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Showing posts with label Cost and pricing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cost and pricing. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 19, 2017

The lowest what?

Bid awards are meant to go to the lowest responsive bid from a responsible bidder, right?

Lowest what?

Too often, the assumption, therefore the focus, is on price: the sticker price. Lowest price wins, right?

But from the phrase "sticker price", we also get the phrase "sticker shock".

Sticker shock is what County Officials are coming to terms with as they near completion of a new 22-story Superior Courts building in downtown San Diego, California. Here's the story from the San Diego Union Tribune:

COSTLY ADD-ON AT NEW COURTHOUSE
The new building downtown county courthouse, designed with 71 courtrooms, will consolidate operations at the 1960s-era downtown criminal courthouse on Broadway, Family Court on Cedar Street and the Madge Bradley Building on Ash Street. The 110 deputies and community services officers working at those three locations will be transferred to the new courthouse.

It will cost an extra $3.3 million a year in staffing to resolve security risks caused by the design of the $555 million downtown county courthouse set to open this summer, county officials say.

They point, in part, to a cost-cutting decision not to build a $25 million tunnel under Union Street that would have allowed deputies to escort inmates directly from the Central Jail to the new Superior Courts building.

“This design difference imposes a measurable and higher level of security costs,” said a 2016 report by Sheriff Bill Gore and Helen Robbins-Meyer, the county’s chief administrative officer.

The San Diego County Sheriff’s Department provides deputies and community services officers as security at the region’s courthouses. The department said it needed 33 more positions on top of the 110 originally planned in order to safely move prisoners in and out of the new 22-story building, and to respond to any courtroom emergencies.

The tunnel from Central Jail to the new courthouse was part of the original construction plan, and Keim said the sheriff continues working with state and local leaders to get it built.

Without the tunnel, the plan is to bus jail inmates two blocks to a controlled entryway at the courthouse called a sally-port. Gore says the buses require extra supervision, as do extra holding cells added to the courthouse design.

Gore’s report, submitted to the state Department of Finance, said the new courthouse’s high-rise configuration “significantly affects the ability of deputies to respond to security issues, dangerous incidents or emergencies.”

He noted that a 2015 study showed an average of 16 such incidents per week at the current courthouse.

There will be up to four criminal trial courtrooms on each of 11 floors in the new building. The sheriff wants roving deputies available to run up or down stairwells to assist courtroom bailiffs in any emergencies. Using an elevator might actually be slower if deputies on multiple floors stop it to get on board, the report says.

Other “rovers” would keep an eye on large public spaces, including the lobby and food court. More deputies also are needed to run the five weapons-screening stations at the entrance.

Two felony arraignment courtrooms pose added concerns: They are on the first floor near the exit doors. That proximity, the sheriff’s report says, “presents an increased security risk for a successful escape of in-custody prisoners charged with serious felony crimes.”

The sheriff has asked the state to cover the $3.3 million estimated annual cost of hiring 30 more deputies and community service officers, and three sergeants.

San Diego County spokesman Michael Workman said, “We need $3 million. If that doesn’t happen, we’ll have to determine what to do. It would probably have to come out of (the sheriff’s) budget.”
So, to save the upfront price to construct the tunnel by $25 million in fixed today's dollars, the taxpayers (of either the State of the County) will have to shell out over $3 million a year in servicing expenses, which tend to escalate over time -- for the lifetime of the complex.

Such a deal to get a lower bid price! In just eight years that $25 Million up front price will look a bargain, but the court will be doing 8 years to life (cycle).

This is an example of contemplating bid prices on sticker prices. That is not the model used, however, in the ABA Model Procurement Code, nor the Guam procurement law and regulations, which are founded on the ABA Model Code.

Whatever the colloquial use of "lowest price" may describe the Model law and regulation require a more holistic analysis. It requires "bids will be evaluated to determine which bidder offers the lowest cost". Moreover, "Only objectively measurable criteria which are set forth in the Invitation for Bids shall be applied in determining the lowest bidder. Examples of such criteria include, but are not limited to, transportation cost, and ownership or life cycle cost formulas." (See, Guam regulation 2 GAR 3109(n)(4))

Nobody likes sticker shock. In a $555 million procurement, that is a rookie mistake.

Friday, August 19, 2016

The art of the protest - Procurement controversy series, Miami, Florida

Art dealer files protest in Miami Dade College project
Miami art dealer Gary Nader has filed a bid protest against Miami Dade College after losing out on a multi-million dollar development project on campus, according to paperwork obtained by FloridaPolitics.com on Sunday. The college, which wouldn’t front any money, would give away the development rights and later get to operate the “cultural centers.”

The idea for the project began as Nader’s own unsolicited pitch to the school last May: To build a world-class Latin American art museum with his family’s name on it, which he would start up with $60 million worth of pieces from his own collection. The project has since grown into a mélange of uses because the college soon grew more interested in having a theater and conference center. Related’s plan more than halves the size of the museum that Nader had first proposed. All of the proposals include luxury residential condo towers to be sold to offset the costs of the cultural parts of the development.

Among its many allegations, the 49-page protest says winning bidder and Nader’s nemesis—developer Jorge Pérez, CEO of Related Group—lowballed the college more than $100 million in an “exceedingly low valuation” of the eventual development, which would be a public-private partnership. Nader’s protest also says the college has so far failed to respond to his lawyers’ public records requests for documents related to the review and selection process.

The protest also alleges a conflict of interest by attorney Al Dotson with the South Florida law firm of Bilzin Sumberg. Dotson, it says, advised Miami Dade College during the development bidding process but also worked for Related on a separate affordable housing project before the Miami-Dade County Commission.

The document also complains of inappropriate contacts between a Related executive and a lawyer advising the college despite a communications blackout between bidders and school officials, known as a “cone of silence.” “The evidence shows that the college promoted favoritism throughout the solicitation process,” it says. “…The ‘cone of silence’ was a moving target that continued to change, for no other reason, than to support favoritism.”

The protest document asks that all action toward the project stop until the dispute is resolved. It seeks a re-evaluation of all proposals by an “impartial evaluation committee.”
Fight over Miami Dade College’s cultural center takes more legal twists
Friday’s challenge came after weeks of legal wrangling over the price of a required protest bond and public records related to an internal college investigation.

(See prior post)
Art Dealer Gary Nader Butts Heads With ‘Condo King’ Jorge Perez Over Bid for New Miami Museum
It's a heated and highly personal battle.

It’s safe to assume that Miami art dealer Gary Nader thought his pitch to Miami Dade College for a multi-million-dollar campus development, including a 90,000-square-foot museum of Latin American art with $60 million worth of work from his own collection, would be welcomed with open arms. The proposal reportedly didn’t even require the school to put up any money; it would take ownership of the culture center in exchange for giving over a parking lot.

But when college officials—citing their status as a public institution—opened up the potential development to other proposals, and then gave top ranking to a rival bid from real estate firm Related, run by Miami “condo king” Jorge Perez of the Perez Art Museum Miami, Nader struck back. His limited partnership Nader + Museu filed a detailed 49-page formal “protest bid” on August 12, which contains nearly 400 pages of accompanying exhibits directed at Miami Dade College purchasing department, opposing an agreement with Related.

The papers claim that the agreement “failed to comply with requirements for a public-private partnership, repeatedly violated the express terms and conditions of this solicitation and offered an exceeding low valuation for the right to develop private improvements on College owned land…” It notes a $158.5 million difference between “the first and second highest ranked proposers,” calling it “astounding.” (See, Abnormally low vs unreasonably low bid)

William Riley, an attorney for Nader, told artnet News via email that there is “a statutorily prescribed opportunity to resolve the protest by mutual agreement between the parties within 7 business days after receipt of the formal written protest” filed on August 12. “We have notified the college that we are available to speak and/or meet within this timeframe. They have not responded to us.”




Tuesday, May 6, 2014

One buyer's "fair and reasonable" is another's fair and reasonable -- "maybe"

The US government General Services Administration operates an Amazon-like online catalog service for its agencies, states, territories and certain NGOs and others to purchase routine, or commercially standard, supplies and services.
GSA awards Schedule Contracts to responsible companies that offer Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and services falling within the descriptions of the Schedules. Combined, the GSA Schedules are a comprehensive, categorical offering of almost every product and service available. To date, there are over 11 million commercial products and services available through the GSA Schedules.

Acquisitions through GSA Schedules are issued using full and open competition. Prices have already been deemed fair and reasonable, and Contracts are in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, reducing evaluation cycles. Purchases can be made directly from a contractor's GSA Schedule Contract, eliminating time-consuming responses to complex RFP’s and lengthy negotiations.

See source.
That's their story and GSA is sticking with it.

Fundamentally, the government is intended to purchase anything only if the price is "fair and reasonable". (See FAR Part 15.402.) And what does that mean; how is fair and reasonable determined?

"Supplies offered on the [GSA]schedule are listed at fixed prices. Services offered on the schedule are priced either at hourly rates, or at a fixed price for performance of a specific task (e.g., installation, maintenance, and repair)." (FAR Part 8.404(d).) Under a fixed price contract, "the contracting officer can establish fair and reasonable prices at the outset, such as when — (a) There is adequate price competition", etc. (FAR Part 16.202-2.) (Also see, for instance, 5 GCA 5232(c) under Guam procurement law (based on the ABA Model Procurement Code), which suggests cost or pricing supporting data is not required "where the contract is based on adequate price competition", etc.)

So, then, is the GSA schedule a list of the lowest priced contractors for each item of supply or service? No. It is, as mentioned, like Amazon, with multiple pre-vetted contractors, each with its own price and contract terms. Each approved contractor posts its own pricelist which contains the pricing and the terms and conditions pertaining to each Special Item Number that is on the contractor's schedule. (See FAR Part 8.402(b).)

Thus, the GSA schedule does not provide the lowest price (nor one necessarily associated with contract terms specified by an agency), but simply a catalog of contractors GSA has determined offer "fair and reasonable" prices. The prices simply reflect "prices associated with volume buying" (Part 8.402(a)). The implication is that each of these prices are fair and reasonable because they have been determined by arm wrestling with the largest monopsony in the US economy; in effect, it is fair and reasonable because it is determined by the same thing as monopoly power. Of course, in a market with a monopoly, or a monopsony, there is no effective competition. Thus, the GSA prices are not based on price competition, but unilateral market power by a party that the market power has determined is -- or should be -- the "most favored customer".

The GSA describes this benevolent rule this way: GSA's goal is to be the best value supplier of choice. GSA Schedule contracts are negotiated with the intent of achieving the contractors' "most favored customer" pricing/discounts under similar conditions. (See GSA FAQ #7 here.)

Critical observers have pointed out, this requirement (to obtain most favored customer pricing) is not based on any explicit mandate of law or regulation, and is problematic as a practical policy decision. For instance:

Most Favored Customer And Price Reductions Clause
The most favored customer (MFC) and price reductions clause (PRC) operate jointly - seldom will you see the MFC clause without the PRC, and the PRC has no meaning without the MFC clause. There simply does not exist a legal basis for these clauses to exist. The FAR standard at 15.4 is "fair and reasonable". Their inclusion in an IFB or RFP is clearly not proper. It is currently in the FTS 2001 RFP improperly.

GSA has imposed these clauses in the schedule program for decades without legal basis. But no one has taken GSA to court. So, the bluff wins. The MFC clause is based on the premise that the government deserves similar or better discounts than the best discount you offer to a particular customer category. When you apply for a GSA schedule, you are required to identify the best discounts you have granted the following customer categories: Dealers/retailers; distributors/wholesalers; educational institutions; state, county, city and local governments; OEMs; and others (national accounts, end users.) Based upon the information you provide, the government will identify the customer that you have granted the largest discount to as your most favored customer, such as the OEM category. It is up to you to negotiate with the government in identifying the category that is most similar to the government customer. This will usually be the end user customer category, which ordinarily receives a lesser discount than offered to other customer categories and is most similar to the government in the way it buys.

We would like to make the case that GSA does not deserve any special price consideration from vendors in schedule negotiations. The rules clearly require procurement from lowest price vendors or justification of higher prices. GSA should be content to let market forces determine price. If Vendor A gives GSA 3% and Vendor B offers 8% for a comparable product, Vendor B will get the business. If this does not occur, this means that the entire schedule program is not workable and should be abandoned. If GSA and GAO cannot enforce this simple concept then we can only conclude that the higher priced product is worth more. - See more at: http://www.captureplanning.com/articles/12118.cfm#sthash.9LJLHicN.dpuf
See also, GSA and Most Favored Customer Pricing and POGO's White Paper on GSA Multiple Award Schedule Pricing, which has a chapter specifically addressing the Most Favored Customer ("FMC") pricing issue.

It is an issue recognized in the GSA Acquisition Manual: "The Government will seek to obtain the offeror’s best price (the best price given to the most favored customer). However, the Government recognizes that the terms and conditions of commercial sales vary and there may be legitimate reasons why the best price is not achieved." (Part 538.270)

The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense has recently released new guidance, under the hand of Richard Ginman, Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, directing DOD contracting officers to determine fair and reasonable pricing independent of the GSA scheduled prices:
GSA has determined the prices of supplies and fixed-price services, and rates for services offered at hourly rates, to be fair and reasonable for the purpose of establishing the schedule contract. GSA 's determination does not relieve the ordering activity contracting officer from the responsibility of making a determination of fair and reasonable pricing for individual orders, BP As, and orders under BP As, using the proposal analysis techniques at 15.404-1. The complexity and circumstances of each acquisition should determine the level of detail of the analysis required.
This directive is discussed in an Lexology-posted article written by Attorney J. Catherine Kunz of the law firm Crowell & Moring LLP:

GSA schedule contracting: has selling to DoD just gotten harder?
This memorandum directs DoD contracting officers to make their own determination of fair and reasonable pricing when using Federal Supply Schedules (also known as GSA or VA Schedule contracts), rather than rely on the fair and reasonable price determination made by GSA when GSA awards Schedule contracts. Specifically, the memorandum establishes a class deviation to FAR 8.404(d) that will be applicable to DoD entities buying off Schedule contracts.

The direction to use proposal analysis techniques at FAR 15.404-1 could mean that DoD contracting officers will (a) compare proposed prices received in response to an RFQ; (b) compare proposed prices to historical prices paid for the same or similar items; (c) use parametric estimating methods/application of rough yardsticks (e.g., dollars per pound); (d) compare proposed prices with competitive published price lists; (e) compare proposed prices with independent government cost estimates; (f) compare proposed prices with prices obtained through market research for the same or similar items; or (g) request and analyze “data other than certified cost or pricing data.”

Because “data other than certified cost or pricing data” is defined at FAR 2.101 as “pricing data, cost data, and judgmental information” and can include “the identical types of data as certified cost or pricing data [required pursuant to the Truth in Negotiations Act] . . . but without the certification,” it is possible that Schedule contractors will need to disclose their cost information in order to perform work for DoD.
The author suggests "This adds complexity and risk to Schedule contract performance and moves Schedule buys even further from the intent that the Schedule program mirror commercial buying practices." (Read the whole article for context I have left out.)  

But, if, as I suggest, the GSA Schedule is simply an Amazon for government buyers, wouldn't a commercial buyer also want independent assessment that the prices offered do, indeed, reflect fair and reasonable ones and not blindly take the first one to pop up on the screen?

Before leaving this topic, to follow up from the observation made above that the Schedules do not offer up the lowest price, rather a catalog of contractors at various prices, I note that the GSA Schedules program has evolved to now both offer and in circumstances require that any authorized government buyers ("ordering activities") to poll the list of contractors with an RFQ (Request for Quotes). The parameters of the e-Buy RFQ program are in FAR Part 8.402(d)
"E-Buy allows ordering activities to post requirements, obtain quotes, and issue orders electronically. Posting an RFQ on e-Buy — (i) Is one medium for providing fair notice to all schedule contractors offering such supplies and services as required by 8.405-1, 8.405-2, and 8.405-3; and (ii) Is required when an order contains brand-name specifications (see 8.405-6)".
See the GSA's Buyer's Guidance here. 

When ordering activities have been authorized to access the GSA Schedule, but are required to use the local source selection method competitive sealed bid to do so, as is the case with Guam agencies under 5 GCA 5122, it would not take a lot of tweaking of the system (laws or regulations) to allow a bid by the lowest contractor on the Schedule, determined by the e-Buy RFQ process, to be qualified for consideration under a local IFB, assuming the contract terms of the GSA Schedule contractor are consistent with the contract terms in the IFB.



Tuesday, April 15, 2014

Price realism vs price reasonableness vs bidder responsibility: a few case snatches

Several recent GAO decisions have involved issues of price realism. This is not an exhaustive look at the nuances or paramenters of the notion of price realism, but simply some brief snatches of decisions that may help point you to further research material. (I confess to using this blog as a card index of cases and issues.)

These snatches are not precise quotes from the decisions and should not be relied on for citation. Read each decision at the appropriate link.


Matter of Tetra Tech, Inc., File B-409095; B-409095.2, January 17, 2014
Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal represented the best value to the government based on price and the following non-price evaluation factors listed in descending order of importance: (1) technical approach; (2) key project team members/management approach; (3) previous corporate experience; (4) past performance, including small business subcontracting compliance past performance; (5) small business participation plan; and (6) small business subcontracting plan.

The source selection evaluation board (SSEB) evaluated the technical proposals and the price team, comprised of a price analyst and a cost engineer, evaluated price proposals. The price team prepared a report, for the SSEB, which then provided its own report, along with the price/cost report, to the source selection authority (SSA). With regard to price, the price team prepared a 112-page report reviewing each offeror's price for each of 84 contract line item numbers (CLINs).

Tetra Tech contends that the agency failed to conduct and document a proper "price reasonableness analysis of the URS Group's very low price." As our decisions make clear, price reasonableness and price realism are distinct concepts. The purpose of a price reasonableness review is to determine whether the prices offered are too high, as opposed to too low. Arguments that an agency did not perform an appropriate analysis to determine whether prices are too low, such that there may be a risk of poor performance, concern price realism, not price reasonableness.

Here, we view Tetra Tech's argument as going to the realism of URS's pricing. In this regard, the price team evaluated the reasonableness and realism of each of the offerors' proposed prices under each of the 84 CLINs and noted instances in which an offeror's price was considered to be high or low, considering its proposed technical approach. For 8 CLINs, accounting for approximately 1.6% of URS's overall price, the price team found that URS's price appeared to be low, and for 1 CLIN, the price team found that the price appeared to be high.

The agency determined that URS's lower prices generally reflected its use of an innovative, advantageous, and less costly technology, and that the risk associated with using the technology was sufficiently mitigated by URS's approach in this regard. We find nothing in Tetra Tech's protest that calls into question the resulting agency determination that URS's overall pricing was realistic for its technical approach.
Matter of: Delaware Resource Group of Oklahoma, LLC, File B-408962.3; B-408962.4, March 24, 2014
Protest alleging that the agency failed to conduct a reasonable price realism analysis is denied where the record shows the agency’s analysis was reasonable and adequately documented.

With regard to price, the RFP established that the agency would rank all technically-acceptable proposals by their total evaluated price, and conduct a price evaluation to determine if the prices were fair, reasonable, and complete. The RFP advised that the agency “reserves the right to conduct a price realism review to determine whether the price proposed is feasible in relation to the technical proposal and the requirements of the [PWS].” Price proposals that were unreasonably high or unrealistically low when compared to the independent government estimate and the offeror’s proposed technical approach could be found to have an inherent lack of understanding of the solicitation requirements, and the proposal could be rejected.

Where, as here, an RFP contemplates the award of a fixed-price contract, or a fixed-price portion of a contract, an agency may provide in the solicitation for the use of a price realism analysis for the limited purpose of measuring an offeror’s understanding of the requirements or to assess the risk inherent in an offeror’s proposal. Our review of a price realism analysis is limited to determining whether it was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation. The nature and extent of an agency’s price realism analysis are matters within the agency’s discretion.

On this record, we conclude that the Air Force conducted a reasonable evaluation of Chenega’s price consistent with the RFP criteria. To the extent that DRG believes that Chenega cannot perform the contract at its proposed price, DRG’s disagreement with the agency’s judgment provides no basis to sustain the protest.
Matter of: JCMCS File B-409407, April 8, 2014
JCMCS, of Washington, DC, protests the Department of the Army’s award of a contract to M&F Concrete, of Manassas, Virginia, under invitation for bids (IFB) No. W91QV1-13-B-0010, for general concrete services at facilities in Virginia and the District of Columbia. The protester argues that M&F’s bid price is so low that the agency should have concluded that M&F is not a responsible bidder. Award was to be made to the low-priced, responsible bidder whose bid was responsive to the terms of the IFB.

M&F had the lowest bid price of $20,514,321.50, significantly lower than JCMCS’s bid, which was the second lowest ($36,374,996).

Below-cost prices on fixed-price contracts are not prohibited, and whether a bidder can perform at its bid price is a matter of bidder responsibility, which is not reviewable by our Office absent circumstances not present here. See Bid Protest Regulations, 4 C.F.R. § 21.5(c) (2013).

First, the protester argues that the agency failed to use any of the price analysis techniques set out in Federal Acquisition Regulations. There is no requirement, however, for the use of price analysis techniques in assessing bid prices.

JCMCS also asserts that, given M&F’s unrealistically low prices, the awardee cannot meet the solicitation requirement to pay labor rates compliant with the applicable Davis Bacon Act wage rates. A bidder may remain eligible for award even if lower wage rates than those required by a prevailing wage rate determination are offered by the firm, where the firm accepts (and is therefore obliged to meet) a requirement to compensate employees at prevailing rates, and the firm is otherwise determined to be responsible.

JCMCS next argues that M&F’s bid is so low that the bid must be unbalanced. This argument, by itself, fails to state a basis for protest. Unbalanced pricing exists where the prices of one or more items are significantly overstated, despite an acceptable total evaluated price (typically achieved through underpricing one or more of the other line items). Low prices, by themselves, are not improper and do not themselves establish (or create the risk inherent in) unbalanced pricing. Where an unbalanced offer is received, agencies are not required to reject it, but should consider the risk to the government of unreasonably high prices for contract performance.
Matter of Kilda Group, LLC, File B-409144; B-409144.2, January 29, 2014
The RFP was issued as a total small business set-aside, seeking proposals to design a strategy for delivering a core curriculum of training programs for agency leaders at the supervisory, management, and executive levels. As amended, the RFP described a broad range of requirements, identifying a number of mandatory tasks such as, project management, on-demand training, executive development, and blended learning.

The RFP provided for the award of a fixed-price contract with definitive and indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract line items (CLINs) for a four-month base period and three 1-year options. Award was to be made on a best-value basis considering the following factors listed in descending order of importance: (1) technical approach; (2) past performance; (3) socioeconomic considerations; and (4) price. The non-price factors, when combined, were significantly more important than price. Kilda contends that the agency failed to adequately evaluate the awardee’s prices for realism.

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) recognizes a number of price analysis techniques that may be used to determine whether prices are reasonable and realistic, including a comparison of proposed prices with each other and comparison of proposed prices with an independent government estimate (IGE).

Here, the VA compared ALIS’ total price to the median total price of $28,340,513, calculated based on the total prices of eight offerors. Kilda insists that the VA should have considered whether ALIS’ proposed labor rates and proposed unit prices were realistic, rather than simply comparing ALIS’ total proposed price to the median of the offered prices. Although Kilda ultimately believes that a more detailed realism assessment was necessary, as noted above, the extent of a price realism analysis is within the sound exercise of the agency’s discretion and agencies are free to use a number of techniques in assessing price realism. Indeed, we have found that a comparison of prices received is among the proposal analysis techniques that may be used under FAR § 15.404-1, and also “can be appropriate in a price realism analysis.”

Kilda also argues that the realism assessment was unreasonable since it was based on an unreasonably calculated median price. In this regard, the protester highlights the fact that the agency calculated the median using the prices of two proposals that had been rated as unsatisfactory under the technical approach factor, in part, because they did not have an acceptable understanding of the agency’s needs. We agree with the protester that the agency should not have included the prices for these two firms in calculating the median. Nevertheless, when these firms’ prices are excluded, the median does not change significantly--it goes up from $28,340,513.00 to $29,802,909.98 (a change of approximately 5%).

Our Office will not sustain a protest absent a showing of prejudice to the protester; that is, unless the protester demonstrates that, but for the agency’s actions, it would have had a substantial chance of receiving the award. In our view, given the minimal impact on the calculated median, we have no basis to conclude that the protester was prejudiced by the alleged error.



Tuesday, March 25, 2014

Cost plus a percentage of cost contracts

Generally speaking, the government can enter into any kind of contract it wants, with the proviso here that I refer to the types of price incentives the government desires to incorporate into a contract. And I add that there may be conditions placed on many types of such incentives. But the one type of price incentive contract that seems to extract uniform rejection in US procurement law is a cost-plus-percentage-of-cost contact.

I was reminded of this when I read a story about a contract the Government of Guam is proposing, considering or playing hot-potato with. (Actually, it remains a political mystery whether the government is proposing it or not; let's just say it is on some kind of agenda of someone somewhere and involves the highest levels of the Guam executive and legislative concerns as well as those of the Guam Federal District Court, but that's another story.)

Here's the story with the critical part pertinent to this post:

‘GRRP plan too expensive’
The 214-page draft agreement negotiated between GRRP and the Guam Economic Development Authority would contract GRRP to build a waste-to-energy plant and manage the island’s solid waste, if implemented. Though it is dated Dec. 13, 2013, it only came to light last week.

“Waste-to-energy, when done properly, is another way to make the landfill last longer. However, waste-to-energy will not be inexpensive if GovGuam goes down this road. To suggest it will actually reduce the cost of the system and the rates of solid waste customers is either badly mistaken or intentionally misleading,” said David Manning, the federal receiver's representative.

Under the agreement, GRRP would receive at least $125 million in bond money from bonds authorized by GovGuam to build a waste-to-energy plant. Under a cost-plus provision of the agreement, GRRP would be entitled to a 15 percent fee on the cost of the construction. This amounts to $18.75 million on construction costs of $125 million.
The pertinent part, obviously, is the suggestion that this contract proposes "a cost-plus provision", where the "plus" is "a 15 percent fee on the cost of construction."

The federal government regulations discuss contract types and their selection in FAR Part 16. Cost reimbursement contracts are covered in Part 16.3. Incentive contracts are covered generally in FAR Part 16.4. "The cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting shall not be used" (FAR Part 16.102(c)).

Guam law, based in the ABA Model Procurement Code, is much less descriptive or as complicated as the FAR. It simply says,
"Subject to the limitations of this Section, any type of contract which will promote the best interest of the Territory may be used; provided that the use of cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contract is prohibited. A cost-reimbursement contract may be used only when a determination is made in writing that such contract is likely to be less costly to the Territory than any other type or that it is impracticable to obtain the supplies, services or construction required except under such contract." (5 GCA Section 5235.)
The genesis of the aversion to cost plus a percentage of cost pricing appears to have taken form in the days before Pearl Harbor when the US was anticipating war, but was informed by circumstances from the First World War, as mentioned in a US Supreme Court case, MUSCHANY ET AL. v. UNITED STATES 324 US 49, 1945, an interesting case.

The case involved the condemnation of land by the US by eminent domain, and the contract with an agent to obtain options in contemplation of condemnation. The agent's fee was a 5% commission to be withheld from the proceeds due the landowners. As the opinion described,
"There were a large number of landowners in the required area. Options were obtained from 270, including the petitioners, and with one exception the options were accepted by the Government at the optioned price. Almost half of the contracts were closed by acceptance of deeds and payment of the price. Criticism of the prices and manner of purchase developed and the War Department repudiated the remaining contracts and turned to condemnation. The repudiation followed upon the conclusion among other things that the contracts violated the statutory provision against the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting, and were contrary to public policy because of the contingent interest of McDowell, which was antagonistic to the Government."
The Court then discussed the law:
"Prior to the present war emergency the Secretary of War had broad powers to acquire land for military purposes by purchase at prices deemed reasonable by him or by condemnation. There were no restrictions as to the manner in which he should exercise this power to purchase, but his power to contract for construction work was sharply limited by statute. These restrictions, if continued, would have seriously impeded the War Department's preparation for war. Thereupon Congress passed the act of July 2, 1940, which removed certain of these prior statutory restrictions. The act did, however, restrict the broad powers conferred therein by prohibiting the use of cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts; use of cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts was expressly approved by the act. The question is raised as to whether the prohibition of cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts applies to the War Department's purchase of these lands with appropriations for the fiscal year 1941.

We are of the opinion that the first section of the act of July 2, 1940 indicates that the purchase of land by the War Department is subject to the provisions of that section; therefore, the proviso in the section which prohibits use of the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting must be taken to apply to purchases of land.

Our next inquiry is as to whether the contract with the vendors violates this prohibition against cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts. Evidently the proviso was inserted to avoid the abuses which were prevalent before and during the first World War from the Government's guarantee of cost plus a profit to contractors.

The purpose of Congress was to protect the Government against the sort of exploitation so easily accomplished under cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts under which the Government contracts and is bound to pay costs, undetermined at the time the contract is made and to be incurred in the future, plus a commission based on a percentage of these future costs. The evil of such contracts is that the profit of the other party to the contract increases in proportion to that other party's costs expended in the performance. The danger guarded against by the Congressional prohibition was the incentive to a government contractor who already had a binding contract with the Government for payment of undetermined future costs to pay liberally for reimbursable items because higher costs meant a higher fee to him, his profit being determined by a percentage of cost."






Monday, October 7, 2013

Fair and Reasonable gross profit margins in war vs peace procurement

Supreme Owner Made a Billionaire Feeding U.S. War Machine
Chemical warfare and car bombings are just a few of the hazards working in war-torn countries such as Iraq and Syria. For Supreme Group BV, it’s the cost of doing business. The perilous business, where contractors dodge bullets fired by the Taliban and explosives set by insurgents, has made the company’s majority owner, Stephen Orenstein, a billionaire. Since the start of the war in Afghanistan in 2001, Supreme’s revenue has increased more than 50-fold to $5.5 billion in 2011.

The company’s largest contract -- an exclusive deal to distribute food to U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan -- has been riddled with lawsuits and accusations, including the Department of Defense’s assertion that Supreme overcharged it by $757 million. The U.S. military food contract has paid it $9.1 billion to date, according to data compiled by the DLA.

Orenstein disputes the U.S. overpaid for Supreme’s services. The company said it’s owed an additional $1.8 billion. “The Pentagon used the word overcharging and it’s not justified,” said Orenstein. “We agreed on preliminary rates. They decided to unilaterally apply new rates based on the costs as they see them, and tried to recoup the difference between the two.”

“By keeping the money flowing to Supreme through noncompetitive contract extensions, the Defense Department unwisely and unnecessarily put U.S. taxpayers on the hook”, said U.S. Representative John Tierney, the ranking Democratic member on the House Government Reform & Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, in a statement to Bloomberg News.

Accusations of Supreme overcharging the DLA first surfaced in a March 2011 audit report by then-Pentagon Inspector General Gordon Heddell. According to the report, the DLA overpaid Supreme $124.3 million for transportation and corrugated-packing boxes. In addition, Pentagon personnel had no assurance that billings for another $103 million in boxes were accurate or “even chargeable to the contract,” the report said. The company was also paid about $455 million for airlifting fresh fruits and vegetables from storage areas in the U.A.E. to Afghanistan, without the DLA ensuring the prices were “fair and reasonable,” according to the audit. Supreme was further said to be overpaid $98.4 million from 2005 to 2008 for transportation costs, in part because reimbursement rates “were significantly higher than the rates needed to reimburse the vendor for costs and associated profits,” the report said.

“The discrepancy in the amount Supreme and DLA claim to be owed is based on a contract modification regarding delivery to additional customer locations,” DLA spokeswoman Mimi said in an e-mail. “DLA and Supreme utilized different methodologies to calculate the appropriate price for transportation to these additional locations.”
I won't go into it in any detail, because I'm not qualified to do so, but there are many instances in federal contracting, including the making of contract changes and the awarding of non-competitive contracts, when the government is limited to making payments that are described, if not well defined, by the term "fair and reasonable". See generally FAR Subpart 15.4 and Selling To The Government: What 'Fair And Reasonable Pricing' Means, by Steve Charles, for a beginner's guide to the topic.

The takeaway in this post's context is that the determination of the fair and reasonable price is ultimately the government's, but the government must follow procedural and substantive rules to make that determination; it is thus a contestable determination. And Supreme is well staffed to bring it on. As the article states,
Orenstein confirmed that he and his family control 75 percent of the company. His partner, Michael Gans, holds the rest with his wife. Their first contract provided logistics services to the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Mozambique in 1993. “My strength has always been the execution and procurement, and Michael’s strength is in writing,” said Orenstein. Gans, who is a citizen of Luxembourg and lives in Baech, Switzerland, received a bachelor’s degree in political science from Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York, and a law degree from George Washington University in Washington.
GW is the home of the US' foremost procurement law education program.

There is another aspect to this article that I want to bring out:
According to its latest annual report, the company had earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization of $953 million in 2011 on revenue of $5.5 billion. According to its annual reports, Supreme had net income margins that ranged from 15 percent to 23 percent between 2008 and 2011.

“That’s a fairly large profit margin when it comes to federal government contracts,” said Scott Amey, general counsel for the Washington-based Project on Government Oversight. “Most contractors claim that their profit margins are zero to 5 percent.”

Orenstein confirmed that Supreme’s food distribution fee to the U.S. military in 2010 was “in the range of 18 to 21 percent” and could go as high as 50 percent, according to a transcript of testimony he gave in a 2010 lawsuit. He also testified that it was “very common that the percentage of total revenue, the service fee percentage, exceeded 75 percent,” when the distribution of food and other supplies flown into Afghanistan by airplanes and helicopters accelerated in 2006.

Including almost $1 billion in dividends he has collected since 2008, Orenstein has a fortune valued at least $1.1 billion, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.
Normally, the higher the risk, the greater return that is demanded from market players. Conversely, the lower the risk, the lower the expectation of profits. Regular peacetime government contracting attracts contractors, especially in economically tight times, because governments are more likely to pay than stressed private buyers. The certainty of payment reduces the risk of buyer default, and profits are generally lower. 

But in times of war or disaster, operational risks tend to increase, which increases costs, and the expectation of profits. Even "fair and reasonable" costs may have an inelastic element that justifies higher contract payment, and profit margins. Canny contractors become attracted to war and disaster margins, and can make a motza.

Saturday, September 7, 2013

The elasticity of pricing professional services

This post keys off the following article from Wales, involving changes in the UK procurement rules for professional legal services.

UK Government's big change to legal plans after protest by lawyers
The UK Government has scrapped plans to award legal aid contracts to the lowest bidders after protest from lawyers who warned high street firms could go bust.

Justice Secretary Chris Grayling announced there would be a set number of contracts for duty work – such as that picked up in police stations – and these would be assessed on the quality and capacity of firms bidding for them. Under the original proposals, price would have been a key factor. There will be an unlimited number of contracts available for own client work, providing minimum quality requirements are met.

The Government stated that “providers delivering services in Wales would be required to ensure that services are accessible to, and understandable by, clients whose language of choice is Welsh”.

Andrew Thomas QC, who has practised across North Wales, welcomed the changes. He said: “The Government had proposed handing the work to big national companies looking to provide a cut-price service. “The intention was to take away the public’s right to choose a lawyer they know and trust, forcing them to accept the provider which had bid the lowest. Quality of service would have gone out the window.
The ABA Model Code provides a variety of "methods of source selection", that is to say, procurement mechanisms. In each, price plays, of course, a key relevant role, but in different ways. There is the common "competitive sealed bid" process whereby bids are assessed against objective criteria and specifications, and the contract goes to the lowest submitted price, without negotiation. It is, in essence, a plain vanilla auction.

The 1979 version of the ABA Model Code contained two different "proposal" methods, one called a competitive sealed proposal (let's call it the RFCP method: request for competitive sealed proposals) and the other a proposal for professional services (let's say RFP: request for proposals). The pricing mechanism differs. In the RFCP method, price is given a particular points weighting in the RFCP solicitation, and is negotiated along with other elements of the solicitation but is not re-weighted, with the best ultimate points winner getting the nod.

In the RFP method, price is not initially considered or even disclosed. Given the classically described in-elasticity of professional service of economics models, price is not a factor in the first instance of choosing the best service available. In the first instance, the quality of the service required relative to the outcome needed is the only consideration. Offerors are ranked in terms of deemed "best offer" of service, from best to least. At that point, the critical price factor comes in to play. The first best offeror is chosen to engage in negotiation for a fair and reasonable compensation. If a fair and reasonable price is agreed upon, the award goes to that offeror. If fair and reasonable price is not obtained from the first best, negotiations begin anew for compensation with the next best offeror.

What draws this story to my attention is the need to have a mechanism for obtaining professional services where quality of service is the foremost first objective. The story illustrates the desirability of a source selection method that places primacy of the professional service factor over price.

The ABA has jettisoned the separate old RFP system, subsuming it within the RFCP method, which requires a careful understanding and use of the weighting process by the procurement officer. It is a decision that is rarely if ever second-guessed, so can lead to less than ideal results, if not abuse.

Guam, which has adopted most of the ABA MC model, curiously kept the RFP method but years ago, soon after adoption, jettisoned the RFCP method, most likely because it is not easily an objectively verifiable selection process and easily subjected to abuse. I would think there is room in the quiver for both arrows, each more useful than the other in particular instances.

Wednesday, July 10, 2013

Published benchmark costs bring procurement savings

Rigorous transparency is a two-way mirror. It not only reveals what the government is doing, it also reveals what the private contractors are doing. Too often we make the assumption that a transparent system just reveals the government action. And then we scratch our heads trying to understand how two different agencies buying the same thing end up with sometimes grossly divergent costs.

In an attempt to capture that low cost to government, big companies have championed cooperative purchasing, a method of source selection where everyone buys from the one seller at the one price. Good for big business, bad for small business and a widened tax base.  It increases efficiency, arguably, at the expense of fostering competition.

The UK government has thought outside that box and achieved the low cost benefit without (directly anyway) bestowing a monopoly on one supplier. 

How?    By disclosing actual costs paid to its contractors.

Construction procurement reform saves £447 million
Cabinet Office minister Chloe Smith announced the latest set of benchmarked government construction costs, which are designed to give public sector customers an indication of how much they should pay. She described the benchmarking system as a “key” efficiency reform and said its ability to deliver projects 15 to 20 per cent cheaper meant the public sector would reinvest £1.2 billion in projects by 2015. This would equate to around 60 new secondary schools, she added.

The new benchmarking figures provide more granular department cost benchmarks and data direct from local authorities, according to Smith. “We have now published department cost reduction trajectories and construction cost benchmarks, which help inform central government and wider public sector clients as to what they currently pay for construction and what their construction should therefore cost,” said Smith.

Changes to public sector procurement to benefit SMEs were also underway, she said, to raise the amount of government business to SMEs by 2015 to 25 per cent. “These reforms are starting to pay off. Overall government has increased its direct spend with SMEs from 6.5 per cent in 2009-10 to 10 per cent in 2011-12,” said Smith. “And in 2011-12 figures from government’s top suppliers shows SMES had benefitted from a further 6.6 per cent of spend in the supply chain.”

She identified prompt payment down the supply chain as “critical to the survival of many SMEs” and said all central government contracts were now contractually obliged to pay to tier three suppliers within 30 days. The government was also trying to roll out Project Bank Accounts, a project which aims to pay prime suppliers at the same time as subcontractors down to tier three, across government construction projects.

- See more at: http://www.supplymanagement.com/news/2013/construction-procurement-reform-saves-447-million/#sthash.0Md2Tt0e.dpuf
So far, the cost disclosure has apparently been limited to the construction sector, but there is no reason in my mind why it should not be at least tried in the services and supply sectors.

The Government have issued a series of reports on the subject. One of the papers describes Cost Benchmarking Principles and Expectations:
This document sets out for the first time the principles of construction related cost benchmarking standards. This publication therefore supports the new procurement models being trialled as part of the delivery of the Government Construction Strategy and the achievement of the overarching target of a sustainable1 reduction in construction costs of 15-20% by the end of this Parliament.

This document should also provide a helpful point of reference for the wider public sector – for example Health Trusts and Local Authorities – in determining a standard approach to construction cost benchmarking.
Another paper discusses progress and other aspects:
Effective cost benchmarking is central to the successful delivery of the Government Construction Strategy (GCS) and the Infrastructure Cost Review. It provides the “should cost” capability1 that is an essential component of the new procurement models being trialled as part of the delivery of the GCS.

The key to this program is uniformity of standards and data integration and integrity. The notion of transparent costing and the papers raise very interesting concepts, and it will be worth evaluating the deliverables that this approach experiments with.



Monday, February 25, 2013

Buying the unknown, pricing the unknowable

This article will likely confuse most of the procurement staff in local and municipal and probably state governments. It does not fit their typical need. Most things purchased, whether supply, service or work of construction, at local levels are standard commercial products. When you don't have to invent the wheel, there is no need to re-invent it either. Keep it simple and stick to what you know.

But, when developing new products, other acquisition paradigms come into play. No one size fits all and an inflexible means of achieving the acquisition will frustrate the goal. That is my take away from the following article, which I digest below, and which itself is a review by Sandra I. Erwin of a more extensive journal article by Frank Kendall, US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics titled "Use of Fixed-Price Incentive Firm (FPIF) Contracts in Development and Production". You have the links, so pick your poison.

Pentagon Acquisition Chief Warns About Misuse of 'Fixed Price' Contracts
Kendall's latest policy guidance tells procurement officials to use "appropriate" contract types. "Unfortunately, sorting this out is not always easy," Kendall writes in the March-April 2013 issue of the Defense Acquisition University journal.

A shift toward fixed-price contract began during the second half of President Obama's first term. Pentagon officials had become increasingly frustrated as too many programs got started and “we find out later on that they were unaffordable,” Kendall says in a February 2012 speech. He cites fixed-price contracting as one of several contracting trends that are embraced and rejected in cycles. In the past two decades, he says, “We have been for-or-against fixed price contracting four or five times."

Kendall's rulebook, known as Better Buying Power, has been interpreted as a mandate to avoid "cost-plus" arrangements where the government agrees upfront to pay a vendor to design a product before it has determined its final price tag.

In the article, titled, "Use of Fixed-Price Incentive Firm Contracts in Development and Production," Kendall cautions buyers that there is no simple benchmark to select a contract type. "The choice of appropriate contract types is very 'situationally' dependent," he says.

Kendall suggests that even though fixed-price contracts do relieve the government from taking on all the risk in a program, if not used properly, such deals could backfire and lead to unneeded court battles.

"Fixed firm price development tends to create situations where neither the government nor the contractor has the flexibility needed to make adjustments as they learn more about what is feasible and affordable as well as what needs to be done to achieve a design that meets requirements," he says.

A fixed-price contract is basically a government “hands off” contract, he adds. "While we can get reports and track progress, we have very little flexibility to respond to cases where the contract requirements may be particularly difficult to achieve."

Shifting the risk to contractors should not be seen as the antidote to the Defense Department's poor track record in predicting costs, Kendall notes. The average EMD (engineering, manufacturing, development) program for a major defense acquisition over the last 20 years has overrun by nearly 30 percent. "Industry can only bear so much of that risk," he says. "It is unrealistic to believe contractors will simply accept large losses. They will not. ... Industry has a finite capacity to absorb that risk and knows how to hire lawyers to help it avoid large losses."

In most cases, says Kendall, there needs to be a "fair sharing" of the risk and rewards of performance. "For good reasons, I am conservative about the use of fixed-price development, but it is appropriate in some cases."

“The government rarely knows what it wants with sufficient specificity to support reasonable fixed prices for evolving, complex or sophisticated products to be delivered years later,” charges John Chierichella, a government contracting attorney at the law firm of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP.

He predicts the “latest federal fascination with fixed prices will end like the others — badly — with delayed fielding of the products, contractors deeply damaged by inadequate cash flow, increased claims and litigation, and focused “bail outs” in which the government decides which of the wounded contractors deserves triage.”

Sunday, February 17, 2013

Abnormally low vs unreasonably low bid

I have read enough cases to know that it can be reasonably expected that bidders will bid below cost, in part at least, in an aggressive tactic to win an award. This does not appear to be a matter that too terribly concerns either the government or the courts. But underbidding comes with a risk of more than lost profits on a contract.

First, if a bid is "abnormally" low, it probably should be rejected out of hand. See my post The price is not always right for a short review of that issue.

Second, at least in the UK, it may give rise to a question of bribery, depending on the wording of relevant statute(s). See this post: When low bidding raises question of bribery.

And now, we see that an "unreasonably" low bid could form the basis of a false claim under the US False Claims Act and similar laws in other jurisdictions. It is not for nought that the typical procurement law requires that bid prices be "fair and reasonable". I have, as usual, selected, chopped and rearranged and messed with rendering the case below, so you should click the link and read it yourself. I only deal with one of the issues of the case.

Nyle J. HOOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 688 F.3d 1037 (2012)
In his Third Amended Complaint, Hooper alleges that Lockheed violated the FCA by: (1) knowingly underbidding the contract. Hooper brings a claim under the False Claims Act ( particularly 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)), alleging that he was wrongfully discharged in retaliation for FCA-protected activity. The FCA protects "whistle blowers" from retaliation by their employers.

The FCA was enacted "during the Civil War in response to overcharges and other abuses by defense contractors." United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir.1999). The purpose of the FCA was to "[combat] widespread fraud by government contractors who were submitting inflated invoices and shipping faulty goods to the government." United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1265-66 (9th Cir.1996). To this end, the FCA creates liability for any person who, inter alia, "(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; [or] (B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).

Hooper asserts that Lockheed violated the FCA by submitting a fraudulently low bid, based on knowing underestimates of its costs, to improve its chances of winning the Air Force RSA IIA contract. Lockheed asserts that allegedly "false" estimates cannot be the basis for liability under the FCA, because an estimate is a type of opinion or prediction, and thus cannot be said to be a "false statement" within the meaning of the FCA. Specifically, Lockheed argues that "estimates of what costs might be in the future are based on inherently judgmental information, and a piece of purely judgmental information is not actionable as a false statement."

The United States filed an amicus brief, urging this court to hold that a false estimate and/or fraudulently low bid may be actionable under the FCA.

Although the issue whether FCA liability may be premised on false estimates where those false estimates were knowingly made is a matter of first impression for this court, both the First and Fourth Circuits have held that FCA liability may attach in such a situation. Their decisions rest heavily on United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943).

In Hess, the Supreme Court found contractors liable under the FCA for claims submitted by government contractors that the contractors obtained by collusive bidding. Id. at 542, 63 S.Ct. 379. Most courts have interpreted Hess to stand for the "fraud-in-the-inducement" theory of FCA liability. Accordingly, many courts, including this court, have applied the FCA to bid-rigging situations.

The Fourth Circuit held that, after the 1986 amendments to the FCA, according to Congress the FCA should be broadly construed. See id. at 786 (quoting S.Rep. No. 99-345, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274 ("`each and every claim submitted under a contract, loan guarantee, or other agreement which was originally obtained by means of false statements or other corrupt or fraudulent conduct, or in violation of any statute or applicable regulation, constitutes a false claim'") (emphasis added in case)). he Fourth Circuit reasoned that "an opinion or estimate carries with it `an implied assertion, not only that the speaker knows no facts which would preclude such an opinion, but that he does know facts which justify it.'"

As a matter of first impression, we conclude that false estimates, defined to include fraudulent underbidding in which the bid is not what the defendant actually intends to charge, can be a source of liability under the FCA, assuming that the other elements of an FCA claim are met.

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Hooper, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Lockheed acted either knowingly, in deliberate ignorance of the truth, or in reckless disregard of the truth when it submitted its bid for the Air Force RSA IIA contract.

Hooper demonstrated that Lockheed employees were instructed to lower their bids without regard to actual cost. Mike Allen, an employee with Lockheed, testified that the Air Force did not accept Lockheed's initial bid because it was too high. Subsequently, Allen "was simply asked [by management] to change the cost" even though the change in cost was not based on any engineering judgment. Allen also testified that, in bidding on another contract, he was told to lower the cost. When Allen told his supervisors, "We can't. This is the real cost. This is what it's going to cost, if not more," he was dismissed from the bidding contract meeting. Allen later learned that Lockheed lowered the cost by almost half and was awarded the contract. He also testified that Lockheed was dishonest in the productivity rates that it used to determine the cost for a contract.

Further, in the Air Force memorandum analysis of Lockheed's bid, the Air Force noted that Lockheed was "optimistic about some of its inputs ..., resulting in an overstated potential for cost savings." Additionally, the Air Force stated that it found Lockheed's Risk Analysis to be "unrealistic..., so the total risk is understated."

On the other hand, the Air Force stated that "[o]verall, [Lockheed] was found `realistic' for this factor." The memorandum found that Lockheed's bid provided the best overall value, even if it was possible that there were risks which might "lead to cost growth beyond target cost."

Because there is a genuine issue as to whether Lockheed had actual knowledge, deliberately ignored the truth, or acted in reckless disregard of the truth when it submitted its allegedly false bid for the RSA IIA contract, we reverse and remand to the district court. See Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (when reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, this court must not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter but only determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial).

Saturday, February 19, 2011

A model for improving competition

I was reading the article discussed in this post and drew from it almost the opposite conclusion than intended, but quite a valuable one, perhaps.

The article is a paper evidently presented at the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology 65 2010, entitled A Simulation Model for Bid Price Decision Making by R.Sammoura, who is with the Industrial Engineering and Management Department, Beirut Arab University, Lebanon. It offers a mathematical model to enable bidders to more carefully hone their bid prices to achieve success without leaving too much on the table.

My extracts, edited and arranged to suit myself, are as follows, but you should read the source paper for better accuracy.
Abstract—In Lebanon, public construction projects are awarded
to the contractor submitting the lowest bid price based on a
competitive bidding process. The contractor has to make a strategic
decision in choosing the appropriate bid price that will offer a
satisfactory profit with a greater probability to win. A simulation
model for bid price decision making based on the lowest bid price
evaluation is developed. The model, built using Crystal Ball decision engineering
software, considers two main factors affecting the
bidding process: the number of qualified bidders and the size of the
project.

The behavior of contractors as a group (market conditions, number and identity
of competitors), individual contractor behavior (contractor
size, work and tenders in hand, availability of staff), and
behavior toward the characteristics of the contract (type and
size of construction work, bid related factors) are the main
factors influencing the contractor’s bidding behavior.
Since it is not usually an easy job to describe the bidding
process by a realistic mathematical model interrelating all the
above influencing factors, a simulation model for bid price
decision making based on the evaluation of the lowest bid
price at a pre-contract stage is developed. The model
considers two main factors influencing bidding behavior: the
project size expressed by the average bid price and the level of
competition presented by the number of qualified participating
bidders. However, in order to reduce extraneous factors that
may distort the study results, all the selected projects
constituting the data sample are of the same type (in the field
of road construction and rehabilitation projects), awarded
according to the same Lebanese formal bidding procedures,
and executed in the same Lebanese market conditions.

The data for the study were collected from the archived
records of Council for Development and Construction (CDR).
All projects selected for inclusion in the
study were in the field of road construction and rehabilitation
in Lebanon. They were publicly bid under a relatively uniform
and formal bidding procedure according to the Lebanese
tendering law. The data collected from a sample of forty-one
awarded projects focused on the value of the lowest bid price
for each awarded contract. It also included the number of
qualified bidders participating in the bid process and their
corresponding bidding prices covering a time period for the
years (1996-2006). Among these forty one awarded projects,
twenty three are completely executed, nine are still in
progress, and nine are not executed. These forty one awarded
projects comprised 275 bidding attempts.

The paper goes on through a series of analysis including stochastic and regression analysis that I don't understand but was regularly exposed to in stock market technical analysis.

Essentially, to my unscientific mind, he looked at the proven standardized data that the government had available from past solicitations and came up with a trend following algorithm of the kind that tries to give lie to the common phrase, "past performance is no prediction of the future". I am reminded of the many financial wizardry schemes concocted by rocket scientists in the financial industry whose blind faith in such schemes brought the world to its financial knees over the course of this last decade.

So, while I appreciate the work in the model, for my money, it would be of little utility in terms of trying to price a contract.

But, it occurred to me, what a wonderful tool the data collection he describes would be to help government reduce its costs of acquisitions. What he did was aggregate and publicize certain bid abstract sheets. Over the course of time, this data would fairly begin to suggest, broadly, trends in project costs, and at the recent margin, a fair indication of expected costs on current projects.

If the government provided this data on all contracting, that would give bidders sharper pencils since they will have a more accurate picture of market pricing. Think of the stock market. You know the likely price of a share of, say, Google, because the stock market makes available to you all recent sale prices. Where pricing data is available, market transactions are more efficient (as a general rule).

If, say, the government has been buying plumbing equipment, getting the same bids from the same players, would a new market entrant know whether to go to the time and trouble to bid? If the new entrant knows what the government has been paying, it probably would attract him, especially if his pricing can beat the old regulars. And the more widespread the information is cast, the more likely others will come along to join in, bringing down government costs.

In the same way I think the government ought to cull, aggregate and make public recorded sales of real estate so that market participants are more equally placed to trade, it occurs to me that public dissemination of historical and recent bid pricing, available from bid abstracts, could help reduce the price government pays for its goods and services and, as this paper discusses, construction.

One of the core principles of government contracting is generating competition. Nothing generates competition like transparent pricing mechanisms.

Just saying.

US aims to myth bust

Daniel I. Gordon, Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, has launched a "myth-busting" campaign to educate the federal procurement workforce, to address so-called misconceptions and improve communications with the procurement industry. It's a back-to-basic building blocks reminder.

His "
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF ACQUISITION OFFICERS, SENIOR PROCUREMENT EXECUTIVES, and CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICERS" is dated February 2, 2011, but went public on February 17, as reported in media stories here and here.

Here are some selected excerpts, arranged and edited to suit myself.
Access to current market information is critical for agency program managers as they define requirements and for contracting officers as they develop acquisition strategies, seek opportunities for small businesses, and negotiate contract terms. Our industry partners are often the best source of this information, so productive interactions between federal agencies and our industry partners should be encouraged to ensure that the government clearly understands the marketplace and can award a contract or order for an effective solution at a reasonable price. Early, frequent, and constructive engagement with industry is especially important for complex, high-risk procurements, including (but not limited to) those for large information technology (IT) projects. This is why increasing communication, in the form of a “myth-busters” educational campaign, is one of the key tenets of the Office of Management and Budget’s 25 Point Implementation Plan to Reform Federal IT Management.

Some agency officials may be reluctant to engage in these exchanges out of fear of protests or fear of binding the agency in an unauthorized manner; others may be unaware of effective strategies that can help the acquisition workforce and industry make the best use of their time and resources. Similarly, industry may be concerned that talking with an agency may create a conflict of interest that will preclude them from competing on future requirements, or industry may be apprehensive about engaging in meaningful conversations in the presence of other vendors.

In light of these challenges, the purposes of this memorandum are to:
1) identify common misconceptions about vendor engagement that may be unnecessarily hindering agencies’ appropriate use of the existing flexibilities, and provide facts and strategies to help acquisition professionals benefit from industry’s knowledge and insight;
2) direct agencies to remove unnecessary barriers to reasonable communication and develop vendor communications plans, consistent with existing law and regulation, that promote responsible and constructive exchanges; and
3) outline steps for continued engagement with agencies and industry to increase awareness and education.

Nothing in this memorandum should be read to alter, or authorize violations of, applicable ethics rules, procurement integrity requirements, or other statutes or regulations that govern communication and information sharing. However, all methods of communication that are not prohibited, either by those rules or otherwise, should be considered, if they would be helpful.3 In addition, contracting officers, program managers, and other acquisition officials should continue to exercise appropriate discretion to balance the practical limitations of frequent vendor engagement, including the demand such engagement places on the time of the acquisition workforce, with the need to better understand the market and make decisions in the best interest of the government.
His Memorandum introduces the "Top 10 Misconceptions and Facts". My favorites among the Top 10 are:

1. Misconception – “We can’t meet one-on-one with a potential offeror.”
Fact – Government officials can generally meet one-on-one with potential offerors as long as no vendor receives preferential treatment.
Prior to issuance of the solicitation, government officials – including the program manager, users, or contracting officer – may meet with potential offerors to exchange general information and conduct market research related to an acquisition. In fact, the FAR, in Part 15, encourages exchanges of information with interested parties during the solicitation process, ending with the receipt of proposals. There is no requirement that the meetings include all possible offerors, nor is there a prohibition on one-on-one meetings. Any information that is shared in a meeting that could directly affect proposal preparation must be shared in a timely manner with all potential offerors to avoid providing any offeror with an unfair advantage (FAR 15.201(f)).
The government ethics rules and Competition in Contracting Act, (10 U.S.C. § 2304), prohibit preferential treatment of one vendor over another.

While a vendor who, as part of contract performance, drafts the specification for a future procurement will almost certainly be barred by OCI rules from competing for that future procurement, pre-solicitation communications are generally less structured, less binding, and much less problematic. When a vendor, in its role supporting the government, is drafting specifications for a future acquisition, the government is relying on the vendor to provide impartial advice regarding the requirements needed to meet the government’s future needs. Ensuring that the vendor will not be motivated by a desire to win the future contract is the way we try to ensure that this advice will be impartial. This differs dramatically from the pre-solicitation context. In the latter context, the government is not looking for impartial advice from one source, but is instead looking for a variety of options from a variety of sources, each one understandably, and reasonably, attempting to demonstrate the value of its own approach. These marketing efforts, in themselves, do not raise OCI concerns.
3. Misconception – “A protest is something to be avoided at all costs - even if it means the government limits conversations with industry.”
Fact – Restricting communication won’t prevent a protest, and limiting communication might actually increase the chance of a protest – in addition to depriving the government of potentially useful information.
Protests are, in fact, quite rare. At least 99 percent of procurements are never protested, although high dollar procurements, of course, are more likely to be protested. The overriding goal of the agency and its program managers, contracting officers, and attorneys should be the best procurement solution, and industry engagement can improve the supplies or services received or can reduce the price paid by the government. If contracting officers conduct responsible, meaningful, and constructive communications during the course of a procurement, issues that could give rise to a bid protest are likely eliminated. Trying to make a procurement ‘protest-proof’ is rarely a good use of agency resources, and it may lead to decisions that aren’t in the interest of the government. Moreover, restricting communication for fear of protests may actually increase the likelihood of a protest – for example, by a vendor that hopes to get more information through ‘discovery’ during the protest.
7. Misconception – “Industry days and similar events attended by multiple vendors are of low value to industry and the government because industry won’t provide useful information in front of competitors, and the government doesn’t release new information.”
Fact – Well-organized industry days, as well as pre-solicitation and pre-proposal conferences, are valuable opportunities for the government and for potential vendors – both prime contractors and subcontractors, many of whom are small businesses.
Industry days, as well as pre-solicitation and pre-proposal conferences, directly benefit the government by promoting a common understanding of the procurement requirements, the solicitation terms and conditions, and the evaluation criteria. These events also benefit industry – especially small businesses – by providing prime contractors and subcontractors an opportunity to meet and develop relationships or teaming agreements that benefit contract performance. However, the value of these events derives from the government providing the maximum information to potential offerors on its requirements, answering questions, and improving the solicitation based on feedback from the potential offerors. In that way, the requirements can be made as clear as possible to assist potential offerors in providing the best solution to the government.
8. Misconception – “The program manager already talked to industry to develop the technical requirements, so the contracting officer doesn’t need to do anything else before issuing the RFP.”
Fact – The technical requirements are only part of the acquisition; getting feedback on terms and conditions, pricing structure, performance metrics, evaluation criteria, and contract administration matters will improve the award and implementation process.
Issuing a high quality solicitation requires engaging with industry on issues that go beyond the government’s technical requirements. In order to appropriately price proposals and reduce the number of potential change orders, industry needs information about any unique terms and conditions, small business set-aside requirements, subcontracting goals, and other matters about which the contracting officer is the expert. Although industry may have had their best technical representatives engaged with the program manager, the contracting officer should communicate to vendors as much information as possible about the government’s needs as early as possible. As a result of early communication, the contracting officer may learn some things that suggest that an approach somewhat different than planned may cause increased competition, more small business participation, lower prices, or even a better definition of the government’s technical requirements.

Issue an RFI to make sure the government not only understands the capabilities of industry, but can develop or improve its acquisition strategy regarding contract type, performance requirements, performance work statements/statements of work, and performance metrics. Release a draft request for proposal to be sure the solicitation instructions are clear.
9. Misconception – “Giving industry only a few days to respond to an RFP is OK since the government has been talking to industry about this procurement for over a year.”
Fact – Providing only short response times may result in the government receiving fewer proposals and the ones received may not be as well-developed - which can lead to a flawed contract. This approach signals that the government isn’t really interested in competition.
Contracting officers should consider that allowing offerors additional time to prepare their proposals will likely yield better proposals, streamlined evaluations, and a reduction in the need for (or scope of) discussions. While the workforce is stretched thin and requirements often arise unexpectedly, shortcutting the proposal development process often results in fewer proposals, and/or proposals that are more difficult to evaluate. This situation can lead to expensive outcomes. Providing adequate time for vendor communication throughout the procurement process – including adequate time for proposals – indicates that the government is interested in obtaining the best outcomes. Contracting officers should have the full support of their customers in determining the right amount of time for receipt of proposals.
10. Misconception – “Getting broad participation by many different vendors is too difficult; we’re better off dealing with the established companies we know.”
Fact – The government loses when we limit ourselves to the companies we already work with. Instead, we need to look for opportunities to increase competition and ensure that all vendors, including small businesses, get fair consideration.
Use the procurement forecast to generate interest. Consider holding an outreach session to announce the release or update, and don’t bundle or over-promise requirements. Hold industry days, public meetings, or small business conferences, and consider hosting multiple outreach sessions for large or complex requirements.
What are your favorite ones?

Related to the media campaign conducted by Gordon is this item from Federal News Radio:

OFPP zeroes in on acquisition workforce
Dan Gordon, administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), said the acquisition workforce isn't equipped to manage the large number of government contracts. His office wants to change that.

Gordon said over the past 15 years the government has been on an unsustainable path of increased contracting and a flat acquisition workforce.

"Putting that tsunami of spending onto an acquisition workforce that had shrunk and wasn't getting the investment and training was a recipe for problems, and we've had a good number of problems," Gordon said.

"Our number one priority is strengthening the acquisition workforce."

Gordon said agencies can help the existing acquisition workforce by improving internal communication. He said poor communication within agencies leads to significant problems with contract design.

"We have our IT shops that are often focused on sophisticated IT solutions," Gordon said. "We have the program shops - the people who actually need what the contract is for - who may not be explaining to the IT people what they need properly. We have a contract shop that doesn't define requirements. They just listen to make sure they've got requirements that make sense in terms of 'will this be a competitive situation', but contract people can't define requirements. They need input from the program people and the IT people to do that."

Gordon also said he wants to increase training for the acquisition workforce. One of OMB's goals in scaling back contract spending was to reduce the number of high risk contracts such as time-and-materials and labor-hours contracts.

"We're not telling agencies to go fixed-price no matter what," Gordon said. "Sometimes is just a matter of looking. Have we come far enough that we can define our requirements and switch to fixed price? Then we should. But we shouldn't switch to fixed price without thinking."

Gordon said insufficient contract management personnel also is a significant challenge. "Of course we need contractors, but contractors support us in the federal government, which means that we have to be in charge," Gordon said. "There are too many situations where there is no federal employee that has oversight of what's going on, or there aren't enough federal employees so that they maintain control. That is an unbalanced, unhealthy situation."