance were to be significantly more important than price. However, the RFQ instructed offers that where quotes were considered substantially technically equal, total evaluated price was to be the determining factor for award. Quotes were submitted by several offerors, including one from M&N, the incumbent contractor, and Tradewind.

After an initial evaluation, M&N’s quote was rated good under the technical factor, and satisfactory under the past performance factor. With respect to past performance, M&N provided three references, two of which responded to the past performance questionnaire. Tradewind’s quote was rated acceptable under the technical factor and was not rated under past performance. The record shows that Tradewind’s past performance was not evaluated as the firm did not provide any references.

The agency set a competitive range consisting of M&N and Tradewind. In its discussion letter to Tradewind, USMS identified one weakness and one deficiency. The discussion letter to M&N did not identify any significant weaknesses, deficiencies or adverse past performance; it simply provided M&N the opportunity to revise its price quote. M&N did not submit a revised technical proposal, whereas Tradewind did. A new technical evaluation was conducted of Tradewind’s revised proposal, resulting in an upgrade of its technical rating from acceptable to good. A review of Tradewind’s past performance information resulted in a rating of satisfactory.

In its final proposal submission, M&N revised its total price from $2,278,100.00 to $2,240,700.00. AR, Exh. 9, Award Decision, at 3. Tradewind’s price remained unchanged at $1,945,022.20.

The contracting officer determined that both M&N and Tradewind’s quotes were substantially technically equal. Based on this finding, she determined that award to Tradewind based on its lower-priced quote was in the best interest of the government.

While M&N does not specifically challenge the agency’s evaluation of its proposal, the firm does challenge the agency’s determination that its proposal was technically equal to the proposal submitted by Tradewind. A review of the record does not support M&N’s allegation, that award was made based on “best price and NOT by best value criteria.” The award decision clearly reflects the agency’s consideration of the relative technical merits and offered prices of both proposals. The contracting officer ultimately concluded that the proposals submitted by M&N and Tradewind were substantially technically equal and made award based on Tradewind’s lower price. However, it is clear that the contracting officer did consider relative technical merit in reaching this conclusion. In this regard, the contracting officer’s award decision comports with the stated evaluation criteria.

We also find no reason to question the agency’s evaluation of the offerors’ respective proposals. The evaluation of an offeror’s proposal is a matter within the agency’s discretion. A protester’s mere disagreement with the agency’s judgment in its determination of the relative merit of competing proposals does not establish that the evaluation was unreasonable. In reviewing a protest that challenges an agency’s evaluation of proposals, our Office will not reevaluate the proposals, but will examine the record to determine whether the agency’s judgment was reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria and applicable statutes and regulations.

In its protest, M&N lists various aspects of its proposal, which we infer to be offered as support for M&N’s position that its proposal is technically superior to the proposal of Tradewind. However, the protester did not address in its comments any matters related to its own evaluation, despite being provided with the agency’s evaluation documentation. Consequently, we view any challenge to the evaluation of M&N’s proposal as abandoned by M&N and will not consider it further.

With respect to Tradewind’s proposal, the protester primarily argues that the awardee did not offer aircraft that complied with the Statement of Work's requirement of “provisions for a minimum of 7-11 passenger seating” and should have been disqualified from the competition. M&N argues that the aircraft available to Tradewind are certified by the manufacturers to have a maximum of 9 passenger seats, and that such capacity does not meet the solicitation’s requirements. M&N appears to contend that the solicitation requires vendors to offer aircraft with capacity to seat the maximum of the range established in the solicitation, i.e., 11 passengers.

The RFQ nowhere stated that only an aircraft that could seat 11 passengers would satisfy the capacity requirement; instead, the RFQ identified a range between 7 and 11 passengers as its minimum requirement. While it appears to be M&N’s view that the solicitation requires aircraft that seat a minimum of 11 passengers, the RFQ’s statement of the capacity requirement in terms of a range suggests that seating capacity within that range would be considered. As a result, the agency’s reading of the requirement is consistent with the solicitation, and we have no basis to question its determination that Tradewind’s quote met the requirement.

M&N also argues that the agency treated the offerors disparately in the conduct of discussions, to its prejudice. Specifically, M&N asserts that while the agency informed Tradewind of weaknesses and deficiencies found in its proposal, it failed to inform the protester that one of its three past performance references did not return its past performance questionnaire. Second, M&N argues that while Tradewind was given the opportunity to revise its quote and address identified weaknesses and deficiencies, M&N was only given the opportunity to revise its price.

When an agency engages in discussions with an offeror, the discussions must be meaningful. In order to be meaningful, discussions must be sufficiently detailed so as to lead an offeror into the areas of its proposal requiring amplification or revision in a manner to materially enhance the offeror’s potential for receiving award. An agency may not, through its questions or silence, lead an offeror into responding in a manner that fails to address the agency’s actual concerns; may not misinform the offeror concerning a problem with its proposal; and may not misinform the offeror about the government’s requirements. While the precise content of discussions is largely a matter of the contracting officer’s judgment, such discussions must, at a minimum, address identified deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and adverse past performance information to which the offeror has not yet had an opportunity to respond.

With respect to M&N’s first allegation, it is not objectionable to evaluate an offeror’s past performance based on fewer than the maximum possible number of references the agency could have received. Here, the RFQ did not specify a minimum required number of past performance references, nor is there any evidence that the agency treated the absence of a response from one of M&N’s three past performance references as adverse information. To the contrary, M&N received the highest past performance rating of satisfactory. As such, we do not believe that the agency was required to inform M&N of the absence of the questionnaire during discussions.

With respect to M&N’s second allegation, there is no evidence that the agency found any deficiencies or significant weaknesses in M&N’s proposal. There is also no evidence that the agency identified any adverse past performance information regarding M&N.

Finally, the record does not reflect that the agency limited the protester’s ability to revise its proposal. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the agency’s discussions with M&N were meaningful and the firm was not treated unequally vis-a-vis Tradewind.

The protest is denied.