Labels and Tags

Accountability (71) Adequate documentation (7) ADR in procurement (4) Allocation of risks (6) Best interest of government (11) Best practices (19) Best value (15) Bidder prejudice (11) Blanket purchase agreement (1) Bridge contract (2) Bundling (6) Cancellation and rejection (2) Centralized procurement structure (12) Changes during bid process (14) Clarifications vs Discussions (1) Competence (9) Competition vs Efficiency (29) Competitive position (3) Compliance (35) Conflict of interest (32) Contract administration (26) Contract disputes (4) Contract extension or modification (9) Contract formation (1) Contract interpretation (1) Contract terms (3) Contract types (6) Contract vs solicitation dispute (2) Contractor responsibility (20) Conviction (4) Cooperative purchasing (3) Corrective action (1) Cost and pricing (13) Debarment (4) Determinations (8) Determining responsibility (37) Disclosure requirements (7) Discussions during solicitation (10) Disposal of surplus property (3) Effective enforcement requirement (35) Effective procurement management (5) Effective specifications (36) Emergency procurement (14) eProcurement (5) Equitable tolling (2) Evaluation of submissions (22) Fair and equitable treatment (14) Fair and reasonable value (23) Fiscal effect of procurement (14) Frivolous protest (1) Good governance (12) Governmental functions (27) Guam (14) Guam procurement law (12) Improper influence (11) Incumbency (13) Integrity of system (31) Interested party (7) Jurisdiction (1) Justification (1) Life-cycle cost (1) Limits of government contracting (5) Lore vs Law (4) market research (7) Materiality (3) Methods of source selection (33) Mistakes (4) Models of Procurement (1) Needs assessment (11) No harm no foul? (8) Offer & acceptance (1) Other procurement links (14) Outsourcing (34) Past performance (12) Planning policy (34) Politics of procurement (52) PPPs (6) Prequalification (1) Principle of competition (95) Principles of procurement (25) Private vs public contract (17) Procurement authority (5) Procurement controversies series (79) Procurement ethics (19) Procurement fraud (31) Procurement lifecycle (9) Procurement philosophy (17) Procurement procedures (30) Procurement reform (63) Procurement theory (11) Procurement workforce (2) Procurment philosophy (6) Professionalism (17) Protest - formality (2) Protest - timing (12) Protests - general (37) Purposes and policies of procurement (11) Recusal (1) Remedies (17) Requirement for new procurement (4) Resolution of protests (4) Responsiveness (14) Restrictive specifications (5) Review procedures (13) RFQ vs RFP (1) Scope of contract (16) Settlement (2) Social preference provisions (60) Sole source (48) Sovereign immunity (3) Staffing (8) Standard commercial products (3) Standards of review (2) Standing (6) Stays and injunctions (6) Structure of procurement (1) Substantiation (9) Surety (1) Suspension (6) The procurement record (1) The role of price (10) The subject matter of procurement (23) Trade agreements vs procurement (1) Training (33) Transparency (63) Uniformity (6) Unsolicited proposals (3)
Showing posts with label Substantiation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Substantiation. Show all posts

Thursday, September 1, 2016

For-proift out of state company beats non-profit in state organizations to fountain of youth services funding

Youth services providers protest bidding process
Two Arkansas companies that operate seven Youth Services Division facilities submitted protests Friday to the state’s intention to award a contract to run the facilities to an out-of-state company that has said it will charge the state more than the current operators charge. Bidders have 14 days to submit a protest after learning of an alleged flaw in the process.

Every seven years, the state is required to seek proposals from organizations interested in operating the juvenile treatment and juvenile offender facilities. Department of Human Services spokeswoman Amy Webb said it has been eight years since bids were taken because of a previous one-year extension. Youth Opportunity Investments of Carmel, Ind., proposed charging the state $232 per bed per day, up from the $147 the state pays now per day for each of the 249 beds in the facilities.

Sen. Terry Rice, R-Waldron, whose district includes the Mansfield facilities, said Friday he has “a great deal of concern” about the plan to switch to an out-of-state provider at greater cost to the state. The current operators “have not received a dime’s increase in three years,” he said.

Sen. Stephanie Flowers, D-Pine Bluff, chairman of the Senate Children and Youth Committee, also said she has questions. “A lot of the intake providers have been asking for more money for years and we haven’t given it to them. It seems quite odd to have an out-of-state contract and offer them more money,” she said.
2 protest youth services contract; ‘robbed’ of fair shot, current operator’s letter to state says
Two nonprofits running seven Arkansas juvenile treatment and detention centers say state officials failed to document why a for-profit, out-of-state company will replace them, even though the new company's bid was more expensive.

Both Consolidated Youth Services Inc. and South Arkansas Youth Services, which have operated the centers for more than a decade, are challenging the decision. The operators are mostly concerned with how their proposals and Youth Opportunity's were reviewed and the quality of the new company's youth services program.

"They robbed the entire bidding process of equity," state Sen. Jeremy Hutchinson* wrote in a protest letter on behalf of South Arkansas Youth Services. The director of the Department of Human Services is currently drafting a "formal written response" to both organizations, Amy Webb, a department spokesman, said Monday.

In its protest letter, Consolidated Youth Services stated it held "no assurances" that the selection process was consistent. The state agencies did not provide individual score sheets used by evaluators to show how they weighed the proposals in each technical category and only a cumulative score was available, according to both nonprofits' letters. Evaluators appeared to have little experience in the youth services field, and there was no proof they attended training beforehand, the letters said.

Consolidated Youth Services' letter, written by attorney Debby Thetford Nye, called for a new evaluation -- one "untainted by significant procedural deficiencies and bias."

Both nonprofits said that Youth Services Division officials held post-bid discussions with Youth Opportunities Investments, even though post-bid conversations can disqualify vendors competing for a contract. The new company was also permitted to change its proposal and circumvent the criteria laid out in the state's request for services, the current contractors said.

Leaders of the Arkansas-based organizations say their programs cost less, strengthen communities and do not slash services. "We are a community program," said Jerry Walsh, chief executive officer of Magnolia-based South Arkansas Youth Services. His organization runs the Dermott Juvenile Correctional Facility and juvenile treatment centers in Dermott and Mansfield. "We know how to approach the community and how to work with them and to get them to support the program."

Youth Opportunities Investments plans to hire subcontractors from Louisiana and Nashville, Tenn., to carry out services, according to its proposal. The Youth Opportunities plan appears to dedicate fewer staff members to special education, GED and technical-vocational coursework and relies more on online learning, Walsh said.

"There is nothing in their proposal to suggest they would enhance the program," said Bonnie Boon, executive director of Jonesboro-based Consolidated Youth Services. Boon also said that she found the state's ability to find the extra dollars for the increase under the new company "curious."

Youth-services advocates have asked for additional funds for years, which Boon and Walsh said has been frustrating.

"It says a lot about their financial management and not funding youth services. Now all of a sudden you're throwing tons of money in this? Unbelievable," Walsh said.

Wednesday, October 7, 2015

The tenacity - and audacity - of incumbent legacy

Although not part of the ABA Model Procurement Code which is Guam's model for its own Procurement Act, 5 GCA 5210, which summarizes the various authorized procurement methods, says "(a) Unless other wise authorized by law, all territorial contracts shall be awarded by competitive sealed bidding [except as authorized by other specified procurement methods. (b) Nothing in this Section requiring competitive bidding shall prohibit the development of specifications which require compatibility with existing supplies, equipment or data processing systems."

On the face of it, such compatibility seems rational enough. The Guam drafters of this provision thought so, commenting "In the past, some problems have arisen due to the requirement for competitive bidding for equipment which should have been, but was not, compatible with existing equipment. The reason alleged was that the lowest bidder had to be chosen. Of course, the proper writing of specifications could have prevented the problem and Subsection (b) makes clear that compatibility may be a legitimate part of the specifications."

Fortunately, the provisions on specifications, in Article 4 of the procurement law, is not part of "this Section", so are not, on the face of the provision, restricted by it, and the provisions of Article 4 are replete with requirements for competition, saying nothing of compatibility. This become important when one stops to consider that compatibility is a substitute for legacy, old school technology and creative destruction.

Which brings me back to yet another Motorola case, this one decided by the federal GAO, related to Motorola's lock on the radio communications market. As always, read the cases and articles in the original, and don't rely on my creative destruction of them in my rendering.

Matter of: Harris IT Services Corporation B-411699; B-411796, October 2, 2015
Harris IT Services Corporation protests the terms of two requests for proposal issued by the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to acquire land mobile radio (LMR) equipment through the issuance of a single delivery order under each RFP. Harris maintains that both of these RFPs improperly contemplate the issuance of a single, second-tier, indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) instrument (labelled by the FBI as a delivery order), under which the agency will place subsequent delivery orders for this equipment without providing Harris a fair opportunity to compete for those orders, in violation of the statute authorizing the use of multiple-award IDIQ contracts. Harris also argues that the RFPs contemplate the issuance of orders that potentially exceed the scope of the underlying multiple-award IDIQ contract program, and include unduly restrictive specifications.

We sustain the protests.

Both solicitations have been issued under the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) tactical communications (TacCom) IDIQ multiple award contracts program and competition has been limited to concerns that previously have been awarded contracts under the DHS TacCom program. The underlying DHS TacCom multiple award IDIQ contract program solicitation contemplated the award of IDIQ contracts for a full array of communications equipment and services ("commodity products, infrastructure and services"). "DHS seeks to establish a multi-vendor approach to implementing fully interoperable solutions to support mission critical, public safety communications." In effect, the equipment to be purchased using the TacCom program is required to employ open systems architecture so that each contractor’s equipment will “interoperate” with equipment manufactured by other concerns.

The current RFPs represent the FBI’s second attempt to meet its requirements for the equipment being solicited. The first attempt sought the award of a sole-source contract for these requirements, and supported its solicitation with a justification and approval ("J&A"; aka "determination")) document maintaining that only one source--Motorola--was capable of meeting its requirements. After protests, this approach was abandoned.

This is the second attempt. RFP 68 is for the acquisition of “subscriber base radio” LMR equipment and is valued at approximately $200 million. RFP 81 is for the acquisition of infrastructure LMR equipment and is valued at approximately $135 million. Both RFPs contemplate the issuance of what the FBI characterizes as a single delivery order for a base year, with 4 one-year options.

The Federal Acquisition and Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) provided agencies with express authority to award task and delivery order type contracts. Broadly speaking, the statutory and regulatory framework favors the award of multiple task or delivery order contracts for the same requirements, rather than the award of a single task or delivery order contract for an agency’s requirements.
The drafters of this federal law said the use of task order contracts for advisory and assistance services and establishing a requirement that solicitations for such contracts shall ordinarily provide for multiple awards and for fair consideration of each awardee for task orders issued under the contracts; indiscriminate use of task order contracts for broad categories of ill-defined services unnecessarily diminishes competition and results in the waste of taxpayer dollars; in many cases, this problem can effectively be addressed, without significantly burdening the procurement system, by awarding multiple task order contracts for the same or similar services and providing reasonable consideration to all such contractors in the award of such task orders under such contracts; and, all federal agencies should move to the use of multiple task order contracts, in lieu of single task order contracts, wherever it is practical to do so.

[Similarly, see Guam procurement regulations: 2 GAR 3122(b): A multiple award is an award of an indefinite quantity contract for one or more similar supplies or services to more than one bidder or offeror when the territory is obligated to order all of its actual requirements for the specified supplies or services from those contractors. A multiple award may be made when award to two or more bidders or offerors for similar products is necessary for adequate delivery, service, or product compatibility.]

The statutory and regulatory framework contemplates that, where an agency is issuing task or delivery orders using a multiple-award IDIQ contract program, it is not required to engage in full and open competition, and may instead confine its competition to firms that have been awarded an underlying multiple-award IDIQ contract. However, those same provisions require agencies to give each contractor that has been awarded a contract a “fair opportunity” to be considered for each task or delivery order in excess of $3,500, and to provide for “enhanced competition” for orders in excess of $5.5 million. Finally, each task or delivery order must specify all of the services to be performed or all the property to be delivered under the order.

Harris first argues that the RFPs impermissibly call for the issuance of what amounts to IDIQ instruments to the successful contractor for a 5-year period. The protester maintains that the RFPs effectively remove the agency’s requirements from further competition for an extended period and amount to an impermissible “downselect” to a single vendor. Harris maintains that this is inconsistent with the terms of the underlying TacCom contracts, as well as applicable statutes and regulations which, the protester maintains, require the FBI to permit all of the eligible TacCom vendors to compete for every delivery order that the FBI may issue to meet its requirements.

The FBI explains that it elected to take this approach to meet its ongoing and future, geographically diverse, requirements in the most streamlined manner possible. According to the agency, its approach will allow it to avoid individually having to compete potentially dozens of delivery orders for varying quantities of equipment over a 5-year period. According to the agency, the latter approach--competing potentially dozens of separate delivery orders--“would place an enormous administrative burden on the FBI.” Legal Memorandum at 5. The agency states that its approach will result in substantial savings of both time and money over the contemplated 5-year period of the delivery orders.

As set forth below [sorry: you're going to have to read the case decision], we conclude that the FBI’s solicitations contemplate the award of what, in effect, would amount to single, multi-year, second-tier IDIQ instruments that are not permitted under the requirements discussed above. The FBI’s contemplated award of a 5-year second-tier IDIQ instrument to a single contractor is inconsistent with the requirements of the applicable statutes and FAR provisions regarding what constitutes a “delivery order.” Those requirements are, at a minimum, that the delivery order be defined as to quantity, place of delivery and schedule.

[Compare Guam's definition of an "incremental" contract, which is distinct from the "multiple award" contract mentioned earlier, in 2 GAR 3122(a). An incremental award is an award of portions of a definite quantity requirement to more than one contractor. Each portion is for a definite quantity and the sum of the portions is the total definite quantity required. An incremental award may be used only when awards to more than one bidder or offeror for different amounts of the same item are necessary to obtain the total quantity or the required delivery. The right to make such an award and the criteria for award shall be stated in the solicitation. Thus, multiple awards, for indefinite quantities, and incremental awards, for definite quantities, are limited to cases where awards to more than one contractor are necessary to obtain the total quantity of the required delivery.]

In essence, the two orders contemplated under these RFPs will deprive all the other TacCom contractors of a fair opportunity to compete for each of the delivery orders that will be issued in the future, despite their aggregate value of approximately $335 million. We therefore sustain this aspect of Harris’s protest.

Harris also maintains that the RFPs impermissibly include a period of performance that exceeds the period of performance of the underlying TacCom contracts. In this connection the FBI’s RFPs contemplate the issuance of delivery orders until August 31, 2020 (whereas the TacCom contracts only allow for issuance of delivery orders until March 25, 2019), and contemplate fulfilling those delivery orders by August 31, 2021 (whereas the TacCom contracts contemplate fulfilling all delivery orders by May 25, 2021). The FBI notes in connection with this allegation that both RFPs incorporate the terms of the underlying TacCom IDIQ contracts and provide that, in the event of a conflict, the terms of the underlying TacCom contracts control. According to the agency, to the extent its RFPs specify a period of performance longer than that contemplated under the TacCom contracts, the terms of the TacCom contracts supersede the terms of its RFPs.

We agree with Harris that the RFPs seek impermissibly to increase the scope of the underlying TacCom contracts. As noted, the agency does not deny that its contemplated delivery schedules vary from, and increase the period of performance beyond, the terms of the underlying TacCom contracts. Rather, the FBI merely asserts that the terms of the TacCom contracts will supersede the inconsistent terms of its solicitations. However, the fact remains that the RFPs expressly contemplate a period of performance longer than the period of performance included in the TacCom contracts.

In addition, and more fundamentally (as discussed above), neither RFP includes a maximum quantity, but, rather, specifies only an estimated quantity. As we conclude above, there essentially is no limit on the quantities the agency could order under the second-tier IDIQ instruments contemplated by the RFPs. It follows that the agency could order quantities that exceed not only the estimated quantities specified in the RFPs, but also the maximum value of the underlying TacCom contracts. In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the FBIs RFPs contemplate delivery orders that potentially are beyond the scope of the underlying TacCom contracts. We therefore sustain this aspect of Harris’s protest.

As a final matter, Harris’s protests that certain specifications are unduly restrictive and are designed to result in the award of the delivery orders to Motorola. Because we recommend below that the agency cancel the RFPs and consider alternatives to how it intends to meet its requirements, we need not consider these allegations in great detail. Nonetheless, we discuss several obvious solicitation requirements that even the agency concedes call for Motorola-specific products.

RFP 68 requires that all radios provided be compatible with a standards based radio system called “SmartNet.” In a similar vein, RFP 68 calls for providing radios that can be reprogrammed using “over-the-air-rekeying” when used with a “key variable loader.”

Harris maintains that these requirements are proprietary to Motorola and that, for all intents and purposes, they limit competition under RFP 68 to products made by Motorola. Harris also maintains that specifying such requirements is inconsistent with the overarching requirement of the TacCom contracts to provide equipment that is interoperable and that meets the P25 open architecture standards.

The agency does not challenge Harris’s fundamental assertion, but nonetheless maintains that these requirements are necessary in order for the radios that it acquires to meet the agency’s needs for data security, and in order for them to be useable with state and local law enforcement entities that still use legacy radio systems that depend on the Motorola-proprietary standards specified.

Where an agency seeks to issue a task or delivery order to acquire items peculiar to one manufacturer, it must execute a J&A in support of its specification for the task or delivery order, unless it has otherwise executed a J&A for other than full and open competition. Here, the agency concedes that it has specified Motorola-specific requirements. However, the record does not include the required J&A, and the agency has offered no explanation regarding its failure to execute such a J&A.

The agency previously attempted to meet its requirements on a sole-source basis, but concluded that the J&A prepared in connection with that acquisition was inadequate to support its attempted sole-source acquisition of Motorola products. Here, the agency again is attempting to acquire Motorola-specific products, but has not executed the required J&A, or even, for that matter, explained or demonstrated why it is not required to execute the J&A. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the RFPs include specifications for products that are specific to Motorola, and that the agency has failed to justify its inclusion of such requirements. We agree with Harris that the agency’s attempt to acquire Motorola-specific equipment appears fundamentally inconsistent with the underlying interoperability objective of the TacCom IDIQ contract program.

We recommend that the FBI cancel the solicitations.









Saturday, August 1, 2015

Questioning process of evaluation is not same as questioning evaluation judgment

World wide UK founded legal services firm Pinsent Masons LLP through its online legal news site Out-Law.com reports, in a couple of articles, an apparently groundbreaking procurement contract award decision. 

As usual, you should read the original at the link, as I take liberal editorial liberties that may, however unintentionally, distort the content or intent of the authors.

High Court orders ‘unsatisfactory’ public contract award to be set aside
In finding against Milton Keynes Council, Mr Justice Coulson was the first judge in an English court to set aside a public body’s contract award decision under the 2006 Public Contract Regulations. The judge noted that procurement laws allow the courts to overturn a public body’s contract award in circumstances where it had “committed a manifest error”. However, he commented that these were often harder to prove than transparency or equality breaches as the contracting authority has a “margin of appreciation” when making its assessment. Despite this fact, he went through each of the award criteria one by one.

On two particular points, the judge found that the council had awarded EAS a 10/10 score when it should legally have awarded the company zero. He said that the scoring criteria were “a matter of law” and that, if a response did not meet the council’s requirements or was unacceptable in accordance with the council's own scoring methodology, then it required to be given a zero score. That the council had not done so in one particular case was “incapable of rational explanation”, the judge said.

“In my view, an informed reader would think that the EAS answers were almost studiedly vague, strong on aspiration and management-speak, light on detail,” he said. “The Woods’ answers, on the other hand, could fairly be said to bristle with detail and commitment.”

On the “unsatisfactory” scoring notes provided by the council, he said that the absence of clear reasons to explain certain scores created a “lack of certainty in the nature of the council’s case”.

"This is a significant decision because it is the first time that an English court has set aside a procuring authority's contract award decision under the Public Contracts Regulations," said procurement law expert Ben Lasserson of Pinsent Masons, the law firm behind Out-Law.com.

"Essentially, this case boiled down to whether the council's evaluation exercise had been conducted lawfully. In the past, such a challenge would have been very difficult for a claimant to sustain because the courts were always reluctant to 'second guess' a procuring authority in matters of evaluation.
Council expected to pay damages after conducting flawed procurement process
Mr Justice Coulson said that Woods Building Services (Woods) was entitled to damages after losing out on the contract on the basis of a flawed procurement run by Milton Keynes Council.

Woods also asked the High Court to order Milton Keynes Council to award the contract to it. However, that request was rejected. Mr Justice Coulson said that "requiring A to contract with B, in respect of a contract which might last for years, would be an exceptional order for the court to make".

"In principle, it might be open to the Court to order a mandatory injunction requiring the Council to enter into a contract with Woods," the judge said. "But it is trite law that a mandatory injunction, which would here require the Council to enter into a contract which would last for many years, will only rarely be granted."

"Whilst I do not suggest that a mandatory injunction of the type which they seek would never be granted in a procurement case, I am satisfied that it would only be granted in exceptional circumstances, and there are no such circumstances here," he said.

Mr Justice Coulson cited a number of reasons for not awarding Woods the contract by way of remedy, including stating that it would have been wrong to award the contract to Woods after determining that the procurement process had been flawed.

"Woods were right to challenge the procurement and, all other things being equal, they would have been awarded the contract," Mr Justice Coulson said in his judgment. "In those circumstances, it would be absurd if, having lost so badly, the Council could then avoid the natural consequence of those breaches, namely an award of damages in favour of Woods."

Public procurement law expert Christopher Murray of Pinsent Masons, the law firm behind Out-Law.com, said that it was unusual for legal challenges brought under public procurement legislation to reach a hearing on remedies.
The typical procurement law in the US is that, whilst deference is paid to agency decisions on the facts of a decision, the decision must be made based on the factors specified in the solicitation and required by law or regulation. 

Thus, the distinction is understood: if a decision is rationally made, it will not be set aside, but it must be shown that the process of deliberation was undertaken and supported by rational application of the facts to the issues. In effect, a court will not set aside a procurement decision that it considers wrong or bone-headed so long as it was clear that a rational thought process had taken place and the judgment was not a bare conclusory opinion.

And it is not at all unusual for a court, or reviewing administrative body for that matter, to set aside an award or contract that was in violation of law. See, e.g., Guam Code Annotated §§ 5451 and 5452.

Saturday, January 24, 2015

Protest of Navy's BOSS contract on Guam upheld

As of November 2017, this contract is still being protested.  For an update, see The laborious SAGA of the US Navy's BOSS contract on Guam.

Matter of: CFS-KBR Marianas Support Services, LLC; Fluor Federal Solutions LLC,: B-410486; B-410486.2; B-410486.3, January 2, 2015 (The redacted version was approved for public release. The version below is my own, unofficial version.)
DIGEST

1. Protest challenging agency’s cost realism evaluation of proposals is sustained where record shows that agency’s evaluation was based on the mechanical application of a government estimate that did not take into consideration each offeror’s unique technical approach, and therefore was not consistent with the terms of the solicitation and applicable procurement statutes and regulations.

2. Protest alleging that agency engaged in misleading discussions is sustained where record shows that agency’s discussions questions were based on the results of its underlying, irrational, evaluation of proposals.
CFS-KBR Marianas Support Services, LLC, of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Fluor Federal Solutions, LLC, of Greenville, South Carolina, protest the award of a contact to DZSP 21 LLC, of Hagatna, Guam, under request for proposals (RFP) issued by the Department of the Navy for base operations support services for the Joint Region Marianas on the island of Guam.

The RFP contemplates the award of a cost reimbursement-type contract. The RFP advised offerors that the agency would make award on a best-value basis, considering cost and several non-cost evaluation factors. For cost evaluation purposes, the RFP advised offerors that the agency would evaluate proposals for completeness, reasonableness, balance, and realism, and that all five non-cost factors, when combined, were approximately equal in importance to cost.

After performing an initial evaluation, the agency established a competitive range comprised of six concerns and engaged in discussions with those offerors. After conducting discussions, the agency solicited and obtained final proposal revisions (FPRs), which the agency evaluated. On the basis of that evaluation, the agency assigned the protesters and awardee the following technical ratings and evaluated costs:

On the basis of these evaluation results, the agency made award to DZSP, finding that its proposal offered the best value to the government.

After being advised of the agency’s selection decision and requesting and receiving debriefings, CFS and Fluor filed protests in our Office. CFS maintains that the agency misevaluated proposals and failed to engage in meaningful discussions; Fluor maintains that the agency misevaluated proposals and engaged in misleading discussions. We sustain Fluor’s protest and dismiss CFS’s protest as academic.

Fluor essentially argues that, because the agency’s initial evaluation was irrational, it led the agency to engage in misleading discussions with the protester which led, in turn, to Fluor adding unnecessary personnel to its proposal and, ultimately, to proposing a cost that made it uncompetitive. Secondarily, Fluor maintains that the agency’s cost realism evaluation after the agency engaged in discussions also was unreasonable.

Fluor asserts that, in its initial evaluation of proposals, the agency never performed a meaningful cost realism evaluation in connection with the offerors’ proposed staffing. According to Fluor, the agency mechanically applied a government estimate in evaluating the sufficiency of the offerors’ proposed staffing. Fluor argues that the agency’s actions were improper because any meaningful cost realism evaluation is required to take into consideration the offerors’ respective technical approaches to accomplishing the requirements.  [Remember, this is a best value evaluation for a cost-reimbursement contract, and cost alone does not determine who gets the award.]

When an agency evaluates proposals for the award of a cost-reimbursement contract, an offeror’s proposed estimated cost of contract performance is not considered controlling since, regardless of the costs proposed by the offeror, the government is bound to pay the contractor its actual and allowable costs. As a consequence, a cost realism analysis must be performed by the agency to determine the extent to which an offeror’s proposed costs represent what the contract costs are likely to be under the offeror’s unique technical approach, assuming reasonable economy and efficiency.   In addition to these broad considerations, while an agency can utilize a reasonably derived estimate of labor hours based on the government’s experience as an objective standard to measure the realism of proposed costs, an agency may not mechanically apply its own estimates for labor hours or costs--effectively normalizing cost elements of an offeror’s proposal to government estimates--without considering the offeror’s unique technical approach.

The record here shows that, in evaluating the offerors’ initial proposals, the agency mechanically applied a government estimate to evaluate the sufficiency of the offerors’ proposed staffing. In particular, the record shows that the agency evaluated all proposals against an undisclosed government estimate of the number of full time equivalent staff (FTE) that the agency considered sufficient to perform the requirements. In each instance where a proposal offered less FTEs than the agency had identified as necessary for any given part of the contract ("annex"), the agency evaluators described the offeror’s proposed staffing as unrealistic and insufficient to perform in the annex identified.

In performing this evaluation, the agency concluded that Fluor’s proposed staffing was insufficient.  The record thus shows that the agency’s initial evaluation was based on a mechanical application of the government estimate to the proposals that did not consider the offerors’ varying technical approaches. In the absence of a cogent explanation for the Navy’s actions, such a mechanical application of the government estimate in the evaluation of proposals is unreasonable. We therefore sustain this aspect of Fluor’s protest.

Fluor further argues that the mechanical application of the government’s estimate discussed above led the agency to pose misleading discussion questions to the firm regarding the sufficiency of its proposed staffing. The protester maintains that it initially proposed staffing that it considered sufficient to perform the contract in light of its proposed technical approach. Fluor argues that, when it attempted to respond to the agency’s concerns during the discussions that were based on the agency’s mechanical application of the government estimate, it effectively priced itself out of the competition.

It is a fundamental principle of negotiated procurements that discussions, when conducted, must be meaningful; that is, discussions must identify deficiencies and significant weaknesses in an offeror’s proposal that could reasonably be addressed so as to materially enhance the offeror’s potential for receiving award.  Here, the record shows that the agency asked each offeror a specific question that identified precisely the number of FTEs by which the agency considered the proposal deficient.  An agency may not mislead an offeror through the framing of a discussion question into responding in a manner that does not address the agency’s actual concerns, or otherwise misinform the offeror concerning a problem with its proposal.

The agency subsequently issued a clarification to these questions, stating that it was not the intent of the agency to dictate the number of FTEs proposed, but to verify that the offeror had a methodology to accomplish the work with the number of FTEs proposed.  Nonetheless, the agency did not retract its original discussion questions.

The record shows that Fluor revised its proposal to precisely the number of FTEs identified by the agency as lacking in its initial proposal.   Ultimately, Fluor’s high evaluated cost led the agency not to select it for award, even though its proposal had been ranked first from a non-cost standpoint.  Because the record shows that Fluor’s revised staffing was raised in direct response to the agency’s discussion question, we conclude that the firm was misled to its competitive prejudice.

As a final matter, Fluor maintains that the agency essentially abandoned the original staffing estimates that it used to evaluate the offerors’ initial proposals, thereby demonstrating the arbitrary nature of the original evaluation. Fluor maintains that the agency’s final evaluation confirms that its initial evaluation bore no relationship to the offerors’ unique technical approaches, and also demonstrates that the agency’s evaluation of revised proposals failed to meaningfully evaluate the offerors’ proposals for realism purposes.

Notwithstanding the fact that the other two firms also offered additional staffing in response to the agency’s initial evaluation and discussion questions, the evaluators nonetheless assigned DZSP an outstanding rating for its proposed staffing and resources, and assigned the CFS proposal a good rating for its proposed staffing and resources (both proposals originally had been rated unacceptable under this evaluation factor).

The agency’s technical evaluators articulated no reasoned analysis for why, despite the fact that these firms did not propose the staffing initially identified by the agency as inadequate, the firms nonetheless merited these better ratings.  For reasons unexplained in the record, the agency did not evaluate the realism of the offerors’ proposed staffing where it exceeded the government estimate.  The agency’s unexplained and inconsistent application of the government estimate further highlights the underlying irrationality of its evaluation.

In effect, the agency’s evaluators appear to have abandoned the initial government estimates, as well as their evaluation findings based upon those estimates. In addition, since the evaluators did not explain why they considered the offerors’ revised staffing adequate in light of their respective technical approaches, we have no basis to find the agency’s reevaluation of proposals reasonable.
In this connection, agencies are required to adequately document their evaluation results in order to facilitate our examination of the record; where, due to a lack of documentation, we are unable to understand the agency’s evaluation conclusions, we will sustain a protest challenging the agency’s evaluation.
We have carefully considered all of CFS’s allegations and find no basis to sustain the firm’s protest. We find no merit to its allegations concerning the agency’s evaluation of technical proposals, and we also find no merit to its allegation concerning the agency’s alleged failure to engage in meaningful discussions with CFS. In addition, while CFS arguably may be correct concerning the agency’s evaluation of cost proposals, we are not persuaded that CFS was prejudiced by the agency’s evaluation in that area, and therefore find no merit to that aspect of its protest.

In light of our discussion above, we sustain Fluor’s protest. We recommend that the agency reevaluate proposals in a manner consistent with our discussion above.  After performing its reevaluation, we further recommend that the agency afford the competitive range offerors meaningful discussions based on its reevaluation of proposals.

After engaging in discussions, we recommend that the agency solicit, obtain, and evaluate revised proposals and make a new source selection decision based on that reevaluation.  Notwithstanding our conclusions regarding the merits of CFS’s protest, we point out that the firm will, in fact, benefit from our recommended corrective action because it will be afforded an opportunity to participate in any reopened competition.

Finally, we recommend that the agency reimburse Fluor the reasonable costs of filing and pursuing its protest, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. The protester’s certified claim for costs, detailing the time expanded and costs incurred, must be submitted to the agency within 60 days after receipt of this decision.

Monday, November 7, 2011

"A case of no one asking the question of where the money went"

From Singapore:

How did 9 men con $1.2m despite rules and safeguards?
Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam told Parliament in November last year that the root cause was human error and not the public sector procurement guidelines and rules, which were fundamentally sound, reported The Business Times. "There was human failure first in supervision, and second in audit," Mr Tharman had said.

And good supervision requires not just knowing the rules and procedures, but also continual vigilance.

Nine men, one government agency and a cool $12.2 million.

At the centre of it all were Koh Seah Wee, 41, and Lim Chai Meng, 38, who ran rings around the rules meant to safeguard the IT procurement system at the Singapore Land Authority (SLA).

an SLA spokesman said detection was difficult as the fraudulent transactions were supported by "invoices" from "vendors" who were conspiring business entities, and approvals were given by Koh, the authorised officer in line with approved procurement procedures then. In all, 282 contracts were awarded to 11 "vendors", which were shell companies operated by their accomplices.

Such scams can be difficult to ferret out, said Associate Professor Mak Yuen Teen, a corporate governance expert at the National University of Singapore (NUS) Business School. "When there is collusion, it is a bit more difficult to uncover such fraud," he told The New Paper.

He said that although this case involved significant IT software-related procurement, "which is more difficult to verify receipt of goods compared to physical equipment, I think this is a case of no one asking the question of where the money went to".

In passing sentence, Justice Tay Yong Kwang said that organisations may put in place the best systems. But if those entrusted with operating the systems, especially those at the higher levels, choose to be dishonest, fraud can still happen.

Since the offences were uncovered, measures have been taken to strengthen internal controls, systems and offences, an Intellectual Property of Singapore (Ipos) spokesman told The New Paper yesterday.

"These (measures) include strengthening internal audit structures and processes, centralising the procurement process, and ensuring that the purchasing officer and the receiving officer (who verifies the receipt of goods and services) are different individuals," said the spokesman.

Wednesday, October 20, 2010

Procurement oversight extends beyond acquisition

Procurement doesn't end with the award and signing of a contract. It involves contract administration through the life of the contract to make sure the government gets what it sought or bargained for.

And it includes collecting information and usable information, and then getting that information to the right person who will actually use it to improve best performance the next go-round. Even in cases where there is no abuse of the system, this is necessary to continually assess and improve the government's purchasing activities.

Military contractors' epic overcharging
There used to be laws in the US to make sure that the government knew what a product cost, so that it could determine reasonable profit margins. The Truth in Negotiations Act (Tina), which was signed into law in 1962, required that companies seeking a negotiated government contract submit "cost and pricing" data.

Unfortunately, Tina did not require cost and pricing data for so-called "commercial" items, which were defined as items sold to the general public in substantial quantities. Government contractors lobbied to have the definition of "commercial" significantly broadened, so that, today, no one really knows how many high margin contracts the government is on the hook for.

BioThrax is considered a "commercial item" – despite the fact that consumers cannot buy it on the open market. Originally developed by military scientists at Fort Detrick, Maryland, in the 1960s, the state of Michigan public health service obtained a licence to produce the vaccine in 1970. At the time, BioThrax was used to help protect mill workers in the textile industry who processed animal hair contaminated with naturally-occurring anthrax. In 1998, the state of Michigan sold off the facility.

Emergent BioSolutions has billed the Pentagon $1.3bn for BioThrax, which one analyst calculates cost the company roughly just $250m to manufacture. Richard C Loeb, a former deputy administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, whose tenure in that office extended across four presidents, says that he has seen government contracts with even higher gross margins. (By contrast, a 2009 study (pdf) of 6,000 Army and Air Force contracts by the Institute for Defence Analysis found that normal margins on such contracts were typically around 10% of production costs.)

Inferior metal used on Navy subs
The Navy is searching for metal used in submarines that fails to meet military specifications and was supplied by a Pennsylvania contractor who recently pleaded guilty to one count of major fraud against the U.S. government.

In a statement provided to The Day, the Navy called the fraud "calculated and widespread."

The search has so far cost the government more than $1.3 million, and the Navy said it may take years to determine the scope of the problem.

Bristol Alloys Inc. and its president, James Bullick, admitted in court last week to selling metal that had not been heat-treated to be used in Virginia-class submarines to meet the contract's requirements. Heat treatment is used to make metal stronger. The company also admitted that it provided counterfeit certifications that the metal had been treated.

I have heard unsubstantiated similar reports about contractors providing materially nonconforming materials to the Government of Guam, but in those cases the contracting personnel either knowingly or negligently failed to verify that what was ordered under a contract corresponded to what was delivered.

If true, that would constitute a woeful failure of proper procurement. It is as much an unlawful expenditure of government funds to pay, or authorize such a payment, for something that was not ordered as it is to contract under unauthorized procedures in the first place. It is not only costly to the government, but detrimental to safety, and undermines the confidence of other, more scrupulous vendors.

Wednesday, March 10, 2010

Procurement controversies -- Pakistan

Audit finds financial irregularities in ERRA
ISLAMABAD: ERRA is full of financial irregularities with no following of PPRA rules in procurement and there are also irregular payments to some of the favourite parties, reveals the audit report of the Authority available with The News on Wednesday.

An amount of Rs1.46 billion has been observed under the head of irregular expenditure and payments while scrutinizing the accounts of the Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) where it failed to comply with observations of the audit.

Procurement controversies -- South Africa

Tender fraud frequent - PSC
Corruption frequently occurs at the quotation stages for contracts under the R200 000 threshold [appx. USD 27,000], a Public Service Commission (PSC) presentation to the National Assembly's public service and administration committee showed on Wednesday.

The invitation for quotations, the required number of quotations obtained, and the evaluation of quotations received often do not comply with procurement rules.

he PSC found no quotations were obtained before orders were placed with service providers in 29% of all transactions evaluated.

In 45% of all transactions the required number of quotations was not called for, and in 46% of transactions the quotations were not evaluated as required by procurement rules.

The rate of compliance with procurement rules relating to the invitation of quotations in four provinces, including national departments, was below the average rate of 71%.

"However, these figures are most likely worse, as not all departments at both national and provincial level submitted the requested information," Dreyer said.

Friday, March 5, 2010

US Federal agency failed to document non-competitive awards

DHS awarded noncompetitive contracts without having adequate records, IG says
The records for the majority of some Homeland Security Department’s noncompetitive contracts are either missing or inadequate, according to a new report from DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner.

The IG reviewed 39 DHS contract files valued at $196 million for fiscal 2009. Of those, 33 contract files, or 85 percent, lacked full documentation, said the report issued March 4.

“Acquisition personnel did not always follow regulations, policies, or procedures to support awarding the contracts through other than full and open competition,” Skinner wrote. “As a result, the department cannot ensure that it received the best possible value on the goods and services it acquired from these contracts.”

Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, an agency contracting officer must provide a written justification when contracts of a certain size are awarded without full and open competition. The justification must have documentation of approvals and a certification that the information is complete and accurate.

Federal acquisition rules also require that agencies conduct market research for all procurements. Deficiencies were found with the market research for 31 of the 39 contracts reviewed.

The full report is here. It notes,
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 requires, with limited exceptions, that contracting officers promote and provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding United States government contracts.

Competition is desirable because it can result in timely delivery of quality products and services at reasonable costs. It encourages contractors to offer best value proposals for meeting mission needs and requirements when bidding on federal contracts, thereby reducing costs and protecting the interest of taxpayers.

Competition also discourages favoritism by leveling the playing field for contract competitors and curtailing opportunities for fraud and abuse.

Contract specialists are required to perform certain steps during the other than full and open contracting process.

The other than full and open competition process begins when a need is identified.

Afterwards, market research is performed to determine the most suitable approach for acquiring, distributing, and managing supplies and services to support the department’s mission. Acquisition planning helps ensure that the government is meeting its needs in the most effective, economical, and timely manner.

With this assurance, acquisition personnel announce a solicitation on FedBizOpps, the single, government-wide point of entry for federal procurement opportunities greater than $25,000.

Within 14 days of posting the solicitation, acquisition personnel award the contract and publish the justification and approval document on FedBizOpps, ending the contracting process.

The FAR requires that any agency contracting officer who approves the acquisition of goods or services through other than full and open competitions provides written justification. The justification must have the proper approvals from the appropriate authority based on an established dollar threshold.

For procurements that require written justification, the contracting officer must sign to certify that the information is complete and accurate.

Of the 39 noncompetitive procurements from fiscal year 2009 that we reviewed, 18 or 46% did not require written justification for the decision to award non-competitively because components awarded them under the Small Business Administration 8(a) sole source program exception.

However, FAR part 10 requires that agencies conduct market research for all procurements. Specifically, it requires that agencies perform research to identify the capabilities of small businesses that are available in the marketplace for meeting the requirements of the agency. It further states that agencies shall use this market research to determine whether sources capable of satisfying the agency’s requirements exist.

Based on our review of the contract files, 14, or 78% of the 18 small business 8(a) sole source procurement files lacked any evidence that procurement personnel conducted market research.

This documentation shows that procurement personnel did not consider any other small businesses under the 8(a) program for the procurements.
The Small Business Administration has a partnership agreement with the DHS where it delegates certain contract execution functions for sole source procurements under FAR part 19. This partnership agreement does not exempt procurement personnel from performing market research as required by FAR part 10.

FAR § 10.001 requires agencies to conduct market research before (1) developing new requirements documents for an acquisition, and (2) soliciting offers for an acquisition that exceeds $100,000, or is less than $100,000 when adequate information is not available and circumstances justify the cost, or could lead to a bundled contract. Market research should be conducted to ensure that the government is procuring goods and services at reasonable costs, regardless of the status of competition.

The FAR provides limited guidance on the extent of market research that agencies must conduct and document with procurements. This guidance required agencies to conduct market research, but did not require them to validate supporting documentation or assign responsibility to specific personnel. This allows personnel to apply market research requirements inconsistently.

DHS updated its Homeland Security Acquisition Manual in October 2009 to include a Market Research Guide in Appendix I.

The Market Research Guide emphasizes for DHS components that a market research plan is essential to ensure that the research conducted is adequate and appropriate to the requirement. The guide goes further to state that the market research plan should document the overall research techniques the acquisition team will employ, information sources to be used, responsibilities of the team members, decision points in the process, and the timeframe for each task. The guide also provides attachments that list specific resources for market research, rules for meeting with industry representatives, guidelines for one-on-one discussions, and a market research report template.

The DHS components we reviewed either did not prepare or could not provide the acquisition planning documentation required for some procurements awarded in fiscal year 2009. According to FAR §2.101, acquisition planning is the process by which the efforts of all personnel responsible for an acquisition are coordinated and integrated into a comprehensive plan for fulfilling an agency’s needs in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost. It entails developing the overall strategy for managing an acquisition. FAR § 7.102 requires that agencies perform acquisition planning and market research

The Advance Acquisition Plan (AAP) is a DHS plan of all anticipated procurements, including interagency agreements, blanket purchase agreements, and task orders greater than $100,000 for the upcoming fiscal year.

AAPs contain the integrated and coordinated efforts of all relevant acquisition personnel in determining acquisition requirements, financing, strategic planning, small business considerations, technical data requirements, contracting, and contract administration. Of the 39 noncompetitive procurements in our sample, 34 or 87% required an AAP. However, 18 or 53% of the 34 procurements, with a value of $46,618,206, either did not have an AAP, referenced the incorrect AAP number, did not have a printout in the contract file, or component personnel could not provide the AAP numbers

Without the AAP, supporting documentation is limited to confirm whether personnel adequately performed advanced acquisition planning. The department needs to place greater emphasis on better planning and documenting its acquisitions and decisions making processes. Making sure each component’s acquisition decisions are well documented, integrated, and coordinated in determining requirements, financing, strategic planning, small business considerations, technical data requirements, contracting, and contract administration, will assist the department in this effort, as well as in ensuring that the goods and services acquired are the best value.