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Showing posts with label Purposes and policies of procurement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Purposes and policies of procurement. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 12, 2021

Race, Religion, and Privacy: Oh My!

Government Contracting does not exists in a vacuum. It exists within the public domain, with governance features that distinguish it entirely from private contracting.

 Lexology, always a reliable source for government contracting updates (and more), hit a trifecta of such features with its procurement related article selections that hit my inbox today.  Here's a brief sampling of them.

Race: Executive Order Prohibiting Bias Training? Ignore That. DoD Issues Class Deviation to Comply with Nationwide Ban on EO 13950 Provisions


On January 6, 2021, the DoD issued a class deviation, effective immediately, to implement the nationwide court order enjoining Sections 4 and 5 of Executive Order (EO) 13950, Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping. EO 13950 prohibits federal agencies, contractors, and grant recipients from using workplace diversity and inclusion trainings to “promote race or sex stereotyping or scapegoating,” with Section 4 applying specifically to government contractors.
That new Court Order trumped Executive Order 13950. Also see Venable's post,Dismantling EO 13950 – Nationwide Preliminary Injunction Results in Suspension of Enforcement Measures for a bit more flavor and information.
For the foreseeable future, Federal contractors, subcontractors, and grant recipients alike no longer need to comply with or worry about the enforcement of EO 13950, especially given President‑elect Joe Biden's very recent announcement that he is appointing Boston Mayor Marty Walsh as the Secretary of Labor. In particular, Mayor Walsh has issued executive orders over the past few years that declare racism an emergency and public health crisis with the goal of "dismantl[ing] [] systemic racism"; acknowledge and improve racial equity through government, as further reported on here; and "create a national model for breaking down system racism across all aspects" of Boston, as reported here. Given that history, it is likely safe to assume that, if confirmed, Mr. Walsh has no intention of advancing policies akin to those in EO 13950.
Religion: OFCCP Issues Final Rule on Religious Exemptions for Government Contractors
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs issued Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause’s Religious Exemption final rule, which becomes effective on January 8, 2021. The final rule is intended to clarify the scope and application of the religious exemption in light of recent developments, including Supreme Court rulings and Executive Orders. Among other things, it clarifies that, in addition to churches, the exemption covers employers that: are organized for a religious purpose; hold themselves out to the public as carrying out a religious purpose; engage in exercise of religion consistent with and in furtherance of a religious purpose; and either operate on a not-for-profit basis or present other strong evidence that their purpose is substantially religious. Moreover, religious employers may condition employment on compliance with religious tenets, as long as they do not discriminate on other protected bases. This particular provision has caused concern, as some have interpreted it to permit discrimination against LGBTQ individuals. Among its key provisions, the final rule adds a rule of construction to provide the maximum legal protection of religious exercise permitted by the Constitution and laws, including the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Privacy (well, one person's privacy is another person's transparency): New Corporate Transparency Act Will Impose Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements on Many Companies, Particularly Small Businesses
The Corporate Transparency Act (CTA), part of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act enacted into law on January 1, 2021, will impose new beneficial ownership reporting requirements on many companies. The stated purposes of the CTA include the collection of beneficial ownership interest information for corporations, limited liability companies and similar entities "to (A) set a clear, Federal standard for incorporation practices; (B) protect vital United States national security interests; (C) protect interstate and foreign commerce; (D) better enable critical national security, intelligence and law enforcement efforts to counter money laundering, the financing of terrorism and other illicit activity; and (E) bring the United States into compliance with international anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism standards." Many types of entities, however, are exempted from the requirements of the CTA. These entities include, among others: public companies; governmental entities; banks and bank holding companies; credit unions; broker dealers; registered investment companies; registered investment advisers; insurance companies; registered public accounting firms; public utilities; certain pooled investment vehicles; 501(c) entities; companies with more than 20 full-time employees in the United States, more than $5 million in gross receipts or sales, and an operating presence at a physical office in the United States; and entities owned or controlled by one or more of such exempt entities. A reporting company will be required to identify each beneficial owner and applicant and report the individual's full legal name, date of birth, current residential or business address, and a "unique identifying number from an acceptable identification document" (generally a nonexpired passport, state issued driver's license or identification card or, if the individual does not have any of these, a nonexpired foreign passport) or a FinCen identifying number. The reporting company need only report the name of the exempt entity having a direct or indirect ownership interest in the reporting company (and not any of the other identifying information otherwise required). There are many issues of scope, definition and interpretation in the CTA which are expected to be addressed by the Treasury's forthcoming implementing regulations.
See, also, How do you determine prospective contractor responsibility if you don't know who the contractor really is?

Wednesday, March 28, 2018

Oops -- My mistake

This article comes from Athol, Maine, and is a perfect textbook hypothetical procurement quiz question, played out in real life. It involves a bid error, and seeks to find a way to deal with it. The facts of mistake are always at the core of a problem such as this. But the clarity of the law would help its resolution.

I've set out the whole article as presented, but for our purposes, let's just pretend it is a test question. How would you analyze the problem and solution?

State AG’s office denies Kenefick bid protest
The attorney general has denied a protest by Kenefick Corp., which submitted the low bid to the town for the Queen Lake Dam rehabilitation project. Bids were opened Jan. 31, and the hearing was held March 9.

Kenefick’s bid of $268,150 was the lowest of the 11 bids received, but the town rejected it because the document was not properly filled out. Kenefick argued that the $60,435 error on the form was obvious and should have been corrected by the town.

On the form, Kenefick wrote the total bid price was $268,150. There was a unit price schedule attached to the form. Bidders were asked to provide a unit price for approximately 20 items. The bidders were expected to multiply each unit price by the estimated quantity to derive a total bid amount. Bidders were further instructed to write the extended price for each item in words.

Instead of listing the extended price for each item in words, Kenefick expressed its unit prices in words. The total of the amounts in written words equaled $207,715, which conflicted with the total bid price of $268,150. The town said it made Kenefick’s bid obscure, mandating the rejection.

In the town’s rules relating to bids, in case of a discrepancy between words and figures, the amount expressed in words governs.

Kenefick was notified that its bid read as $207,715. Project Engineer David Lenart told the selectmen this week that, “Kenefick was told to take the bid for the lower amount, or withdraw it. He filed a protest.”

Kenefick maintained the error was obvious, and the town should have corrected it.

The town argued that Kenefick’s bid was obscure because of its $60,435 discrepancy, and also that Kenefick is not a responsible bidder, because it does not have experience with three dam projects, which was called for by the bid specifications.

The company’s lack of experience was also a concern, the town said. Lenart said, “Kenefick could only come up with two projects, which were not comparable” to the scope of the work needed on the Queen Lake project.

State Assistant Attorney General Deborah A. Anderson wrote that the town was under no obligation to correct Kenefick’s bid price, noting if a bidder’s error makes the price or scope of work ambiguous, the bid must be rejected. She further stated the town did not abuse its discretion by failing to correct Kenefick’s error.

Anderson ruled, “I find that Kenefick’s error was an obvious one, even though Kenefick’s bid price could be read as either $207,715 or $268,150. The town had the discretion to correct this error, but it chose not to do so. This was not an arbitrary decision.’

Anderson said as protestor, Kenefick did not meet its burden to prove that its rejection was arbitrary. She said the town was rightfully concerned about allowing Kenefick to choose which bid price was the correct price, thus giving Kenefick ”two bites of the apple.” Also, she said the town followed its own rule. For those reasons the protest was denied.

The second-lowest bidder, R. Bates & Sons, who bid $270,540, made similar, though fewer, errors on the bid forms. He was informed of the same issue.

Selectmen signed two documents prepared by the town’s attorney, officially rejecting the Kenefick and Bates bids. Selectmen then voted to award the bid to the third lowest bidder, Edward Page Corp., which came in at $319,069 ($50,919 higher than the Kenefick bid).

Chairman Thomas Brouillet and John Telepciak signed the contract saying Page “did everything right, and has good experience.”

The project involves the demolition of the dam’s existing spillway and outlet conduit, and construction of a new concrete spillway and gate structure, outlet gates, trash racks, low level outlet pipe, riprap slope protection, gravel crest and landscaping.

Representing the town at the Boston hearing were Thomas McEnaney (town counsel) who filed a response to Kenefick’s protest, and David Lenart, the project engineer.

Work on the dam will begin after Labor Day.
So, what happened here? Kenefick presented a bid with itemized unit prices. In accordance with bid requirements, Kenfeck's bid amount was provided for each itemized line item, but was spelled out in word form. The total amount of all bids was then provided, in Arabic numerals.

Setting aside the question of Kenefick's responsibility for the moment, because the article makes it look like its bid was rejected on grounds of responsiveness, not responsibility, its bid was rejected because the bid "was obscure because of its $60,435 discrepancy" between the total bid price and the mathematical total of the itemized prices. Kenefick argued it was an obvious mistake, but the State Assistant Attorney General held that the town was under no obligation to correct the bid, on the ground that, if a bidder's error makes the price ambiguous, the bid must be rejected. She said the town did not abuse its discretion by failing to correct Kenefick's error.

That may well be the applicable law in Athol, which evidently has a rule that, "in case of a discrepancy between words and figures, the amount expressed in words governs." But this blog is about the ABA Model Procurement Code, and more particularly the Guam procurement law, which follows the ABA MPC, and there is no such law in that context. Remember, we are treating this article as a hypothetical factual situation for our analysis purposes.

MPC § 3-202(6) states that "correction ... of inadvertently erroneous bids before or after award ... shall be permitted in accordance with regulations. This is the same language in Guam law, 5 GCA § 5211(f).

The pertinent ABA MPC regulation is in R3-202.11 ("Mistakes in Bids"), in particular R3-202.11.4(b)("Mistakes where intended correct bid is evident"), which states, "if the mistake and the intended correct bid is clearly evident on the face of the bid document, the bid shall be corrected to the intended correct bid and may not be withdrawn. Examples of mistakes that may be clearly evident on the face of the bid document are ... errors in extending unit prices, ... and arithmetical errors." 

It might be the case that the town did not consider this to be a "clearly evident" mistake. But the AAG was certain it was a clearly evident mistake: "I find that Kenefick’s error was an obvious one...."

The AAG also said "the town was rightfully concerned about allowing Kenefick to choose which bid price was the correct price, thus giving Kenefick 'two bites of the apple'.” Again, I do not question the AAG's statement of applicable Maine law. But the "two bite at the apple" old saw is irrelevant in the MPC regulation, which says such a mistaken bid "shall be corrected ... and may not be withdrawn.

Moreover, there is another element here. Both bites of Kenefick's bid were the lowest prices bid. "Kenefick’s bid price could be read as either $207,715 or $268,150." The next lowest bid, at $270,540, was higher than both of those bids, if we assume, for argument, they were intended to be two separate bids. Even if the totaled low bid written in words,$207,715, the total bid expressed in Arabic numerals, $268,150, remained the low bid. For some reason, “Kenefick was told to take the bid for the lower amount, or withdraw it. He filed a protest."

I hope that there was a stronger reason to reject the bid because of issues of responsibility, though there is not much in this article that would help an analysis of that issue. This bid was rejected before it was evaluated from all appearances, even though it was the lowest bid. It was reported only that "Kenefick is not a responsible bidder, because it does not have experience with three dam projects, which was called for by the bid specifications." 

In the ABA MPC regulations (R3-401.10), it is not necessary to actually have all the experience at the time of bid if it can be obtained (R3-401.03) after bid evaluation, for instance by subcontractors or other professionals available for hire. This regulation requires a separate inquiry to determine responsibility after bid opening, so long as the low bidder's responsibility is determined to the satisfaction of the procurement officer before award (R3-401.04). There was evidently here no finding that Kenefick was nonresponsible (see, R3-401.05), merely "a concern".

And what did the town get from this? The obligation to pay $50,000 more for the next available bid, about 20% more than Kenefick's stated total bid.

It might be asked, why is the ABA MPC so lenient on allowing low bidders to correct bids? It would seem, unless the low bidder has determined to be nonresponsible, that government should be allowed the opportunity to take a low bid, notwithstanding technical mistakes in it that do not prejudice the competitive standing of other bidders. Here, correction of the bid, even to the higher amount, would not improve the competitive position of any of the other bidders.  

It is one of the foundation purposes and policies of the MPC, and Guam's procurement law, "to maximize to the fullest extent practicable the purchasing value of public funds". (MPC § 1-101(2)(f); 5 GCA § 5001(b)(5).)  It is mandated that the procurement law is to be construed and applied to promote its purposes and policies.  (MPC § 1-101(1); 5 GCA § 5001(a).)


Wednesday, August 23, 2017

The ethics of paperwork

Illinois, USA

Note: As I so often warn, I slice and dice and paraphrase and omit articles to my end an didactic idiosyncrasies. Therefore, don't take my word for the renditions of articles here. If you need to know the actual intent and full context of the authors of articles presented in this blawg, read the source at the links.

Procurement changes welcome
Gov. Bruce Rauner signed bipartisan legislation last week that should make it easier for the state to make required purchases at lower costs for taxpayers. S.B. 8 has particularly positive ramifications for public universities throughout Illinois.

The legislation is intended to make the procurement process more efficient and transparent by undoing restrictive rules that were put into place after the scandals of the administrations of former Govs. Rod Blagojevich and George Ryan. They created bureaucratic nightmares, the undoing of which Rauner said will "make it easier for small and midsize businesses to bid on contracts." It also will make it easier for public entities to accept the lowest bid. That may seem like common sense, but in Illinois, it's revolutionary political reform.

Killeen cited several problems UI officials endured under the old rules that he expects to be addressed by the new law. He said that "our libraries will be able to purchase academic journals that are staples throughout higher education without going through unnecessary and time-consuming procurement reviews" and "will avert delays that have slowed research and frustrated top faculty, threatening to chase them and their nearly $1 billion in annual research funding to states with "less-cumbersome" procurement guidelines. "For instance, our chemistry and biology researchers will be able to order a specialized microscope that is available from just a single source without jumping through hoops to attract other vendors that don't exist," Killeen said.

The goal of limiting public corruption under the old approach was well intended. Given the criminal instincts that pervade government in this state, they can hardly be ignored. But there are limits to what bureaucratic rules can achieve in pursuit of the noble but challenging goal of legislating honesty. They can become counter-productive when they have the effect of paralyzing the process — in this case, the procurement process.
Governor Signs Procurement Reform Bill
Rauner said the bill isn’t perfect, but it will make the procurement process easier for both vendors and state agencies like universities. “And, based upon the estimates I’ve heard, this can save the university tens of millions of dollars every year.” And Rauner says the savings will be even greater for other state agencies, from Central Management Services to the state prison system. Rauner said that his administration estimated that procurement reform would, in time, save the state $250 million to $300 million a year.

“This bill will allow us to save hundreds of millions of dollars every year”, the governor said. “This is big stuff, and it’s wonderful. This is major progress for the people of Illinois.”

Prof. Jeffrey Moore, said he welcomed the measure. Moore said Illinois’ complicated procurement rules have made it difficult for researchers to obtain vital but obscure equipment and parts at good prices, because many suppliers find them too complicated to bother with. He gave the example of a researcher who was seeking a part that was made by only one small company. “And this particular company, which is a small company and doesn’t have a lot of business, but is the only maker of this research part, was not willing to learn the process of our complicated system and chose not to participate in the bidding process”, said Moore, “which meant that the researcher was not able to do the research that they needed to do, because they couldn’t get this part.”

Gov. Rauner said it’s difficult to regulate ethics, and the result is often a surplus of paperwork. He said his own administration supported a different approach.

“We’ve made an effort to try to encourage ethical behavior”, said Rauner, “and encourage good government, but try to also balance that with making government efficient and effective and transparent.”
The devil is always in the detail. There will never be a one-size-fits-all-perfectly procurement system for all time. It's a balancing process. Every procurement change involves a rebalance of crucial principles, for better or worse. You can never finally have it the way you'll always be happy with it. In other words, it's a politician's dream come true: a never-ending dream of posture and headline. As Prof. Steven Schooner of the George Washington University Law School tells us in his procurement Desiderata, the choices we make in procurement reform involve trade-offs of critical governance principles.
It is difficult to articulate objectives for a procurement system. There are many options, and most are contradictory.

Critics of the U.S. system suggest that, historically, efficiency was not a fundamental goal of the procurement process and, arguably, our system is designed to thwart efficiency. A procurement system is efficient when it spends the least amount of resources in the process of purchasing what is needed. If your buyers are overworked, however, such a system becomes more expensive, because your buyers fail to obtain the best prices. Unfortunately, the pursuit of best value typically requires greater buyer resources, from market research to negotiation.

Ultimately, each government must decide how much discretion or flexibility it wishes to delegate to its buyers. For each individual transaction, greater buyer flexibility should result in higher customer satisfaction and better value for money. For all of your transactions, taking a systemic view, broad delegations of discretion or flexibility may reduce transparency and competition. Accordingly, this discretion may entail a lack of control that may threaten public confidence in your procurement system.

No system can achieve all of these goals. Nor can a state expect that its objectives for its system will remain constant over time. Determining which goals are most important is a daunting, ever-evolving challenge.

Because no system can achieve all of the goals here (or the many not discussed), your desiderata entails important tradeoffs. There are significant transactional, economic, and social costs associated with maximizing transparency, integrity, and competition. Nonetheless, the author believes these costs are an excellent long-term investment.

Three “pillars”, in my opinion, underlie the United States procurement system: system transparency; procurement integrity; and competition. In the United States, we believe that, as a general rule, our government enjoys access to the best contractors, lowest prices, most advanced technology, favourable contract terms and conditions, and the highest quality goods and services. We think this is so because our system, for the most part, encourages participation by the widest possible pools of potential competitors; it consistently demonstrates that competitors will be impartially considered for award of our contracts; and it treats all contractors in a manner that balances appropriate risks with meaningful profit incentives and rewards.

Friday, April 22, 2016

Exceptionalism

The procurement manifestation of NIMBY-ism is exceptionalism: I'm a unique critter and too precious to be subjected to the procurement rules.

I have previously posts concerning the expression of exceptionalism in the esteemed halls of academia, e.g., here.

This article is about the precious IT industry. Read the article at the link for fullness and accuracy and to avoid my editing for my own purposes. (FITARA is the acronym for the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act.)

National labs' FITARA exemption nixed in Senate funding bill
The Energy Department's national laboratories will likely lose their exemption to procurement rules in the Federal IT Acquisition Reform Act after just one year.

Under FITARA's enhanced CIO authorities, Cabinet-level IT chiefs typically have budget authority and some influence over hiring when it comes to the activities of their bureaus and agencies. The Senate's fiscal 2017 energy and water development appropriations bill would not renew a provision from last year's funding bill that allowed the national labs to conduct IT procurement without the involvement of DOE's CIO.

The labs and its contractors had sought the exemption because they believed their supercomputing programs should not be treated like garden-variety IT. They had a well-placed advocate on the Senate Appropriations Committee.

"Our national laboratories are building the fastest research supercomputers in the world and developing next-generation exascale machines," Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.), chairman of the Appropriations Committee's Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, told FCW in June 2015. "One-size-fits-all models don't work well, and I am concerned that this well-intentioned law could make it more difficult to develop the technology we need to support the Department of Energy's research and national security missions."

In its budget request for fiscal 2017, the Obama administration advocated a rescission of the language that authorized the exemption.

In a June 2, 2015, letter to Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), Director of the Office of Management and Budget Shaun Donovan called the exemption "highly problematic." He wrote that, if passed, the provision would "eliminate the administration's ability to ensure information technology resources effectively support the department's mission by reducing duplicative IT systems, implementing a comprehensive cybersecurity solution and addressing other IT management issues that support the president's goal to deliver a government that is more effective, efficient and accountable."

Office of Federal Procurement Policy Administrator Anne Rung echoed that sentiment during a House hearing that same month, saying, "It's our viewpoint that FITARA is a tremendous management tool for the agencies, and we are not carving out the Department of Energy labs."

Although the White House appears to have won the fight, there is a catch: If the government is funded on the basis of a continuing resolution for 2017, rather than by new appropriations bills, the exemption will likely remain in force. Given that the appropriations process for fiscal 2017 is taking place against the backdrop of a presidential election, a continuing resolution is a strong possibility.

Saturday, June 9, 2012

Where procurement is an essential feature of governance, it's in the constitution

The articles below are posts in the World Bank blog.

Morocco: When Governance, Transparency, Integrity, Accountability, & Public Procurement Entered the Constitution by Laurence Folliot Lalliot
Morocco has joined the very small list of countries (i.e., South Africa and the Philippines) to grant a constitutional status to this rather technical field, the impact of which will be progressively felt in the world (even outside the small world of procurement lawyers), as it affects how government money is converted into goods and works like roads, schools, vaccines, etc.

Proclaimed by the Preamble and woven throughout its articles, Governance and governance topics including access to information, transparency, integrity, anti-corruption, accountability, and social participation (notably through a right to petition), are paid an unprecedented tribute in the new Constitution. Such topics, which are considered recent features of good governance, are usually prescribed at the lower level of ordinary laws or regulations. However, with their inclusion in the Constitution of Morocco, they now enjoy a preeminent status that supersedes any potential contradictory law or regulation. Beyond being a symbolic gesture with potential profound legal implications, this will change the dimensions of the debate on Governance by expanding opportunities for improvement (e.g., facilitating a dialogue on social accountability with the Government).

The new provisions such as the one promoting access to information will mirror international best practices in procurement laws which require the publication of all procurement documents on a free website. The procurement process will be impacted by the provision granting the right to challenge any administrative decisions before the Administrative Courts. Another provision addressing the principle of free competition could help ensure all bidders are allowed to compete without discrimination. And on the topic of integrity of public management, public procurement and the administration of public contracts were considered important enough to earn their own article (article 36):
“Offenses relating to conflicts of interest, insider trading,and all offenses of financial nature are sanctioned by law. Public authorities are obliged to prevent and punish according to law, all forms of delinquency related to the activities of government and public bodies, to the use of funds they manage,to the award and administration of public procurement contracts. Trafficking of influence and privilege, abuse of dominant position and monopoly,and all other practices contrary to the principles of free and fair competition in economic relations are sanctioned by law. There shall be installed a National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Agency.” (Free translation from Lalliot.)
Considering the demands for transparency, integrity and accountability which helped serve as the foundation of the “Arab Spring,” we may assume the practice of including Governance topics and public procurement in the Constitution may be expanded outside the Moroccan borders and considered by other Constitutional Assemblies in Tunisia, Egypt or Libya. This would not be surprising given the growing consensus that transcends political affiliations to install ethical and accountable public functions under the scrutiny of the civil society. Perhaps as we look back at this time in the years to come, the inscription of government spending and purchases on the frontispiece of a country’s primary legal document shall become an emblematic testimony of this new era.
Would you agree with one comment that this is mere window dressing? If so, you have no hope, and are probably wasting your time reading blogs such as this.

Procurement Monitoring by Citizens: Is it Effective? by Sabina Panth
According to the International Budget Partnership, developing countries spend $820 billion a year on procurement-related transactions. These expenditures are critical for the delivery of goods and services but they are also extremely vulnerable to corruption. Transparency International estimates that $400 Billion is lost to bribery and corruption in public procurement internationally (2006). Procurement monitoring is an emerging area, where citizens’ involvement has been experimented to address the impending waste and corruption in public procurement.

The procurement process typically consists of identifying what is needed; determining who the best person or organization to supply this need is; and ensuring what is needed is delivered to the right place at the right time and for the best price and quality. Some loop holes that offer room for manipulation and fraud in procurement consist of:
Planning stage: Absence of clear criteria for project selection; stimulating demand for personal benefits; short cutting bidding process by misrepresenting urgency
Preparation Stage: Weak technical specifications leading to favored bidders; lack of public participation in project design/bidding specifications, tailor fitting favored bidders
Advertisement Stage: Limited/insufficient advertising; published in paper with limited circulation
Pre-qualifications: Bias requirement to a favored bidder or contractor, lengthy process leading to opportunities for bribe solicitation, contract sharing among the bribing companies

Integrity Pacts and Public Hearings are some tools that have been used to engage civil society in procurement monitoring. In a public hearing, the responsible authority convenes a meeting with citizens and subject experts to discuss the planned terms of a contract and citizens in turn express their objections and suggestions for improvements. In Integrity Pact, the responsible authority and business agencies competing in the bidding share a contract of reciprocal control to prevent the payment of bribes between the bidders and the authorities. This allows control mechanisms for the citizens and also the losing bidders to monitor how the winning bidder addresses the terms of the contract. Citizens are also able to make use of the grievance redress provision in the contract to report cases of complaints and dissatisfaction during the implementation phase.

For meaningful participation of citizens in procurement monitoring, it is important to first identify key stages of procurement where civil society and government can collaborate. Equally important is to make information on procurement processes accessible to the general public. This will help avoid hand-picking of individuals and organizations in the formation of monitoring committees or participation in public hearings. Also, civil society needs proper incentives, including trained manpower and sufficient budget to participate in procurement monitoring. Given the entrenched corruption in procurement handling and the association among stakeholders involved in the process, civilians are not always in a position to resist threats and manipulation. However, there are some cases, where civil societies have cultivated home-grown solutions to effectively engage in procurement monitoring and influence policy changes.

I'm not sure how far the concept of citizen participation can effectively go. To the extent it allows citizens to see the guts of procurement and the way the procurement sausage is made, I'd agree. And, from the discussion in the article, it is this monitoring that is emphasized.

But if extended to citizen participation in selection of projects and contractors, procurement could end up being no different than corrupt procurement, which is discriminatory procurement for the benefit of some, even if a majority, at the cost of the society as a whole.

When people criticize democracy as a model of governance, they exaggerate or see only the majority rule aspect (which is fundamentally mob rule), and disregard entirely the equally essential minority rights aspect (that is, government by consent). As the first article alluded to, good procurement is good governance, and good governance requires good procurement. A failure of one is always reflected in a failure of the other.

Read more of each article featured at the article title link.

Feel free to comment, but please keep comments civil. (Since there's only ever been one comment, that has not been a problem in this blog.)

Monday, June 4, 2012

A time to outsource and time to insource?

I've been a bit amused that those who rally hardest to allow government to buy its things off island to save money, turn blue in the face at the thought of importing cheaper labor, too. It's obviously not a cost-savings mantra that drives such irreconcilable positions. Procurement often lives right at the coal face of social dissonance with economics and politics.

With unemployment everywhere in the Western world, at least, in steep decline, it is not unexpected that organized labor would want its own share of the government pie, like many other contractors just barely getting by. Hard facts can make for bad law.

California government unions move to squeeze out private contractors
With California facing yet another budget crisis that threatens state jobs and pay, employee unions are moving on several fronts to push use of civil service workers instead of private contractors for state government work.

The state historically has had trouble recruiting and keeping high-skill workers in areas such as high-tech, law, science and finance, Yank said, because the state's pay and benefits are less than in local government or the private sector.

"Contracting for those jobs – it's a horrid, vicious cycle," he said. The compensation gap empties the in-house talent pool, which causes the state to spend money on contractors that could be used to make pay more competitive.

Last month, the state attorneys' union successfully contested a multimillion-dollar contract with a private law firm for legal services. Last month, the state's legal professionals' union successfully challenged a multimillion-dollar agreement for services between the California's prison department and a private law firm.

The three-year deal between the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and Williams & Associates started in 2009 at $1 million to defend the state against inmate lawsuits normally handled by civil service lawyers. After two revisions, it ballooned to $5 million for the three years ending June 30.

Although state law requires departments to notify the affected unions of such contracts, the attorneys' association learned of the deal after a staff researcher found it by combing through a state expenditure database.

The discovery prompted a union challenge before the State Personnel Board, a five-member panel that rules on a range of employer-employee disputes.

"Our top attorneys make $50 per hour," said CASE's Whalen, a tenth of what contract attorneys can bill. "So by definition you can't save money by hiring out because you already have some of the cheapest attorneys on the planet."

Last month the Personnel Board ruled that the corrections agency had illegally contracted for the work. To avoid harming current litigation, the board said Williams & Associates could continue handling cases until its contract expires at the end of this month.

"We've got a bunch more (cases) in the pipeline," said Patrick Whalen, general counsel for California Attorneys, Administrative Law Judges and Hearing Officers in State Employment, or CASE. "When it's crunch time, you look for every penny you can."

Pepperdine University political scientist Michael Shires said another motive is also at work: "Clearly, the unions are trying to protect their members' jobs."

Sometimes it makes good sense to contract for services, Shires said. "Once someone is a monopoly, the competitive forces of the market won't hold them accountable," Shires said, "including when government grants the monopoly to itself." The unions long have argued that keeping jobs in-house is cheaper than outsourcing. They press their case hardest during tight budget cycles.

"There are instances when jobs should stay in-house and cases when they should be contracted," said Mitch Zak, a Republican strategist whose firm, Randle Communications, works with a number of trade organizations. "But the standard should be what's best for California, not what's best for the unions or for individual businesses."

Read more at the link above.

Sunday, February 20, 2011

The uneasy fit of wage determination standards in the procurement process

The Guam Public Auditor issued a Decision recently (actually two decisions, but in parallel cases), once again wading into the thicket the legislature created when it tried to bolt on a labor law regulation to the procurement law, without proper appreciation of the limits and language of procurement law.

In this case, the legislature desired to ensure labor wage rates are paid on government contracts by putting some onus on the procurement system to do something about it. That something is not much, when analyzed, as the Public Auditor rightly did.

First, there is the labor issue. Consistent with certain Federal law, Guam law requires, in some instances, that wages be paid according to a scale determined from time to time by the Department of Labor. That is a labor law that the DOL is meant to police.

The procurement problem arises because the legislature seems to have found that the DOL was not entirely effective in enforcing the labor laws, so decided to place some of that onus on the procurement contracting process. In the Wage and Hour Determination Article 13 of the Procurement Act, the law requires: “In such cases where the government of Guam enters into contractual arrangements ... for the provision of a service to the government of Guam, ... then the contractor shall pay such employee(s)”, the required wage rates. (5 GCA § 5801.)

Having clearly made this a “contracting” issue, the legislature muddied the water by adding: “The Chief Procurement Officer shall require bidders to submit declarations ... to demonstrate their compliance with [§ 5801], if applicable”. (5 GCA § 5805.)

It has to be appreciated that bidders are not contractors. The obligation of Article 13 to pay wage rates is on contractors. Bidders should not be made to submit any declarations that they comply with Article 13 because they cannot: they are not contractors.

The simple way to read § 5805 us to say that bidders might have had to submit the declaration to demonstrate compliance, but they don’t have to because Article 13 is not applicable to them; by its own terms, § 5805 only applies to bidders if § 5801 applies, and it does not. Bidding is not one of those "cases where the government of Guam enters into contractual arrangements". Bidding precedes those arrangements.

The Public Auditor’s decision did not take that simplistic route, however. Her route was through jurisdiction. She rightly pointed out that enforcement of payment of the wage rate was the responsibility of the DOL (5 GCA § 5803). She concluded, her jurisdiction, regardless whether Article 13 applies to bidders, does not extend to enforcing the payment of wage rates, so she washed her hands of further consideration of that matter.

But the story does not end there.

Not content with Article 13, the legislature also meddled with the procurement process to require that IFBs contain “a recitation of the Wage Determination most recently issued ... including a demonstration of compliance with [Article 13], if applicable.”

In this case, the government did not put the most recent determination in the IFB, but did require the bidders to put a wage determination schedule in with their bids. It turns out, each of the three bidders submitted a different schedule, and that the lowest bid was traceable to the use of a wage determination schedule that was lower then the others.

The Public Auditor ruled that the failure of the government to specify “the most recent” wage determination resulted in the bidders basing their bids on differing criteria. The Decision held this defect in the bid specifications violated the rule that “those criteria that will affect the bid price and be considered in evaluation for award shall be objectively measurable.”

As a remedy, the Public Auditor negated the contract. That is a result I would have reached, also, but perhaps by emphasizing slightly different law and language than was used.

Taking first the language that was used, the Public Auditor found “that DOE's award of the contract to J&B is void.” (Decision, p 14.) That is an unfortunate use of the term “void”, and is a use inconsistent with what she said in her conclusion: “DOE's contract with J&B, arising from the IFB, is hereby terminated.” Whether a contract is void or terminated is an important distinction in the law; that is why I used the term “negated”, which is not a legal term of art but could include both a “void” contract and a “terminated” contract. (A void contract is treated as an empty act that never occurred, but a terminated contract raises the possibility of damages for a breach that is so material that it allowed the contract to be terminated.)

This is not mere semantics. The Procurement Law specifically allows a contract to be made “void” only if there is a showing of fraud or bad faith. (5 GCA § 5452(a)(2)(i).) Here, the Public Auditor made a specific finding there was no such fraud or bad faith. In this instance, as the Public Auditor also held, the appropriate remedy is to “terminate” the contract. (5 GCA § 5452(a)(1)(ii).)

As to the law used to reach the result, I would have relied more heavily on the government’s obligation to provide appropriate specifications, which it failed to do, leaving the IFB too vague to satisfy the law’s requirement for certainty.

“Purchase descriptions shall describe the salient technical requirements or desired performance characteristics of supplies or services to be procured....” (5 GCA § 5268(c).) “Specifications shall be drafted with the objective of clearly describing the territory’s requirements.” (2 GAR § 4102(a)(1).) “The Invitation for Bids shall set forth the requirements and criteria which will be used to determine the lowest responsive bidder.” (2 GAR § 3109(n)(1).)

Importantly, after bids are opened, all bids should be rejected if “ambiguous or otherwise inadequate specifications were part of the solicitation.” (2 GAR § 3115(d)(2)(A)(ii).) That was certainly the case here. It was the government’s inadequate specifications that were at the root of the bid dispute.

In my line of reasoning, I would start with the proposition that the government was required to provide the current wage determination schedule. Having failed to do so, it invited confusion with inadequate specifications, did not specify the performance pay standards it desired, and let itself be misled into evaluating the bids based on criteria not provided in the IFB.

I would not have paid any attention to what the IFB required the bidders to produce in terms of wage determination schedules, and I would consider any such requirement to be void as beyond the power of the government to compel. First, the law requires the government to provide the information, not bidders. Second, bidders are only required to comply with the wage determination laws “if applicable”, and the law is not applicable to them. And finally, the government cannot compel empty acts, and this case illustrates just how emptythe act is; how empty is it to require the bidders to do something that the government is already supposed to have done?

Now there’s one more small item, but one easily dismissed. 5 GCA § 5211(g) puts the onus on the government purchasing agency to award to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder “whose bid amount is sufficient to comply with Article 13". But how is the government to make such a determination if the bidder is content to come a bit out of pocket to pay any shortfall to get the contract for other reasons? The government is not given access to all internal information a bidder may have. The only information the government has to hand is the total bid price and the total possible wage expenditure, assuming it may accurately know the manning requirements. It is rare, if ever, that such information would be adequate to make such a calculation without resort to pure speculation.

Fortunately, that is a question that does not need an answer because, just like in Article 13, that determination is only required where the “bid amount is sufficient to comply with Article 13 ..., if applicable”. Awarding a bid is not “entering into a contractual relationship”, so Article 13 should not be deemed to be applicable to require any such indeterminable determination. The law does not require the impossible.

The companion cases are IN THE APPEAL OF JRN AIR CONDITIONING & REFRIGERATION, INC. OPA-PA-10-007 and 10-008, and the Decision in one is the same as the other.

Sunday, December 19, 2010

Outsourced quasi-public-private partnerships subject to public procurement rules?

HRT skirted contracting and bidding laws, audit finds (Virginia, USA)
State investigators say Hampton Roads Transit's former leaders flouted federal and state contracting laws, steering millions of dollars of publicly funded consulting work to "preferred individuals" over about four years.

HRT manipulated some contracts to prevent them from coming before the agency's governing board and failed to seek competition in nearly 70 percent of procurements reviewed by the Virginia Department of Transportation Inspector General's office, that office says.

Additionally, consultant work at times was "improperly" arranged without the knowledge of HRT's procurement office or was secured under expired contracts, says the inspector general's "special review," which was released last week.

"HRT did not comply with applicable procurement laws," the report concludes.

"As far as I'm concerned, it's the same thing as stealing money," said Jim Wood, a Virginia Beach city councilman and past chairman of the HRT board. "If anybody who worked for HRT or works for HRT knowingly violated procurement laws, they should be prosecuted. Period."

The report states that HRT: improperly hired consultants without seeking competition in 16 of 24 contracts; failed to establish an "impartial and comprehensive evaluation" in eight of nine contracts competitively bid; produced no documents to show price was considered in five of seven competitive bids; awarded five consulting jobs under expired contracts; and twice hired consultants as temporary employees to avoid seeking competition.

The report cited examples including,

n When a recruiter was hired to fill an executive position, there was no documentation that the job was competitively bid or that the procurement department knew of the hiring. E-mails among senior staff admit that the hiring violated federal law and indicate Townes instructed staff not to use federal money to pay the contractor because rules were not followed.

n HRT policy stated that contracts over $50,000 must be approved by the HRT board. However, the board had no knowledge of payments of $485,000 over 2-1/2 years to one light-rail consultant. The consultant was hired as a temporary employee in five-month periods, for less than $50,000 each period, "in order to keep it within the President/CEO's signatory authority."

"HRT staff took deliberate steps to avoid obtaining Board approval of these services." And by contracting as a temporary employee, HRT avoided the need to seek competitive bids.

n HRT awarded a $9.5 million contract to Williams Mullen for legal services. Although pricing was listed as part of the selection criteria, the law firm was chosen before HRT's evaluation panel even considered the fee schedule.

Additionally, bias was introduced in the process when HRT's technical evaluation included the statements that Williams Mullen "has unequalled knowledge of HRT, its history and its needs" and "has demonstrated excellence in representing HRT... for many years."

n When HRT was selecting a firm to conduct a study for extending light rail into Virginia Beach, Townes, who was not part of the evaluation panel, attended a meeting to tell panel members that HRT might sue one of the proposers for other work it had done for the agency and therefore the firm's hiring could harm HRT's case. Prior to that, the firm received scores that were equal to or higher than the company that was eventually selected.

n A consultant's contract for light-rail construction and management was altered several times when costs started exceeding the contract limits. Early on, the contract with PBS&J Inc. was doubled to nearly $17 million by Townes, without approval from the board, which had authorized a $10 million limit for the work. Townes did not have authority to approve such a large change, so the contract increase was rescinded and replaced with one that brought the contract to the $10 million limit.

About six months later, the company wrote HRT indicating that it still needed the extra money, plus more, for a total increase of $10 million. About six months later, the HRT board authorized $2.8 million.

Then several months later, HRT staff had the board approve an additional $8.1 million. Meanwhile, during the lag, the consultant performed $2.4 million worth of work "without approved funding."

Donors profit from Myrtle Beach sales tax (South Carolina, USA)
(As a background note, this article suggests that the Myrtle Beach Chamber of Commerce was given public funds to promote the area's tourism industry. On Guam, the Guam Visitors Bureau is an autonomous government agency, part of the Executive Branch, and its affairs are expressly covered by the government Procurement Act.)
"Any time you're spending taxpayers' money, there should be some checks and balances," said state Sen. Ray Cleary, R-Murrells Inlet.

Although public money makes up 70 percent of the chamber's revenue - a projected $18.7 million for 2011 - state law does not require the chamber to solicit competitive bids or follow any other procurement rules for projects that are paid with taxpayer dollars.

The chamber is required to submit regular reports to governing bodies and the public showing how much tourism grant, accommodations tax and sales tax money it spends and where it spends it, but those reports have no impact on the vendors chosen to do that work.

Some businesses that made campaign donations to politicians who approved a sales tax increase for the Myrtle Beach Area Chamber of Commerce now are among the biggest beneficiaries of that tax increase.

The chamber has paid those businesses and others that donate to a political action committee supporting those politicians at least $5.9 million in public money - including sales tax revenue - during the first nine months of this year for marketing work without any competitive bidding and little public oversight.

Most of the sales tax money - charged on retail sales within the Myrtle Beach city limits - goes to the chamber of commerce for advertising to out-of-state residents. The city gets about 20 percent of the funds for property tax breaks and tourism infrastructure projects.

The tax is expected to generate up to $18 million per year over the 10-year life of the legislation.

Myrtle Beach, which passes the sales tax money along to the chamber, does not require the chamber to follow any procurement rules, according to city spokesman Mark Kruea.

"The chamber is interested in getting the biggest bang for its buck, so I'm sure they are being responsible with that money," Kruea said.

Myrtle Beach Mayor John Rhodes said the chamber's quarterly reports and regular updates to council provide enough accountability.

"It's all there - what they are spending and what they are spending it for," Rhodes said. "There are always going to be questions with anything that has to do with public money, but I think it's fine the way it is."

John Crangle, director of Columbia-based Common Cause of South Carolina, said giving public money to the chamber without oversight "is an open invitation to abuse."

Read more: http://www.thesunnews.com/2010/12/19/1877146/donors-profit-from-sales-tax.html#ixzz18aDv1w00

Friday, October 22, 2010

The debate over applying modern procurement theory to developing countires

Flexibility In Government Procurement Needed For Developing Countries By Riaz K. Tayob.

Riaz K. Tayob is the South African Representative of SEATINI (the Southern and East African Trade Institute), currently reading for a PhD in Technology Governance under Prof. Rainer Kattel at Tallinn University of Technology (Estonia). In this article he presents the debate:
The reality of the global economic crisis seems not to have affected the rationale for trade liberalisation in general, and for government procurement in particular. Given the paucity of standard textbook or neoclassical economics to explain the crisis (including the crisis on the Millennium Development Goals in most developing countries), there ought to be more analysis that grapples with the evidence and the relevance of the theories that underpin liberalisation.

One such approach included in a recently published journal article considered whether it is advisable for developing countries to use public or government procurement for development and whether developing countries should join the World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). The paper concludes that if public procurement for innovation (PPfI) is to be seen as part of their industrial-policy portfolio, accession to the GPA would not help, and advises against it.

And public procurement as part of industrial policy has a lot more to offer developing countries than is generally demonstrated in the typical studies undertaken, it finds. It does, however, mean that developing countries would first have to develop more robust innovation policy skills and competences, which may be lacking, and they should not directly transfer the respective policies from the developed world.

The article “Public Procurement as an Industrial Policy Tool: An Option for Developing Countries?” by Prof. Rainer Kattel and Veiko Lember appears in the Fall 2010 issue of the Journal of Public Procurement. It surveys the key arguments for and against joining the GPA, and argues that government procurement should not be seen only as an indirect support measure for development, but as a direct vehicle for promoting innovation and industries, and thus growth and development.

WTO Government Procurement Agreement

Only about 40 countries have joined the WTO GPA (a plurilateral agreement) including from the developing world Hong Kong (China), South Korea and Singapore and through the European Union, ten Eastern European countries. The GPA requires that signatories apply the principles of openness, transparency and non-discrimination (most-favoured nation treatment and national treatment) to national public procurement laws. The agreement applies above certain thresholds, for those sectors included in the positive or negative list annexed to the agreement, with exceptions allowed for “high national interests” or military products.

Government procurement, which constitutes more than 10 percent of the national economy in most countries, is perceived as one the main barriers to free trade. Discriminatory government procurement, according to the (neoclassical) theory of comparative advantage, makes states worse off in the long run because it leads to inefficient allocation of resources and limits the benefits of free trade: access to other markets, increased competition, job creation and budgetary savings.

The article states that the current debate on WTO and government procurement has been mostly about the relationship between trade and procurement and not so much about public procurement and economic development as such. The WTO approach assumes that liberal trade rules and maximum competition will eventually lead to sustainable economic growth both in developed and developing countries.

According to the article, using public procurement for developmental goals, in particular innovation (PPfI – public procurement for innovation), is seen in the literature as a demand-side policy measure through which governments can generate new markets for companies in order to develop new technological capabilities and solutions. However, the paper distinguishes PPfI from government purchases of “off-the shelf” products, procurement for innovation involves procurement that needs additional research and development work and thereby influences the innovative capacity of providers.

The article notes that while policy space has become much narrower for industrial policy under the WTO, it shows why it is still important for developing countries to use the still-available policy options. This would allow for the needed policy learning to take place through experimentation and is less open to rent-seeking and capture by interest groups.

A maximum level of competition may not be the best solution for developing countries and, instead, a more strategic policy view could be used that mixes competition with cooperation.

Direct public procurement for innovation represents one possibility that can be used to affect the technology life cycle, promote clusters and innovation systems, and thereby increase urban, regional and national competitiveness, the authors argue. The role of the public sector could be seen as a facilitator of innovation processes especially in the fluid phase of technology development because both social and economic benefits for the region and/or nation state might follow.

Concretely, the authors suggest several ways that public agencies can support innovations through procurement: The creation of new markets for products and systems that go beyond the state-of-the-art; the creation of demand “pull” by expressing its needs to the industry in functional or performance terms; the provision of a testing ground for innovative products; the provision of the potential of using public procurement to encourage innovation by providing a “lead market” for new technologies/solutions.

Compared to the (traditional) supply-side innovation policy measures, the public sector can use PPfI to act as a demanding first buyer by absorbing risks for socially/ecologically demanded products (where significant financial development risks prevail) and by promoting learning (where procurement introduces strong elements of learning and upgrading into public intervention processes). The government can also be the demander, bear higher entry costs, create critical mass, signal the market and link innovation to production – and not just increase internal capacities of producers.

Comment: The article is much longer than this extract, eliciting and examining many issues in the academic debates over the subject matter of procurement per se and the social policy context of government contracting and economic development.

While most of the academic argument is way over my head, I sense an agenda that strives to return to the "pick a winner" past of economic "development" practice. It is disturbing the extent to which this article lauds the ability of government to pick up the cost of technological advance, with the implication that profits might be privatized whilst losses are socialized. Quoting from extracts of the article:
For evolutionary economists, entrepreneurs seek technological innovation in order to create market failures, where technological development is anything but linear and technology is anything but freely available. The paper favours the perspective of procurement from the evolutionary economics

using public procurement for developmental goals, in particular innovation (PPfI – public procurement for innovation), is seen in the literature as a demand-side policy measure through which governments can generate new markets for companies

the public sector can use PPfI to act as a demanding first buyer by absorbing risks for socially/ecologically demanded products (where significant financial development risks prevail)

the government can also be the demander, bear higher entry costs, create critical mass, signal the market and link innovation to production – and not just increase internal capacities of producers.

The role of the public sector could be seen as a facilitator of innovation processes especially in the fluid phase of technology development because both social and economic benefits for the region and/or nation state might follow.
To me, the article lays a framework for rationalizing the removal of government contracting from the spotlight of transparency, accountability, planning and fair and equitable treatment, and placing it in the smoke-filled back room, to be protected by social preferences whose social good has not been opening studied and decided.


I hope I'm mistaken.

When government picks "winners" to allocate resources to, it backs them for political purposes whether the "winner" in fact wins or fails. The political incentive to cover-up losses is greater than the economic incentive that drives business. Competition is the umpire between businesses. Influence and corruption and conflict of interest is the umpire in government demand economy.


It might work, but the need for absolute transparency, accountability and fairness at every stage of the process is even greater in that regime than the usual competitive procurement regime.

Tuesday, August 10, 2010

More on the importance of planning, purposes and policies

This is a bit of a knock-on from a post I put up last week regarding the practical effect of procurement purposes and policies.

In my Guam Procurement Process Primer, after explaining where and how to find the laws and rules of Guam procurement, I begin the substantive topics of procurement law with a discussion of procurement policies and purposes. I try to make the point that it is error and folly to overlook these fundamental aspects.
The law and regulations specify certain purposes or policies of procurement law. These are not mere maxims, platitudes and ideals. They are intended to fill in the blanks and provide direction when the law or regulations have holes or are in need of clarification or direction.

This point is illustrated quite aptly in the following article by lawyer George Wheeler-Carmichael of the UK offices of lawfirm Nabarro LLP.

Most of the article is taken up in a discussion of what the author terms the "pre-procurement stages" of procurement under EU and UK law more particularly. The pertinent part, for this post, is this comment, at the beginning of the piece:
There are many things that can (and should) be done to prepare for the procurement, including market testing. But how far can you go?

There is very little law on this. European procurement rules are silent. The only guidance is in the three general principles of procurement law:

* equal treatment
* non-discrimination
* transparency

As long as market testing is carried out in a way which treats all participants equally, does not discriminate (and this includes inviting a wide range of organisations to participate in the first place) and ensures that the same information is given to all, then there should be no problem.

Sunday, August 8, 2010

On the importance of planning, policy and purpose

Effective procurement is not a "paint by the numbers" endeavor. While there are many bright lines, any application of procurement law that fails to take into account the over-arching goals of procurement policies and purposes will often reduce to mere paper shuffling and rubber stamping.

That's the message behind the following federaltimes.com piece on US Federal procurement contracting.

How some agencies are cutting contract costs
President Obama took aim at the growth in noncompetitive and cost-reimbursable contracts last year, telling OMB Director Peter Orszag and other top officials in a March 2009 memo to come up with guidelines to "maximize the use of full and open competition."

Figures released in the July 7 report show an overall slowdown in new contracts, increased use of competitively awarded contracts and fixed-price contracts, and decreased use of sole-source contracts.

While the administration has made some headway, its progress is not as impressive as it may seem, said Ray Bjorklund, a federal contracting expert with the market research firm FedSources. It's true that spending via sole-source and cost-plus contracts went up from fiscal 2000 to 2008, but the increases were roughly commensurate with the overall explosion in contract spending during that time. Similarly, the decline in the use of those types of contracts in fiscal 2010 corresponds with a general decrease in spending, Bjorklund said.

"It's a recognition that perhaps the executive branch has not been following all of the principles and the policies that are already documented" in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), he said.

The FAR encourages increased competition and instructs contracting officers to pick the type of contract that will offer the best results and least risk, Bjorklund said.

"[Obama's] memo says, let's step back and recognize those fundamentals," Bjorklund said. "Agencies are taking that to heart and being more conscientious."

Bjorklund said he thinks the administration's message has by now trickled down to the federal acquisition work force. However, moving to increased competition and fixed-price contracts is difficult and time-consuming for a career field widely acknowledged as understaffed and overworked.

Joseph Waddell, the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) senior procurement executive, acknowledged that switching gears is a strain on his staff.

"It is more difficult," he said. "It's more work up front. It's easier to just take the existing contract and repackage it and send it out for re-bid."

Stan Soloway, president and CEO of the Professional Services Council trade group, said he supports the administration's push for smarter contracting but worries about unintended consequences for contracting officers.

"I think we have to guard against pushing people to make contract-type decisions based on some overarching policy rather than what's right in the circumstance," he said.

Soloway said his organization has heard from government procurement officials who said they feel they're being pushed to use fixed-price contracts "even where they're not sure it's the right answer."

When the Environmental Protection Agency went to clean up the Tower Chemical Co. site, an abandoned pesticide plant about 25 miles west of Orlando, Fla., it had a fairly good idea what it was getting into.

The agency wanted to remove dirt that was full of hazardous chemicals, to reduce contamination of soil and groundwater at the Superfund site.

"We knew what was in the ground and how much of it was in the ground," said John Bashista, director of EPA's office of acquisition management.

Armed with this information, EPA was able to integrate into the Tower Chemical project a key element of the Obama administration's push for contracting reform: fixed-price contracts. EPA incorporated another administration goal by pushing hard for multiple vendors to bid on the project

Because the agency could clearly define the project's requirements before asking contractors for bids, EPA was able to avoid a "cost reimbursable" contract that left the door open for cost increases down the road. EPA also was able to get more than 20 companies to compete for the cleanup work.

The agency ended up with a $5.2 million contract, 65 percent below its initial estimate for a cost-reimbursable deal.

Obama didn't talk about reverse auctions in his memo, but they appear to be a crucial part of OMB's reforms. Dan Gordon, administrator of OMB's Office of Federal Procurement Policy, mentioned reverse auctions in congressional testimony July 15 when asked about the administration's most important contracting initiatives.

"Agencies are now routinely driving down prices by conducting electronic reverse price auctions," Gordon said.

OMB's report said the Department of Homeland Security alone ran more than 2,500 reverse auctions in fiscal 2009, resulting in savings of more than $40 million.