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Showing posts with label Resolution of protests. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Resolution of protests. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 3, 2018

Methinks they do protest too much about frivolous protests

Whenever there are contracts to be had or performed, there will be disputes. Thus, procurement protests are endemic to government contracts and contracting.

And, since government contracting is the means by which most of our tax money is spent, the government provides an administrative process to resolve the disputes more expediently than available by courts, which is where private contract disputes usually end up, absent some form of ADR (alternative dispute resolution) process the circumvents court action. In this light, the administrative dispute process is another form of ADR.

It must also be added that the procurement dispute process is the only means of assuring our tax moneys are being spent properly (if not wisely) by policing the system in real time (as contrasted with an audit some years hence).

I feel quite certain that the boring and routine procurement protest system would receive no more attention than the run-of-the-mill ADR procedure but for two things: it provides a "train wreck" story for the media to monetarize; and, it provides a platform for politicians to politicize. The theme in both cases is by question and answer. Question: why is this procurement being held up when the need is obvious and immediate? Answer: because of the frivolous action of a disreputable vendor.

In this blawg, I have often posted about frivolous protests, because the issue is so constantly being brought up. See, here, here, here, here, here, and here, for example.

And it is only being brought up because it is "good" (money making) media and "good" (vote and/or attention-getting) politics. It is not being brought up because it is a real problem, and to the extent it may be some kind of problem it blown all out of proportion to the seriousness of the matter.  It is not brought up in good faith to address a real issue.  It is simply a concocted drama.

Here is another illustration of the meme from Bloomberg. As always, read the original article at the link. I can end up taking extreme liberties and artistic license to the subject for my own didactic purposes, and you cannot rely on this blawg to provide the full, accurate, true-to-form, or intended iteration. So, go on, read the original.

Pentagon Contract Protests Aren't Frivolous, Rand Study Finds, by Anthony Capaccio, January 4, 2018
The Defense Department’s process for buying weapons, goods and services isn’t being overwhelmed or delayed by frivolous contract protests filed by major defense contractors as critics have contended, according to a study mandated by Congress. Instead, “bid protests are exceedingly uncommon for DoD procurements,” the report by the Rand Corp.’s federally funded National Defense Research Institute said. The report was based on a review protests in years fiscal 2008 through 2016.

Congress directed the study to examine 14 areas, including how much the government spends on manpower to defend its actions. Rand said it was unable to quantify those costs for lack of data. This lack of data could undercut a provision in this year’s defense policy bill that requires the Pentagon set up a three-year pilot program in 2019 requiring losing protesters to pay the Defense Department’s costs for handling GAO challenges.

More than half of challenges were brought by small businesses, it said, and the protest process was more effective than generally realized at compelling a military service to change its initial contract solicitation terms or its decision after a protest was filed.

The data-driven assessment is significant because it’s likely to be the basis of future congressional and Pentagon decisions on improving the process that lets bidders that have complaints before an award or those who lose a competition file appeals to the Government Accountability Office. The report underscores that most challenges are routine, unlike the few that end up in the spotlight.

“Policymakers should avoid drawing overall conclusions or assumptions about trends from one case when it comes to the efficacy of the bid protest system,” Rand said. The percentage of contracts protested is very small -- less than 0.3 percent per billion dollars of military contract spending, Rand said.

The report also described “a lack of trust on each side” between the defense industry and the Pentagon’s acquisition bureaucracy about the protest process. For example, military personnel say the rules allow “protesters to make excessive numbers of ‘weak allegations,’” it said. The report concluded that “firms are not likely to protest without merit,” debunking the notion that losing incumbents protest a loss merely to extend their contracts for a few months while the case is open, according to Daniel Snyder, an analyst with Bloomberg Government.

While the GAO sustained 2.6 percent of defense protests filed since fiscal 2008, the study found that’s not the whole measure of effectiveness. “The majority of relief to protesters takes the form of corrective actions” by the contracting agency while a challenge is pending before the GAO or withdrawn based on the potential for solving issues short of a decision, the study said. “Roughly 40 percent of all protest actions result in some change to the initial procurement decision or terms,” Rand said.

Rand concluded the steady record of effectiveness it documented “refutes the claim that meritless protests (some use the term frivolous)” account for the increased challenges.

MORE:
Methinks we doth not protest so much after all?
Poppycock
Doth we protest too much? Methinks not

Tuesday, September 22, 2015

Protests: "the worst outcome for both parties"

Guam is in the process, over the last few years, of making some essential, if not earth-shattering, procurement reforms.  Many ideas have been floated, but sunk by the Executive Branch, including the Attorney General's office, which is fixated on the idea that protests are typically "frivolous" and all protests should be deterred with protest bonds, as well as shortened -- and "jurisdictional" -- time limits (see, How Draconian are those procurement time limits, really?).

The notion that protests are not the problem -- but that the time to it takes to finally resolve them is -- has been coolly received; efforts to give effect to the authority which procurement agencies already have, to settle and resolve them before litigation, have been beaten back.

For mine, it is worth spending a bit of up front time to try to resolve disputes and get on to the acquisition, where the dispute is clearly without merit, or get on with acknowledging and the fixing the solicitation when the dispute is meritorious or even arguably so. Better a few more days, or weeks, up front than a few more months, or years, spent litigating the dispute to finality.

As the article below opines, "when both sides get so dug into their positions and don’t listen to each other it will lead to a legal action (i.e. protest).  This is the worst outcome for both parties....". 

(As usual in this blawg, I may take great liberties with articles presented here for my own instructional purposes. You need to read the original at the provided link, and not take my version of it as what was intended.)

Deflategate and federal procurement process, by Mike Sade
As I watched the "Deflategate" story unfold, I could not help but consider the parallels between this case and government contracting.

•Source selections officials (in most cases the contracting officer) have absolute authority to make the award decision.
•Clearly identify the process, how the decision will be determined, and what the outcomes will be for failing to meet the standards.
•Fairness in the process is paramount to a successful outcome.
•If an appeal is filed, the agency must ensure that due process is afforded to both sides.

In my experience, within the federal procurement process the rules are well defined; the process is clear; and, the avenues for appeal of a source selection decision are all in statute and regulation. Similar to the process in the NFL collective bargaining agreement.

What remains unclear is the fairness of discovery within the process.

What the NFL failed to do in the case against New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady was clear to Judge Richard Berman. He did not question the commissioner’s authority; what he questioned was the fairness of the player’s ability to question or cross examine the “right” personnel, and the failure to clearly state facts in support of the finding. Often in government procurement this is what the debrief process should afford.

So what can a source selection official learn from this case? First, a solicitation must clearly outline the requirements, proposal preparation instructions, and most importantly the source selection criteria. Then, after proposals are submitted, if there are serious questions about what a proposal includes, or what the requirements mean, there should be discussions.

Too often I have seen source selection decisions made where there are unanswered questions, or where the government might disqualify a really good proposal because they are in a hurry to get to an award instead of finding the best solution. In the NFL case the commissioner relied solely on the Ted Wells report (i.e. the technical report in government procurement) without questioning what went into the report and how they came to the conclusion.

Second, I have often seen actions in arbitration or other informal ADR processes I would equate to a debriefing. The government is too focused on defending the award decision and not listening. In the “Deflategate” case the NFL failed to ask the right questions and allow the player to address those issues.

In a government debriefing the government should understand a debriefing is an opportunity to identify the reasons for the award decision as well as learn what they might have missed in the process of reaching that decision by listening to a losing contractor’s position.

Finally, when both sides get so dug into their positions and don’t listen to each other it will lead to a legal action (i.e. protest). This is the worst outcome for both parties because it is costly in terms of personnel cost and legal fees.

One of my favorite lines from the movie “Other People’s Money” is when Danny DiVito says “Our side has lawyers because their side has lawyers, but once you use them it gets all [messed] up.” This is not a slam on lawyers but it is the worst state of events when you have a mission to accomplish and distracting resources from accomplishing that mission to defending a decision which is detrimental to the agency mission.

So how does a source selection official avoid the pitfalls of “Deflategate”? Here are my suggestions to improve communications and avoid the pitfalls:

•During market research, understand the market, listen to industry to help define the requirements and outcomes, identify what the best source selection criteria should be, and how to rank those criteria.
•During proposal evaluation, ensure the technical panel clearly identifies strengths and weaknesses in a proposal, and if a proposal has some promise to provide the best solution, give the company the opportunity to address those deficiencies through discussions.
•During a debriefing, give a company a chance to clearly articulate why they felt they had a winning proposal. If the company identifies areas where the evaluation process missed something -- or was wrong – address how you will fix that mistake. If the company is wrong, educate them on how they can improve in the future.

My message is don’t fall in to the “Deflategate” syndrome by standing your ground without listening to others and admitting you made a mistake. It can only embarrass the agency and affect the mission.

Nobody wins in this scenario.

UPDATE October 4, 2015.

Apropos the idea of this post, that resolving and settling well laid disputes, rather than denying the and girding for battle, is better for everyone:


Oak Bluffs advised to reboot bid process for North Bluff seawall project
When Oak Bluffs selectmen unanimously voted on Sept. 22 to accept a $5.25 million bid from MIG Corporation to rebuild the new North Bluff seawall, contingent on additional Community Preservation Committee funding, it appeared that the long awaited project would move ahead. However, due to a bid complaint from Northern Construction Service, Oak Bluffs selectmen, on the advice of town counsel Michael Goldsmith, have called a special meeting this Tuesday to rescind their decision, and to re-bid the project.

“We awarded the bid and then a complaint was filed in regards to the language in the bidding,” chairman of the board of selectmen Mike Santoro told The Times on Friday. “Right away we filed an appeal with the Attorney General for a hearing next Wednesday, but in the process, we found it would be easier to rescind the vote and put it back out to bid again.”

At issue is the wording of the RFP which asked for the bid to be broken into sections—the “base bid” was for construction of the steel sheet seawall and boardwalk from the harbor to the fishing pier, along with hazardous waste removal. Addendums to the bid were requested for the cost of continuing the wall and boardwalk to the SSA terminal. Northern Construction did have the lowest bid for the entirety of the project, at $5.9 million.

However, all bids, including MIG’s, came in well over the $5.6 million the town had received in state grants for the project, once management fees and a 5 percent contingency fund was added to the bottom line. So a decision was made to begin with the most crucial part of the project, e.g. the base bid, where MIG Corporation came in lower than Northern Construction by $103,000.

Once selectmen rescind the bid on Tuesday, the project will go back out to bid, which is a 30 day process. Despite the month long delay, project manager David Lager told The Times that the re-bid would not significantly delay the project.

“It’s in our best interest to deal with the ambiguities in the RFP (Request For Proposal) and start with a clean slate,” town administrator Robert Whritenour told The Times. “A bid protest that goes to hearing and then an appeal can take a lot longer than a month.”

Mr. Whritenour said it is possible that the re-bid process could reduce, and possibly eliminate, the overage that required selectmen to request $230,000 in additional funds from the Community Preservation Committee (CPC), which was approved at last Monday’s CPC meeting.



Friday, July 31, 2015

Frivolous claims of protest costs

Study: Contractor Protests Have Negligible Impact on Defense Acquisitions
Defense contractor protests draw disproportionate media attention even though most of them get resolved relatively quickly without causing major disruptions to military procurement programs.

Congressional Research Service defense acquisition specialist Moshe Schwartz and legislative attorney Kate Manuel took a deep dive into bid protest trends across the federal government in response to growing congressional interest in the subject. In recent years, lawmakers have become alarmed by blaring headlines about high-profile contractor protests, prompting both the House and Senate in their respective versions of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act to direct the Pentagon to commission an independent study of bid protests.

Schwartz and Manuel crunched bid protest data from fiscal year 2001 to 2014. In their July 21 report, they find that while the number of bid protests is growing against civilian agencies, Defense Department contracts are now less likely to be protested and, when challenged, are less likely to be ruled by GAO in favor of contractors than is the case with civilian agency contracts. They note that protests against civilian agencies are increasing at a faster rate than protests against Defense.

When defense programs are delayed, protests themselves are not the reason, the study said.

Over the past four years, the number of protests filed with GAO has been constant — 2,206 in fiscal year 2011 compared to 2,269 in 2014. Most were dismissed, withdrawn by the protester or settled before GAO issued an opinion. In recent years, the percentage of protests won by contractors against the Defense Department has dropped by more than half.

The increasing willingness of agencies to voluntarily take corrective action is one of the most significant trends in bid protests, the study said. Actions include rewriting contract requirements or amend request for proposals. In cases when they believe the procurement was done properly, some agencies still agree to meet with the protesting party to clarify why it lost. The relatively large share of protests that are resolved via settlement is a significant trend, the study said.

Greater efforts to negotiate disputes have increased the so-called “effectiveness rate” of bid protests. That is the percentage of protesters that obtain relief either through a protest being sustained or voluntary action taken by an agency. Agencies tend to voluntarily take corrective actions rather than wait for GAO to sustain a protest. From 2001 to 2014, the effectiveness rate of GAO protests grew from 33 to 43 percent. It has averaged 42 percent over that past five years. One possible explanation for the higher effectiveness rate is the unpredictable nature of GAO opinions.

Another way to read this, CRS noted, is that corrective action reflects agency risk aversion and fear of losing a protest. In this context, the high likelihood of protests being resolved through voluntary actions encourages companies to file protests. Under this line of thinking, if agencies allowed more cases to be decided on the merits, companies might be less inclined to file protests.

The ups and down of government spending also influence the rate of protests as contractors are more motivated to challenge awards when they see fewer opportunities. When federal spending was on an
upswing from 2001 to 2008 — spending grew 100 percent — protests increased by 35 percent. The trend reversed from 2008 to 2014 when government spending dropped by 25 percent and protests increased by 45 percent.

The study also delved into the psychological warfare between agencies and contractors. The threat of protests may motivate agency officials to do more rigorous market research, hold a competition instead of awarding a sole-source contract, or conduct more thorough and fair competitions. But fear of protests also could prompt officials to structure contracts in ways that are less likely to be protested, such as using “lowest price technically acceptable” as award criteria, instead of a best-value competition when best value may be more appropriate.
The Congressional Research Service, as its name implies, is for Congress. CRS does not generally make the reports directly available to the public. Thus, hattip and credit to Sandra I. Erwin who wrote the above blog post on national defense magazine.org for doing a very complete job of cataloging the main findings of the report, titled GAO Bid Protests: Trends and Analysis.  

Although I was initially able to obtain a copy of the report with the aid of our local Delegate to the House, Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo (because I live on Guam, I and my fellow Guamanian citizens have no representation on the floor of Congress and no representation in the Senate), the report has now found its indirect way online.

As the report (Number R40227) explains,
This report is one of two providing Congress with background on the GAO bid-protest process. It analyzes (1) trends in bid protests filed with GAO, (2) why companies protest, (3) the impact bid protests have on acquisitions, (4) the most common grounds for GAO to sustain a protest, and (5) trends in bid protests filed against DOD. Its companion report, CRS Report R40228, R40227, by Kate M. Manuel and Moshe Schwartz, provides background and an overview of the time frames and procedures in a GAO bid protest.
Also see Making Sense Out of the Recent Congressional Study on Bid Protests, written by lawyers from the firm Holland & Hart LLP, published on the website of the National Law Review.
Yes, GAO bid protest filings have risen in recent years. No news there.

CRS also looked at the “effectiveness rate.” CRS tried to explain why the effectiveness rate for GAO protests is so high. One theory cited by CRS is that agencies usually take corrective action after GAO has indicated that it is going to sustain the protest. But the data uncovered by CRS does not support that theory.

Another CRS theory for this high effectiveness rate is the “predictable nature of GAO opinions.” Based upon this theory, CRS concluded that “the effectiveness rate is a rough measure of the number of protests that have actual or potential merit.” That seems about right to us. GAO often (but not always) sustains protests that have merit. Agencies take corrective action where it’s necessary. No controversy there.

CRS looked at the impact of protests on contract awards and implementation. CRS found that in 2014, the average time it took for GAO to resolve a protest was 39 days. CRS also found that more than half of GAO protests were resolved before the agency even filed its report responding to the protest (due 35 days after the protest filing). Those cases were resolved by dismissal or withdrawal of the protest. The average time for those cases was 21 days.

CRS did not look behind those numbers to separate out dismissals for agency corrective action and the GAO’s summary dismissal of protests that are untimely, lacking detail, or that otherwise fall outside GAO’s protest jurisdiction (e.g., contract administration issues). Maybe it should have. Such analysis might have yielded useful results.
Protests that are summarily dismissed on jurisdictional or procedural grounds are over and done. There is no further impact to the procurement. Protests that are dismissed for agency corrective action will have further impact (and delay) on the procurement. But CRS didn’t undertake that analysis. Instead, CRS took another path.
CRS concluded that agency actions to respond to protest issues (through corrective action or where protests are sustained by GAO) “can delay contract awards for weeks or months, costing millions of dollars and delaying delivery of goods and services.” But CRS cited to only one old (2007) DOD memorandum and one article about a procurement impacted by a GAO decision to support that conclusion. It seems to us that CRS’s conclusion was worthy of more detailed study. Certainly, the important conclusion for consideration by lawmakers – that delays from protests cost agencies millions of dollars – should have been based upon more extensive supporting data.

Yes, bid protests cause delays in procurements. Yes, delays are longer when agencies have to go back and fix errors. But there are some simple conclusions to be drawn from CRS’s statistics, too.
CRS showed that 43% of GAO protests had sufficient merit to result in a sustain or an agency determination to undertake voluntary corrective action to rectify identified or potential flaws in the procurement process.  Shouldn’t those procurements be corrected no matter the delay?
CRS also showed that 57% of protests lack merit and that more than half of protests are resolved within 21 days. That sure sounds like the delay in a lot of protest cases is limited to 21 days. What are the costs in dollars of a 21 day delay on a procurement?
The longer delays and higher costs come from post-protest actions that drag out the process beyond the time the protest is pending. Those delays are not really “caused” by the protest. Rather, they are caused by the contracting agency’s mistakes. That is not just a semantic argument.

Our takeaway from this is that CRS statistics show a procurement and GAO protest system that is working effectively. Concerns over protest-related delays in the government’s ability to acquire necessary products and services is understandable and rational.
But don’t forget, agencies already have tools to deal with that. They can override the automatic stay of contract performance triggered by a GAO protest, and should do so when it’s in their best interest, or when their need for the solicited goods or services is urgent.
Read the article at the link; I've taken some editorial liberty, as usual in the posts here.

Wednesday, March 25, 2015

Procurement controversy du jour: Philippines voting machines

This story illustrates the problem with bid protests: not the protests themselves, which can reveal questionable judgment or incompetence, but the need for an expeditious resolution of them, especially judicial review.

EDITORIAL - Resolve the questions quickly
Legal challenges were expected in the maintenance contract for voting machines that was awarded just three days before Sixto Brillantes Jr. retired on Feb. 2 as chairman of the Commission on Elections. Smartmatic-Total Information Management, which supplied the 80,000 precinct count optical scan machines that the Comelec used in the 2010 and 2013 polls, bagged the P268.8-million contract to refurbish the PCOS machines for the general elections next year.

Those opposing the deal argue that it should have been opened to public bidding as required under government procurement laws instead of being approved merely as an extension of a warranty for the PCOS machines. For its part, the Comelec argued that aside from time constraints as it prepares for next year’s polls, it would be risky to award the diagnostics and repair of the PCOS machines to another company.

Yesterday the Comelec warned that the court TRO could set back the timetable for poll preparations seriously enough to compel a return to manual voting in 2016. After automated elections in 2010 and 2013, Filipinos are sure to protest against a return to the long, laborious and fraud-prone manual vote.

All sectors, including the courts, must do their part to prevent this from happening. The courts must not take their usual sweet time in resolving the challenges to the refurbishment contract. The other day, the Supreme Court voted 12-2 to issue a temporary restraining order on the deal, effective immediately and with no specified duration. The slow administration of justice is already wreaking havoc in places such as Makati, where no one knows when the legal question over the suspension of the mayor will be settled with finality. With only 13 months to go before the general elections, the SC must act more quickly in the case of the Comelec deal with Smartmatic-TIM. The nation wants poll automation, and it should be conducted as smoothly as possible, with all legal challenges resolved.