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Showing posts with label Professionalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Professionalism. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 6, 2017

Own up to those mistakes; don't put lipstick on that pig

Jason Miller is an astute federal procurement journalist with Federal News Radio, with a knack for making arcane and difficult matters interesting and graspable. I don't read him regularly, but when I do I wonder why not. (Not enough time in a day comes to mind.)

Jason wrote the following article, and his respect for action of the protagonist in the unfortunate circumstances of the story is palpable, and deserved. You may just want to click the link to the article and get it from the horse's mouth. Or you can stick around with me and my rendition, and be sorry.

What happened in a nutshell is that the Department of Homeland Security solicited, and then cancelled (after protests began), a solicitation for certain technical services, known as "Flexible Agile Support for the Homeland" ('FLASH'). It was framed as a small business set-aside procurement focused on agile development methodologies. (That's another story; read it, too.)

As Jason explained in a prior article, DHS' Procurement Innovation Lab (PIL) set out to get its arms around one of the problems of federal acquisition — the need to close out low-risk, low-dollar contracts. Too often these contracts are forgotten or under prioritized, and a backlog builds up. At DHS, for example, its backlog grew to more than 350,000, and 92 percent of the contracts had been completed more than a year ago. PIL took an innovation risk and re-engineered the business processes a simplified means for contract closeout. (Look, as I said he can explain better than I, so read that article, too.)

To re-engineer the business processes, DHS first created PIL, a cross-functional team of policy, finance, general counsel, contracting and industry and then had to identify the low-risk contracts. It was all about coordinating, good communications and making sure that all the people that could be involved and are looking at the process to collaboratively understand what to do and all the appropriate steps to do it. PIL completed nine projects and is working on others.

One of the PIL's biggest experiments was FLASH.   As Soraya Correa, the chief procurement officer at DHS, described it, FLASH was meant to take care of "contracts that are typically small dollar value, generally firm fixed price, no activity over the last 12-to-24 months, final goods and services have been delivered so we know they are probably ready for close out. What we are doing is a streamlined approach trying to close them in one fell swoop.”

Correa explained, “Everything we’ve done on FLASH has been very different from what we’ve done in the past. Start with our industry day where our communications were more of a discussion where we provided the ability to do speed teaming or speed dating, but also an opportunity for vendors to meet with government officials and ask questions,” she said. “We also had experts in various business areas like small business, digital services and others so industry could come up to speed on what we were doing in those areas. It was a very interactive day that focused a little more on the business processes around bidding as opposed to focusing on the requirements that would be contained in the solicitation.”

DHS evaluated contractors based on a technical challenge where the bidders had to present to the agency how they would go through an agile development process. Correa said the bidders then had 4-to-6 hours to actually complete and then did a presentation. DHS received 114 proposals.

Now, flash forward a bit to last month when Jason reported "DHS cancels $1.5B contract for agile services".
DHS has been working on the multiple award vehicle for the better part of a year. The goal of FLASH was to give department components access to innovative methods and industry best practices to acquire agile design and development support services. DHS said in the solicitation it was seeking to develop an acquisition contract that includes the concepts from the U.S. Digital Services Playbook such as user-centered design, dev/ops, automated testing and agile. DHS’s Procurement Innovation Lab (PIL) was running FLASH.

But since November when DHS awarded FLASH to 13 companies, it faced an uphill battle to get the contract off the ground. Eight vendors who didn’t make the cut submitted protests to GAO. DHS decided to take corrective action instead of letting GAO decide the protests and reopened bidding.

Then in early March, DHS announced 11 new winners under the FLASH contract, and 12 unsuccessful bidders protested to GAO again.

The decision to cancel FLASH comes as more and more agencies are developing contract vehicles to buy agile services. Along with the DHS, the General Services Administration’s 18F organization also struggled to award and ultimately cancelled the second and third contracts under its agile blanket purchase agreement. 18F awarded 16 vendors a spot in part one of its agile BPA in August 2015.

It’s unclear what comes next for FLASH — whether DHS will try again with a new procurement or give up entirely on a separate contract vehicle for agile services and rely on an existing one like EAGLE II.
So, now for the denouement:

DHS’ internal assessment of its $1.5B agile contract: ‘significant errors and missteps’
If the Homeland Security Department’s decision to cancel its $1.5 billion contract for agile services wasn’t shocking enough, the details of the missteps and problems the agency detailed in its “motion to dismiss” left long-time federal procurement attorneys and vendors with their collective mouths agape.

“DHS has determined that cancellation of the FLASH solicitation, HSHQDC-16-R-00118, is the only viable option to address the many issues that DHS has identified as problems with the requirement and the record,” DHS lawyers wrote to GAO in the document, which Federal News Radio obtained. “The integrity of the procurement process will be served by this cancellation.”

Barbara Kinosky, managing partner with Centre Law and Consulting LLC, said she was “floored” by DHS’s honesty and the level of detail it provided.

“They did everything but name names,” she said. “It is absolutely draconian to cancel the contract at this point. It means it is so flawed that they couldn’t tweak this, or conversely they decided not to let all the protestors on to the vehicle. I suspect the whole methodology was flawed and even if they tweaked the evaluation factors it was still susceptive (sic) to more protests.”

In the motion to dismiss, DHS said the problems with FLASH ranged from the evaluation criteria and adjectival ratings to the price evaluations and best value tradeoffs to lacking the expertise in agile software services to do a proper evaluation.

“DHS has also determined that the evaluation of the offerors may have resulted in unequal treatment of offerors’ weaknesses and risks. This is partially due to the adjectival ratings that were used, but also due to the evaluation process used to evaluate and assess offerors during the technical challenge exercises,” DHS stated in its motion.

“DHS has identified issues in the price evaluation report (PER) and best value tradeoff analysis (BVTA) which do not adequately support its award decisions. The methodology by which the price evaluation team evaluated price realism is not identified in the PER. Nor is it evident in the PER itself what DHS reviewed and evaluated to determine whether prices were reasonable and realistic.”

Christoph Mlinarchik, a government contracts expert and owner of Christoph LLC, a consulting firm, said DHS’s self-assessment of the FLASH procurement resulted in a firm vote of “no confidence” due to a “comedy of errors: poorly executed technical challenge evaluations, sparse price analysis, inadequate tradeoff analysis and more.”

“The most glaring admission by DHS is that critical documents were altered after award, like the technical evaluation report and best value tradeoff analysis. These critical documents were changed after submission to the GAO as part of the official record– a flagrant foul that undermines the bid protest system,” Mlinarchik said. “In summary, DHS rolled over, showed its belly, and provided ample reasons that the FLASH procurement was a total failure.

This does not look good for DHS, but it shows courage in admitting fault and starting from scratch instead of putting lipstick on a pig.”

The decision to cancel FLASH left vendors both relieved and in disbelief. One industry source, who requested anonymity for fear of retaliation from DHS, said it was a painful process from the beginning.

As Soraya Correa, DHS chief procurement officer, said in December in a NextGov article after the initial set of protests delayed FLASH:

“We’ve got to start getting rid of that fear,” Correa said. “We’ve got to start making it OK to sometimes make a mistake, as long as you’re making an intelligent mistake. It’s OK to take a few chances, and you know what? Every now and then, we’re going to stub our toe.”

Thursday, May 18, 2017

War (good God): What is it good for? In Nigeria, the elite and Boko Haram, it seems

Or so the following article would have us believe. I use this as though it is thoroughly hpothetical to illustrate that, in times of strife, whether ma-nmade or natural, attention is more attracted to the strife, not the money trail. 

The only defense for such diversion of attention is transparency and accountability in as near real time as possible. A trained and trustworthy professional bureaucracy is critical. 

It is obviously most useful to elect and appoint honest leaders who put good governance and the welfare of the led before their own interests.

Nigeria's Political Elites Hid Behind Military to Steal Billions of Dollars - Report
Corrupt officials over the years exploited the excessive secrecy of the country's defence budget to rip off the nation, says the report released Thursday in Abuja by Transparency International Defence And Security. The 15-years-old war against Boko Haram insurgency has helped pushed up Nigeria's defence budget and corresponding increase in corruption within the sector, the report said. The Areport has highlighted how Nigeria's political elites for years hid under the cover of the country's military to steal billions of dollars that would have been channeled into improving the living conditions of the citizens.

The report, which was prepared in partnership with the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre, CISLAC, is titled, Weaponising Transparency: Defence Procurement Reform As a Counterterrorism Strategy in Nigeria. Corruption in the defence sector, according to the report, is a major threat to Nigeria's internal security and political stability. "Largely unaddressed, it has weakened Nigerian counterterrorism capacity whilst strengthening Boko Haram," it said.

The report repeatedly mentioned a former National Security Adviser, NSA, Sambo Dasuki's case as an example of how the country's defence sector leaves room for exploitation. Mr. Dasuki is currently standing trial for allegedly mismanaging funds meant for the procurement of weapons to prosecute the war against Boko Haram.

The report also mentioned former President Goodluck Jonathan and the late military dictator, Sani Abacha, as some of the nation's leaders who profited from the inherent weakness in the sector.

According to the report, the stealing is usually done through inflating of procurement contract values and creating of "phantom" defence contracts. "Such contracts are used as a vehicle for money laundering: facilitated via weak or corrupted Nigerian banks, illicit financial flows are often hidden in property in the UK, United States, South Africa and Dubai," the report says.

The stealing is done with the active connivance of the country's military leaders. "With oil prices at a record low, defence has provided new and lucrative opportunities for the country's corrupt kleptocrats," says the report.

"Former military chiefs have stolen as much as US $15 billion - a sum equivalent to half of Nigeria's foreign currency reserves - through fraudulent arms procurement deals."

All is not lost. The report acknowledged President Muhammadu Buhari administration's effort to tackle corruption in the country's defence sector. But it warned that, "Only a holistic reform agenda can deliver the deep, systemic changes and improvements in transparency and accountability needed to prevent the next US $15 billion quietly leaving Nigeria through the back door".

"Since coming to power in May 2015, President Buhari has taken some bold action in tackling defence sector corruption. Central to his approach have been two ad hoc, temporary audit committees: one investigating spending by the Office of the National Security Adviser and one investigating defence arms and equipment procurement.

"Taking on the defence establishment was a significant move: the evidence uncovered by these probes revealed that several of the country's former military chiefs, using dozens of companies, together stole as much as US $15 billion.

"President Buhari's anti-corruption drive is a rare example of senior Nigerian defence and security officials being exposed to criminal investigation. By signalling that military impunity is not without limit, it is undoubtedly a positive step forward," it said.

State governors in Nigeria are also known to have used the secretive "security votes" as an avenue to steal public funds, the report said.

The report recommends a unified anti-corruption strategy for the defence sector, the extension of public access to defence and security information, and the monitoring of confidential procurements as some of the ways of tackling the problem. Other recommendations include the sharpening of international focus on fighting corruption in Nigeria, plucking off money laundering loopholes in banks, the extension of whistle-blower protection to cover the defence sector, and regulation of secretive security votes.

"Declassifying how the security vote funds have been spent, after a two-year information embargo, could also enable citizen oversight," the report said.

Katherine Dixon, Director Transparency International Defence and Security, called for a quick action against corruption in the Nigeria's defence sector. "Corruption in Nigeria is not just a problem for Nigerians, but a concern for all of those looking to tackle violent extremism around the world.

"Entering into blind defence deals that ignore the rampant corruption in Nigeria's defence sector means international partners could inadvertently be giving rise to Boko Haram. Likewise, the doors to allow corrupt officials to launder their ill-gotten gains out of Nigeria should be slammed shut, through the active denial of visas and other domestic legislation that targets corrupt money. With Buhari's first term soon to end, the international community may soon find itself without a Presidential ally in this fight - now is the time to act," Ms. Dixon said.

Wednesday, August 6, 2014

Procurement reform needs to address both necessity and sufficiency of procurement regime

EU members urged to devise strategies for public procurement reform
The European Commission is calling on member states to design comprehensive medium-term strategies to reform their public procurement systems. Joaquim Nunes de Almeida, director of public procurement, DG internal market and services at the European Commission, explained, “In the European Commission we are mature enough to have understood that having transposed correctly a legal framework is certainly a necessary, but certainly not a sufficient, step to achieve a correct desirable functioning of a public procurement system. The work is unfortunately much more complicated than simply to transpose European legislation in a formally correct way.”

There are also plans to develop a policy to promote the “professionalisation of buyers,” Nunes de Almeida announced. “Public procurement is not perceived as a strategic function but as an administrative clerical exercise focused on legal compliance,” he said. “We need market intelligence, business skills and a focus on skills to become the heart of public purchasing.”

The conference heard the Commission is looking into introducing policy to tackle corruption in purchasing too. “Fraud and malpractice is an ongoing threat for governments as they undermine cities and companies trust in public authorities,” said Nunes de Almeida. “We are considering the possibility of developing a more effective and proactive policy on public procurement. Initiatives that may be considered include setting clear rules for the protection of whistleblowers, [and making use of] IT tools and indicators for better monitoring the procurement process.”

He added there is “still a lot to be done to build efficient and pragmatic solutions” for everyone involved in public procurement.

Saturday, May 31, 2014

Variety is the spice of procurement training

To improve the contracting workforce, improve training
In recent years, considerable resources have been invested in hiring and educating our biggest asset, human capital. This additional staffing and education has so far met with mixed results. This is because people are only as effective as the experience and education they have received.

Contracting executives frequently mention the need to develop judgment, reasoning, and analytical skills, as well as to obtain real-world experience. These goals can be met through exposure to diverse acquisition and operational scenarios. Three years of varied contracting experience (simplified acquisition, major systems, source selection, and acquisition planning) is better than 10 years of doing the same, simplified, repetitive tasks over and over, yet still moving up the career ladder.

Effective contract management doesn’t involve memorizing policies and regulations. To no one’s surprise, regardless of legislation, business judgment and skills are best learned on the job or via the next best thing: scenario-based training. Professional certifications require the ability to know where to find the various and often conflicting sources of guidance on a particular problem and weigh the merits of all in arriving at a balanced and proper business solution. Rigorous testing that most pass, but many may fail, ensures good judgment is developed before its applicability to real-world situations.

However, there is a way this varied experience can be developed—through scenario-based learning and testing. This involves providing present and future acquisition specialists the ability to develop their skills on the simulator faster and less expensively before being thrown into real-world situations.

A profession that develops itself exclusively through passive class time, guaranteeing successful completion to everyone, is no better than maintaining existing business processes because “that’s the way we’ve always done it,” or “because I said so.” A rigorous, widely adopted, professional development process, combining education with “practical exams” for every government and industry organization must exist in today’s complex and collaborative acquisition system.
I often suggest to my procurement students at Guam Community College that they follow all the news they can on a wide range of procurement issues. It may not suffice for actual hands on experience, but it can represent a case study approach to issues they do not see in their limited roles in the system.

This blawg is an attempt to present such a resource, and I encourage my students to wander through its posts and come back to it from time to time.

Unfortunately, all one has to do is check the View My Stats link in the right-hand column, and compare it to the ClustrMap hits, to notice that there are not a lot of hits from Guam, not even following the announcements in class. You can lead a student to water, but ....

Friday, March 21, 2014

Professionalizing procurement -- Jamaica

Gov't moves to improve procurement process
Minister with responsibility for Public Service in the Ministry of Finance and Planning Horace Dalley who made the announcement Wednesday, said the move is intended to ensure that only professionals of the highest level have responsibility for public procurement. The minister said that in the process there will be extensive training as well as certification of procurement officers, noting that memoranda of understanding have already been signed with some agencies and institutions to undertake this process.

In the meantime, Minister of Transport, Works and Housing Dr Omar Davies said the training of a specialised cadre of professionals is critical to improving the public procurement process. Dr Davies said there was a need to have specifically trained persons in procurement rules and guidelines to handle these matters within each ministry, and not, for example, the personnel officer or office manager, who have merely been asked to carry out this task.

"Oftentimes you are dealing with multi-million dollar contracts and somebody is just assigned this task without the full recognition of the importance (of the procurement process) and having a trained professional dealing with the matter is a critical element of making the system more efficient, in terms of the procurement guidelines," the minister said.

"We set out two years ago to fix public procurement and to take the pressure off public officers and this cloud of corruption that people tend to heap on public officers because simple errors were made. But at the same time, public procurement officers must improve their skills in public procurement and at the same time, the system must be improved," he said.

Dalley noted that as part of this improvement, a new public procurement law will come on stream soon, and there will be a comprehensive revision of the handbook of public sector procurement procedures and the standard bidding documents.

In addition, improvements are expected to be made in the procurement contract process and steps are also being taken to implement a fair and robust contractor performance assessment system.

Tuesday, July 30, 2013

The price factor

Public funds are meant to be spent prudently and wisely. Not for the government purchaser is the joy of buying on whim, impulse and sheer abandon and show.

So, price is a factor, and a central factor, in any decision to dip into the public purse.

But how much of a factor? It, of course, depends. Getting something that is needed is always a balance of knowing fairly precisely what it is that you need, and how much do you need it compared to all the other things that are needed. It boils down to getting bang for buck: how much bang do you need and how many bucks can you justifiably spare to get it.

The need question typically precedes the buck question. If you need something desperately, you will pay dearly; if you don't, you won't. Just search for "price elasticity" to overwhelm yourself with reading and technical analysis of that simple commonsense equation.  Professional services, especially health care services, tend to be inelastic.

Guam provides a request for proposal process to acquire professional services. It is based on the model the ABA Model Procurement Code incorporated in its original 1979 form, but which has been since set aside. In this particular RFP process, the procedure first ranks responsive and responsible offers in terms of quality of service, and price pays no part in the evaluation or ranking. It is only after all offers are ranked that price becomes a factor. The process requires that the government negotiate with the highest ranked offeror first, to negotiate a "fair and reasonable" compensation. If it is unable to come to terms on fair and reasonable compensation with the highest ranked offeror, then it proceeds to negotiate with the next highest offeror for fair and reasonable compensation, and on down the list as necessary.

Thus, when obtaining professional services under that RFP process, price is a secondary factor, but ultimately determinative.

For the most part, government, and especially state, shire or municipal governments, do not acquire supplies and services that are unique. They tend to buy the same thing cyclically, or the same things that other organizations acquire; that is, they acquire standard commercially available supplies and services. If you think of these standard products as commodities, it typically hardly matters which one you select (discounting the personal taste or other ego factors). In that case, price matters first and foremost. It is essentially an auction process.

Thus, in the language of the ABA Model Code, the acquisition process for such supplies and services (and routine construction) is conducted by "bid": an Invitation for Bids. Just like at an auction, people bid the price they are willing to pay or accept, and the fine points of product or service differentiation are ignored (to the chagrin of marketing and brand managers). It is a simple equation: low bid wins. Price is the only factor.

And to digress a moment. First, there is a variation on the bid process for non-standard supplies or services whereby bidders first offer supplies or services to be evaluated for acceptability to meet the described government need, but they are not ranked. All acceptable products are then determined and bids are then opened, with the lowest bid price taken. Second, it is worth pointing out that in the Model code, absent competition (such as when only one bid is received), as with the acquisition of professional services, the government must be assured that the price it pays is "fair and reasonable", otherwise it does not make that acquisition.

Then there is a middle ground, and it is murky, but only in the sense that objectivity is blurred, and subjective discretion is given greater weight than price. This comes in a variety of forms and nomenclature, such as "best value". It typically arises from an offer process, where proposals are submitted and negotiations take place before the government accepts a contractor. 

This process generally places a great deal of trust in the integrity, skill and market knowledge of the government purchasing team -- in a word, in their professionalism.   In this process, price is a component of the offer, and is negotiable along with other specifications, within the scope of the solicitation.  The price component is usually weighted by some specified proportion against other critical components, thus it is neither the first nor the last factor considered, but one that is blended with and weighted against other desirable, or nondesirable, factors.

Getting the ingredient mix, and especially the price ingredient, is a difficult task, as is any recipe. The choice of ingredients, and the proportions, can make a great souffle or a sorry one.

The difficulty in getting the recipe made in the first case is illustrated in the following story.

Jefferson Parish restores price as factor in evaluating service contractors
A new procurement reform that the Jefferson Parish Council has adopted restores price as a factor in awarding some service contracts. The council had removed price from the scoring in 2011. The ordinance says the price proposed by vendors will count for 20 percent of their overall grade by technical committees that score proposals. The law applies to non-professional services, such as landfill operation and catering, for which the government is not required to accept the cheapest proposal.

The non-profit Bureau of Governmental Research criticized that move as a precursor to favoritism. Most concerning to the organization was the council's broad authority to pick most types of service contractors, essentially relegating the evaluation committees to toothless advisory bodies.

That the legislative branch chooses contractors is "abnormal" on its face, the report stated, and the council's "nearly unfettered discretion" to disregard the committee recommendations creates "a fundamental conflict of interest." A better method, BGR said, is to uphold the evaluation committee recommendations, or at least to choose from one of the committee's top-ranking firms. The council has resisted the push for more executive control in choosing contractors.

Councilwoman Cynthia Lee-Sheng said a certain degree of council discretion is necessary. Evaluation committees might not know of vendor problems that rigid scoring criteria do not factor, such as recent mistakes with continuing projects. "Sometimes the technical evaluation committee might not have the newer information I might have," Lee-Sheng said. "I'm not going to blindly select the top ranked firm."

The new ordinance fixes price as a 20 percent weight. BGR CEO Janet Howard stated that a chief procurement officer should determine the importance of price in any given procurement. "If you are a hiring a consultant where you are really hiring their judgment and expertise, price would generally be a much lower factor, versus something that maybe is more of a service provider in which case the scope of work is well defined or routine," Purdy said.

Lee-Sheng agreed, stating that price should be a stronger consideration in grass cutting, for example, because the end result isn't likely to vary much. "I don't think it's ever really a great system," Lee-Sheng said. "At least if you set it at the beginning, no one can accuse anyone of messing with the formula."

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

What's the point of having rules?

Out of Singapore, we have this globally recurring theme:

Procurement lapses due to individual officers' failure to follow rules: MOF
The Auditor-General's report scrutinized the expenditure of government ministries and statutory boards for the last financial year and was released on Wednesday. Several ministries were cited for various oversights.
[The StraitsTimes reported, For instance, the Media Development Authority negotiated with a vendor for a revised proposal to organise the $4.57 million Film Festival. This was after the request for proposal exercise had closed, and contravened government rules. Another tender by Republic Polytechnic was not conducted in an open and fair manner, Auditor-General Willie Tan said. The tender was for a $19.14 million project to develop an integrated academic system."]

The Ministry of Finance said it has reminded all permanent secretaries and heads of government agencies to pay close attention to procurement issues.

Government agencies are also urged to undertake regular reviews of procurement processes and ensure vigilant supervision throughout all stages of the procurement process.

The ministry stressed that it is essential that the public service and its officers remain fully accountable for the use of public funds and uphold the integrity of public procurement.

To further strengthen government procurement as a whole, the ministry said it has already stepped up the training of public officers, as well as requiring all agencies to conduct regular internal audits to provide an independent check.

Work is also in progress to develop a procurement specialist track, with professional development opportunities and proper career pathways.

MOF explained that the procurement specialist track will help professionalise the practice of procurement by giving officers greater recognition and more opportunities to develop deep skills and knowledge.

The ministry said while it cannot expect to be able to completely eliminate lapses in a system with over 80,000 tenders and quotations annually, the public service is committed to take every effort to avoid them or promptly rectify them when they are detected.

Monday, June 10, 2013

India tells prospective contractors, "Let's Talk"

Govt bodies to give reasons for rejecting procurement tenders
The government awards public contracts worth lakhs of crores each year, but the process is fraught with delays as losing bidders often seek to stall their execution by filing vigilance complaints and mounting multiple legal challenges. Congress president Sonia Gandhi has identified public procurement as the biggest source of corruption along with the allocation of natural resources.

Finance Minister P Chidambaram had told Parliament in 2011 that even buying a pencil is a painstaking process in government. "Every time you go for procurement, on the day you are going to place the order, you will have a complaint on your table," he had said in his earlier avatar as home minister.

"It has been observed that there are many instances of a tender being rejected or tender documents not being issued and when the party enquires reasons, the same are not communicated," the procurement division in the expenditure department has said in a memo sent to government departments last month. "In such cases, the first round of litigation is to find out the reasons and the second round is to challenge the reasons," it noted.

The finance ministry has asked all government bodies to disclose the reasons for rejecting or excluding bidders from contracts awarded by them in order to bring more transparency into public procurement and avoid litigations from losing bidders.

Procurements made by the central government are currently regulated by the General Financial Rules of 2005, which only have the status of a subordinate legislation and are generic guidelines on government expenditure. Violations of these rules seldom attract penalties, noted a recent report on probity in India's public procurement by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The finance ministry has, however, pointed out that the rules clearly require that "every authority delegated with the financial powers of procuring goods in public interest" shall be responsible for bringing transparency in such procurements and ensuring "fair and equitable treatment of suppliers and promotion of competition." The rules also stipulate that suitable provisions be made in the bidding document "to enable a bidder to question the bidding conditions, process and/or rejection" of its bid. "The reasons for rejecting a tender or non-issuing a tender document to a prospective bidder must be disclosed where enquiries are made by the bidder," the finance ministry has said.

The ministry has pointed departments to a recent order on the issue by the Delhi High Court and said that importance of complying with it 'in letter and spirit cannot be over-emphasised.' Adjudging a case filed by a contractor who was not being issued tender documents by a government department, the court had said: "We have repeatedly emphasised in various orders that whenever a tender is rejected or tender documents are not issued and a party enquires reasons, it is necessary that the reasons be communicated to avoid unnecessary litigation...Despite this, the authorities persist in keeping silent over such representations, which we strongly deprecate."
In the US federal government contracting system, this is called "debriefing". It is a process that has been adopted in the last decade or so.

Contract Debriefings
Debriefings instill confidence in the contracting process by affirming that proposals were treated fairly. Statutory and regulatory changes to the debriefing rules better establish the debriefing as an offeror right that can reduce the number of protest filings, and strengthens the Government’s relationship with industry.

Debriefing means informing unsuccessful offerors of the basis of the selection decision and contract award. This information includes the Government’s evaluation of the significant weaknesses or deficiencies in the offeror’s proposal. Debriefings provide offerors to a competitive solicitation with an explanation of the evaluation process, an assessment of their proposal in relation to the evaluation criteria, a general understanding of the basis of the award decision, and the rationale for their exclusion from the competition.

Debriefings are different than notifications to unsuccessful offerors. The contracting officer must notify the offerors promptly in writing when their proposals are excluded from the competitive range or otherwise eliminated from the competition. See FAR 15.503for detailed coverage of notifications.
Legal and Practical Aspects of Debriefings: Adding Value to the Procurement Process (You may have to "trust" the site and click through a series of alerts. I do.)
Properly conducted, debriefings can greatly aid offerors, who can obtain insights for improving their proposals in future procurements. A skillfully performed debriefing also can ward off a potential protest by an unsuccessful offeror to the agency, the General Accounting Office (GAO), or the United States Court of Federal Claims whereby the agency allays the debriefed offeror’s concerns about possible prejudicial error in the evaluation or selection decision.

Poorly conducted, debriefings can decrease an offeror’s confidence in the agency’s evaluation practices, and can discourage that offeror from pursuing future business with that agency, thereby decreasing competition. A confusing or poorly executed debriefing also can spark a protest when the offeror was not otherwise so inclined. Most protests consume extensive agency resources in defending the procurement before the protest decision maker.5

In a debriefing, which can occur before or after contract award, agency representatives inform the offeror, commonly face to face, of the proposal’s weaknesses and deficiencies. The procuring agency in a postaward debriefing will further disclose limited information relating to the awardee’s proposal, such as the awardee’s overall evaluated cost or price, and the rationale for the source selection. The debriefed offeror either before or after award is entitled to receive certain other information, such as whether the agency followed the applicable source selection procedures. Debriefings are closely regulated by statute3 and the FAR,4 which identify appropriate topics for further discussion in this article.
Of course, the legal eagles do not warm easily to commercial realism, because they know how to make the worm turn.

Should government attorneys attend debriefings?
At the Nash & Cibinic Roundtable this past December 2 and 3 in Washington, DC, an issue came up that has bothered me for many years. The issue is the role of the government contract lawyer in the contracting process. Specifically, what role does the government contract lawyer play in debriefings of unsuccessful offerors? During a discussion of debriefings, one of the attendees identified herself as a government attorney and said that she always made a point of attending debriefings given by the contracting officers of her agency. I don't remember the entire comment, but the impression that I got was that she did so in order to ensure that all went well.

The comment made my contracting officer blood boil. I oppose the practice of having government lawyers attend debriefings. The main reason is that it sends the wrong signal to the company that is being debriefed. If I go to a meeting with someone who is unhappy with me and bring my lawyer, it sends a signal (whether accurate or not) that I expect trouble and feel the need to have a counselor present. Another reason is that I don't want any interruptions, interjections, note passing, whispering in my ear, or requests to caucus. Those things look bad. A debriefing is not supposed to be an interrogation, a negotiation, a debate, or an adversarial proceeding.

Of course, I am assuming that the CO is competent, that he or she understands the rules of the source selection process, understands how the source selection in question was conducted, knows the facts of the evaluation of the proposal in question, can explain the findings and conclusions of the evaluation team, and understands the basis for the source selection decision. If that is not the case, it raises the question of whether the CO should provide a face-to-face or telephonic debriefing. If the person responsible for the debriefing, the CO, cannot be trusted to do a good job, then perhaps a written debriefing, prepared or reviewed by an attorney, is the thing to do. But to send an incompetent CO into a debriefing armed with his or her lawyer does not strike me as a particularly intelligent course of action.

At one point during the Roundtable discussion, someone in the audience shouted out, "What if the offeror brings an attorney?" So what? As a CO, I asked offerors on more than one occasion if they had an attorney and, if so, would they please bring him or her to the debriefing. Why? I respect attorneys for their ability to think clearly and be dispassionate. An attorney is likely to recognize and acknowledge that a source selection was conducted properly even when their client is climbing the walls. If we did a good job and if I could explain the job that we did, then there was nothing to worry about. In my last source selection as a government CO, the loser filed a protest with the GAO right away. I called the protester, asked them to attend a debriefing, and asked them to bring their lawyer. They brought Professor Gilbert J. Ginsburg of The George Washington University Law School, a renowned government contracts expert. At the debriefing I handed them a copy of our request for proposals, a copy of their proposal, our complete source selection file for their proposal, including the write-ups by the individual evaluators and the scores, and told them to go through the material and to ask any questions they had. I left them in the conference room. They called me about an hour later, thanked me, and said goodbye. The next day I received a copy of their communication with the GAO withdrawing their protest.

Would I meet with my attorney before a debriefing? Not unless I had a legal question. As a CO, I would not need advice about what to say and what not to say. I believe in full disclosure debriefings. I believe in giving the loser everything. If a protest is filed, the protester?s lawyer is going to get everything anyway, including the proposals of the other offerors, so why withhold? While as a CO I cannot release the proposals of the other offerors, I see no reason to withhold anything else. if we made a mistake I would rather be told and be given a chance to take corrective action before a protest is filed. Full disclosure shows no fear.

Don't take this as dislike of attorneys. I work with them all the time and both like and admire most of the ones I meet. I have deep respect for the profession, which I consider to be admirable. But as I see it they and the CO have different roles to play in acquisition. If the attorney reviewed the source selection decision and found it to be legally sufficient, then he or she has played their part. Debriefing the losers is the CO?s role. If the CO is competent, then he or she will not need an attorney's services during the debriefings. If the CO is not competent, then a face-to-face or telephonic debriefing should be avoided at all costs. Having an attorney present will not make things go better.

Thursday, June 6, 2013

FAS made a Mess of MAS

Improper Management Intervention in Multiple Award Schedule Contracts, Report Number A120161/Q/6/P13003, June 4, 2013, by Office of Audits, Office of Inspector General, U.S. General Services Administration
OBJECTIVE -- The objective of this audit was to review the circumstances related to FAS management intervention in contracting actions related to MAS contracts.

Finding - Improper Federal Acquisition Service (FAS) management intervention in Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) contracts resulted in inflated pricing and/or unfavorable contract terms, and undermined the authority of contracting officers.

Government business shall be conducted in a manner above reproach and, except as authorized by statute or regulation, with complete impartiality and with preferential treatment for none. Transactions relating to the expenditure of public funds require the highest degree of public trust and an impeccable standard of conduct. The general rule is to avoid strictly any conflict of interest or even the appearance of a conflict of interest in Government-contractor relationships. While many Federal laws and regulations place restrictions on the actions of Government personnel, their official conduct must, in addition, be such that they would have no reluctance to make a full public disclosure of their actions. [FAR 3.101-1]

In the course of performing Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) contract audits, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) identified numerous instances where Federal Acquisition Service (FAS) management, based on complaints from contractors, overrode contracting officer determinations without proper justification, pressured contracting officers to extend or award contracts, and reassigned contracts to different contracting officers. In the Oracle contract, the directors did not provide justification for transferring the contract to another contracting officer. In addition, the contracting officer who was replaced stated that the Division Director said, “Oracle is done with you as a CO.” In addition, when the OIG asked why some standard GSA contract language was changed in Deloitte’s contract, the contracting officer stated that Deloitte would not agree to a contract without the revised language.

These instances of FAS management intervention included direct communications between contractors and FAS management, often without the knowledge and participation of the responsible contracting officers.

In at least one case, FAS management interference resulted in a contract with higher prices and less favorable terms than those recommended by the original contracting officers. In other cases, interference resulted in questionable contract extensions.

To more fully assess the extent and possible impact of these cases on the integrity of the MAS contracting process, we reviewed the circumstances related to some of these management intervention actions. This report focuses on three large MAS contracts representing over $900 million in contract sales in calendar year 2011 (CY 2011).

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 1 includes a “Statement of guiding principles,” as well as the authorities and responsibilities of the contracting officer.
FAR 1.102-4(a) states: "Government members of the [acquisition] Team must be empowered to make acquisition decisions within their areas of responsibility, including selection, negotiation, and administration of contracts consistent with the Guiding Principles. In particular, the contracting officer must have the authority to the maximum extent practicable and consistent with law, to determine the application of rules, regulations, and policies, on a specific contract."

In addition, the following FAR citations outline the authorities and responsibilities of the contracting officer. "No contract shall be entered into unless the contracting officer ensures that all requirements of law, executive orders, regulations, and all other applicable procedures, including clearances and approvals, have been met. [FAR 1.602-1(b)] Contracting officers are responsible for ensuring performance of all necessary actions for effective contracting, ensuring compliance with the terms of the contract, and safeguarding the interests of the United States in its contractual relationships. In order to perform these responsibilities, contracting officers should be allowed wide latitude to exercise business judgment."

The concentration of authority in the contracting officer is critical to maintain the integrity of the contracting process. FAR 4.1 requires that, “Only contracting officers shall sign contracts on behalf of the United States.” In addition to the FAR requirement of wide latitude, contracting officers must also complete educational and training requirements before being granted a contracting warrant. The FAR, therefore, vests significant contracting authority and responsibility in the contracting officer and ensures that the contracting process is independent from all impairments.

FAS management intervention undermined the authority and morale of GSA contracting officers. FAS management (1) allowed contractors to circumvent contracting officers when the contractors disagreed with contracting staff determinations, and (2) supported the contractors’ positions, including reassigning contracts to different contracting officers. In each reassignment case, the new contracting officer awarded or extended contracts without properly addressing significant issues identified by previous contracting officers.

Although we have noted instances of improper management interference across several MAS Schedules, the three examples included in this report relate to FAS Schedule 70 Information Technology contracts. We will primarily focus on the actions of the Deputy Director and a Division Director (directors) of the Schedule 70 program.

FAS directors’ interference in the Oracle contract included undocumented discussions with Oracle representatives without the knowledge or participation of contracting staff, directives to the contracting officer to take actions contrary to the contracting officer’s determinations, and reassignment of the contract to another contracting officer. The evidence shows that Oracle officials went over the heads of the contracting staff to FAS management to have contracting staff replaced and to obtain decisions favorable to the company. This intervention usurped the contracting officer’s authority and resulted in the extension of the contract with questionable pricing, terms, and conditions. The Division Director twice intervened by directing the extension of the contract, despite contracting officers’ determinations that extensions were not in the best interests of the United States. The directors’ explanation for extending the contract was that the volume of sales under Oracle’s contract demonstrated a need by federal agencies. However, no examples were provided to demonstrate how government agencies would be negatively impacted if the contract were allowed to expire.

Oracle’s Senior Director of Government Affairs sent an e-mail to the Associate Administrator for GSA’s Office of Governmentwide Policy that stated, “Regarding GSA. We’re having a miserable time with our contracting officer on ge! tting [sic] our schedule contract modified. How would we go about getting a new one?” The GSA official asked Oracle if it was referring to a FAS contracting officer and Oracle responded that it was. Oracle also provided the June 29 letter and stated, “We find it a bit difficult when a CO is telling us which of our job titles do not qualify to be on a schedule. Can fill you in on the rest.”

FAS management intervention in the Carahsoft contract included undocumented discussions with Carahsoft representatives without the knowledge or participation of contracting staff, directives to the contracting officer to take actions contrary to the contracting officer’s determinations, and reassignment of the contract to another contracting officer. This intervention usurped contracting officer authority and resulted in the lengthy extension of a contract with inflated pricing and other terms and conditions unfavorable to the Government. Carahsoft’s MAS Contract Number GS-35F-0131R was scheduled to expire on November 18, 2009, but has been repeatedly extended on a temporary basis and is still currently under temporary extension.

On March 30, 2011, the contracting officer sent an e-mail to the OIG that stated:
The pressure is coming from my boss who has told me he doesn't want Carahsoft to call their Congressman. They have already called their Congressman before, so . . . my Division Director, said if we don't work with them (which means bend the rules that we have in place and make other vendors follow) that they will call the Congressman, and he doesn't want that. I just feel stuck between a rock and a hard place. I don't feel like Carahsoft wants to negotiate . . . they want to dictate. When I try to negotiate, or ask for information, they don't want to provide it, and [the Division Director] has told me they are going to call their Congressman, and it will come right back down to [their] or my lap to fix.
FAS management intervention in the Deloitte contracts included undocumented director discussions with Deloitte representatives without the knowledge or participation of contracting staff, directives to the contracting officer to take actions contrary to the contracting officer’s determinations, and reassignment of the contract to another contracting officer. This intervention usurped contracting officer authority and resulted in the award of a contract with inflated pricing and other terms and conditions unfavorable to the Government.
To me, one of the teachable moments of this report is that when structures are set up to "streamline" procurement, to place efficiency over integrity, issues such as this cannot come to light because there is no competitor in the process who would step in to complain. In this case it is a necessary precondition to having such a mechanism, in my mind, to have an independent and robust review mechanism that the contracting professionals can turn to and trust to "have their back".

While this post is has run on a bit, there is a lot more very interesting and human interaction detailed in the report that makes for valuable insight of what goes on at the coalface of procurement, and I highly recommend a read of it. It's only 15 pages long and you have already read a lot of it here.

Thursday, June 7, 2012

Procurement as Career Choice

Becoming a Procurement Person – Ellen Davis explains her move from HR
Davis was originally an HR manager in the MOD and moved to the UKHO 13 years ago. She worked on career development issues, and she says that she felt “I should think about my own career in the same way that I was advising others to do!”

Then, in around 2008, she saw a piece written by Amyas Morse in an MOD staff publication – Morse, who now heads up the National Audit Office, was then Commercial Director for the MOD. He explained that procurement in the MOD needed more “managers not technicians”, and outlined what a great career and profession one might have in MOD commercial / procurement. He must have been very persuasive, because Davis decided to make that move. She signed up for the MCIPS programme in 2009, paying for the first year of education herself, and before she actually had a job in the function – very brave!

Move on three years, and not only has she passed all her exams first time on her path to MCIPS, but she is now Head of Procurement in UKHO. She worked with an interim head for a year, an experienced procurement professional who acted as a mentor, and now heads a transformed procurement team and has recently also taken ownership of delivering an on demand digital print capability for her business.

“We’re becoming less transactional – we’ve introduced category management, nearly all of the team are now CIPS qualified, and we want to be seen as leaders in the public sector”, she explains.

The function achieved a 7% saving last year across the total organisational third party spend, and some of the savings have been invested in new projects.

“But I have found the public sector procurement constraints frustrating at times”, Davis says. “We can’t just ‘do deals’ even where we see real opportunities; we have to stick with the processes”. (Welcome to the world of public procurement, Ellen!)

Tuesday, February 7, 2012

Acquisition malpractice

If we are to consider that procurement staff should be identified as a profession, and certificated as such, then we must accept the concept of "acquisition malpractice". Still, this article is the first I've seen that uses the term (not that I've been around long enough or experienced the field wide enough to have had a significant exposure to the field).

Procurement chief knocks early F-35 production
“Putting the F-35 into production years before the first test flight was acquisition malpractice,” said acting Pentagon procurement chief Frank Kendall, speaking at a Monday event hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “It should not have been done.”

Kendall said that the Pentagon had made “optimistic” predictions about the capabilities of design tools, simulations and modeling to build a fighter that would breeze through test flights without problems.

“We didn’t model everything as precisely as we thought,” Kendall said. “Now we’re paying the price for being wrong.”

Transitioning from development to production is traditionally been one of the most difficult challenges for any program.

Kendall said there is a tendency to start production too early, adding that the F-35 is an “extreme example.”

Barry Watts, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C., agreed with Kendall’s assessment. But with then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates terminating the F-22 Raptor program, the Pentagon “has put all of its eggs in the JSF basket,” he said.

“My understanding is the amount of concurrency on this program is as great as or greater than any past program,” he said.

Watts, who has been to Lockheed’s Fort Worth, Texas, plant, described long lines of F-35s already being built. The F-35 is an extremely complicated engineering challenge with its many missions and three variants, Watts said.

“Most of those, if they’re going to be operational airplanes eventually, are going to have to go back and have a bunch of changes made to them,” he said. “That drives up cost and delays things.”

Watts said that the Pentagon should have insisted on more flight tests before starting low rate initial production.

Tuesday, February 8, 2011

Bidder dobs self in

There is probably more to this than meets the eye, but on face value, you have to admire the principled action taken by this preferred bidder.

Search and rescue helicopter bid process is halted
the preferred supplier, Soteria, admitted it had access to commercially sensitive information.

The Department for Transport and Ministry of Defence (MoD) said the preferred supplier would not be used.

In a statement to Parliament regarding the £6bn procurement programme, Transport Secretary Philip Hammond said: "In mid December, the Preferred Bidder in the SAR-H competition, Soteria, had come forward to inform the government of irregularities regarding the conduct of their bid team which had only then recently come to light.

"The irregularities included access by one of the consortium members, CHC Helicopter, to commercially sensitive information regarding the joint MOD/DfT project team's evaluations of industry bids and evidence that a former member of that project team had assisted the consortium in its bid preparation, contrary to explicit assurances given to the project team."


MORE: As I noted above, there would likely be more to this story. Evidently, this is having major ramifications, based on a report in the Financial Times, which says:
Cancelling the privatisation will also require the government to put in place some potentially costly interim measures to provide a continuation of service. Depending on the length of delay, this could include an upgrade to extend the air life of the existing Sea King helicopter fleet.

It will also amplify calls for a review of MoD rules on the employment of civil servants and military officers by defence companies during sensitive commercial competitions.
FT's report contains much more detail of the players and consequences of the situation. The Wall Street Journal also reported on the story, impressed by the size of the project and the global players involved in it.

Friday, November 26, 2010

Ireland schools also pay for unauthorized procurement

NI Department of Education launches procurement fraud probe
Northern Ireland’s Department of Education has launched fraud investigations into buying practices at two education authorities after discovering procurement irregularities in school contracts.

Launching the inquiries, education minister Caitríona Ruane informed the Northern Ireland Assembly of serious concerns surrounding procurement activities at the North Eastern Education and Library Board (NEELB) and the South Eastern Education and Library Board (SEELB).

The external investigation into the NEELB, County Antrim’s local education authority, follows its purchase of a £8.2 million school building for Magherafelt High school. This involved an agreement with a contractor without the full approval of the Department of Education. Despite lacking approval, the board paid the contractor for work.

The minister also expressed “serious concerns” around procurement practices at SEELB, which covers most of County Down and a small part of Country Antrim. She described a “suspected fraud” concerning the installation of heating equipment in a school, where second-hand burners were put in. Additional procurement irregularities linked to a maintenance contract led Ruane to commission an investigation into the contract and procurement practices at the SEELB.

Ruane has also instructed her department to create a Centre of Procurement Expertise for the education sector. It will carry out an assessment of the region’s capacity to manage contracts and procurement practices across the education sector.

She said: “In the light of these events I have determined that further action is needed to provide assurance to me as minister and to the executive that procurement practices across the education sector are professional.”

NI Education Minister’s Statement To Assembly On Procurement


Comment: The reference to "also" in the title to this post?
See this.

Sunday, November 21, 2010

Guam Procurement Institute -- a proposal

This is a column I wrote, appearing today in the Marianas Business Journal.

Professionalizing procurement staff
Lawyers, accountants, teachers and real estate agents get education and continuous formal training to do their jobs. Procurement staff get ... what?

When Guam adopted the American Bar Association Model Procurement Code as the basis for its own Procurement Act, the legislature simply passed over the part that required the establishment of a procurement institute for both public and private sector procurement staff.

The comments to the ABA Code point out that "procurement is a complex process which experience has shown can only be adequately learned over a period of time. Thus training in procurement is vital for new government employees without prior knowledge in the field."

"In addition, training courses should be reasonably available to vendor personnel, university professors, students and others. Experience has shown that when a vendor or other person affected by the system (and I might mention senators and agency heads in this context) makes an unnecessary mistake through a lack of knowledge of the ground rules of procurement, it causes friction and expense to the government."

The ABA Code envisioned a local procurement institute to provide formal and continuous procurement education and training, research, and a library of procurement resource material.

A procurement institute is not bricks and mortar. It is a curriculum under the guidance of an administrator. It is both a formal vehicle for theoretical and profession education as well as a community outreach program to provide broad exposure to the "ground rules of procurement."

Hawaii is an ABA Model Procurement Code state, and it has established its Hawaii Procurement Institute under the supervision of a law professor in the University of Hawaii's Richardson School of Law. Procurement is only 20% to 25% law. The rest is logistics, purchasing management, public administration, contract management, audit and accounting.

It is my suggestion that UOG's School of Business and Public Administration would be an excellent choice of host for a Guam Procurement Institute.

The U.S. government spends multiple millions of dollars on procurement staffing and training because it recognizes the critical role procurement plays in effective government and delivery of services.

In the U.S. Air Force, contracting is a career path. Following the example of the Air Force, the U.S. Army established a "Contracting Command" and staffed it with contracting professionals.

The head of the Army's Contracting Command, Edward Harrington, was recently interviewed in the Washington Post. He said "contracting is a practice, a profession. It is similar to law or engineering, where you develop your expertise and skills over a number of years. . . . It takes time to get the training as well as to get the experience with all of the various contracting regulations. Those mid- and senior-level individuals are essential to coaching, counseling and mentoring our entry-level people coming onboard. We do regular ethics training with our contracting workforce. We focus on procurement integrity and ensuring that we have no undue influence on the process or the people in the process."

It is my belief that a better educated, trained and professional Guam procurement workforce will reduce the instances of blunder in the management of the procurement processes, saving government and industry money, time and aggravation, and delivering the whole of government from the appearance of a dysfunctional and self-interested system of patronage.

Building a quality procurement system is like building a quality hotel. You can have the best design, plans, specifications, tools, material and equipment, but, without the skilled workforce, all you have is a pile of rubble.

FOLLOW UP:

The Guam Pacific Daily News ran this Editorial November 30, 2010:
Institute: Procurement process needs enforcement, education to work

The government of Guam continues to violate its own procurement rules and regulations due to systemic problems that paves the way for abuse.

Elected officials need to revamp the GovGuam procurement process and implement measures to ensure procurement laws and regulations are followed. We must also hold accountable those who don't follow the law.

The Department of Public Works has been "artificially" splitting large contracts into smaller, lower-priced ones to circumvent the competitive bidding process. This practice is allowed to continue because there is no effective penalty against doing so.

GovGuam has a long history of violating procurement rules. Agencies split contracts to circumvent the rules or fail to follow regulations that result in bid protests and delays to important projects.

This has to stop because our community can't afford to allow it to continue. We need to be able to trust that government agencies and employees will follow their own procurement rules and regulations.

Elected officials need to implement tighter controls on agencies and employees to ensure the procurement process is administered properly.

Guam also needs a "Procurement Institute," to educate and train local government employees in the procurement process. The lack of training is the most enduring and systemic problem with the island's procurement process, according to local attorney John Thos. Brown, author of "A Guam Procurement Process Primer."

According to Brown, when the island adopted its procurement code, lawmakers omitted provisions that required a funded procurement institute to hold procurement training for public- and private-sector procurement participants.

The incoming administration must work with lawmakers to make these changes happen. Elected officials need to make it clear to directors and employees that they must follow procurement laws and regulations. It's also important that whenever procurement rules aren't followed, that GovGuam hold accountable those responsible.

Government officials can't turn a blind eye or cast blame on the system. When agencies and employees fail to follow rules and regulations, they must be held to task for that failure.

Wednesday, June 30, 2010

The difference between public and private work

IG: Former postal marketing exec misused staff, contractors
The U.S. Postal Service's former top marketing executive repeatedly used government staff — and at least two business associates he hired with sole-source contracts — to manage his personal finances and outside business interests, according to a new report.

Bernstock told OIG investigators that in June 2009 — about a year after Bernstock joined the Postal Service — he told Postal Service general counsel Mary AnneGibbons that his staff sometimes worked on his personal business, which he thought was allowed.

Gibbons told him using postal staff to conduct his private business was "inappropriate."

"Gibbons physically ‘covered her ears' and was adamant that ‘she didn't want to talk about the past … do not do it,' " the report quoted Bernstock as saying.

"He said that was when he first appreciated the difference between working for the government and working in the private sector."

Among other findings by the OIG:

• Bernstock conducted negotiations with Costco to allow the company to sell Christmas stamps in bulk while owning $30,000 in the company's stock. Postal rules require an official owning more than $15,000 in stock in a company to recuse himself from any Postal Service dealings with that company.

• Bernstock failed to tell the Postal Service about several companies on whose boards he sat, and he used his office, computer and telephone to participate in teleconferences and meetings for several private companies on whose boards he serves.

• Bernstock tried to hire an unnamed postal staffer as a private employee to handle his personal affairs, but the agency's legal department advised against it. So Bernstock got that staffer a $10,000 annual retention bonus for the rest of his postal career, even though he admitted that staffer was not planning to leave the Postal Service.

• Between June 2008 and February 2010, one or more unnamed postal staffers sent or received 1,422 e-mails regarding Bernstock's outside businesses or from his tax accountant and financial adviser.

• An unnamed postal staffer created documents that supported an Ohio barbeque restaurant chain called City Barbeque, of which Bernstock is a co-owner. A postal staffer also e-mailed Bernstock's personal financial adviser to wire Bernstock money as a down payment to invest in the restaurant.

• Contractors Kimberly Wolfson and Lynne Alvarez, to whom Bernstock steered separate sole-source contracts in 2008, also sent one or more postal staffers e-mails with personal business documents related to City Barbeque and the convenience store chain The Pantry. Bernstock serves on the board of directors for The Pantry.

Postal Service spokeswoman Joanne Veto said the agency has tightened rules on noncompetitive contracting in response to the IG's investigation:

• Most postal executives no longer can approve their own department's sole-source contracts worth more than $1 million. Those deals now must be approved by Vice President for Supply Management Susan Brownell. Under the old rules, all noncompetitive contracts worth more than $250,000 had to be approved by the vice president of the organization requesting the contract, which allowed Bernstock to steer contracts to former business associates and approve the deals with little outside oversight.

• Contracting officers also must make sure that all necessary reviews and approvals, price determinations and supplier evaluations are documented and included in the contract file. The IG report found that many of Bernstock's sole-source contracts lacked documents explaining why they needed to be awarded noncompetitively.

• And Veto said the new rules "make clear that contracting officers, managers and executives avoid a professional conflict of interest or the appearance of a potential conflict of interest when considering sole-source contracts."

COMMENTARY: The ABA Model Procurement Code, and Guam law, contain provisions dealing with Ethics in Public Contracting, which note that public employment is a public trust and prohibit certain dealings involving conflicts of interest, among other things. See Guam Code Annotated Article 11, Chpt 5, Title 5, 5 GCA § 5601 et seq.

Of course, having the rules and paying attention to them are separate matters. There must be effective enforcement provisions and actions or they are worthless.

Monday, June 28, 2010

Effective procurement requires effective staffing

USAF Helps The Army Hit The Target
By the end of 2003, it was clear that bribery, and corruption in general, were going to be the biggest threat to stability and the introduction of democracy in Iraq. Massive dishonesty is a problem throughout the region

For example, captured Iraqi oil ministry documents revealed a pattern of international bribery, from the 1991 Gulf War until the 2003 invasion, involving millions of barrels of Iraqi oil (worth over $100 million). This was paid, in return for support for Saddam Hussein, to 46 organizations and individuals.

The recipients included prominent Arab families, religious organizations, politicians and political parties in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Sudan, China, Austria, France and several other countries.

Some of the organizations named, included the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian Communist Party, India's Congress Party and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Buying kind words is nothing new, but in a democracy, you're expected to be open about it. In the United States, lobbyists have to register with the government, and payments from foreign governments reported. In the Middle East, you give, or take, the money, do the job, and keep quiet about it. This was not unique to Iraq, after U.S. forces got into Afghanistan in late 2001, they captured Taliban records revealing that even these Holy Warriors had big problems with corruption.

Within Iraq, American civil affairs troops, and soldiers in general, constantly come up against Iraqis who offered to bribe them for special treatment. It's unnerving for Americans to encounter such a pervasively corrupt atmosphere. The Iraqis take it for granted that the rules are for fools and that you buy your way to success, and screw those who can't.

There were also problems with corruption among Kuwaiti government officials, who apparently demanded, and got, kickbacks from the American firms doing reconstruction work in Iraq. The corruption was not only pervasive, but often a major obstruction to getting anything done.

This was especially true in Kuwait, which was a U.S. ally, and not under the control of the American military, as was the case in Iraq. Thus Kuwaiti suppliers could sometimes threaten to hold up vital military operations unless a bribe was paid, The only choice was to pay, or delay (and have the State Department or senior U.S. military officials go through the Kuwaiti government to apply pressure to the obstructive supplier.)

There was a body of knowledge in the American military contracting community that U.S. Army officials could use to get around a lot of these problems. But the army didn't have it

So, following the example of the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Army established a "Contracting Command" and staffed it with contracting professionals, to handle the larger volumes of contract personnel and organizations hired for the war on terror. Iraq, in particular, was a struggle. There were nearly 200,000 contractor personnel in Iraq (including Kuwait) and Afghanistan, during peak operations. This was an unprecedented contracting situation for the American military.

Iraq was what broke the army's existing contracting capability. Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the army had one base in Kuwait (through which most army troops pass, on their way to Iraq), and contracting officers there handled $150 million worth of business a year. By 2007, there were eight bases in Kuwait, and a billion dollars a year in contracts to deal with. Since 2003, over 800,000 U.S. Army troops have passed through Kuwait, on their way to Iraq, where tens of billions in contracts have been issued, and often not administered well.

The army got lots of help from the air force, which sent many of its contracting officers to help out.
In the air force, contracting is a career path, and the air force people really knew their stuff. The army could see that after a few years, when they measured rate of contracts with problems, and found it was much lower for air force personnel than for army contracting officers.
It was only two years ago that the Army Contracting Command was established, with a strength of over 4,000 personnel, including 400 military and 1,100 civilian personnel specializing in contracting. The rest were existing acquisition people, who will benefit from having their own command and career path. The command is led by a Major (two star) General, and will take at least five years to come near the level of effectiveness the air force already enjoys in this area.

Wednesday, June 9, 2010

Pentagon looking for a few good procurement officers

Pentagon procurement officer describes overhaul in contracting
the Pentagon's deputy assistant secretary for procurement, Edward M. Harringto, helps oversee how the Army spends more than $132 billion annually, buying a range of items and services: from complex computer software to run electronics programs, to setting dining tents for soldiers in deserts, to buying armored tanks, ammunition and weapons from contractors.

Its "Contractors on the Battlefield" chart outlines the number of contractors compared with the number of soldiers since the American Revolution. Back then, the ratio of contractors to soldiers was 1:6. World War I, 1:20. Vietnam, 1:6. Gulf War, 1:60. Iraq, 1:1. Afghanistan, 2:1.

The office estimates that as the workload has increased 1,000 percent since 1987, the government's contracting workforce has decreased by 25 percent.

Harrington said the biggest challenge we have is restoring the contracting workforce. Building both the numbers of the workforce back as well as advancing their skills. As the contracting dollars have gone up, the government's contracting workforce has gone down. That left us with a relatively minimal staff of senior contracting experts.

Contracting is a practice, a profession. It is similar to law or engineering, where you develop your expertise and skills over a number of years. . . . It takes time to get the training as well as to get the experience with all of the various contracting regulations. Those mid- and senior-level individuals are essential to coaching, counseling and mentoring our entry-level people coming onboard.

We do regular ethics training with our contracting workforce. We focus on procurement integrity and ensuring that we have no undue influence on the process or the people in the process. Are we absolutely perfect? No. It is a matter of daily oversight on our part.

We have a five-year plan to insource a lot of our contracting manpower. We'll add about 4,100 people to our acquisition workforce.

It will be from engineers, to testers, to cost analyzers, to quality assurance personnel -- many of whom are currently contractors.

There's tremendous opportunity to grow. We have a career path, and it is a good, steady job.

COMMENT: Building a quality procurement system is like building a quality hotel. You can have the best design, plans, specifications, tools, material and equipment, but without the skilled workforce all you have is a pile of rubble.