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Showing posts with label Adequate documentation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Adequate documentation. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 14, 2020

Follow the money

With every disaster comes disastrous spending.  And attempts to stem the flow.  So many attempts.  Sad.

Here's an illustration of the money flow, from the source to the see (sic), all courtesy of Covington & Burling LLP.

GAO Report Reveals New Insights Into Lobbying Disclosure Act Compliance and Enforcement
:
"The 2020 annual report from the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) provides new details regarding the state of Lobbying Disclosure Act (“LDA”) compliance and enforcement. By statute, the GAO is charged with conducting random audits of LDA compliance and submitting reports reflecting the results to Congress. This year’s audit reviewed approximately 100 quarterly “LD-2” reports filed by lobbyist employers and lobbying firms and about 160 semi-annual “LD-203” reports that disclose political contributions and politically-related contributions.

"Many takeaways from this year’s review were consistent with past reports. Lobbying registrants still often neglect to round their lobbying expenses and lobbying income to the nearest $10,000. Many registrants also fail to disclose the prior covered government positions held by newly-registered lobbyists. And many LDA reports continue to be amended after a registrant learns of the audit — a fact that GAO believes “suggests that our contact may spur some lobbyists to more closely scrutinize their reports than they would have without our review.”

"But the 55-page report does include some interesting new nuggets:

     • "Missing Political Contributions. Almost half (45%) of audited registrants failed to report political contributions on their semi-annual LD-203 political contribution reports. GAO described this as a “statistically significant” increase over prior years. This is a preventable error. Prior to filing, registrants should consider cross-checking the LD-203 reports versus Federal Election Commission reports to ensure there are no missing contributions.
     • "JACK Act Certifications. Pursuant to a new statute, the JACK Act, lobbyists are now required to certify they have not been convicted of certain crimes. This year, GAO audited the accuracy of these reports, including by conducting criminal background checks on names listed in the reports. While it found no errors, GAO’s background checks underscore the importance of conducting due diligence to confirm the accuracy of these representations.
     • "Naming and Shaming. The report singles out, by name, two lobbying firms that “declined to meet with us following our initial letters.” The failure to meet led to GAO reporting the names of these firms to Congress.
     • "Low Enforcement Levels. While there has only been a trickle of LDA civil enforcement cases in the last decade, the trickle has begun to dry in recent years. Only one civil attorney now handles LDA enforcement part-time (down from two in 2017). Moreover, GAO announced that “no suits have been initiated or cases settled since our 2018 lobbying report.” Those prior cases, GAO emphasized, have all involved “chronic offenders”."

Whistleblowers Watch Stimulus Money From Inside from the firm Squire Patton Boggs.
"Whistleblowers, with their unique access to business operations, follow the money to learn whether the business abides by the strings attached to that money. Whistleblowers look for an opportunity to cash in on what they consider fraudulent conduct. What’s a business to do?

Strings Attached

"We recently advised about the many strings attached to the trillions of dollars available from the stimulus packages. Government watchdogs aggressively will scrutinize what happens to that money from the outside. If they find fraudulent conduct, they will seek recovery under the federal False Claims Act (FCA) not just for the amount of loss to the government but for up to three times that amount (known as treble damages).

Whistleblower Incentives

"Whistleblowers are employees on the inside who know what procedures are in place, what procedures they think should be in place, and the people to who make decisions about those procedures. The FCA incentivizes whistleblowers to capitalize on their invaluable insight by filing a lawsuit (a qui tam suit) reporting what appears to be fraudulent conduct to the government watchdogs. The rewards are great. Whistleblowers receive 15% to 30% of the amount of any recovery. In addition, the business is required to pay attorney’s fees to the whistleblower.

"Those incentives work. Whistleblowers are the source of most recoveries under the FCA. We reported that qui tam law suits in 2019 were being filed at the rate of more than 12 per week. Whistleblowers personally recovered more than $271 million in payments. The government itself recovered more than $2.2 billion in those qui tam suits. This far outstrips direct enforcement actions brought by the government without a whistleblower. Now that trillions of dollars are flowing, whistleblowers know the rewards are even greater.

Proactive Action

"A business that needs a recovery stimulus should obtain the relief that is available. From small businesses, nonprofits, venture-backed startups, higher education institutions, and healthcare to trade, supply chains and defense, and other regulated industries, Squire Patton Boggs attorneys are here to help you receive the much-needed assistance.

"But vigilance also is needed. Prepare to account for the money received by, for example, ensuring

     • Protocols are established to handle the money
     • Compliance programs are in place
     • Compliance programs operate effectively
     • Clear and readily available channels handle complaints remotely
     • Tone at the top encourages employees to report problems to leadership"

Past as Prologue: The Wave of Investigations to Follow the Pandemic Recovery and Actions that Companies Can Take Now to Prepare from, again, Covington & Burling LLP.  
"On March 30, 2020, the inspectors general of several major agencies selected the Department of Defense Inspector General, Glenn Fine, to lead a newly created federal oversight entity that will investigate waste, fraud, and abuse in connection with the massive new coronavirus economic relief legislation. The inspectors general were exercising new authority contained in the legislation, but these actions also echo Congress’s past approach to oversight of recovery efforts. This client alert examines the new investigative authorities in the legislation and provides advice for companies, based on past examples.

"Throughout American history, when Congress has confronted a national emergency and authorized a major government response, the economic recovery has almost always been accompanied by significant congressional, civil, or criminal investigations. This paradigm dates back at least to the Civil War, with Congress’s Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. In modern times, the savings and loan crisis and bailout of the late 1980s led to criminal convictions and the Keating Five lobbying scandal.

"Most recently, after the 2008 financial crisis, Congress sought to formalize and institutionalize the oversight and investigation of recovery efforts through the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“SIGTARP”) and other oversight bodies. A Congressional Oversight Panel held 26 hearings over more than two years on the causes, symptoms, and effects of the economic crisis and government response and reform efforts. Investigations by just one entity, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, resulted in 1,665 convictions, pleas, or judgments, along with more than $157 million in recoveries, forfeitures, seizures, and other savings.

"In the newly enacted Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), Congress again provided that oversight and investigations will accompany the $2 trillion relief program:

"The bill establishes a Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery within the Department of the Treasury. The Special Inspector General will be presidentially appointed, as was the SIGTARP. The Special Inspector General will be responsible for conducting, supervising, and coordinating audits and investigations of the making, purchase, management, and sale of loans, loan guarantees, and other investments by the Treasury under the CARES Act. Like the SIGTARP, the Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery will also be responsible for providing quarterly reports to Congress. Congress dedicated $25 million of new Treasury funds for the Special Inspector General to carry out these duties.

"The bill establishes a Pandemic Response Accountability Committee within the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement of funds and to mitigate risks across programs and agencies. Congress appropriated $80 million for the Committee. This new Committee appears to be modeled on the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board established by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which is generally viewed as having successfully protected against the misuse of recovery funds. Although the Recovery Board was required to coordinate its activities with various agency inspectors general, the new Pandemic Committee is created within the Inspectors General Council. This may mean that the Pandemic Committee will have a heightened degree of autonomy and a greater ability to act quickly and with better coordination than was the case for the Recovery Board. The Pandemic Committee is authorized to issue subpoenas to persons outside of the government.

"The bill authorizes the creation of a bipartisan Congressional Oversight Commission charged with oversight of the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve, as they work to provide economic stability in the wake of the coronavirus. Like the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel, the CARES Act’s Congressional Oversight Commission will consist of five members appointed by the leaders of Congress. Also like its predecessor, the Congressional Oversight Commission will have significant authority to conduct oversight and investigations, including holding hearings and taking testimony.

"In addition to these new entities, existing authorities are certain to continue to investigate. For example, the House Oversight and Reform Committee has already launched an investigation of travel insurance companies and their coverage decisions related to travel cancelled due to the coronavirus. It is likely that congressional committees will examine the administration’s preparedness and response to the crisis, along with the activities of deeply affected companies and industries, especially those that receive federal aid. If history is a guide, these investigations will continue for many years into the future. For example, as late as last year, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing that focused on bank accountability “10 years after the Financial Crisis.” The CEOs of Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, and others all testified.

"Criminal authorities will also continue to investigate. Attorney General William Barr has directed federal prosecutors to prioritize investigations and prosecutions of coronavirus fraud schemes, and Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen directed each U.S. Attorney’s Office to identify a prosecutor to serve as the lead coronavirus fraud coordinator. These developments mirror actions that were taken after the financial crisis. For example, SIGTARP investigations related to fraud involving TARP funds resulted in enforcement actions against nine financial institutions and in the successful criminal prosecutions of 51 bank officers and executives. The Department of Justice—including through a Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force and a Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Working Group—investigated fraud related to the financial crisis itself, ultimately resulting in several multi-billion dollar civil settlements with financial institutions.

"Of course, the investigations that will follow the coronavirus recovery will not be exactly the same as the investigations of the financial crisis or the savings and loan bailout. Each new crisis has its own unique attributes and characteristics. Nonetheless, based on our experience defending companies and individuals involved in similar investigations, we can offer the following five tips for being prepared:

     1. Invest in compliance now to avoid problems in the future. Companies need to understand the implications of taking federal money and establish systems that ensure compliance. For example, companies that benefit from increased federal investment in pandemic responses may have increased compliance obligations as a result of contracting with the government. Certain of the federal relief programs contain restrictions on executive compensation. Even the process of seeking federal assistance may implicate laws that regulate lobbying, depending on the agencies or officials contacted.
     2. Consider the public and political dynamics of corporate actions. Congressional investigators often follow where the press leads, and investigative reporters will be looking for juicy stories to highlight. Some recipients of prior federal funds were criticized for paying bonuses, moving jobs overseas, or even for their executives’ vacation arrangements. By seeking and accepting public funds, companies will often be held by the public and Congress to a higher standard.
     3. Understand your company’s areas of vulnerability. Companies in certain industries already face a high risk of investigation. Industries involved in the response to the crisis—including the biopharmaceutical, technology, consumer goods, and medical device industries—could have their actions scrutinized closely. Sometimes companies with the best intentions, such as rushing to respond to a pandemic, will take risks that would not be warranted upon reflection. Companies should have a clear understanding of these vulnerabilities and a clear and compelling answer to after-the-fact criticisms.
     4. Involve your legal department in business decisions. With the vast majority of employees working from home, and business situations moving rapidly, there are significant risks that business decisions can be made in “silos” without proper examination by all relevant parts of the company, including the legal department. The coronavirus pandemic has placed pressure on government regulators, including the Food and Drug Administration and others, to relax tightly controlled regulatory regimes. This dynamic also creates opportunities for industry, including for companies that may seek to develop new product lines or otherwise re-tool their manufacturing processes to meet current demand for hand sanitizers, facial masks, and other products and supplies needed during the pandemic. It is critical to involve the legal and compliance functions in these business decisions in order to mitigate a host of risks, including missteps with the federal government that could lead to regulatory or criminal exposure.
     5. Carefully vet all applications for assistance and other submissions to the federal government. In order to review applications and other submissions quickly and exercise judgment about the suitability of individual institutions to receive funds, the government will need to rely on representations, attestations, and certifications made by applicants. Companies and their counsel should carefully vet such statements with an eye toward the potential civil and criminal risks associated with submissions to the government. Civil and criminal authorities will focus on such submissions and other disclosures in any eventual investigations, and companies should seek to mitigate this risk with proper planning and legal review processes on the front-end."

UPDATE TO THIS STORY:
As reported in the final article above,"The [Congress']bill establishes a Pandemic Response Accountability Committee within the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement of funds and to mitigate risks across programs and agencies. ... This new Committee appears to be modeled on the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board established by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which is generally viewed as having successfully protected against the misuse of recovery funds. ... the new Pandemic Committee is created within the Inspectors General Council. This may mean that the Pandemic Committee will have a heightened degree of autonomy...."
NOT SO FAST. Fine, but...
Trump Removes Acting Pentagon IG Slated to Lead Pandemic Oversight Last week, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency tapped Fine to chair the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, an oversight body created by the $2.2 trillion CARES Act to ensure taxpayer money is spent wisely. The law empowered CIGIE to name the committee chair, but stipulates that only current IGs can hold the position, so Trump’s removal of Fine from his acting position prevents the well-regarded watchdog from leading the oversight committee.

Over the course of his presidency, Trump has flouted transparency precedents and bristled at the role of IGs, whose work is critically important to holding agencies and the administration accountable for protecting the public’s health, among other things. Fine’s removal is part of a larger shakeup to the IG community.

Trump signaled in a signing statement on March 27 that he would not enforce some of the oversight provisions in the $2.2 trillion CARES Act. He specifically objected to the creation of a special IG for pandemic recovery at Treasury empowered to request information from other agencies and report to Congress any delays in receiving that information: “I do not understand, and my administration will not treat, this provision as permitting the SIGPR to issue reports to the Congress without the presidential supervision required by the Take Care Clause, Article II, section 3,” the statement said."
The Constitutional "authority" the President of the United States cited doesn't appear to quite fit this particular Bill which, remember, was intended "to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement of funds." Article II, Section It says, the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed...." Instead, the President seems more interested in taking care that no independent voice is heard, and no such Inspector seen.

Tuesday, March 27, 2018

For the times, they are a'changing -- or are they?

Here is the first of a couple of intriguing and thought-provoking current articles, each from very good sources (or so I've observed), considering aspects of the current "changes" in federal government acquisition. The second will be in the next post (see here). 

Remember, I take indecent liberty with articles advanced here, to provide context to students of local government procurement, and Guam's in particular. Thus, I slice and dice, omit great swaths of critical data, paraphrase, rearrange, and perhaps tilt to one side or the other, the original information in these articles. It is imperative that you read the articles in their original form and the authors' intent, and not rely on my iteration of them.



“Other Transaction Authorities” might seem like a risky new acquisition method, but it’s been around longer than the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
Before there was a Federal Acquisition Regulation regime describing the many procurement laws adopted at the federal level in the last three decades plus, there were “other transaction authorities,” also known by the shorthand OTAs or OTs. This contracting method, outside the usual federal process, is not widely used and even less understood. But that’s beginning to change. “Even though it’s been around for a fairly lengthy period of time, it’s just not been used very much. So, people are afraid of it because they haven’t seen how it’s worked,” Douglas Maughan, director of the Homeland Security Department's Science and Technology Directorate’s Cyber Security Division, told Nextgov.

It comes across as new and scary but is potentially a game-changing acquisition model and it is catching fire across government. After all, it has no structure, no built in roadmaps, accountability or paper trails. But, it doesn’t have to be scary and is not really all that new, if you are a big believer in getting to the future by going back before the dawn of modern procurement rules-based practices. It has roots going back to the 1950's, long before the FAR and the Competition in Contracting Act. Three decades later that same language came to be used to grant the Defense Department similar authorities. “Under these authorities, agencies may develop agreements that are not required to follow a standard format or include terms and conditions that are typically required when using traditional mechanisms,” according to a Government Accountability Office definition. In other words, OTAs rely more on principles than rules.

By 1994, that authority had been broadened beyond research to include prototyping and then updated again in 2017 to enable contracts to move into production after successful prototypes. Over that time, several departments have been granted other transaction authorities, including Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security and Transportation. Under these departments, five component agencies have also been given explicit OT authority: the Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation Security Administration, National Institutes of Health, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy, or ARPA-E.

Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate awarded its first OT contract for cybersecurity in February 2016 after launching its Silicon Valley Innovation program. While the primary focus for OTs is on research and development, not all agencies are using them for that express purpose. For instance, TSA and NASA use them for other services, such as airport security, education and outreach, according to GAO.

The reluctance to use OTs is based on “fear of giving people a lot of discretion,” said Nash, the procurement law expert. “If you’re in a government agency and you’ve got an inspector general and you’ve got congressional oversight … there’s a tendency to be pretty cautious about how you do business.”

That said, “It’s the same oversight you have over any other transaction where you’re giving a company money,” Nash said. “The problem is, if you have a lot of discretion, you take away a lot of the rules, but you still have basic ethics problems. If you gave an OT to your father without telling anybody else about it, you’d have the same ethical violation you’d have with a contract or a grant.”

The other major roadblock is the fear of funding projects that don't pan out, Nash said. “People have a hard time understanding that when you fund research, over half the time you’re funding failure,” Nash said. “You do not get 100 percent payout from research; and you shouldn’t expect it.” If you were to see a 100 percent success rate in funding research, that would just mean you weren't looking far enough into the future. “There’s nothing wrong with failure,” Nash said.

Homeland Security’s Maughan agreed. “We have a lot of successes we can talk about with return on investment, but even the failures” have some return, he said. He cited a program to downsize a Defense Department radar system to fit on smaller drones used by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The company awarded a contract ultimately failed to produce a working prototype, but everyone involved still consider it a successful venture. The company was able to get funding to move their research forward and CBP learned what is feasible for the size of drones they use. “They were still really happy about being part of the program,” Maughan said. “We helped them move the technology down the roadmap toward a smaller device and that will help them in some of their DOD missions.”

“I think there’s still some return on investment," Maughan added. "Our investment was less than $400,000 with them, so I think it falls into the category of: If you’re going to fail, fail quickly."

Had the office used a traditional contracting method for this project, it likely would have taken six to 12 months just to make an award, let alone discover that the idea would not work. Under the Science and Technology Directorate's OT authority, the time from application to award can be as short as 60 to 90 days.

Broadening OTs beyond research seems to increase their use accordingly. GAO reports that while most agencies do fewer than 75 OT transactions a year, TSA and NASA conducted 640 and 3,220, respectively, in 2014 alone.

Many in government have been reluctant to use their OT authorities precisely because of the lack of regulations governing their use. Since the contracts exist outside of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, they can be written with far less stringent requirements. But that also means there are fewer protections along the way to avoid a catastrophic contracting failure—one that could land a government official in front of a congressional committee.

“Even though it’s not FAR-based, we still have to do procurement documentation, we have to do a source-selection plan that says what are the criteria by which we’re going to evaluate proposals. For the most part, it’s the same as a traditional FAR-based contract, it’s just that the vehicle you’re using is not a FAR-based vehicle,” Maughan said. Despite appearances, “It’s not the wild, wild west,” Maughan added. “You still have to make sure the government is making the decisions on what gets awarded. Even still, we have a contracting officer—who’s called an ‘other transaction authority officer’—so you’re still doing the same kinds of things with the contracting folks as part of the team.”

The company was able to get funding to move their research forward and CBP learned what is feasible for the size of drones they use. “They were still really happy about being part of the program,” Maughan said. “We helped them move the technology down the roadmap toward a smaller device and that will help them in some of their DOD missions.”

“I think there’s still some return on investment," he added. "Our investment was less than $400,000 with them, so I think it falls into the category of: If you’re going to fail, fail quickly."

Had the office used a traditional contracting method for this project, it likely would have taken six to 12 months just to make an award, let alone discover that the idea would not work. Under the Science and Technology Directorate's OT authority, the time from application to award can be as short as 60 to 90 days.

“It’s not a solution for every case,” Maughan said. “It’s not the answer for all things,” he added. “If you’re trying to get startups with new innovation, then an OT might be good for you as an organization. There’s a little bit of risk working with a startup company—if you’re really just looking for a solutions provider and you’re not willing to take some risk, then an OT might not be for you.”

Nash agreed and offered some advice to agencies interested in getting in on OTs. “Let’s say you find a company out there that’s never done business with the government and that has some fascinating technology. You go to them and you say, ‘How could we sponsor you to do this? And we’ll give you all the money.’ Well, they may say, ‘The only way we’ll deal with you is this, this, this and this,’” Nash said. “We’re talking about intellectual property issues; we’re talking about accounting issues. And a normal contracting office might be pretty darn uncomfortable when they hear that because that’s not their norm.”

“You’ve got accounting problems. You want to make sure the company spends the money for what you gave them the money,” which can be particularly difficult, as one advantage of an OT contract is the company does not have to abide by government accounting standards. “But you need to make sure they have some systems.

“You need to worry about intellectual property—who’s going to have rights to it. And that would mean that if they said, ‘We’ll only do it if you take zero rights,’ that would be a problem. You might do it but you certainly would know that that’s a flashpoint that you would worry about. And then, of course, you’ve got to worry about audit rights because the government always wants to be able to audit and the contractor might not want to be audited.
Additional reading for this subject: Acquisition Disruption - Innovative Concepts in Government Contracting
Excerpt:  "This term is not defined by statute or regulation; it is best defined by what it is not. An OTA is not a procurement contract, grant, or cooperative agreement. It is a different type of agreement with the government – one that is not subject to the strict regulatory regimes that characterize other types of contracting." 

In my mind, adherence to principles is absolutely necessary for a successful procurement regime, but principles are not, in themselves, sufficient, any more than rules alone are.  See, The ethics of paper work.

Tuesday, November 28, 2017

Smack-down of Forestry Service over claim an unduly restrictive specification was reasonable for its needs

This GAO decision is Matter of: Global SuperTanker Services, LLC, File: B-414987; B-414987.2.

This post will be brief, while the decision itself is extensive. Extensive in its unrelenting smack-down of an agency trying to defend a specification the decision hails as "a post hoc attempt to justify" an unreasonable restriction on competition. "[T]he agency’s decision to restrict those assets at this time does not withstand logical scrutiny.

If you ever want to see what a comprehensive, almost frolicking, dismantling of lumbering argument looks like, this will give you an entertaining read. Clearly, the Forest Service was unable to see the forest for its own trees.

Tuesday, August 9, 2016

Procurement controversy - North Carolina Dept of Health & Human Services

Audit outlines shortcomings in DHHS contracting
A new audit has found that many no-bid contracts within the N.C. Department of Health and Human Services lacked proper review or documentation, and didn’t have adequate written justification to waive competition, putting taxpayer dollars at risk. State Auditor Beth Wood said that agency officials are supposed to provide justification before waiving the bid process. Many contracts had no waiver justification, and others were assigned justifications that didn’t add up, she said.

The deficiencies were found under both Democratic and Republican administrations.

On several occasions, Wood said, officials said bidding was waived because there was an immediate need for the contract, even though the state “had this person on contract for 10 years.”

The report found three contracts with a value of $6.1 million lacked the required review from the Attorney General’s office. “When the A.G. does not review no-bid contracts, a greater risk exists that these contracts are not in proper legal form, do not contain all clauses required by law, are not legally enforceable, and do not accomplish the intended purposes of the proposed contract.”

The State Auditor’s Office recommended that DHHS evaluate and monitor its contracting processes to ensure that its personnel are applying state laws and department policies and procedures effectively and efficiently. It also recommended that the department incorporate best practices when negotiating no-bid contracts. In addition, it recommended that DHHS ensure its contract personnel provided more specific documentation when it waived competitive bidding.

The audit quotes from author William Sims Curry’s book, Contracting for Services in State and Local Government Agencies. Curry has been a member of the National Contract Management Association for more than 30 years and has held procurement or contract positions in federal, state, and local governments.
“Contractors that are well aware of their status as the sole source provider for a particular service have a tendency to propose higher pricing than they would in a competitive environment,” Curry writes. “Sole source contractors involved in service delivery over the long term also tend to increase their pricing at a rate higher than increases to their costs or the applicable rate of inflation. This tendency for higher initial pricing and excessive price escalation from sole source contractors is intuitive and well understood.”

The report noted, by way of background,
The North Carolina Administrative Code states “North Carolina’s purchasing program shall be built on the principle of competition.” The competitive bidding process is designed to prevent collusion and favoritism in the award of contracts, and to generate better pricing, quality or value to conserve public funds. However, the Administrative Code allows competition to be waived when contracting under certain circumstances. When a contract is awarded without competition, NC regulations, and contracting best practices require it to be sufficiently justified, negotiated when feasible, and supported by documentation.
It found that "data in DHHS’ contract database, Open Window, had approximately 2,500 non-competitively bid contracts with a value of approximately $2.4 billion between state fiscal year 2012 through 2014. The value of the no-bid contracts accounts for more than 32% of all contracts during the same period."

Its key findings were:
• Many no-bid contracts lacked required review and approval to protect state interests
• Many no-bid contracts lacked documentation of negotiations to improve pricing or terms
• Many no-bid contracts lacked adequate written justification to waive competition, which increases the risk of favoritism, unfavorable terms, and poor performance

Monday, November 9, 2015

US States mostly flunk transparency and integrity audit: no political will, not a voter issue

Secrecy, corruption and conflicts of interest pervade state governments
The comprehensive probe reported in the 2015 State Integrity Investigation, a data-driven assessment of state government by the Center for Public Integrity and Global Integrity, found that in state after state, open records laws are laced with exemptions, and part-time legislators and agency officials engage in glaring conflicts of interests and cozy relationships with lobbyists while feckless, understaffed watchdogs struggle to enforce laws as porous as honeycombs.

When first conducted in 2011-2012, the State Integrity Investigation was an unprecedented look at the systems that state governments use to prevent corruption and expose it when it does occur. The 2015 grades are based on 245 questions that ask about key indicators of transparency and accountability, looking not only at what the laws say, but also how well they’re enforced or implemented. The “indicators” are divided into 13 categories: public access to information, political financing, electoral oversight, executive accountability, legislative accountability, judicial accountability, state budget processes, state civil service management, procurement, internal auditing, lobbying disclosure, state pension fund management and ethics enforcement agencies.

The results are “disappointing but not surprising,” said Paula A. Franzese, an expert in state and local government ethics at Seton Hall University School of Law and former chairwoman of the New Jersey State Ethics Commission. “It’s not the sort of issue that commands voters,” she said.

Aside from a few exceptions, there has been little progress on these issues since the State Integrity Investigation was first carried out in 2012. In fact, most scores have dropped since then, though some of that is attributable to changes made to improve and update the project and its methodology.

Since State Integrity’s first go-round, at least 12 states have seen their legislative leaders or top Cabinet-level officials charged, convicted or resign as a result of ethics or corruption-related scandal. Five House or Assembly leaders have fallen. No state has outdone New York, where 14 lawmakers have left office since the beginning of 2012 because of ethical or criminal issues, according to a count by Citizens Union, an advocacy group. That does not include the former leaders of both the Assembly and the Senate, who were charged in unrelated corruption schemes this year but remain in office while they await trial.

Though every state in the nation has open records and meetings laws, they’re typically shot through with holes and exemptions and usually have essentially no enforcement mechanisms, beyond the court system, when agencies refuse to comply. In most states, at least one entire branch of government or agency claims exemptions from the laws. Many agencies routinely fail to explain why they they’ve denied requests. Public officials charge excessive fees to discourage requestors. In the vast majority of states, citizens are unable to quickly and affordably resolve appeals when their records are denied. Only one state — Missouri — received a perfect score on a question asking whether citizens actually receive responses to their requests swiftly and at reasonable cost.

“We’re seeing increased secrecy throughout the country at the state and federal level,” said David Cuillier, director of the University of Arizona’s School of Journalism and an expert on open records laws. He said substantial research shows that the nation’s open records laws have been poked and prodded to include a sprawling list of exemptions and impediments and that public officials increasingly use those statutes to deny access to records. “It’s getting worse every year,” he said.
Florida bombs public integrity test

How Missouri got a D-minus in national ethics report

Kentucky gets D+ grade in 2015 State Integrity Investigation: yawning gaps in oversight remain


Texas Gets a D- in 2015 State Integrity Investigation

Maryland receives ‘F’ grade in public access to information

Hawaii gets D+ grade in 2015 State Integrity Investigation: Lobbyists thrive in land of sunshine

How does your state rank for integrity?
The investigation shows that states have their work cut out for them:

>>  Most states are still grappling with the provision of meaningful and responsive implementation mechanisms to provide citizens and journalists with access to public information. Some — if not most of these barriers — seem to be rooted in the lack of political will, rather than genuinely technical hurdles.
>>  ‘Open data’ is not yet a reality across state governments. While many governments do not make available any open data in particular sectors, electoral data and campaign finance data make a noticeable exception with a few state governments making data sets available in open formats.
>>  Many states fail to ensure their accountability institutions are truly independent. In other cases states reverse hard won gains. Instead, institutions such as independent ethics entities, audit institutions or access-to-information monitoring agencies regularly lack resources and/or their mandates are curtailed.

Unfortunately, the report does not look at US Territories, such as Guam. It would be interesting to see how the whole USA stacks up.

FOLLOW UP:

There is and will be more to this story, as it travels around the states, such as:

Michigan ranks last in laws on ethics, transparency
Michigan, which already had a distinction as one of only two states where both the governor and the Legislature are exempted from state open records laws, has moved backward since 2012.... Of the 245 "corruption risk indicators" in 13 categories examined in the study, Michigan ranked last for laws and systems related to executive accountability, legislative accountability, judicial accountability and management of pension funds. Michigan also received grades of F, but did not get ranked last in the nation, in categories related to public access to information, political finance, civil service oversight, procurement, lobbying oversight and ethics oversight.
EDITORIAL: Massachusetts public records reform can't wait

Trouble at the Statehouse: secrecy, questionable ethics and conflicts of interest

Ohio graded D+ in report on integrity — but that was 6th best among 50 states
“While Ohio has many appropriate ethics rules and a strong Sunshine Law, there are simply too many loopholes,” Catherine Turcer, a veteran government watchdog with Common Cause-Ohio, said in the report.

New report a blow to ethics reform in Georgia
The Georgia Legislature has done very little to improve our ethics laws in the past three years, enforcement of open meetings and records laws is non-existent, and we have experienced unprecedented scandals with our state ethics commission that included interference with ethics investigations by the Office of the Governor.

Meaningful ethics reform has not happened in our state in decades, and this 2015 State Integrity Investigation will be the death knell to ethics reform for many more years to come.


Wednesday, January 7, 2015

Is this an appealing size or not?

First, I'd like to hattip this client alert article from Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, appearing on the very useful and user friendly Lexology website. It has introduced me to the very arcane world of Small Business Administrative decision making, in particular to the essential size factor for winning Section 8(a) set-aside contracts.

Next, this is not a discussion of the Sec. 8(a) SBA program, and I'd hardly have any authority to conduct one, although there have been a few posts on related subject matter in this blawg, e.g., here and here. You can search the web for many articles describing the program, which is an essential component of federal procurement legislation, and indicative of the kinds of programs that Prof. Steven Schooner has termed the "wealth distribution" principle of procurement, although, to me, it is also wrapped up in the goal of nurturing or propagating competition; something in the nature of an agricultural nursery.

The basic proposition for this topic is that size matters in the set aside provision. (It is a very basic proposition, in which there is no "one size fits all", but that's not a discussion for today.) Because the SBA program is about "small business" set asides, something of a valuable preference for contract awards, one of its major abuses has been qualifying a large business for a contract by use of a "front" small business. This little ruse comes in a variety of colors and forms, some of which actually work, proving the keen adaptability of businesses and lawyers. But many don't, proving that clever people can land themselves in hot water, jail and other uncomfortable headlines.

This post takes the case of one such close question. As expressed in the Pillsbury client alert mentioned above, "This decision serves to remind small and large businesses engaging in mentor-protégé relationships that the approval of a mentor-protégé agreement by the SBA does not create a safety net for the mentor-protégé joint venture formed to submit qualifying small business bids and proposals."

The "decision" is actually two decisions. One made in November "affirms Area Office finding that firms were affiliated by virtue of joint venture agreement because provisions of agreement between mentor and 8(a) protégé did not meet requirements of 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.513(c) and (d)". The other, made in December, "dismisses appeal because District Office's decision that joint venture agreement did not meet requirements of regulations was not a size determination and, therefore, could not be appealed to OHA". You can get the link to these and many more such "size decision" questions on SBA's website here.

The fundamental substantive question here was whether this particular "mentoring agreement", a concept promoted by the government to help small businesses become more competitive, might be seen as falling into the pile of relationships technically smelling of a "front". And it's not such a subjective question as it may appear at first blush, because, as any good bureaucratic regime, there are regulations that require certain hoops to be jumped to flush out the reality of the relationship. The devil here is definitely in the details, and no amount of artistic license can suffice as a subterfuge.

The first decision is Size Appeal of Kisan-Pike , A Joint Venture, SBA No. SIZ-5618 (2014):
On October 6, 2014, the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) Office of Government Contracting, Area I (Area Office) issued Size Determination No. 01-SD-2014-44, finding that Kisan-Pike, A Joint Venture (Appellant) is not a small business under the size standard associated with the subject procurement. Appellant is a joint venture between Kisan Engineering Company, P.C. (Kisan), an 8(a) Business Development (BD) participant, and The Pike Company, Inc. (Pike), a large business that SBA approved as Kisan's mentor. The Area Office found that Kisan and Pike are affiliated for this procurement under 13 C.F.R. §121.103(h)(2), as a result of their joint venture. For the reasons discussed infra, the appeal is denied and the size determination is affirmed.

The Contracting Officer )"CO") expressed concern that Appellant's joint venture agreement did not comply with 13 C.F.R. §§124.513(c)(6) and (7). As a result, Appellant might be ineligible for the mentor-protégé joint venture exception from affiliation.

The joint venture agreement between Kisan and Pike states that Kisan owns 51% of Appellant and serves as Appellant's Managing Venturer, and Pike owns the remaining 49%. [It spelled out the roles of each co-venturer in descriptive but general language. You must read the decision in its original at the link citation for details and full context; I paraphrase stuff like this in this blawg.]

The Area Office explained that SBA may find firms affiliated based on a joint venture relationship, unless an exception applies. One such exception refers to participants in an SBA approved mentor-protégé agreement, but if the size status of the joint venture is protested, the provisions of §§ 124.513(c) and (d) will apply. This means that the joint venture must meet the requirements of §§ 124.513(c) and (d) in order to receive the authorized exception to affiliation.

It then considered whether Appellant complied with 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(c)(6) and (7). Under those regulations, a valid joint venture agreement must contain provisions:
•(6) Itemizing all major equipment, facilities, and other resources to be furnished by each party to the joint venture, with a detailed schedule of cost or value of each; [and]
•(7) Specifying the responsibilities of the parties with regard to negotiation of the contract, source of labor, and contract performance, including ways that the parties to the joint venture will ensure that the joint venture and the 8(a) partner(s) to the joint venture will meet the performance of work requirements set forth in paragraph (d) of this section.
The Area Office found Appellant's joint venture agreement deficient with respect to both requirements.

As to subsection (c)(6), rather than itemizing all major equipment and facilities, the agreement contained a single sentence stating, “Upon award of the Contract, Kisan and Pike will provide equipment, facilities and other resources to the Joint Venture required to execute the contract.” (Size Determination at 4, quoting Agreement § 5.0.) Appellant argued that its agreement was sufficiently detailed because this is a design-build contract, and the Corps must approve the design before Appellant can confirm the construction plan. The Area Office rejected this explanation, however, observing that Appellant's Phase II proposal contained proposed design drawings and a detailed construction schedule. Therefore, while the design had not yet been approved, “the nature and the type of building construction are certain,” and “it is very unlikely that [Appellant] has no idea how [it] will execute [its] proposal to complete the project.”

As to subsection (c)(7), the Area Office observed that the joint venture agreement merely confirmed that Appellant will perform at least 50% of the non-construction labor costs and at least 15% of the construction labor costs.

The Area Office also considered Appellant's compliance with 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d), which requires that the 8(a) BD participant perform at least 40% of the work performed by the joint venture, and that this work consist of “more than administrative or ministerial functions.” Appellant did not meet this requirement, the Area Office reasoned, because the agreement made “broad” and “generic” representations that Kisan will perform at least 40% of the work “without any constructive plan to support [this] claim.”

Because the joint venture agreement was deficient, the Area Office determined Appellant may not avail itself of the mentor-protégé affiliation exemption. Accordingly, Kisan and Pike are affiliated for this procurement due to their joint venture. Pike is a large business, so the combined average annual receipts of Kisan and Pike exceed the applicable size standard, and Appellant is not a small business for this procurement.

Appellant contends that the Area Office “acted irrationally, arbitrarily, and outside the scope of its proper review.” First, Appellant argues, the size determination is clearly erroneous because Kisan and Pike are presumably unaffiliated as a result of their SBA-approved mentor-protégé agreement. Second, Appellant complains that it repeatedly asked SBA personnel to review and comment on the joint venture agreement, but SBA declined to do so before an award was made: “Had [Appellant] been able to obtain SBA input, it could have addressed these concerns up front." Third, that “at the
Phase I proposal stage of a design-build solicitation, at which no architectural, material, equipment or engineering details or even preliminary designs are known with any degree of specificity about the project, it is entirely infeasible for an offeror to make good faith determinations on the specific needs for equipment and managerial assignments.”

SBA stresses that a joint venture between a large and a small business, such as Appellant, is normally not eligible for a contract set aside for small businesses. SBA rejects Appellant's argument that Kisan and Pike are presumed unaffiliated. SBA asserts, concerns size determinations of the protégé itself, not size determinations of a joint venture between a mentor and a protégé, as is the
case here.

SBA notes that the joint venture agreement does not itemize resources, and Appellant makes no attempt to argue that its agreement does comply with these requirements. Further, the joint venture agreement “entirely flouts” the requirement in 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d) that the protégé firm, Kisan, perform at least 40% of the joint venture's substantive work. SBA argues that these omissions are egregious because the purpose of these rules is to prevent large businesses from enjoying contracts intended for small businesses. By failing to delineate responsibilities, Appellant makes it possible for Pike to perform all or most of the contract. Further, SBA argues, to create an exception for joint venture agreements drafted before the offeror is certain of the procuring agency's requirements would be “unwise and unworkable” because there is often some degree of uncertainty. (Id. at 6.) Such an exception would also be at odds with OHA precedent, which indicates that joint venture rules should be applied “literally and narrowly so as to preclude situations where the 8(a) concern brings very little to the joint venture relationship in terms of resources and expertise other than its 8(a) status.”

The CO notes Appellant executed its joint venture agreement on May 7, 2014, after the Corps had issued the Phase II technical specifications and drawings on April 28, 2014. These specifications, the CO emphasizes, contained “over 2000 pages of technical standards and criteria, and numerous conceptual drawings". Thus, Appellant had ample information to define the partners' respective responsibilities and to itemize equipment, facilities, and other resources. The CO casts doubt on Appellant's representation that it could not determine what each joint venture partner would need to bring to the project. To the CO, this statement is not credible because Pike, the mentor firm, has vast construction experience with similar projects.

Appellant also argues unconvincingly that mentors and protégés are presumably unaffiliated when there is an SBA-approved mentor-protégé agreement. The regulation Appellant relies upon, however, does not stand for the proposition Appellant advances. Importantly, the regulation does not establish a presumption that a mentor and protégé are unaffiliated. Rather, it merely states that the mentor and protégé are not affiliated based on the mentor-protégé agreement itself. The Area Office did not find affiliation based on the mentor-protégé agreement, but instead determined that the exception for mentor-protégé joint ventures is not available because Appellant's joint venture agreement does not meet the criteria.

For the above reasons, the appeal is DENIED and the size determination is AFFIRMED.
The first decision certainly, to this uninitiated eye, looked like a size determination: the CO "issued Size Determination No. 01-SD-2014-44, finding that Kisan-Pike, A Joint Venture (Appellant) is not a small business under the size standard".   Alas, things are not always what they seem, even though it seems the size determination stuck in any event. The second decision concluded that the SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) didn't have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the size decision.

This second decision is Size Appeal of Kisan-Pike, A Joint Venture, SBA No. SIZ-5623 (2014):
On November 10, 2014, Appellant filed an appeal with the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA). The appeal, titled “Joint Venture Agreement Rejection Appeal of Kisan-Pike, A Joint Venure”, challenges the decision by the District Office declining to approve Appellant's JVA. In the appeal petition, Appellant states that “SBA's determination that KPC's JVA does not conform to regulatory requirements is in essence a size determination.” OHA noted the determination Appellant seeks to challenge does not appear to be a formal size determination.

Appellant states that the “instant matter is at its very essence a size determination because under the mentor-protégé regulations, the Determination is a finding of affiliation between [Kisan Engineering Company, P.C.] and [The Pike Company].” Appellant contends OHA, in the past, has routinely taken jurisdiction over cases involving size determinations where an SBA Area Office rejected a JVA. Appellant maintains the difference here is that the District Office rejected the JVA without explaining that the rejection was based on Appellant's size.

OHA's jurisdiction, stated by regulation, provides in pertinent part: “OHA has authority to conduct proceedings in the following cases: ... Appeals from size determinations ...." The regulations
governing size protests and formal size determinations include “Who makes a formal size determination?” provides: “The responsible Government Contracting Area Director or designee makes all formal size determinations in response to either a size protest or a request for a formal size determination. . . .”

Here, the District Office's disapproval of the JVA is not a formal size determination according to this definition. The disapproval did not come from a Government Contracting Area Director, and it was not issued as the “response to either a size protest or a request for a formal size determination.” A size protest may only be filed after bid opening or notification to offerors of the selection of the apparent successful offeror. Appellant did not file a protest after receiving notification of the identity of the apparent successful offeror, but only upon receipt of the disapproval of the JVA. The regulation does not provide for filing an appeal from this decision.

Accordingly, the District Office's letter rejecting Appellant's JVA is not a formal size determination, or in “essence” a size determination as Appellant argues, and OHA does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
As noted above, this is pretty arcane stuff, and the devil is in the details. That said, the broad structure is pretty common and understandable.








Monday, June 30, 2014

Huntington Ingalls Industries fails the cut for Coast Guard cutter

HII protest over lost contract bid is rejected
Eight companies originally pursued the project to design the new Coast Guard offshore patrol cutter, smaller than the national security cutter. It is intended to replace its fleet of 210-foot and 270-foot medium endurance cutters.

In a rare move, HII and another shipbuilder filed a formal protest with the federal government. Between Ingalls and Newport News Shipbuilding, HII is the government's most productive shipbuilder. But the Government Accountability Office recently denied the protest in a 21-page decision that sheds light on what factored into a highly competitive bidding war for a program presumed to be worth an eventual $12 billion.

A side-by-side comparison of the bids showed HII running even with the three eventual winners in factors such as sound design, its design approach, organizational management and production capability.

The key difference was past performance. In this case, the company's past performance on other programs came into play, including the San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ships, the GAO report showed. HII was rated "marginal" while the three winners were deemed "satisfactory."

Regarding the San Antonio class problems, HII spokeswoman Beci Brenton said the company "has vigorously applied lessons learned, markedly improving quality and efficiency with each successive ship, resulting in very successful trials and, we believe, a very satisfied customer." "We are seeing the benefits of lower costs, higher quality and increased learning which comes from serial production," she said.

"I think it was a big surprise to the industry that Huntington Ingalls was not included," said Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with The Lexington Institute, Arlington-based research group. "First of all, they make the national security cutter, which is widely considered to be a success." Thompson said these types of solicitations place a major emphasis on past performance. But in this case, "past performance isn't really indicative of current capability," he said.

Still, Thompson said Coast Guard's source selection authority "is in a legal strait jacket in terms of applying its selection criteria. If the solicitation places an emphasis on past performance, then Huntington Ingalls is stuck with that aspect of its credentials, even though the company is better run today and has better capability."

"You've got to stick with the rules," he said.
This short description of the GOA decision is pretty accurate so far as it goes, but a reading of the whole decision reveals a close attention to detail that renders the implication that the decision was based on arbitrary subjective criteria out of place. I also will not provide all of it, so you should read the whole decision at the link. I do hope, however, to provide enough information taken from the decision to suggest a more dispassionate judgment. 

As usual, I cut, paste, rearrange, delete citations and paraphrase, so go to the source if you need reliable unedited authority.

Matter of: Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc.; VT Halter Marine, Inc., File: B-409541; B-409541.2; B-409541.3; B-409541.4; B-409541.5, June 2, 2014 (pdf here)
Huntington Ingalls and VT Halter Marine both challenge the Coast Guard’s evaluation of Bollinger’s past performance, arguing that the agency unreasonably assigned Bollinger a satisfactory past performance rating despite receiving negative information about Bollinger’s performance on the Fast Response Cutter contract. In this regard, Huntington Ingalls contends that the Coast Guard unequally evaluated its and Bollinger’s past performance. Specifically, Huntington Ingalls contends that the Coast Guard ignored negative information with respect to Bollinger’s performance of the Fast Response Cutter contract, while focusing on negative comments in a PPIRS report in evaluating Huntington Ingalls’ performance of the LPD contract.

As a general matter, the evaluation of an offeror’s past performance is within the discretion of the contracting agency, and we will not substitute our judgment for reasonably based past performance ratings. Where a protester challenges an agency’s past performance evaluation and source selection, we will review the evaluation and award decision to determine if they were reasonable and consistent with the solicitation’s evaluation criteria and procurement statutes and regulations, and to ensure that the agency’s rationale is adequately documented. A protester’s disagreement with the agency’s judgment concerning the merits of the protester’s past performance does not establish that the evaluation was unreasonable.

The technical evaluation team (TET) determined that the offerors had corrected all identified weaknesses or deficiencies, and assigned all offerors superior ratings under the two concept design subfactors, and under the design approach factor.

With respect to past performance, the agency’s past performance evaluation team (PPET) reviewed the past performance questionnaires for contracts identified by the offerors for recency and relevance. The PPET also identified additional recent and relevant contracts through the past performance information retrieval system (PPIRS). Where the PPET found negative or questionable past performance information, the PPET had telephone conversations with references.

The RFP stated that the agency’s evaluation of offerors’ relevant past performance would be based on the following elements (in descending order of importance):
(1) Overall Customer Satisfaction – Would the customer select this firm again?
(2) Cost Control – Delivered within budget, provided current and accurate/complete billings, and relationship of negotiated costs to actuals.
(3) Quality of Product – Compliance with contract requirements, accuracy of reports, technical excellence, management responsiveness, appropriateness of personnel, and stood behind warranty.
(4) Timeliness of Performance – Met interim milestones, reliable, completed on time, including wrap-up and contract administration.

Here, the record shows that the Coast Guard’s evaluation of Bollinger’s past performance on the Fast Response Cutter was reasonable. The agency’s past performance evaluation team recognized that the most recent PPIRS report included four marginal ratings in the areas of schedule, management, management responsiveness, and logistic support/sustainment. The PPET also received, however, a more recent past performance questionnaire from the same individual (the contracting officer) that prepared the PPIRS report for this cutter. The questionnaire provided adjectival ratings that ranged from mostly exceptional to satisfactory; there were no marginal or unsatisfactory ratings. The questionnaire’s narrative comments indicated that Bollinger had made “substantial changes” to its organization and to its management, which resulted in improved performance.

With respect to Huntington Ingalls, the PPET determined that the offeror’s past performance was marginal. The PPET received past performance questionnaires for four contracts for the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutters and the U.S. Navy’s DDG 51 destroyer. All were found to be recent and relevant, and included mostly positive comments. However, the PPET noted that a PPIRS report for the National Security Cutter No. 5 contract indicated schedule problems. The PPET also identified three PPIRS reports for Huntington Ingalls’ contract for LPD-17 class amphibious transport dock ships. The PPET found that the PPIRS reports, which covered performance from October 2009 to September 2012, included adjectival ratings that ranged from exceptional to unsatisfactory. In this regard, the PPET noted that, although the customer that completed the PPIRS report stated that it “probably would” again award a contract to Huntington Ingalls, the PPIRS report included numerous adverse comments. For example, the PPET noted Huntington Ingalls’ unsatisfactory rating for cost control, under which the LPD customer commented that “[c]ost performance . . . has degraded” over the performance period. The PPET’s follow-up conversations on the LPD contract indicated that negative performance was continuing. In this regard, the customer for the LPD contract noted that Huntington Ingalls’ work had deteriorated prior to Hurricane Katrina, worsened after the hurricane, and had improved to be “stabilized at a poor level.” On this basis, the PPET concluded that Huntington Ingalls’ failure to meet contract requirements was the contractor’s fault.

The evaluation results were provided to the agency’s Source Selection Authority (SSA), who weighed the comparative merits of the offers based upon the final evaluation reports. In this regard, the SSA identified strengths and differentiating characteristics of the offerors’ proposals under each of the evaluation factors. With respect to the most important factor, concept design, the SSA concluded that all the competitive range offerors had strong technical concept designs and that no offeror stood out. The SSA recognized, however, that various offerors had strengths under the hierarchical requirements.

Under the design approach factor, the SSA concluded that all offerors provided a comprehensive design approach, with few discriminators, but noted that Bollinger offered an approach that increased the government’s confidence of success.

Under the organizational management factor, the SSA concluded that all offerors provided adequate descriptions of their organizational management and met the minimum requirements of the RFP, but noted that the proposals of Huntington Ingalls and Bath Iron Works were the only ones to receive strengths under this factor.

Ultimately, the SSA concluded that past performance provided the basis upon which to differentiate these proposals. With respect to Huntington Ingalls’ past performance problems, the SSA noted that the customer provided updated information that indicated that Huntington’s performance, though improved, remained at a poor level. The SSA agreed with the PPET that Huntington Ingalls’ and VT Halter Marine’s past performance should be assessed as marginal.

Based upon his review, the SSA concluded that, although Huntington Ingalls’ and VT Halter Marine’s proposals met all technical and management requirements and offered some unique strengths, the offerors’ recent and relevant past performance records did not provide confidence that they would be able to satisfactorily perform the contract. The SSA further concluded that Huntington Ingalls’ proposal included “essentially a threshold Concept Design” and otherwise had limited distinguishable benefits in comparison to other offerors. The SSA also noted that considering the firm’s marginal past performance rating, its proposal was the least advantageous to the government.

The protests are denied.

In contrast to the Huntington Ingalls Industries case, another case, Gaver Technologies, illustrates a winning protest when evaluation factors are questioned.

Here, the protest is sustained where record shows that agency’s source selection authority lacked a reasonable basis for failing to give weight to several source evaluation board findings pertaining to strengths in the protester’s proposal. The RFP sought services for computer science, computer software engineering, IT security, networking, application development, and web services. The protestor, Gaver Technologies, Inc., is referred to as GTI.

The RFP provided for award to the offeror whose proposal was considered most advantageous to the government based on the following three factors (of approximately equal weight): mission suitability, relevant experience/past performance, and cost. The mission suitability factor was comprised of three subfactors: technical requirements (worth 45% of the factor weight), management plan (worth 35%), and work management (worth 20%).

 Matter of: Gaver Technologies, Inc., File: B-409535 June 3, 2014 (pdf here)
It is a fundamental principle that agencies must evaluate proposals consistent with the terms of a solicitation and, while the evaluation of offerors’ proposals generally is a matter within the procuring agency’s discretion, our Office will question an agency’s evaluation where it is unreasonable, inconsistent with the solicitation’s stated evaluation criteria and requirements, or undocumented. Further, while source selection officials reasonably may disagree with the evaluation ratings and results of lower-level evaluations, they are nonetheless bound by the fundamental requirements that their independent judgments be reasonable, consistent with the stated evaluation factors, and adequately documented.

Of relevance to this protest, the RFP explained that in evaluating offerors’ technical approaches, the agency would consider their overall understanding and approach to accomplishing the requirements of the SOW, taking into account the “adequacy, realism, effectiveness, quality assurance, risk reductions, efficiencies, and completeness” of the information provided in the following areas:
1. Proposed approach of disciplines, skills, and techniques the Offeror plans to use in the performance of this work.
2. Proposed innovative processes, systems, and technology trends the Offeror suggests for accomplishing and/or streamlining the tasks required in the SOW with supportive rationale.

Of significance to this protest and our discussion below, with regard to the technical requirements subfactor, three of the five significant strengths for GTI concerned its technical approach.

The Source Selection Board's (SEB’s) first significant strength was that GTI had “demonstrated a thorough understanding of the SOW [Statement of Work] by proposing the critical disciplines, skills and techniques needed to effectively implement the SOW requirements.” The evaluators found that GTI’s proposed initiatives, as summarized in the five bullets, would “significantly increase the quality and timeliness of contract deliverables,” which was “expected to result in greatly enhanced performance of IT services throughout the life of the contract.”

The second significant strength assigned GTI was based on the SEB’s finding that GTI’s proposed technical approach contained “a multitude of highly innovative processes and insightful technology trends.” This finding was supported by six bullets with explanatory details. The third significant strength was based on the finding that GTI’s technical proposal demonstrated “an in‑depth understanding and innovative approach to accomplishing the requirements in the SOW area of IT Security (ITS).” The evaluators supported this conclusion with four detailed bullets.

In comparing GTI’s and Peerless’s proposals under the technical requirements subfactor, the Source Selection Authority (SSA) noted that while she had initially agreed with the SEB’s observation that the protester’s proposal provided several innovations and insights, she concluded after extensive discussions with the SEB that “there existed offsetting considerations,” which led her to “question the overall impact of the findings.” Summarizing the technical requirements subfactor, I acknowledge the potential benefits stemming from the GTI proposal. However, considering the unknown implementation costs, I find them of relatively lesser value to the Government because I do not have high confidence that the innovations could be implemented. Based on this, I believe that the quantitative difference between the two Offerors is immaterial.

The SSA then compared the two proposals under the management plan subfactor. She noted that Peerless offered an organizational structure that mirrored the agency’s own structure, which, in her view, demonstrated a keen understanding of the GRC’s requirements and culture that would lead to successful contract performance. The SSA also noted that she was impressed with Peerless’s proposed customer feedback mechanism and viewed it as a discriminator in her selection decision. She went on to identify Peerless’s proposed phase-in plan as a second key discriminator, noting that Peerless’s approach left the final 30 days of phase-in for dealing with contingences and unexpected issues associated with start up of the new contract, which ensured that GRC would have “no systematic problems upon full contract initiation.” The SSA further noted that in comparing the proposals under the management plan subfactor, she had considered the significant strength assigned GTI’s proposal for subcontracting agreements, but had concluded that this significant strength was not “of the same qualitative merit” as the findings associated with Peerless’s proposal under the management plan subfactor.

As a result of the above findings, the SSA concluded that Peerless’s proposal had a slight advantage over the protester’s with regard to the mission suitability factor. She further found that while both offerors received ratings of high confidence under the relevant experience/past performance factor, Peerless’s proposal had a slight edge under the factor due to the highly relevant experience of its team members and “the direct experience and overall successful performance of its major subcontractor” on the predecessor contract to the contract here. Finally, the SSA noted that the probable costs of the two proposals were almost equal, with Peerless’s being slightly lower. She concluded that because Peerless’s proposal offered slight advantages under each of the three factors, it represented the best value to the government.

GTI complains that the SSA failed to adhere to the evaluation scheme set forth in the RFP in evaluating its proposal under the technical requirements subfactor by unreasonably failing to credit GTI’s proposal with any of the proposed innovations identified by the SEB, as contemplated by the solicitation. The protester further contends that Peerless’s phase-in plan should not have been viewed as a significant strength, and that the SEB and the SSA treated the two proposals unequally by crediting Peerless’s proposal, but not its own, for offering a management structure mirroring the structure of the OCIO.

As noted above, under the technical requirements subfactor, the SSA considered the protester’s proposed innovations, which formed the basis for the significant strengths assigned by the SEB, to be “of relatively lesser value to the Government,” and she gave them little weight in her source selection decision. In dismissing the weight of the SEB’s findings, the SSA concluded that she did not have high confidence that the innovations could be implemented due to their unknown implementation costs. In order to further shed light on the extent to which the SSA’s concerns regarding funding pertained to the innovations underpinning the significant strengths assigned GTI’s proposal by the SEB, our Office held a hearing.

In our view, the SSA’s explanation for why she did not attribute value to the innovative approaches proposed by the protester that were funded is not supported by the contemporaneous record. The SSA made no contemporaneous reference to insufficiently detailed descriptions in her SSS (she referred only to unknown implementation costs), nor is there any indication in the record that she directly reviewed the content of the proposals herself (rather, she based her decision on the information presented by the SEB). Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that the SEB questioned the value of proposed innovative approaches, such as horizontal protection, on the basis that the approaches were not adequately described, or that the SEB conveyed such a concern to the SSA.

In sum, we find that the record fails to support the SSA’s conclusion that the protester’s proposal should not be given any meaningful credit for the multiple proposed innovative approaches for which implementation funding either was included in the protester’s proposal or was not required. That is, while we recognize that the overall impact of the SEB’s findings pertaining to the protester’s proposed innovations is diminished when items with unknown implementation costs are excluded, we nonetheless fail to see a reasonable basis for the SSA to have given the innovations for which unknown implementation costs was not an issue--in particular, those pertaining to IT security--essentially no weight. Accordingly, we sustain GTI’s complaint pertaining to the evaluation of its proposed innovative approaches.

GTI further argues that the SEB unreasonably assigned Peerless’s proposal a significant strength for its proposed phase-in plan -- indeed, the SSA cited Peerless’s plan to complete phase-in within 30 days, rather than the required 60, as a key discriminator in her selection decision.

The record supports GTI’s position. While Peerless represented in its proposal that it “can complete transition in as little as 30 days because we are very familiar with all aspects of the contract,” it went on to indicate that “[w]e acknowledge a lower level of risk associated with a 60-day transition and planned our schedule accordingly.” Peerless Mission Suitability Proposal at 59 (emphasis added). Thus, while Peerless believed that it could accomplish the phase-in transition in as little as 30 days, it did not commit to do so; rather, it proposed a 60-day phase-in schedule to reduce risk. Because Peerless did not propose to complete the phase-in transition within 30 days, both the SEB’s finding to that effect and the SSA’s reliance upon that finding as a key discriminator in her source selection decision lacked a reasonable basis.

We recommend that the SSA make a new source selection decision, taking into account our findings above. If, as a result, the protester is selected for award, the agency should terminate the contract awarded to Peerless and make award to the GTI. The protest is sustained.