Labels and Tags

Accountability (71) Adequate documentation (7) ADR in procurement (4) Allocation of risks (6) Best interest of government (11) Best practices (19) Best value (15) Bidder prejudice (11) Blanket purchase agreement (1) Bridge contract (2) Bundling (6) Cancellation and rejection (2) Centralized procurement structure (12) Changes during bid process (14) Clarifications vs Discussions (1) Competence (9) Competition vs Efficiency (29) Competitive position (3) Compliance (35) Conflict of interest (32) Contract administration (26) Contract disputes (4) Contract extension or modification (9) Contract formation (1) Contract interpretation (1) Contract terms (3) Contract types (6) Contract vs solicitation dispute (2) Contractor responsibility (20) Conviction (4) Cooperative purchasing (3) Corrective action (1) Cost and pricing (13) Debarment (4) Determinations (8) Determining responsibility (37) Disclosure requirements (7) Discussions during solicitation (10) Disposal of surplus property (3) Effective enforcement requirement (35) Effective procurement management (5) Effective specifications (36) Emergency procurement (14) eProcurement (5) Equitable tolling (2) Evaluation of submissions (22) Fair and equitable treatment (14) Fair and reasonable value (23) Fiscal effect of procurement (14) Frivolous protest (1) Good governance (12) Governmental functions (27) Guam (14) Guam procurement law (12) Improper influence (11) Incumbency (13) Integrity of system (31) Interested party (7) Jurisdiction (1) Justification (1) Life-cycle cost (1) Limits of government contracting (5) Lore vs Law (4) market research (7) Materiality (3) Methods of source selection (33) Mistakes (4) Models of Procurement (1) Needs assessment (11) No harm no foul? (8) Offer & acceptance (1) Other procurement links (14) Outsourcing (34) Past performance (12) Planning policy (34) Politics of procurement (52) PPPs (6) Prequalification (1) Principle of competition (95) Principles of procurement (25) Private vs public contract (17) Procurement authority (5) Procurement controversies series (79) Procurement ethics (19) Procurement fraud (31) Procurement lifecycle (9) Procurement philosophy (17) Procurement procedures (30) Procurement reform (63) Procurement theory (11) Procurement workforce (2) Procurment philosophy (6) Professionalism (17) Protest - formality (2) Protest - timing (12) Protests - general (37) Purposes and policies of procurement (11) Recusal (1) Remedies (17) Requirement for new procurement (4) Resolution of protests (4) Responsiveness (14) Restrictive specifications (5) Review procedures (13) RFQ vs RFP (1) Scope of contract (16) Settlement (2) Social preference provisions (60) Sole source (48) Sovereign immunity (3) Staffing (8) Standard commercial products (3) Standards of review (2) Standing (6) Stays and injunctions (6) Structure of procurement (1) Substantiation (9) Surety (1) Suspension (6) The procurement record (1) The role of price (10) The subject matter of procurement (23) Trade agreements vs procurement (1) Training (33) Transparency (63) Uniformity (6) Unsolicited proposals (3)
Showing posts with label Contract disputes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Contract disputes. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 14, 2020

May the Force be with you

One medical website describes an epidemic as including "any problem that has grown out of control". It distinguishes pandemic by the breadth of the "problem".  "An epidemic becomes a pandemic when it spreads over significant geographical areas and affects a large percent of the population. In short, a pandemic is an epidemic on a national or global level."


Now, of course, that website was referring to disease, a disease usually caused by a tiny, hard to decipher critter of some sort. one which at the extreme threatens the survival of the human or  other species.  But, by that definition, in a world organized by contracts, the world is now also caught in the grips of a force majeure pandemic. One London based firm, Farrer & Co., elucidates (though, in my usual slice and dice tossed salad rendition, I have "taken license" of their explanation to assist the mad scheme of this blog, so you are implored to read the original at that link):
Attention is now turning to whether businesses and their suppliers, customers and commercial partners can continue to perform their contractual obligations in spite of the fundamentally different situation in which they find themselves and, if not, what consequences flow from that.

These events shine a spotlight on contractual small print and legal concepts that perhaps provoked little thought in more normal times. They may now be critical to business survival.

Contrary to common perception, there is no statutory or common law definition of force majeure or a force majeure event in English Law. The parties to a contract therefore have the freedom to agree what will amount to a force majeure for the purpose of their contract and what the consequences will be if such an event happens. That means there are no generic answers to questions about how force majeure applies – each party must look at the wording of their own contracts to establish how it works in the relevant circumstances.
That caveat makes Dr. Fauci's assertions and Trump-inspired qualifications look down right transparent. But, it is a sound description of the beast.

As the authors cited cautioned, "This note is designed to be of general application," and it does pretty well hold true around the world, regardless of legal system. So, again, if you need a broad grounding in force majeure, that article is a good place to start. Another broadly examined article dealing generally with the force majeure-like factual issues that arise in this particular Covid-19 pandemic I'd recommend is Coronavirus/COVID-19: Implications for Commercial and Financial Contracts from the firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP and Affiliates.

Given the vagueness, or vagaries, of legal theories resulting because of or in the midst of a medical pandemic, and the slippery facts upon which it all rests, I do not attempt to provide my own discussion of the legal issues. But, all you have to do is search online the topic "covid-19 force majeure" and you will see a swarm of force majeure discussions from around the globe, each lying in wait for your interest.

Tuesday, June 18, 2019

Unilaterial termination of government contract: fettered or convenient?

There is, in this post, a bit of a red herring. I will be comparing failures of a government to perform an admitted contract, and the effect of the contract obligation on the validity of the contracted obligation. Actually, the compared situtations are distinguishable on their facts, but the common notion is one of governance issues one necessarily encounters when contracting with a government. Thus, this is more a case of contrasts, not comparisons at a certain level, but a teachable moment nevertheless (I hope).

Note that I regularly, with no disrespect intended, slice and dice, reorganize, paraphrase, leave out critical facts and citations, and generally make a mess of the original source to fit the available space and the point to be made in a post. So, always, always, go to the source; read the original at the link and don't get misled by my wayward rendition.

The impetus of this post is the Australian appellate case captioned Searle v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] NSWCA 127, decided May 31, 2019. A good nutshell discussion of the case is provided by Dr Nick Seddon, an honorary professor at the Australia National University College of Law, on the Australian Public Law blog. Dr Seddon is an accomplished leading authority, and author, on Australian commercial and government contract law. Critically for this blog writer, he writes in a forthright and narrative style that is easy to read and grasp.

Searle v Commonwealth [2019] NSWCA 127 – government contracting and fettering
What happened in Searle?    Searle joined the Navy as a marine technician. After being signed up, he entered into a training contract under which he would undertake a course of training towards a Certificate IV in Engineering. Under it the Navy undertook to provide a training plan and the various components to achieve the Certificate. The Navy failed to provide these elements of training. After leaving the Navy, Searle sued for damages for breach of contract. He argued that, if he had achieved the Certificate, he could have obtained a more remunerative job in civilian life than he in fact got.

There is a special legal background to this story. Going back to medieval times, English law held that the Crown does not enter into contracts with its servants. This applies in Australia although, for the ordinary public service, it has been superseded by elaborate legislation. Not so for the military, or at least not so as to remove the basic proposition that there is no contract between an service member and the Commonwealth. Such members are engaged at her Majesty’s pleasure.

The fettering rule.   When government enters into a contract, there is always a potential tension. To what extent does the contract bind the government in a way that may thwart the government’s task of governing? The answer to this traditionally has been that freedom to govern trumps freedom of contract. Under various labels (executive necessity, the rule against fettering or, more vaguely, sovereign risk) the government must be free to implement its programs and policies even if this causes the government to be in breach of contract. Traditionally, that is too bad for the contractor with no right to a remedy. This collection of principles has generated much controversy over many years, though it arises rarely. The controversy is fully described by Bell P, the lead New South Wales Court of Appeal judge in Searle v Commonwealth.

This tension is captured in a number of propositions (stated starkly here):
1. The government may simply break a contract with impunity;
2. The government cannot contract out of, or relieve the contractor from, existing statutory obligations;
3. The government cannot through a contract fetter its future exercise of executive power;
4. The government cannot through contract commit to future legislation;
5. The government may instigate legislation to override an existing contract.
Propositions 2 and 4 are less controversial and are well-established. Propositions 1 and 3 are controversial and ill-defined. Proposition 5 is well-established but controversial.

The no-fettering argument in Searle:   The Commonwealth said that the basic employment arrangement was not contract but, instead, an exercise of the Crown’s prerogative (or executive) power. Even if the training contract was a separate arrangement, over and above the underlying employment arrangement, the training contract could not fetter the Navy’s prerogative right to direct, control and manage Searle as a military person (dubbed “Navy Command” in the Court of Appeal). This was therefore a proposition 3 (the training contract could not fetter the exercise of Navy Command), or possibly a proposition 1 (the Commonwealth could simply break the training contract with impunity), case. This argument succeeded before the trial Judge.

Appeal:   On appeal, the New South Wales Court of Appeal (the functional equivalent to a Supreme Court in many U.S. jurisdictions) took this opportunity to examine the long-standing controversy about propositions 1 and 3, described as “uncertain” and “ill-defined”. The lead judgment by Bell P was supported by short judgments from Bathurst CJ and Basten JA. It was held that the training contract did not amount to a fetter on the Commonwealth’s executive (or prerogative) power of Naval Command and that the Commonwealth was liable to pay damages.

Space does not allow coverage of the very thorough description and analysis by Bell P of the difficulties and criticisms of the fettering doctrine. Making a government contract almost invariably employs the executive power. The fettering rule says that that contract is void if it purports to dictate or control a future exercise of executive power, including making another contract. If this is correct, it is a public law intrusion on contracting.

The Mason solution:   The consequence of invoking the fettering rule -- the contract that offends the rule is void -- has been one of the strands of criticism of the rule. Voidness is usually chaotic. Many years after the contract is made, a court pulls the rug leaving the parties in a very uncertain position. An important solution to this problem was suggested by way of obiter dicta by Mason J in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54 at 76. This was that the contract is not void but it could not be enforced by coercive orders such as an injunction of specific performance. But, on the other hand, it could be the subject of a damages remedy. This solution preserves the underlying rationale of the fettering doctrine and, at the same time, protects the contractor. It is clear that the denial of the equitable remedies of injunction or specific performance is because of the government’s imperative to be unhindered in its task of implementing its policies and programs -- not for one of the reasons that guides a court’s discretion under the ordinary law of contract.

The training contract:    In Searle the contest was between the training contract and the future exercise of the power of Naval Command. Absent a possible fettering argument, there was no basis for challenging the contract. At a factual level, the training contract simply did not fetter the power of Naval Command. Any resort to Naval Command that detracted from the obligations arising from the training contract did not fetter the Commonwealth in any real sense. Even the possibility of having to pay damages in accordance with the Mason solution would not amount to a practical fetter. The Commonwealth conceded that it had the power to enter into such a contract and did not attempt to argue that it lacked that power, absent a fettering argument.

President Bell, during the course of his wide-ranging examination of the academic and judicial criticisms of the fettering doctrine, was clearly motivated by the fundamental principle that contracts should be kept, not just for the sake of the contractor but also from the perspective of government, because otherwise it would not be a credible commercial player. "This approach is more nuanced than others which carry the crude, often overbroad and instinctively unfair consequence of a contract being treated as void. It is an approach which arguably best reconciles the competing policy considerations."

Conclusion:   This case “raises a number of very important questions of principle” about government contracting, albeit in an area of the law that is rarely litigated. The fettering doctrine, at least arising from propositions 1 and 3, has been festering over many years and is in need of a fresh look and restatement. The Mason solution has been applied for the first time in Australia by the New South Wales Court of Appeal. It strikes a sensible balance between the government’s imperative to govern and its need to make contracts.

Watch this space for a possible appeal to the High Court.

In the U.S., the private law of contract has been undermined and supplanted by statutory laws applicable to government acquisition contracts. In the typical "procurement" government contract, the government is acquiring something. "“Acquisition” means the acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or services (including construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government through purchase or lease.... Acquisition begins at the point when agency needs are established and includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs, solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contract financing, contract performance, contract administration, and those technical and management functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency needs by contract. 2 FAR 2.101(a) In the Searle case, the government was acquiring nothing.

There was nothing more than an arrangement between the government and an employee that the government would provide a service for an employee. It was something in the nature of, what the U.S. Supreme Court has styled, a "gratuity": "Pensions, compensation allowances and privileges are gratuities. They involve no agreement of parties; and the grant of them creates no vested right. The benefits conferred by gratuities may be redistributed or withdrawn at any time in the discretion of Congress. ... On the other hand War Risk policies, being contracts, are property and create vested rights. The terms of these contracts are to be found in part in the policy, in part in the statutes under which they are issued and the regulations promulgated thereunder." Lynch v. United States, 292 US 571,577, U.S. Supreme Court (1934)

I'm not sure if that is a difference with a distinction between the fettering rules for government contract as practiced in Australia and contract clauses available in U.S. government, and Guam, contracting regulations, but by definition, Searle did not deal with a government contract as we know in procurement. "“Contract” means a mutually binding legal relationship obligating the seller to furnish the supplies or services (including construction) and the buyer to pay for them. It includes all types of commitments that obligate the Government to an expenditure of appropriated funds and that, except as otherwise authorized, are in writing. In addition to bilateral instruments, contracts include (but are not limited to) awards and notices of awards; job orders or task letters issued under basic ordering agreements; letter contracts; orders, such as purchase orders, under which the contract becomes effective by written acceptance or performance; and bilateral contract modifications. Contracts do not include grants and cooperative agreements ...." 2 FAR 2.101(a)

Guam's procurement law would not provide jurisdiction for a court to hear the contract claim brought by Searle, because the Guam procurement law does not waive sovereign immunity involving government contracts that are not acquisitions. In Guam, the government has waived sovereignty to be sued under government contracts more generally, but under the Claims Act, and, similar to Searle, the Claims Act only has jurisdiction to render judgement for monetary awards related to expenses incurred "upon a contract", not other monetary damages and it is an open question whether it even applies to to oral or un-written contracts, or to any theories of recovery based in equity, contracts implied in law, quasi-contract, or quantum meruit. The Guam Supreme Court has left to "another day our answer to whether the Guam Legislature has extended the waiver of sovereign immunity to oral or unwritten contracts, or to any theories of recovery based in equity." Guam Police Department v. Superior Court (Lujan) 2011 Guam 8, ftnt 8.

But, to the extent that the authority of the executive branch of the government in the U.S. is impinged upon by the procurement contracting process, the U.S. government and most if not all other jurisdictions in the USA have obtained a bit of flexibility unavailable in private contract law to cope with matters of good public governance, resulting in similar outcomes as in Searle yeilding a sensible balance between the government’s imperative to govern and its need to make contracts, in reliance on the immunity of the 'crown', particular laws and regulations, and the contract between the parties, all in concert, when a void contract is to be avoided.

An example of this is the accepted "Termination for Convenience" clause, which in private law of contracts would normally render the entire contract void as an illusory "bargain". It allows the government to unilaterally terminate a contract for practically any reason short of bad faith or fraud. However, it also requires that the government to compensate the contractor for work done and profits earned to the date of termination. It thus reached a similar outcome as in the Searle case. The termination for convenience clause arose out of the experiences of war, in particular the armistice following hostilities (in the "good old" days of wars between established states), when peace suddenly broke out but war material contracts persisted, without the government's need for more war materiel -- indeed as an impediment to redirecting funds to meet the needs of rebuilding the country.

Another example is the standard contract disputes clause. In simple terms, this clause and implementing regulations provides that contract disputes between the government and a contractor will be decided by the government if the parties are unable to "mutually agree" on a settlement and resolution of the dispute. In the face of this somewhat illusory and certainly conflicted decision making process, the clause contemplates a review of the government's decision, administratively, judicially or both.

This discussion illustrates a point I make when people tell me that government contracting should be done in the same manner as private contracting: government contracting must be conducted with an eye to good public governance as the overriding principle on which the contracting is allowed. It is true that "when the United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals". Lynch v. United States, supra, 579, U.S. Supreme Court (1934) Nevertheless, only Congress can determine to allow a cause of action against the government arising under that contract. "The character of the cause of action — the fact that it is in contract as distinguished from tort — may be important in determining (as under the Tucker Act) whether consent to sue was given." Id., at 582 "Specifically, the Tucker Act permits three kinds of claims against the government: (1) contractual claims, (2) noncontractual claims where the plaintiff seeks the return of money paid to the government and (3) noncontractual claims where the plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to payment by the government."

American jurisdictions tend to mitigate the "fettering tensions" discussed above by Dr Seddon with a combination of regulations and contract clauses, coupled with particular waivers of sovereign immunity. And they each, in their separate ways, look for that nuance which strikes a sensible balance between the government’s imperative to govern and its need to make contracts.


Tuesday, April 9, 2019

When it's not best left unsaid

Government contracting by implication. It's what you do when you've left home without it, it being a critical government contract clause, required by the procurement law, including its regulations. Now I know, thanks to Lexology and Attorney Edward Arnold and the article below.

The Christian Doctrine: The Double-Secret Contract Clause
The typical government contract contains a laundry list of standard Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) or Defense Federal Regulation Acquisition Supplement (DFARS) clauses that outline the requirements for the construction or services to be provided. These clauses are either expressly stated, i.e. written out in full length in the contract, or incorporated by reference to a particular provision which the contractor must research for the specific language. But contractors beware: not all contracts are what they seem. Since 1963, courts have held that certain clauses are so integral to public procurements that they are deemed incorporated by operation of law, even if they are omitted from the contract.

The “Christian Doctrine” arises from the Court of Claims’ 1963 decision in G.L. Christian & Associates v. United States.[1] The contractor there sought to recover anticipated profits on a contract that terminated by the U.S. Department of the Army. The government sought to avoid liability for anticipated profits, relying on the standard termination for convenience clause, which disclaims government liability for anticipated profits on unperformed work. Interestingly, the termination for convenience clause was not referenced or incorporated in G.L. Christian’s contract. The government argued that, despite its absence, the clause should be read into the contract as a matter of law. In support of its argument, the government relied on Section 8.703 of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (“ASPR”), which requires the termination clause be inserted in all fixed-price construction contracts such as the one at issue.[2] The Court agreed, stating that since World War I, the limitation on anticipated profits in a termination case was “a deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy.”[3]

Following this ruling, various boards of contract appeals and courts took a relatively broad view of the court’s holding, incorporating clauses and procurement regulations with little or no consideration for whether such provisions reflected a deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy. Thus, a series of ancillary clauses were deemed incorporated by operation of law, even though they were not in the contract. For example, one case from the Court of Claims held that the ASPR “Mistake in Bids” clause was incorporated by law into the contract based on a theory that: “If a regulation appears intended to define and state the rights of a class of persons, it is presumptively intended to benefit those persons.”[4] The Court ruled that the missing clause was intended to benefit bidders, without any analysis as to whether that end was a deeply ingrained in the federal procurement scheme.

In 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed the expanding scope of the Christian Doctrine in General Engineering & Machine Works v. O’Keefe.[5] Emphasizing Christian’s reliance on the significant and long-standing policy implemented by the termination for convenience clause, the Court re-iterated that “the Christian Doctrine does not permit the automatic incorporation of every required contract clause.”[6] Rather, “the Christian Doctrine applies to mandatory contract clauses which express a significant or deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy.”[7] In the wake of General Engineering, one set of commentators noted: “They [the courts and boards] have been saved for the last 20 years by being able to mechanically follow the Christian Doctrine to incorporate all mandatory clauses in the contract without analysis or thought. But that day is over. Under the guidance provided by the Federal Circuit, the boards of contract appeals now have to think through each case to determine if the clause meets the General Engineering tests.”[8]

Under the guidance of General Engineering, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) has invoked the Christian Doctrine only twice to incorporate clauses into contracts. And even so, the ASBCA only incorporated clauses that had been previously incorporated under earlier case law.[9] In that same time, the ASBCA has refused to invoke the incorporate various other clauses.[10]

In its most recent decision involving the Christian Doctrine, the Federal Circuit held for the first time that bonding requirements in FAR Part 52.228-15, “Performance and Payment Bonds—Construction,” were incorporated in every construction contract at the time of award.[11] Not only did the Court find that the purposes of the performance and payment bonds rendered them “a significant or deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy,” it was also persuaded by the fact that government property cannot be subject to subcontractors’ and suppliers’ mechanic’s liens.[12] Thus, protecting subcontractors and suppliers represents a deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy.

The lesson of K-Con: Federal contractors of all sizes must understand: (1) what type of contract is being contemplated by the government’s solicitation; (2) which provisions are found in those types of contracts; and (3) which provisions have been, or may be, deemed incorporated by operation of law even if not present in the contract. This will greatly impact how contractors price their proposals in competitive solicitations to better account for potential risks.
The article comes with a very organized and helpful matrix of over 40 administrative and judicial decisions, showing whether the decision followed or rejected the Christian Doctrine on the facts of the respective cases. This proved helpful to me as I was able to get a lead to two decisions concerning the incorporation of the standard federal and ABA Model Procurement Code Contract Dispute Clause models. Both of them followed the Christian Doctrine.

My interest arises from two separate procurement controversies that have been playing out here on Guam, that turned into binding arbitration train wrecks. I have been puzzled by that. Guam has the ABA MPC version of the contract dispute clause. Although the regulations elaborate, the essence is in the law, 5 GCA § 5427:
§ 5427. Authority to Resolve Contract and Breach of Contract Controversies.
(a) Applicability. This Section applies to controversies between the Territory and a contractor and which arise under, or by virtue of, a contract between them. This includes without limitation controversies based upon breach of contract, mistake, misrepresentation, or other cause for contract modification or rescission.
(b) Authority. The Chief Procurement Officer, the Director of Public Works, the head of a purchasing agency, or a designee of one of these officers is authorized, prior to commencement of an action in a court concerning the controversy, to settle and resolve a controversy described in Subsection (a) of this Section.
(c) Decision. If such a controversy is not resolved by mutual agreement, the Chief Procurement Officer, the Director of Public Works, the head of a purchasing agency, or the designee of one of these officers shall promptly issue a decision in writing. The decision shall:
    (l) state the reasons for the action taken; and
    (2) inform the contractor of its rights to judicial or administrative review as provided in this Chapter.
(d) Notice of Decision. A copy of the decision under Subsection (c) of this Section shall be mailed or otherwise furnished immediately to the contractor.
(e) Finality of Decision. The decision reached pursuant to Subsection (c) of this Section shall be final and conclusive, unless fraudulent, or the contractor appeals administratively to the Public Auditor in accordance with § 5706 of this Chapter.
(f) Failure to Render Timely Decision. If ... one of these officers does not issue the written decision required under Subsection (c) of this Section within sixty (60) days after written request for a final decision, or within such longer period as may be agreed upon by the parties, then the contractor may proceed as if an adverse decision had been received.
It seems to me that the requirement of mutual agreement by the parties precludes arbitration, and certainly the requirement that a disputed final agency decision must be appealed (first administratively, from which further appeal procedures are available, ultimately to the Guam Supreme Court), renders binding, non-reviewable arbitration clearly out of the question.

Yet, those two, very large (on Guam scale) contract disputes ended up in arbitration -- and litigation, adding insult to injury, and costs.

It should be noted Guam's Procurement Contract Disputes law is fortified by a strongly stated government policy in favor of resolution of "all controversies by mutual agreement without litigation", and backed up by a quite specific "Disputes" clause which "shall be inserted in all territorial contracts".

I could not square the arbitrations with that contract clause requirement. Obviously, someone(s) somewhere along the line neglected or resolved not to abide by the mandatory dispute resolution procedure explicitly mandated in law and regulation. A law and regulation, I might add, that has been ensconced in Guam's procurement law from the beginning of the comprehensive procurement law's adoption in 1982.

Needless to say, I have been plowing that Christian Doctrine field since coming across the article above and amassed a goldmine of resources should I ever need to have it to hand.

Such is the aspiration of a Procurement True Believer. Or nerd. Whatever.

Helpful to me, among others:
Yosemite Park v. United States, 582 F. 2d 552 - Court of Claims (1978)
SJ Amoroso Const. Co., Inc. v US, 12 F3d 1072, Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit (1993)
Bay Shipbuilding Company vs Dept. HomeLand Security, CBCA 54, 84 (2007)
US v Thomas K. Mills, MD, Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit,822 F.2d 373 (1987)



Wednesday, January 7, 2015

A stop work order of a different order

It is clear that contract administration is a component of that range of matters falling under the "procurement" umbrella. Thus, contract disputes, particularly government contract disputes that this blawg tends to stick to as "procurement" rather than simply "acquisition", are of interest. The case reported in this post was spotted on the Lexology website, which reported the article as originally posted on the Gordon & Rees LLP Construction Law Blog.

The case is Kiewit-Turner v. Department of Veterans Affairs (CBCA 3450, December 9, 2014), decided by the U.S. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. The decision is in the nature of an interpretation of the contract and the subsequent rights and obligations of the parties, brought by an action for declaratory relief, a uniquely useful contract remedy. As usual, this is a my own rendition of the decision and you must read the original decision for citations, fullness, context and accuracy, etc.
This decision answers the following three questions: (1) Did the contract modification known as SA-007 obligate the respondent, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), to provide a design that could be built for $582,840,000? (2) Did the VA materially breach the contract by failing to provide a design that could be built for that amount of money? (3) If such a breach occurred, is KT entitled to stop work?

After hearing testimony for eight days, reviewing a voluminous documentary record, and considering lengthy briefs and reply briefs submitted by the parties, we now answer each of these questions in the affirmative.

On August 31, 2010, the VA awarded to KT a contract for the performance of preconstruction services on a medical center campus in Aurora, Colorado. The contract included an option for the performance of construction services as well. The contract was described as an “integrated design and construct,” or IDc, type contract – something similar to the “construction management at risk” or “construction management as constructor” types of contract used in the private sector. A key early VA funding decision was establishing a construction cost target, known as the estimated construction cost at award, or ECCA, at $582,840,000. This ECCA was prescribed, on the same day as the KT contract was awardedThe VA had never used this type of contract before. The agency’s own project management plan recognized as a high risk that “IDc represents new contracting approach for VA; does not fit existing procedures which is complicated by VA culture that does not encourage or is [not] comfortable with new approaches.”

Indeed, the VA did not use the IDc mechanism properly right from the start. This limited the agency’s flexibility to make modifications based on KT’s pre-construction services advice. A September 2011 review by the Army Corps of Engineers, which was commissioned by the VA, confirmed that the IDc contract was not properly used: “[T]he IDc contract type may have not been appropriate for the Medical Center Replacement in Denver. . . . [P]roceed[ing] with design development to major design milestones (DD1) prior to procurement of the IDc contractor . . . did not permit the IDc contractor to integrate with the designer to achieve the benefits related to this contract type. . . . The current methodology appears to be counterintuitive to the Government’s ability to achieve best value.”

KT informed the VA at many stages that the design lacked coordination and completeness, that the design was over budget and included elements that were above the standard for a healthcare facility, and that value engineering (VE) was not being incorporated into the design. As early as October 2010, an independent advisor was cautioning the VA’s project executive that the costs of the project, per the then-current design, were increasing. In November, the project executive’s supervisor told him that “[the] DD1 packet is unsatisfactory and the JVT (the original design team) is not listening to the directions they are given from the user [side] or from the CFM [VA Office of Construction and Facilities Management] side.”

In September 2011, the agency’s project executive and contracting officer issued a critical performance evaluation of the JVT designer. They complained that the JVT had chosen form over function, placed an over-emphasis on aesthetics, had produced an unnecessarily complex design, did not believe that a budget problem existed, and was often uncooperative with the agency. In December 2011, the contracting officer denied the JVT’s request for release of retainage, “[d]ue to the ECCA above the contract stated limit and the complete design has not been accepted.” In March 2012, the contracting officer reminded the JVT that under its contract, when bids exceeded the estimated price, the JVT had to “perform such redesign and other services as are necessary to permit contract award within the funding limitation.”

Nevertheless, the VA asked KT to prepare a proposal for the optional work under its contract – constructing the medical facilities. In July 2011, the parties agreed that KT would submit a firm target price (FTP) proposal in the amount of $603 million. On August 25, 2011, KT submitted such a proposal. The price was $599.6 million for construction itself and $3.4 million for all pre-construction activities, with a ceiling price of $609 million. The FTP was based on a detailed analysis of DD-2 enhanced drawings. The proposal included many pages of general, technical, and pricing clarifications, which noted assumptions on which the proposal was based. We credit the testimony of KT’s former managing partner that including these sorts of assumptions and qualifications in a proposal is typical in the commercial world for an IDc-type contract where the design is incomplete. The proposal assumed that the VA would ensure that the design include $23 million of value engineering (VE) items and that KT would negotiate price reductions of nearly $31 million from its subcontractors. KT’s detailed FTP proposal became known as “The Book.” By the time that KT submitted its proposal, the VA also had in hand an independent estimate which showed that the cost of construction would be $677,697,408.

Chris Kyrgos, the VA contracting officer’s supervisor demanded that KT remove the clarifications, qualifications, and assumptions from The Book and present a proposal based on the most recent set of drawings. KT’s managing partner explained further that in light of the contractor’s estimate that the current design would cost more than $664 million to construct, KT could not possibly build the project for only $603 million. At this point,it was proposed that if the VA would agree to present a set of drawings that could be constructed for the ECCA, KT would agree to perform the construction work for the price it had offered. A handwritten statement entitled “Agreements – Path Forward” was signed. The three key paragraphs of this statement read:
1. All parties agree that they must get price to $604 mil. They will each expend resources to keep that goal.
2. VA shall cause JVT to produce a design that meets their ECCA with use of alternates and other methods as a safety net.
3. Agreed: . . . FTP set to $604m[illion]/clg.[ceiling]@610. (The difference between the ECCA of $582,840,000 and the FTP of $604 million was that the latter included pre-construction and off-site infrastructure work, as well as other items, but the former did not.)

Both parties understood that by making this agreement, the VA recognized that it would have to ensure that through the use of VE and other means, the JVT would produce a design which could be constructed for less than the current estimated cost of the project. KT’s managing partner testified that “[t]he big caveat there is they have to produce a design that meets the ECCA because the current design didn’t come anywhere close to that.” Demonstrating that both parties understood this, in March 2012, KT’s deputy managing partner and the VA contracting officer gave to personnel from both parties a presentation entitled “SA-007 and Managing to the $604M.” The presentation asked, “Does SA-007 clearly define the scope of work?” and provided the answer, “No. Defines the box.” The VA adhered to this understating well into 2013.

KT expected, based on communications from the VA, to receive 100% complete construction documents by the end of January 2012. In late 2011, however, the VA let lapse its architect/engineer peer review contract, and without a peer review, the agency would not release the 100% design package. KT told the VA that the “lack of this information is currently creating numerous negative impacts in material procurement/fabrications, obtaining approvals of submittals, coordination of trades, putting work in place in the field, as well as obstructing our ability to maintain the schedule as currently planned.” KT proposed that it solicit subcontractor bids based on 95% drawings, but the VA rejected this request.

The 100% documents were finally delivered to KT on August 31, 2012. These documents turned out to be far from finished, however. The incomplete design, and changes to it, prompted KT to issue an unusually large number of requests for information (RFIs), seeking clarification as to design elements. Responses to RFIs were often late and/or incomplete.

KT planned to subcontract about 85% of the work on this project. All subcontracts valued at $300,000 or more were required by the contract to be secured through a competitive process in which at least three bids were made. The subcontracting process required consent to each subcontract from the VA’s contracting officer. By the fall of 2012, according to witnesses from KT, the VA medical center, and a VA resident engineer on the project, prospective subcontractors were reluctant to submit bids for project work because subcontractors were not being timely paid for work they had performed. Sureties were also refusing to participate in the project due to the lack of timely payment to subcontractors. Those firms that did bid on subcontracts increased their prices to account for the risk of not being paid timely, or even not being paid at all. Meanwhile, the project’s cost was increasing.

In March 2013, KT submitted to the VA a firm fixed price proposal, based primarily on competitive subcontractor bids, in the amount of $897,584,831 (with clarifications and qualifications). The VA rejected this proposal, with the contracting officer stating that the agency “will continue to hold Kiewit-Turner responsible to the firm target price and ceiling price established in SA-007.” (The parties never agreed on a firm fixed price, as opposed to a firm target price, for KT’s work.) In June, KT told the VA that the cost could be as high as $1.085 billion.

KT proposed many multi-million-dollar VE changes to modify the design so as to bring it within budget. Most of them were rejected by the VA. Often, however, even if a VE proposal was approved at all levels of the VA, the JVT refused to incorporate it into the design. In February 2014, the VA adopted the figure of $630 million as the “independent government estimate.” Even at the amount of $630 million, JVT members complained that the estimate was $48 million over the ECCA and would cause the JVT to have to redesign the project to lower its cost.

In January 2013, the VA brought together KT and the JVT to discuss how the project might be redesigned to be within budget. A VA executive explained that “the VA’s intent [was] to focus on the JVT’s obligation to deliver a design at or below the ECCA.” The three-day meeting which ensued – called the “blue ocean” meeting – was devoted to brainstorming to develop cost-cutting ideas. The agency tells us in its brief that it ultimately accepted only about $10 million of the blue ocean ideas.

On April 30, 2013, KT requested a final decision from the contracting officer as to whether the VA had breached its obligation under the contract to provide a design that could be built for the ECCA of $582,840,000 and whether KT consequently had the right to suspend work. The contracting officer issued a decision denying that the VA had breached the contract and directing KT to proceed with construction of the project. The agency has no plans to redesign the project. According to VA witnesses, the agency has approximately $630 million appropriated for construction of the project.

In June 2013, the contracting officer wrote to the JVT, “Please do not proceed with any cost cutting items from the January 2013 meeting.” Also in June, the VA’s director of cost estimating determined that the Jacobs estimate of nearly $785 million should be rejected because Jacobs’ failure to use actual known costs was a “fatal flaw” that undermined the reliability of the estimate. (The reason that Jacobs had not used actual known costs, however, was that the contracting officer had specifically directed the firm not to use them. The contracting officer did not disclose this fact to the cost estimating director.) And the contracting officer told KT that it must use pricing from The Book, the contents of which had been made irrelevant when SA-007 was agreed to, as the basis from which pricing change orders would be considered.

A KT executive testified at our hearing in June 2014 that KT had already financed $20 million worth of work for which it had not been paid and projected that this figure could reach $100 million by December 2014.
Discussion
(1) Did contract modification SA-007 obligate the VA to provide a design that could be built for $582,840,000?

SA-007 could not be more clear: “The VA shall ensure the A/E (Joint Venture Team) will produce a design that meets their Estimated Construction Cost at Award (ECCA) with use of alternate and other methods as a safety net.” The ECCA was $582,840,000 at the time that SA-007 was agreed to, and it remained at that number throughout the period discussed in this decision. Because the language is unambiguous on its face, its plain language dictates an affirmative answer to the question. Use of the words “shall” and “ensure” demonstrates that the VA must make certain that the design will meet the ECCA.

“Although extrinsic evidence may not be used to interpret an unambiguous contract provision, [the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has] looked to it to confirm that the parties intended for the term to have its plain and ordinary meaning.” TEG-Paradigm Environmental, Inc. v. United States, 465 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The extrinsic evidence here confirms that the SA-007 paragraph regarding the ECCA means exactly what it says. The VA’s commitment to produce a design that could be built for the ECCA was the key to the parties’ agreement.

The agency maintains that KT is obligated to perform construction work for the FTP, altered only by the cost of scope changes and adjustments to the profit percentage pursuant to a clause contained in SA-007. The ECCA provision, according to the VA, is inconsistent with the profit adjustment clause. These contentions are not well taken. The mention of the ECCA in SA-007 is not just material to the agreement – it is critical to the agreement. SA-007 clearly links the ECCA and the FTP, providing that the latter is dependent on the former. Altering the contract price to account for scope changes is not possible, for reasons we discuss later in this opinion. There is no inconsistency between the ECCA provision and the profit adjustment clause; if the VA had produced a design which could be constructed for the ECCA, the profit adjustment clause could have been implemented in accordance with its terms.


(2) Did the VA materially breach the contract by failing to provide a design that could be built for the ECCA of $582,840,000?


“Not every departure from the literal terms of a contract is sufficient to be deemed a material breach of a contract requirement.” “A party breaches a contract when it is in material non-compliance with the terms of the contract.” “A breach is material when it relates to a matter of vital importance, or goes to the essence of the contract.” “The standard of materiality for the purposes of deciding whether a contract was breached is necessarily imprecise and flexible. The determination depends on the nature and effect of the violation in light of how the particular contract was viewed, bargained for, entered into, and performed by the parties.” We consider also the factors enunciated in section 241 of the Restatement when determining whether a breach is material:
In determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is material, the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.
The VA’s breach of its contract with KT, by failing to provide a design which could be constructed for the ECCA, is of vital importance, as it goes to the essence of the agreement. The breach is material under each of the Restatement standards (as detailed meticulously in the decision). Applying these principles, we find that the behavior of the VA has not comported with standards of good faith and fair dealing required by law. The agency failed to provide a design that could be constructed within the ECCA because it did not control its designer, the JVT. It paid no heed to VE suggestions for cost reductions which were made by KT and Jacobs (or even those which were accepted by the agency’s own medical center personnel following the “blue ocean” meeting). The agency delayed progress of construction, such as by delaying the processing of design changes and change orders, as described under factor (a) above. The agency disregarded cost estimates by KT and Jacobs, even to the point of rejecting a Jacobs estimate because it was developed under restrictions which the agency itself had imposed. The agency adopted as an independent government estimate a document which was neither independent (it was developed by a subcontractor to the JVT, an entity which had a strong interest in the result), nor by the Government (it was by the JVT), nor an estimate (it was by admission of the chief estimator an academic exercise), and the number was so far below any previous estimate as to be of dubious accuracy. The agency did this notwithstanding the testimony of every witness who addressed the matter, including several VA witnesses, that an “independent” estimate should not be made by a party with a vested interest in the outcome. The agency ultimately directed KT to continue its construction work for the FTP, even though the agency refused to fund that work appropriately.

We do not know what the cost of construction of this project ultimately will be. Whether it is any of these figures, however, it will be significantly in excess of the ECCA of $582,840,000. We find that beyond doubt, the VA’s breach of its contract with KT was material.

(3) Is KT entitled to stop work?

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that “[u]pon material breach of a contract the non-breaching party has the right to discontinue performance of the contract.” The Court has explained further, “The choice of remedy is generally with the non-breaching party, and only in exceptional circumstances will equity require the non-breaching party to continue to perform the remainder of the contract.” “[I]f a contract is not clearly divisible, in accordance with the intention of the parties, the breaching party can not require the non-breaching party to continue to perform what is left of the contract.”

The VA draws our attention to Northern Helex Co. and Cities Service Helex, Inc.), two cases in which the Court of Claims held that if a contractor continues performance under a contract, without protest, notwithstanding the Government’s breach, “the obligations of both parties remain in force and the injured party may retain only a claim for damages for partial breach.” The VA’s analysis, however, ignores the phrase “without protest” which is part of the teaching of these decisions. The record is clear that KT has been proceeding with the construction (to avoid any possibility of being charged with being in default) under strenuous protest, including the very constructive advancement of VE proposals, throughout the post-SA-007 history of the project. As a matter of law, KT has the right to stop performance.

As enunciated in this opinion, we afford Kiewit-Turner the declaratory relief it seeks.

Another similar tale of contract dispute over claimed misrepresentations of material facts by the government, entitling the contractor to damages, is reported in:
Court of Federal Claims determines that government contractor may recover for losses attributable to omissions and inaccuracies in data provided by government in negotiated procurement .