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Showing posts with label Effective procurement management. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Effective procurement management. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 11, 2019

How do you determine prospective contractor responsibility if you don't know who the contractor really is?

The ABA Model Procurement Code, as do most other procurement regimes, require the government to know who it is doing business with.  "It is important that the bidder of offeror will be a responsible contractor -- that the contractor has the financial ability, resources, skills, capability, and business integrity necessary to perform the contract."  (MPC 3-401, Comment 1)

"The unreasonable failure of a bidder or offeror to promptly supply information in connection with an inquiry with respect to responsibility may be grounds for a determination of nonresponsibility with respect to such bidder or offeror".  (MPC 3-401(1))

Since the time the MPC was enacted in 1979, other laws were being developed to facilitate cloaks of invisibility for entities to hide the identities of the money, ownership, assets and control of  businesses organized under such laws.  The most recent has been the promulgation of a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) in 1995.  Use of LLCs to provide ownership anonymity of assets, and businesses, is easy (see "How to Hide Ownership of a Company?") and notorious (see, "Anonymous Owner, L.L.C.: Why It Has Become So Easy to Hide in the Housing Market").  The ULLCA, both in original form and in a revised 2006 Model, has been adopted on Guam and many U.S states.

This is becoming a problem, both in the U.S. and Europe, and presumably elsewhere, as indicated in the following article published by the Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists (ACFCS):

Report roundup: EU calls U.S. a ‘secrecy haven,’ GAO highlights commercial owner opacity, and more, posted March 16, 2017.
This week’s Report Roundup has a common theme running through hundreds of pages of reports: the risk of opaque ownership structures and how, in the United States and beyond, the inability for countries to collect beneficial ownership information is a magnet for bad actors.

In the U.S., that means a major ally in the European Union (EU) calling out a longstanding gap in the country’s anti-money laundering (AML) defenses: the federal government allowing certain states like Delaware to sell corporate secrecy as a service – an ultimate irony as this country aggressively chases and chastises other jurisdictions for doing the same thing, according to the report.

That vulnerability is made doubly dangerous when it intersects the international trading sector due to the knowledge that organized criminal groups, corrupt kleptocrats and terror financiers currently hide, funnel and legitimize trillions of dollars in illicit gains, per estimates, through a myriad of trade trickery, including under and over-invoicing items, falsifying documents and other tactics.

In that same vein, U.S. government watchdog group the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted in a report that because this country doesn’t broadly require ownership information to be made available, that can open the door to national security risks when government operations are housed in buildings owned by foreign entities who may or may not be a shell for prying, spying eyes bent on espionage.

Lastly, another report by United Nations Security Council highlighted that the issue of anonymous shell companies globally allows rogue regimes like North Korea to flout international sanctions and get access, as analysts prognosticate, to banned technology and weapons systems on its path to wreak worldwide havoc by creating weapons of mass destruction.
The article goes on to elaborate on some of those reports.

It is interesting that the article mentioned a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), being critical of lack of ownership information in the national security context, because the GAO has now, again, turned its eyes to the subject, in the context of procurement, in its November 2019 report below.  In its letter to Congress transmitting the report, it noted, 
DOD awards contracts to companies in the private sector to provide a wide variety of services for U.S. military forces. Of the thousands of contractors doing business with DOD, some companies are what are known as shell companies — that is, companies that exist but conduct either no business or minimal business. Shell companies can be used for legitimate purposes; for example, they may be formed to obtain financing before starting operations. However, companies sometimes use shell companies to form opaque ownership structures designed to disguise the beneficial owner — the natural person or persons who directly or indirectly own and control, or receive substantial economic benefit from, a company.

These opaque ownership structures can be used to facilitate fraud and other unlawful activity in commerce, including contracts with DOD. For this report, we define opaque ownership as structures of business governance that may conceal or obfuscate entities or individuals who own, control, or benefit financially from a business.
Ongoing DOD Fraud Risk Assessment Efforts Should Include Contractor Ownership  (some excerpts of the letter an other parts of the report, sliced and diced to meet the didactic goal and limited space of this blog; you should read the whole report for original meaning and intent):  In the letter mentioned above, it further noted:
We researched legal databases and news articles involving DOD contractors to identify federal court cases and agency decisions. We reviewed GAO bid-protest decisions to identify cases in which contractors may have failed to disclose foreign ownership or concealed beneficial-owner information to obtain contracts that they were not eligible to receive.  We examined known risks identified through our case-study research and interviews with DOD officials.  We further examined the risk that contractors could be disguising their ownership to create the appearance of competition.

We contacted several government contractors’ associations to gain members’ perspectives on reporting beneficial ownership information and received feedback from 16 members of three government contractors’ associations. The perspectives gained from our queries are not generalizable to all contractors.
In the body of the report, GAO found:  
As the number of layers of ownership increases, ownership information becomes more opaque. This opacity can make it difficult for DOD to determine which entities and individuals ultimately own or control its contractors.

In the United States, no centralized information source or national registry maintains company ownership information. In 2014, the National Association of Secretaries of State found that most states collect minimal ownership data. The association reviewed key information collected by the 50 states and the District of Columbia during the entity-formation process and in annual or periodic reports. During both the entity-formation process and in annual or periodic reporting, the association found that very few states collect some form of entity ownership or control information from limited liability companies or corporations.  The Securities and Exchange Commission collects some ownership information on publicly traded companies. Any person or group of persons that acquires beneficial ownership of more than 5 percent of a publicly traded company’s registered voting securities must register.

GSA’s System for Award Management (SAM) is a federal government-wide database for vendor data that is used across all federal agencies. Any entity that wishes to do business with the government must register in SAM to be eligible to receive a contract award, except in specific circumstances. To increase procurement transparency and traceability, entities that wish to do business with the federal government are now required to provide additional ownership information through the annual registration process in SAM. The required ownership information includes the “immediate” and “highest” level ownership of an offeror.

Responsibility Determination

Contract award decisions are based on evaluation factors and significant subfactors that are tailored to the procurement, at the discretion of procurement officials. At a minimum, these factors must include: price/cost, quality, and past performance. A prospective contractor must affirmatively demonstrate its responsibility, including, when necessary, the responsibility of its proposed subcontractors. Contracting officers must then determine the responsibility of prospective contractors, including whether prospective contractors can perform the terms of a contract. To be determined responsible, a prospective contractor must have adequate financial resources to perform the contract (or the ability to obtain them); be able to comply with the required delivery or performance schedule; have a satisfactory performance, integrity, and ethics record; have the necessary organization, experience, accounting and operational controls, and facilities to carry out the contract (or the ability to obtain them); and be otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under applicable laws and regulations.

Before awarding a contract over the simplified acquisition threshold, a contracting officer must review the prospective contractor’s performance and integrity information available in the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS). FAPIIS is a federal government-wide database designed to assist contracting officers with making a responsibility determination by providing integrity and performance information of covered federal agency contractors and grantees. FAPIIS provides a prospective contractor “Report Card” that includes information pertaining to the prospective contractor’s past performance (if applicable), such as any administrative agreements, contract terminations, nonresponsibility determinations, and exclusions, among other things. It also includes the ability to view the company relationship information, which details the ownership information that prospective contractors are required to report in SAM. When making a responsibility determination, the contracting officer must consider all the information available through FAPIIS with regard to the prospective contractor and any immediate owner, predecessor (an entity that the prospective contractor replaced by acquiring assets and carrying out affairs under a new name), or subsidiary identified for that prospective contractor in FAPIIS. The contracting officer must document in the contract file how the information in FAPIIS was considered in any responsibility determination, as well as the action that was taken as a result of the information.

Contractors with Opaque Ownership Pose Financial Fraud Risks Including Price Inflation

Concealing relationship with subcontractor to inflate prices. Contractors can subcontract with companies they own or control to inflate prices for financial benefit. For example, in one case the contractor purchased goods from a company that its owners created, controlled, and used to make fraudulent markups appear legitimate. Contractors or subcontractors can also bill for work not performed by creating fictitious invoices that add costs to a contract. For example, in four court cases we examined, multiple DOD subcontractors were actually shell companies that did not have the inventory they purported to ultimately provide to the government or perform the work indicated in the contract requirements. Contractors or subcontractors can conceal conflicts of interest for financial benefits. For instance, in one case a DOD contractor employee and his spouse formed a company and concealed their interests by not listing their names but listing the names of family members on formation documents. This company became a subcontractor to the company that employed the DOD contractor. The contractor employee, in his official position, wrote letters justifying awards of purchase orders to the subcontractor he owned and approving recommendations that the awards be made to the subcontractor. The co-owner of the subcontractor concealed her involvement by signing contracts using a different name. We also identified the potential risk of companies creating the appearance of competition by submitting bids from fictitious companies. We identified one case that involved a DOD contractor whose executives admitted as part of their plea agreements to creating fictitious, inflated bids that were not from actual businesses to ensure that the contractor’s own bid would be selected by DOD as the supposed lowest.

Contractors with Opaque Ownership Can Also Pose Nonfinancial Fraud Risks


Contractors can pose nonfinancial fraud risks to DOD by concealing their ownership structure to bid on and obtain contracts that they are not eligible to receive. These nonfinancial risks may not pose a direct financial cost to DOD, but they can allow ineligible companies to contract with DOD while potentially denying eligible companies from contracting with DOD. These risks can also lead to additional vulnerabilities. One contractor that fraudulently obtained set-aside contracts claimed it was owned by a service-disabled veteran; however, that veteran had virtually no involvement with the contractor. Some contractors have been found not eligible to receive the set-aside contracts because they were not at least 51 percent controlled by the eligible individuals and the eligible individuals did not make long-term decisions for the companies. Rather, the contractors were controlled by an ineligible individual who owned and controlled a separate company that actually performed work on the set-aside contracts.

Contractors with opaque ownership structures can also pose the risk of circumventing eligibility requirements for contracts that are only designated for domestic companies, which can lead to other vulnerabilities that affect warfighter readiness. We identified four cases in which individuals created domestic shell companies for foreign manufacturers and bid on contracts designated for domestic companies. In three of the four cases, the individuals behind the shell companies also had ownership interests in the foreign manufacturing companies. Foreign manufacturers received payments from the contracts, despite the contracts only allowing domestic manufacturers to be eligible, and one such manufacturer ultimately supplied DOD with defective and nonconforming parts that led to the grounding of at least 47 fighter aircraft.
I'm sure you get the drift here. There's much more in the GAO report, much more. Have a look. Of particular importance is the lengthy discussion of things that are needed to improve the system of contractor selection. In brief, in its conclusions, the report summarizes,
We recognize that collecting additional ownership information, including beneficial-ownership information, could pose compliance burdens for contractors; and regulatory trends have generally focused on easing the burden to do business. Additionally, verifying contractor ownership can be challenging and time-consuming. Nevertheless, having a thorough assessment of contractor-ownership risks will better position DOD to make informed decisions on how best to use its resources and help ensure that the department’s fraud risk management program is organized and targeted to manage risks in a prioritized manner.

POST SCRIPT: In another new development along the lines of tracking who is whom, note the following article reprinted in Lexology:

Government Contractors Beware: DOJ Announces Creation of Interagency Procurement Collusion Strike Force
On November 5th, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division doubled down and announced the formal launch of the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (“PCSF”), an interagency partnership consisting of prosecutors and investigators focused on deterring, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting antitrust crimes, such as bid-rigging conspiracies and related fraudulent schemes in government procurement, grant, and program funding.





Thursday, February 21, 2019

The risky business of outsourcing essential government services

Britain to tackle doubts about outsourcing risks with new guidelines
Britain, which hires private firms to run parts of its health service, schools, prisons and public transport, has been rethinking how it awards contracts after the collapse of contractor Carillion just over a year ago. Carillion became the largest construction bankruptcy in British history last year, leaving creditors and pensioners facing steep losses and putting thousands of jobs at risk. Its demise reduced the number of big corporate bidders for government contracts and increased scrutiny of how the sector is run, driving down share prices of firms that provide outsourcing services, such as Babcock, Capita, Serco, G4S, Mitie and Compass.

Britain’s government will take measures to identify and reduce risks taken by private firms that provide public services, it will say on Wednesday, in a bid to encourage companies that have become increasingly wary of taking on new government business. “A more considered approach to risk allocation will make us a smarter, more attractive client to do business with,” cabinet office minister Oliver Dowden will tell business leaders at the Confederation of British Industry on Wednesday.

Guidelines, set out in the “Outsourcing Playbook”, will specify that “when designing contracts, departments must seek to mitigate, reduce and then allocate risks to the party best able to manage it”, Dowden will say, according to a text of his remarks released before delivery. The aim is to improve how government works with industry and deliver better public services by, for example, piloting services needed in advance and publishing details of work departments will require, so companies are better able to plan.

Public departments will also be required to say when it is best to deliver public services in-house or when there is benefit from drawing on private sector expertise.
Read this and other articles at the link(s) provided; I tend to slice and dice, rearrange, omit, paraphrase and pretty much destroy the integrity of the original work to try to create a teachable moment fitting the context of this blog.

Professor Steven L. Schooner, of the George Washington Law School, has asked, "what does your government hope to achieve through its government procurement law? It seems reasonable to attempt to describe general aspirations for a procurement system before drafting begins." In a paper he wrote, published in the Public Procurement Law Review in 2002, he identifies the principle of "risk avoidance" as one of nine particular desiderata often mentioned for a successful procurement regime.
It is difficult to describe a procurement regime without acknowledging the role of risk avoidance. Avoiding undue risk is a fundamental responsibility of any governing body. Conversely, improper obsession with risk avoidance can suffocate creativity, stifle innovation and render and institution ineffective. Further, there are infinite mechanisms available to control different types of risk.

No system can fully achieve all of the nine goals. Nor can a state expect that its objectives for its system will remain constant over time. Determining which goals are most important is a daunting, ever-evolving challenge. Because no system can achieve all of the goals, your desiderata entails important tradeoffs. Ultimately, each government must decide how much discretion or flexibility it wishes to delegate to its buyers.
Prof Schooner applied that principle of risk avoidance in testimony before the United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, in 2007, commenting on "the benefits, challenges, and risks of agencies’ increased reliance on contractors to provide critical services". He noted:
The challenges associated with extensive contractor reliance include, among others: (1) planning, which includes understanding what outcome will be sought from the private sector; (2) both understanding and accurately describing that outcome (or task) to the private sector; (3) selecting appropriate, qualified contractors in a timely fashion; (4) negotiating cost-effective agreements and drafting clear contracts that contain effective incentives (or profit mechanisms) to maximize contractor performance; (5) managing the contractual relationship to ensure that the government receives value for its money; (6) providing appropriate oversight throughout the process to, among other things, avoid corruption; and, most importantly, (7) maintaining a sufficiently educated, experienced, and motivated government workforce (or augmented workforce) to take on these challenges.

These challenges can be difficult to accomplish because the combination of government recruiting policies, salaries, benefits, opportunities, and quality of work lag much of the private sector, particularly in high-demand career fields. Thus, the “market” reflects that the government undervalues critical skills.

By the same token, slavish focus upon the relative cost of contractor support is misguided. Specifically, it is not productive to criticize agencies for paying contractors “too much” without: (1) permitting an agency to hire additional personnel; (2) confirming that sufficient personnel are available in the marketplace and willing to work for the government; (3) comparing “apples to apples,” such as taking into account all of the costs of civil servants or members of the armed services; and (4) considering critical issues such as flexibility and surge capacity. For example, higher contractor salaries may be offset, at least in part, by long-run costs avoided. Indeed, a strong case could be made that, for short-term demands for additional resources, it makes sense to pay higher, and potentially significantly higher, amounts for contractor support.

Fundamentally, though, it is difficult to conceive of a higher priority for a heavily outsourced agency than to “assess program office staff and expertise
necessary to provide sufficient oversight” of its most important service contracts. And, empirical evidence is scant to demonstrate that government employees are more talented, committed, motivated, or honest than their private sector counterparts, and vice-versa. However, the private sector’s exposure to market forces, and the related corporate purpose of pursuing profit, permits (and, arguably, requires) a more diverse and potent arsenal of employee incentives and disincentives. These tools include compensation (salary, salary increases, bonuses, stock incentives), opportunity for advancement, and, of course, the risk of termination. While the Government can use similar tools, their impact (or the degree to which these tools can influence behavior) is at least perceived as far less dramatic, given a heavily constrained promotion and bonus regime and an impenetrable de facto tenure system. The private sector-government contrast is greatest at the extremes. The private sector offers far greater economic rewards for success and threatens more credible sanctions for less than desirable performance.

Ultimately, however, the debate between in-house services or privatized services is increasingly academic. The government today relies on the private sector because we have restricted the size of government or, more specifically, the number of government employees. The government currently has no short-term choice but to rely upon contractors for every conceivable task that it is understaffed to fulfill. It is not an option to consolidate its missions, jettison a number of its tasks, terminate contracts, and take on only those missions it is appropriately staffed to perform. Nor is it feasible to wait while it embarks upon an aggressive program to identify, recruit, hire, and retain an extraordinary number of civil servants.

Only serious, long term, far reaching personnel reforms can, in any meaningful manner, begin to reverse the current trend. Accordingly, the government must continue to expend its best efforts to achieve its mission with the resources available, acknowledge that it is a rather “hollow” agency, and invest significant energy and resources in improving its use of contractors to help it achieve its mission. This involves conceding that contractors will continue to perform what historically have been perceived as inherently governmental functions. But even that notion is becoming increasingly quaint, outmoded, anachronistic, or simply irrelevant. At least, that is, until our increasing reliance on contractors to perform services for core government activities is matched by the capacity of government officials to supervise and evaluate the performance of these activities.

As our procurement system has struggled throughout this decade, Congress has been quick to call for more auditors and inspectors general to scrutinize contracting. That’s a responsible gesture. But the corresponding call – for more contracting experts to perform the many functions that are necessary for the procurement system to work well – has been both delayed and muted. In order to serve the taxpaying public and meet the needs of agency customers, acquisition professionals must promptly and accurately describe what the government wants to buy, identify and select quality suppliers, ensure fair prices, structure contracts with proper monetary incentives for good performance, and manage and evaluate contractor performance. Accordingly, the contracting workforce – understaffed, under-resourced, and under-appreciated – desperately requires a dramatic recapitalization.

We have witnessed an explosive growth in what we refer to as body shop or employee augmentation arrangements. As the name implies, the government uses this type of contract to hire contractor personnel to replace, supplement, or work alongside civil servants or members of the armed forces. Civil servants work alongside, with, and at times, for, contractor employees who sit in seats previously occupied by government employees. Unfortunately, no one stopped to train the government workforce on how to operate in such an environment. Worst-case scenarios have arisen where contractors have performed work under an
open-ended contracts (e.g., with a vague or ambiguous statement of work) without guidance or management from a responsible government official.

More than fifteen years of ill-conceived under-investment in the acquisition workforce, followed by a government-wide failure to respond to a dramatic increase in procurement activity has lead to a triage-type focus on buying, with insufficient the resources available for contract administration, management, and oversight. The old adage – an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure – rings true. More auditors and inspectors general will guarantee a steady stream of scandals, but they’ll neither help avoid the scandals nor improve the procurement system. Conversely, a prospective investment in upgrading the number, skills, and morale of government purchasing officials would reap huge dividends for the taxpayers.


Tuesday, April 4, 2017

Procurement controversies series: Ohio. Time after time...

Ohio awards millions in unbid IT contracts, sidestepping state policy, analysts’ protests
Time after time, state purchasing analysts warned that the pricey pending contracts were improper. “This position was unbid” ... ”No competitive procurement was issued” ... “The rates seem to be excessive” ... “The agency did not complete any competitive process” ... ”This position could have been filled ... with rates at least $63 less per hour.” The supervisors also repeatedly disregarded the agency’s own purchasing policy and sidestepped approval of the bipartisan state Controlling Board that serves as a check on spending on non-competitive contracts.

And, time after time, their superiors at the Ohio Department of Administrative Services overrode those concerns to award millions of dollars in no-bid, information-technology contracts, frequently paying more than $200 an hour — often to a company employing one-time Administrative Services executives, a Dispatch investigation found. As a result, Ohioans likely have paid much more than if routine competitive purchasing procedures had been used by the agency with the responsibility to “guide the use of resources on behalf of the public trust.”

Revolving door in reverse:

The high cost of contracting consultants' employees is underscored by a pair of instances in which the consultants later were hired by the state to perform similar duties — but at a sharply lower cost to taxpayers.

Gregory Jackson, one of Davis’ predecessors as the state’s chief information officer for five years (Davis was a 20-year agency employee who was named chief information officer in 2009 and became a deputy director two years later), left his state job in 2005. He was employed by Advocate beginning in September 2012, and through an unbid contract approved by Administrative Services, immediately became interim chief information officer at the Ohio Department of Medicaid. The company received more than $913,000, charging $218 an hour for Jackson’s full-time services until May 2015, when he departed both Advocate and the Medicaid department.

Jackson then returned to the state 10 months later as a full-time state employee in a similar job as head of information services at the Department of Job and Family Services. His hourly state salary of $67.31 — which yields $140,000 a year — represents less than a third of what Advocate was paid for his services. Advocate was paid $453,400 in its last contract for the services of Jackson, who listed a salary of $180,000 a year at Advocate on his state employment application. Jackson declined a request for an interview.

Peter McGeoch, Administrative Services’ IT director in the 1990s and an Advocate employee, worked at the Ohio Department of Higher Education through an unbid contract. His duties included advising Chancellor John Carey on IT issues. Records show McGeoch was hired for $150 an hour, for a total of $77,400, to work for three months ending in September 2016. A spokesman for Carey said McGeoch continued his work at $150 an hour under an extension with Advocate before departing in January. Advocate also was paid $456,000 in 2014 and 2015 for general consulting services provided by McGeoch.

A spokesman for the agency said that it did nothing wrong because its awarding of no-bid contracts is lawful under a waiver of competitive selection granted by the Controlling Board for the past 45 years. But the spokesman could not point to any law or another written policy permitting the awarding of contracts, even with the waiver, without first obtaining at least three price quotes from competing suppliers, as required by the department’s own policy.

The Department of Administrative Services oversees or handles most state purchasing. It also serves as the state property manager and human-resources and payroll office. Its Office of Information Technology handles most software and computer-system contracts for state agencies. The state spends more than $930 million a year on those agencies’ computer and information-technology needs. State agencies generally are required to obtain Controlling Board approval of no-bid or single-source contracts in excess of $50,000 per vendor per year. Last year, a department purchasing analyst pointed out a need to “help reduce the $75 million spent on consultants ... who have since 2006 received several million dollars in unbid work,” writing that some tasks could have been done at lower cost by other companies.

Administrative Services has not submitted any no-bid information-technology contracts for board approval during the past four years, records show. Top agency officials, such as Director Robert Blair and Chief Information Officer Stuart Davis, were not made available for interviews requested by The Dispatch. “The complexity of this subject matter does not lend itself to an interview,” wrote department spokesman Tom Hoyt.

“The majority of the identified (no-bid) contracts are for managing large-scale, complex IT projects and programs that span several years,” Hoyt said. “Items such as a pen or pencil can be compared or purchased in a like manner, apples-to-apples, while IT consulting involving specialized skills, knowledge and experience is difficult to compare in the same way.”

Among the findings from The Dispatch’s seven-month investigation:
‒ Advocate, a Columbus family of companies that has received in excess of $14 million in multiple unbid contracts since mid-2011, employs several former Department of Administrative Services IT executives who once worked closely with the state’s current highest-ranking IT officials.

‒ Stonyhurst Consulting, based in the Washington, D.C., exurb of Middleburg, Virginia, was handed more than $3 million in unbid IT contracts — again, many over the protest of Administrative Service analysts — that included pay rates of up to $250 an hour.

‒ Advocate also charged hourly rates exceeding $200 an hour. In fact, when a couple of its employees transferred to the state payroll, their wages were less than a third of what Advocate had charged the state for similar services.

‒ Despite insisting the no-bid contracts were proper, agency officials canceled some and sought price quotes following the protests of purchasing analysts. However, department leaders gave some contracts to Advocate and Stonyhurst anyway — even though they were the highest-priced.
The unbid contracts uncovered by The Dispatch were awarded without complying with an Administrative Services policy that since 2008 has required the agency to obtain at least three price quotes from competing suppliers, a process intended to save tax dollars by yielding lower prices through competition. The quotes are to come from pre-negotiated and pre-approved “state term schedules” that would-be contractors file with the state.

Hoyt said that policy is overridden by the agency’s receipt of a waiver of competitive selection each biennium from the Controlling Board, which consists of six legislators and a Kasich appointee. The waiver permits the granting of unbid contracts for specialized work and “to provide continuity of services,” Hoyt said. “It allows for a judgment call to be made by DAS.”

Addressing the purchasing analysts’ objections to sole-source contracts, Hoyt said they did not understand that the work was so specialized that it could not be obtained through the so-called staff augmentation contract at lower hourly rates. Analysts periodically have questioned supervisor justifications for some no-bid contracts, disagreeing that the work called for specialized expertise.

On June 4, 2015, acquisition analyst Andrew Miller flagged a $56,250 contract for Stonyhurst. “No competitive process has been completed,” he wrote. “I would recommend that the requester seek Controlling Board approval.” Davis responded that it was “not realistic” to seek the Controlling Board’s OK because the state fiscal year was ending June 30. Davis noted that the contract request was submitted in late April, but documents show the contract did not enter the state-vetting system until June 3. The contract called for one consultant to work 250 hours, at $225 an hour, during June, an average of 62.5 hours a week.

The Controlling Board waiver contains no language overriding Administrative Services’ three-price-quotes policy, which its own employees have written must be followed. The agency’s 127-page state procurement manual does not list any process for directly hiring “specialized” consultants through no-bid contracts. An internal department document also states that sole-source and no-quote contracts cannot be awarded in the manner used by the agency.

Opaque "transparency"

Most of the documents about the transactions are not easily accessible by the public. Administrative Services officials took more than four months to fulfill much of The Dispatch’s request for public records concerning vendors’ contracts. Some records still were being turned over last week — after nearly seven months.

A spokesperson for Kasich, who appoints the head of the Department of Administrative Services, referred questions to the agency.

The husband-and-wife team of Steven Zielenski and Jonelle St. John worked for a state IT contractor called Top5 before forming their own company, Stonyhurst Consulting. State purchasing analysts complained that the company’s first contract in 2015 for $128,100 to help with IT optimization efforts was unbid. Most of the company’s subsequent contracts also were flagged as “unbid” — a total of nearly $3.2 million in all.

Asked for comment, Zielenski responded in an email: “Stonyhurst LLC maintains strict confidentiality with respect to all our clients and our business relationships with them.”

See related article, It can be a tortured path to get state records.
Note that almost every article I reference in this blog gets sliced and diced. Here, for instance, there is much detail that has been left out and many bits of the article have been re-arranged to suit a didactic, rather than newsworthy, intent, as a case study of procurement law and (mal)practice.  

You are advised, therefore, always to go to the article at the provided link for the straight scoop.

Thursday, August 20, 2015

A counterproductive way to deal with emergency no-bid acquisitions

New board approves millions in no-bid contracts (Read full story at the link)
The revamped Personal Services Contract Review Board is part of a contracting reform bill the state Legislature passed this year after much debate, with the Senate watering down sweeping House proposals.
It appears the Legislature, in its wrangling over contract reform, may have inadvertently given agencies a potential out on competitive bidding.

Numerous agencies requesting approval of contracts and exemptions from bidding quoted the new law that allows exemption if “utilization of a competitive bid procurement would have been counterproductive to the business of the agency.” Now agencies appear to be using it as their reasoning for not competitively bidding contracts.

The legislation was driven by a Mississippi Department of Corrections bribery and kickback scandal. Former state Corrections Commissioner Chris Epps ran one of the largest and longest-running criminal conspiracies in state history. He took about two million in bribes over eight years in exchange for steering hundreds of millions of dollars in prison contracts to a former lawmaker co-conspirator.

The contracts subject to Epps’ malfeasance had been approved by the state Personal Services Contract Review Board. After the prisons bribery scandal, state leaders — and a task force created by Gov. Phil Bryant to recommend reform — criticized agencies’ use of “emergency contracts,” exempt from bidding, for goods and services that did not appear to be emergencies.

The reform legislation revamped the board to include citizen members appointed by the governor and lieutenant governor. The board, holding its second monthly meeting Tuesday, has only four members because Lt. Gov. Tate Reeves has not filled his appointments. The directors of the State Personnel Board and Department of Finance and Administration also serve on the board.

On Tuesday, the PSCRB questioned numerous “emergency” contracts approved by agencies, including two recently inked by MDOC worth more than $60 million combined. MDOC entered into an $11.6 million emergency contract with Valley Services for feeding inmates and a $48.8 million one with Centurion of Mississippi for medical services for inmates. Both are for a year.

New board member Bill Moran of Tupelo questioned why feeding inmates and providing medical care were deemed emergencies and the contracts not put out for bid. “Why can’t you at least take the time to get RFPs?” Moran said. “This is $60 million, and nobody’s put a pencil to it. Have you not had time to do that?”

Stanley Brooks, MDOC director of prison agriculture enterprises, said the agency did attempt to get quotes but ran into problems with the previous PSCRB and the contracts were running out, so feeding and caring for inmates became an emergency. At the board’s direction, Brooks said MDOC would try to quickly get RFPs from vendors — within a couple of months — and can back out of the emergency contracts with a month’s notice.

Moran also questioned several emergency contracts worth more than $200,000 from the state Oil and Gas Board — extensions to previous emergency contracts — for companies to plug and abandon oil and gas wells. “How is it an emergency when these wells have been sitting there for years?” Moran said.


House Accountability, Efficiency and Transparency Chairman Jerry Turner, who authored the House reform bill, said this is the result of the Senate stripping out much of the House plan before it passed the bill. Turner said the new board has the authority to establish tougher rules and regulations on bidding and emergency contracts and to force state agencies to seek best prices. He said he hopes it will. “But if they can’t, we can go back in the Legislature and put new language in there,” Turner said. “We are not going to sit by and watch all those problems we’ve had still be allowed because of misinterpretation of the language.”
I might note, Guam procurement law (5 GCA § 5030(x)) defines "emergency" as:
"a condition posing an imminent threat to public health, welfare, or safety which could not have been foreseen through the use of reasonable and prudent management procedures, and which cannot be addressed by other procurement methods of source selection."

Monday, April 27, 2015

Clean audit doesn't reveal dirty procurement management laundry

House HS Subcommittee Takes Hard Look at DHS's Procurement Processes
DHS achieved a much sought-after clean audit of its financial statements by independent auditor KPMG. The audit found DHS’s financial statements were in order. The auditors certified they had “reasonable assurance that what they saw on” DHS’s books “is correct,” said Chip Fulghum, DHS’s chief financial officer and acting undersecretary of management.

“I am pleased to announce that for the second year in a row, our audit firm KPMG, working in conjunction with our Office of Inspector General, has issued the Department of Homeland Security an unqualified audit opinion -- essentially a reasonable assurance from our outside auditors and the department’s Inspector General that our financial statements are accurate,” Fulghum said, adding that, “For the third largest department of our government … consisting of 22 components, 240,000 personnel, a 60 billion dollar budget and six core financial systems and hundreds of feeder systems, I consider this a remarkable achievement.

However, the chairman of House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency harshly criticized the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) department-wide acquisition processes last week during an acquisition oversight hearing on how effectively DHS is safeguarding taxpayer dollars. “A broken acquisition process delivers tools that are late, cost more and do less than anticipated. Watchdogs continue to find failures in DHS’s management of its acquisitions, which is unacceptable and puts taxpayer dollars at risk," said subcommittee chairman Scott Perry (R-Pa.).

“Each year, DHS invests billions of dollars in its major acquisition programs to help execute its many critical missions. In fiscal year 2014 alone, DHS planned to spend almost $11 billion on these acquisition programs, and the department expects it will ultimately invest more than $200 billion in them,” said Michele Mackin, director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management at the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

“Each of DHS’s major acquisition programs generally costs $300 million or more and can span many years,” she explained to the subcommittee, noting that, “We have reported that DHS’s acquisition policy is generally sound, in that it reflects key program management practices,” but, “Due to shortfalls in executing the policy, we have highlighted DHS acquisition management issues on our high-risk list and made numerous recommendations to improve acquisition management practices.” Mackin said, “many of our recommendations have not yet been implemented, including that DHS ensure all major acquisition programs fully comply with DHS acquisition policy.”

Mackin told lawmakers that, “In its April 2015 report, GAO reviewed 22 major programs at DHS and found that [only] two of them were on track to meet schedule and cost parameters." However, she said, “GAO was unable to assess six programs—four of which are in Customs and Border Protection—because DHS leadership had not yet approved baselines establishing their schedules and cost estimates as required by DHS policy. The remaining 14 programs had experienced schedule slips, or schedule slips and cost growth. On average, these program milestones slipped more than three-and-a-half years, and their life-cycle cost estimates increased by $9.7 billion, or 18 percent.”

Mackin said, "DHS lacks key information necessary to manage its programs. For example, GAO found ambiguity across DHS testing assessments in that they did not always clearly identify whether the systems tested met all of their key performance parameters (that is, the capability or system attributes that are required to successfully meet the DHS mission).” “In addition,” Mackin explained, “DHS’s official system for acquisition program reporting—which feeds into required congressional reports—is hampered by data problems, such as inaccurate lifecycle cost estimates.

“Finally,” Mackin told the subcommittee, “DHS does not have information on operations and maintenance costs for 42 operational programs for which the normal documentation requirements were waived in 2013. GAO found that only one of these 42 programs has an approved life-cycle cost estimate. Operations and maintenance costs—which can account for more than 80 percent of program lifecycle costs—could run in the billions of dollars for these 42 programs." In Fiscal Year 2014, DHS still “lack[ed] written guidance for a consistent approach to day-to-day oversight,” according to an earlier GAO audit, which stated, “Federal standards for internal control call for organizations to define and document key areas of responsibility in order to effectively plan, direct and control operations to achieve agency objectives."

Sustainment costs can account for more than 80 percent of total costs, but all but one of these programs lack an approved cost estimate. GAO said “cost estimates are necessary to support decisions about program funding and resources.”

Sen. Tom Carper (D-Del.), former chairman and now ranking member of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, was especially incensed about GAO having found that DHS “needs to develop more realistic baselines for the cost and schedules of major acquisitions, improve testing and ensure that senior DHS leaders and Congress have complete and reliable data on the status of major acquisitions.

DHS needs people to effectively carry out everything that is on paper (rules, guidelines, etc.),” Homeland Security Today was told by former DHS Chief Procurement Officer Dr. Nick Nayak, who along with former DHS procurement ombudsman Jose Arrieta, wrote their report, Partnering with Industry is Key to Improving Acquisition Outcomes, in the Aug./Sept. 2014 issue of Homeland Security Today. Nayak explained that, “There simply are not enough cost estimators or program management people to carry out the oversight everyone wants.”

“DHS programs are large and complex, much like DoD, and they simply do not have the capability (through people) to get every single thing done,” Nayak said, emphasizing that, “The limited people in place perform heroically -- because they are mission driven to protect the country – [but] they are stretched so far that it is humanly impossible to sustain that level of performance over time.” And it all leads “to another problem,” Nayak said, which is “employee burnout, low morale and ultimately high turnover.”

Nayak and Arrieta wrote,“DHS has developed a unique way to train its acquisition workforce to be smarter and faster. DHS has developed an innovative approach to fill a gap in acquisition training that has existed forever across government agencies - lack of industry understanding." According to Nayak and Arrieta, “Today, DHS is spending 17 billion more a year teaching acquisition professionals about how industry does business, including concepts such as how companies determine to bid on a requirement, the best approach to minimizing proposal costs in order to maximize competition, and how to minimize or eliminate protests through effective communication.”

They added that, “DHS has been able to address the systematic and market convergence pressures immediately by partnering with industry associations to develop industry led seminars for the workforce – the cost is almost zero, and the impact is immediate. The seminars,” they explained, “focus on developing DHS acquisition professionals’ understanding of the marketplace and create a safe environment outside the acquisition process for contracting professionals to learn about their potential industry partners and to gain valuable experience before ever soliciting them for a requirement. They are even frank discussions about contracting and acquisition issues that nobody typically talks about until they are adverse in nature.

Further, Nayak and Arrieta said there's also a problem with government acquisition “brain drain.” They noted that, “In every magazine, newspaper and blog on federal contracting, you will find an article about transforming the acquisition workforce. Why? Because acquisition professionals are important. The federal acquisition process is a business executed and managed by people. Annually, the federal government spends $500 billion through the acquisition process. In total, across the federal government, there are 40,000 contracting professionals, about 30 percent of whom are eligible to retire in five years."

Meanwhile, 30 percent of the acquisition workforce has less than five years of work experience. Furthermore, it takes about five years to provide adequate training and experience to develop a competent contracting professional.
There is much, much more in the article, which you should read in full at the link above.