Labels and Tags

Accountability (71) Adequate documentation (7) ADR in procurement (4) Allocation of risks (6) Best interest of government (11) Best practices (19) Best value (15) Bidder prejudice (11) Blanket purchase agreement (1) Bridge contract (2) Bundling (6) Cancellation and rejection (2) Centralized procurement structure (12) Changes during bid process (14) Clarifications vs Discussions (1) Competence (9) Competition vs Efficiency (29) Competitive position (3) Compliance (35) Conflict of interest (32) Contract administration (26) Contract disputes (4) Contract extension or modification (9) Contract formation (1) Contract interpretation (1) Contract terms (3) Contract types (6) Contract vs solicitation dispute (2) Contractor responsibility (20) Conviction (4) Cooperative purchasing (3) Corrective action (1) Cost and pricing (13) Debarment (4) Determinations (8) Determining responsibility (37) Disclosure requirements (7) Discussions during solicitation (10) Disposal of surplus property (3) Effective enforcement requirement (35) Effective procurement management (5) Effective specifications (36) Emergency procurement (14) eProcurement (5) Equitable tolling (2) Evaluation of submissions (22) Fair and equitable treatment (14) Fair and reasonable value (23) Fiscal effect of procurement (14) Frivolous protest (1) Good governance (12) Governmental functions (27) Guam (14) Guam procurement law (12) Improper influence (11) Incumbency (13) Integrity of system (31) Interested party (7) Jurisdiction (1) Justification (1) Life-cycle cost (1) Limits of government contracting (5) Lore vs Law (4) market research (7) Materiality (3) Methods of source selection (33) Mistakes (4) Models of Procurement (1) Needs assessment (11) No harm no foul? (8) Offer & acceptance (1) Other procurement links (14) Outsourcing (34) Past performance (12) Planning policy (34) Politics of procurement (52) PPPs (6) Prequalification (1) Principle of competition (95) Principles of procurement (25) Private vs public contract (17) Procurement authority (5) Procurement controversies series (79) Procurement ethics (19) Procurement fraud (31) Procurement lifecycle (9) Procurement philosophy (17) Procurement procedures (30) Procurement reform (63) Procurement theory (11) Procurement workforce (2) Procurment philosophy (6) Professionalism (17) Protest - formality (2) Protest - timing (12) Protests - general (37) Purposes and policies of procurement (11) Recusal (1) Remedies (17) Requirement for new procurement (4) Resolution of protests (4) Responsiveness (14) Restrictive specifications (5) Review procedures (13) RFQ vs RFP (1) Scope of contract (16) Settlement (2) Social preference provisions (60) Sole source (48) Sovereign immunity (3) Staffing (8) Standard commercial products (3) Standards of review (2) Standing (6) Stays and injunctions (6) Structure of procurement (1) Substantiation (9) Surety (1) Suspension (6) The procurement record (1) The role of price (10) The subject matter of procurement (23) Trade agreements vs procurement (1) Training (33) Transparency (63) Uniformity (6) Unsolicited proposals (3)
Showing posts with label Contractor responsibility. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Contractor responsibility. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 11, 2019

How do you determine prospective contractor responsibility if you don't know who the contractor really is?

The ABA Model Procurement Code, as do most other procurement regimes, require the government to know who it is doing business with.  "It is important that the bidder of offeror will be a responsible contractor -- that the contractor has the financial ability, resources, skills, capability, and business integrity necessary to perform the contract."  (MPC 3-401, Comment 1)

"The unreasonable failure of a bidder or offeror to promptly supply information in connection with an inquiry with respect to responsibility may be grounds for a determination of nonresponsibility with respect to such bidder or offeror".  (MPC 3-401(1))

Since the time the MPC was enacted in 1979, other laws were being developed to facilitate cloaks of invisibility for entities to hide the identities of the money, ownership, assets and control of  businesses organized under such laws.  The most recent has been the promulgation of a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) in 1995.  Use of LLCs to provide ownership anonymity of assets, and businesses, is easy (see "How to Hide Ownership of a Company?") and notorious (see, "Anonymous Owner, L.L.C.: Why It Has Become So Easy to Hide in the Housing Market").  The ULLCA, both in original form and in a revised 2006 Model, has been adopted on Guam and many U.S states.

This is becoming a problem, both in the U.S. and Europe, and presumably elsewhere, as indicated in the following article published by the Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists (ACFCS):

Report roundup: EU calls U.S. a ‘secrecy haven,’ GAO highlights commercial owner opacity, and more, posted March 16, 2017.
This week’s Report Roundup has a common theme running through hundreds of pages of reports: the risk of opaque ownership structures and how, in the United States and beyond, the inability for countries to collect beneficial ownership information is a magnet for bad actors.

In the U.S., that means a major ally in the European Union (EU) calling out a longstanding gap in the country’s anti-money laundering (AML) defenses: the federal government allowing certain states like Delaware to sell corporate secrecy as a service – an ultimate irony as this country aggressively chases and chastises other jurisdictions for doing the same thing, according to the report.

That vulnerability is made doubly dangerous when it intersects the international trading sector due to the knowledge that organized criminal groups, corrupt kleptocrats and terror financiers currently hide, funnel and legitimize trillions of dollars in illicit gains, per estimates, through a myriad of trade trickery, including under and over-invoicing items, falsifying documents and other tactics.

In that same vein, U.S. government watchdog group the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted in a report that because this country doesn’t broadly require ownership information to be made available, that can open the door to national security risks when government operations are housed in buildings owned by foreign entities who may or may not be a shell for prying, spying eyes bent on espionage.

Lastly, another report by United Nations Security Council highlighted that the issue of anonymous shell companies globally allows rogue regimes like North Korea to flout international sanctions and get access, as analysts prognosticate, to banned technology and weapons systems on its path to wreak worldwide havoc by creating weapons of mass destruction.
The article goes on to elaborate on some of those reports.

It is interesting that the article mentioned a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), being critical of lack of ownership information in the national security context, because the GAO has now, again, turned its eyes to the subject, in the context of procurement, in its November 2019 report below.  In its letter to Congress transmitting the report, it noted, 
DOD awards contracts to companies in the private sector to provide a wide variety of services for U.S. military forces. Of the thousands of contractors doing business with DOD, some companies are what are known as shell companies — that is, companies that exist but conduct either no business or minimal business. Shell companies can be used for legitimate purposes; for example, they may be formed to obtain financing before starting operations. However, companies sometimes use shell companies to form opaque ownership structures designed to disguise the beneficial owner — the natural person or persons who directly or indirectly own and control, or receive substantial economic benefit from, a company.

These opaque ownership structures can be used to facilitate fraud and other unlawful activity in commerce, including contracts with DOD. For this report, we define opaque ownership as structures of business governance that may conceal or obfuscate entities or individuals who own, control, or benefit financially from a business.
Ongoing DOD Fraud Risk Assessment Efforts Should Include Contractor Ownership  (some excerpts of the letter an other parts of the report, sliced and diced to meet the didactic goal and limited space of this blog; you should read the whole report for original meaning and intent):  In the letter mentioned above, it further noted:
We researched legal databases and news articles involving DOD contractors to identify federal court cases and agency decisions. We reviewed GAO bid-protest decisions to identify cases in which contractors may have failed to disclose foreign ownership or concealed beneficial-owner information to obtain contracts that they were not eligible to receive.  We examined known risks identified through our case-study research and interviews with DOD officials.  We further examined the risk that contractors could be disguising their ownership to create the appearance of competition.

We contacted several government contractors’ associations to gain members’ perspectives on reporting beneficial ownership information and received feedback from 16 members of three government contractors’ associations. The perspectives gained from our queries are not generalizable to all contractors.
In the body of the report, GAO found:  
As the number of layers of ownership increases, ownership information becomes more opaque. This opacity can make it difficult for DOD to determine which entities and individuals ultimately own or control its contractors.

In the United States, no centralized information source or national registry maintains company ownership information. In 2014, the National Association of Secretaries of State found that most states collect minimal ownership data. The association reviewed key information collected by the 50 states and the District of Columbia during the entity-formation process and in annual or periodic reports. During both the entity-formation process and in annual or periodic reporting, the association found that very few states collect some form of entity ownership or control information from limited liability companies or corporations.  The Securities and Exchange Commission collects some ownership information on publicly traded companies. Any person or group of persons that acquires beneficial ownership of more than 5 percent of a publicly traded company’s registered voting securities must register.

GSA’s System for Award Management (SAM) is a federal government-wide database for vendor data that is used across all federal agencies. Any entity that wishes to do business with the government must register in SAM to be eligible to receive a contract award, except in specific circumstances. To increase procurement transparency and traceability, entities that wish to do business with the federal government are now required to provide additional ownership information through the annual registration process in SAM. The required ownership information includes the “immediate” and “highest” level ownership of an offeror.

Responsibility Determination

Contract award decisions are based on evaluation factors and significant subfactors that are tailored to the procurement, at the discretion of procurement officials. At a minimum, these factors must include: price/cost, quality, and past performance. A prospective contractor must affirmatively demonstrate its responsibility, including, when necessary, the responsibility of its proposed subcontractors. Contracting officers must then determine the responsibility of prospective contractors, including whether prospective contractors can perform the terms of a contract. To be determined responsible, a prospective contractor must have adequate financial resources to perform the contract (or the ability to obtain them); be able to comply with the required delivery or performance schedule; have a satisfactory performance, integrity, and ethics record; have the necessary organization, experience, accounting and operational controls, and facilities to carry out the contract (or the ability to obtain them); and be otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under applicable laws and regulations.

Before awarding a contract over the simplified acquisition threshold, a contracting officer must review the prospective contractor’s performance and integrity information available in the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS). FAPIIS is a federal government-wide database designed to assist contracting officers with making a responsibility determination by providing integrity and performance information of covered federal agency contractors and grantees. FAPIIS provides a prospective contractor “Report Card” that includes information pertaining to the prospective contractor’s past performance (if applicable), such as any administrative agreements, contract terminations, nonresponsibility determinations, and exclusions, among other things. It also includes the ability to view the company relationship information, which details the ownership information that prospective contractors are required to report in SAM. When making a responsibility determination, the contracting officer must consider all the information available through FAPIIS with regard to the prospective contractor and any immediate owner, predecessor (an entity that the prospective contractor replaced by acquiring assets and carrying out affairs under a new name), or subsidiary identified for that prospective contractor in FAPIIS. The contracting officer must document in the contract file how the information in FAPIIS was considered in any responsibility determination, as well as the action that was taken as a result of the information.

Contractors with Opaque Ownership Pose Financial Fraud Risks Including Price Inflation

Concealing relationship with subcontractor to inflate prices. Contractors can subcontract with companies they own or control to inflate prices for financial benefit. For example, in one case the contractor purchased goods from a company that its owners created, controlled, and used to make fraudulent markups appear legitimate. Contractors or subcontractors can also bill for work not performed by creating fictitious invoices that add costs to a contract. For example, in four court cases we examined, multiple DOD subcontractors were actually shell companies that did not have the inventory they purported to ultimately provide to the government or perform the work indicated in the contract requirements. Contractors or subcontractors can conceal conflicts of interest for financial benefits. For instance, in one case a DOD contractor employee and his spouse formed a company and concealed their interests by not listing their names but listing the names of family members on formation documents. This company became a subcontractor to the company that employed the DOD contractor. The contractor employee, in his official position, wrote letters justifying awards of purchase orders to the subcontractor he owned and approving recommendations that the awards be made to the subcontractor. The co-owner of the subcontractor concealed her involvement by signing contracts using a different name. We also identified the potential risk of companies creating the appearance of competition by submitting bids from fictitious companies. We identified one case that involved a DOD contractor whose executives admitted as part of their plea agreements to creating fictitious, inflated bids that were not from actual businesses to ensure that the contractor’s own bid would be selected by DOD as the supposed lowest.

Contractors with Opaque Ownership Can Also Pose Nonfinancial Fraud Risks


Contractors can pose nonfinancial fraud risks to DOD by concealing their ownership structure to bid on and obtain contracts that they are not eligible to receive. These nonfinancial risks may not pose a direct financial cost to DOD, but they can allow ineligible companies to contract with DOD while potentially denying eligible companies from contracting with DOD. These risks can also lead to additional vulnerabilities. One contractor that fraudulently obtained set-aside contracts claimed it was owned by a service-disabled veteran; however, that veteran had virtually no involvement with the contractor. Some contractors have been found not eligible to receive the set-aside contracts because they were not at least 51 percent controlled by the eligible individuals and the eligible individuals did not make long-term decisions for the companies. Rather, the contractors were controlled by an ineligible individual who owned and controlled a separate company that actually performed work on the set-aside contracts.

Contractors with opaque ownership structures can also pose the risk of circumventing eligibility requirements for contracts that are only designated for domestic companies, which can lead to other vulnerabilities that affect warfighter readiness. We identified four cases in which individuals created domestic shell companies for foreign manufacturers and bid on contracts designated for domestic companies. In three of the four cases, the individuals behind the shell companies also had ownership interests in the foreign manufacturing companies. Foreign manufacturers received payments from the contracts, despite the contracts only allowing domestic manufacturers to be eligible, and one such manufacturer ultimately supplied DOD with defective and nonconforming parts that led to the grounding of at least 47 fighter aircraft.
I'm sure you get the drift here. There's much more in the GAO report, much more. Have a look. Of particular importance is the lengthy discussion of things that are needed to improve the system of contractor selection. In brief, in its conclusions, the report summarizes,
We recognize that collecting additional ownership information, including beneficial-ownership information, could pose compliance burdens for contractors; and regulatory trends have generally focused on easing the burden to do business. Additionally, verifying contractor ownership can be challenging and time-consuming. Nevertheless, having a thorough assessment of contractor-ownership risks will better position DOD to make informed decisions on how best to use its resources and help ensure that the department’s fraud risk management program is organized and targeted to manage risks in a prioritized manner.

POST SCRIPT: In another new development along the lines of tracking who is whom, note the following article reprinted in Lexology:

Government Contractors Beware: DOJ Announces Creation of Interagency Procurement Collusion Strike Force
On November 5th, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division doubled down and announced the formal launch of the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (“PCSF”), an interagency partnership consisting of prosecutors and investigators focused on deterring, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting antitrust crimes, such as bid-rigging conspiracies and related fraudulent schemes in government procurement, grant, and program funding.





Monday, December 25, 2017

Crikey! Wot a rort!

I remind my reader to click the links to the articles presented and read the originals, as I slice and dice the material for didactic purposes in order to try to present a "teachable moment". These posts are mostly to be considered as hypothetical procurement case studies, not news or other literary content, and omit, paraphrase and rearrange a lot of original material. You've been warned, again.

Allegations of systemic fraud sparked Defence Department internal audit
Confidential documents drafted by a senior defence department investigator reveal allegations of systemic fraud spanning several years inside the government's biggest spender. The 10-month investigation, which finished in February this year, was prompted by an anonymous disclosure about fraud and corruption made to the department in April 2016.

One of the most concerning aspects involved the department awarding companies contracts without a competitive tender process and only a flimsy justification they met "value for money" requirements. In other cases the department was unable to tell whether a contract breached procurement rules or not because important paper work could not be found.

In 2015-16 the Department of Defence reported the largest yearly contract spend of any agency within the public service. The department dialled-up a bill of $30.5 billion on contracts, amounting to 54 per cent of total government contractor spending.

The investigation raised serious questions about the department's use of "single source" tenders, where a single company is awarded a contract without having to compete against other providers. "It is questionable whether true value for money is achieved when [redacted] continually conduct single source limited tenders," Dr Clarke wrote. "Whilst there is less administration and quicker decision making with this approach, it provides limited opportunity for Defence to achieve the best possible outcome. "Single source limited tenders increase the risk of contractor underperformance and corruption."
Defence spending data unreliable, incomplete, national audit office says
Transparency and accountability for billions of dollars of annual defence spending remains suspect despite recent reforms, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) has found.

Last year, the Defence Department spent $8.3 billion on keeping its equipment in working order, known as "sustainment" in military jargon. Yet, the audit office found that despite small recent improvements, information about where that money went and whether it was being spent wisely was often unreliable or not available.

The report also questions a claim from Defence that reforms to its sustainment policies had saved $2 billion. "Defence has not been able to provide the ANAO with adequate evidence to support this claim, nor an account of how $360 million allocated as 'seed funding' for Smart Sustainment initiatives was used," it read.

Auditors were also critical of inconsistencies between figures given to the Government during the budget process and those provided in the department's annual report. "It's absolutely not good enough," Andrew Davies, director of defence and strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, told AM.
Oz military megahack
An Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) presentation to the Australian Information Security Association (AISA) conference yesterday detailed the hack. Suffice to say that a medium-sized defence contractor was breached and gigabytes of aerospace data and commercial arrangements for military aircraft and naval vessels were delivered into the hands of the attackers. The ASD used it as a case study for the AISA conference yesterday.

The government has since said the information was commercial-in-confidence, but not classified. This is not an isolated incident: in Australia, as elsewhere, attackers thwarted by a network's defences then seek out third-party contractors as an easier mark.

This suggests a problem in sub-contractor oversight – you can win a government contract without proving you have adequate network security.

Minister for Defence Industry Christopher Pyne seems to agree. This morning, he told Radio National's Breakfast programme that the government can't be held responsible for a contractor's lax security.
Fat and mismanaged public sector is eating us alive
In a Crikey article, carried by the Community and Public Services Union, Eric Beecher chronicles appalling mismanagement in service delivery.

Then there’s the $11 billion spent by the Defence Department managing 119 bases around Australia which the ANAO says is well in excess of the $9.3bn “expected value” of the 10 services contracts, signed in 2014, to do the work. The department has defended its performance, saying the vast project to renegotiate the contracts has delivered value for money, when considered against increased service demands and changing expectations of the ADF. Yet a new $120 million IT system, meant to manage contracts ­between Defence and the private companies servicing the bases, was $39m over budget and five years late.

There’s also the flawed tendering and contracting processes overseen by the Immigration ­Department, which resulted in the waste of “tens and possibly, hundreds of millions of dollars”. Given these practices were subject to a scathing ANAO report, they could hardly be ignored.

We’re reminded of last year’s Australian Bureau of Statistics census “stuff-up”, the Australian Taxation Office’s massive and damaging IT outage, the Department of Health’s decade-long mismanagement of e-health records, and the embarrassing release of identifiable Medicare information. There’s also the Department of Finance’s lax oversight of ministerial travel arrangements. But not raised is the $576m public service travel bill — a blowout of $75m in just four years.

While this shocking record is acknowledged, Beecher argues the blame lies mainly with outsourcing to powerful private contractors.
Outsourcing failures expose weaknesses in both government and business
The problems of dealing with private sector providers and contractors are a persistent theme in the analysis of government shortcomings. For example, recent Australian National Audit Office reports highlighted contracting problems in Air Services Australia, the Defence Department and the Immigration Department. Contract management issues were at the heart of last year's failed online census and have been a constant factor in the turbulent administration of Australia's controversial offshore detention centres. Over-reliance on contracted consultants was a major cause of the botched home insulation scheme.

Given the extent to which governments rely on private contractors for a large range of goods and services, it is unsurprising that contractors are often in the frame when things go wrong. But many of the recurring issues arise out of factors specific to the contracting process.

A common complaint is that the use of contractors has caused agencies to run down their in-house expertise and technical resources. As a result, it can be argued, agencies lack the capacity to assess whether the contracts they are agreeing to give the government and taxpayer adequate value for money. Without their own professional judgment, grounded in technical knowledge and practical experience of the area in question, public service managers are ill-equipped to decide matters of all-round quality. Instead, they tend to fall back on generic checklists of assessment criteria that emphasise easily specifiable factors, such as cost and timeliness.

Alternatively, if funds allow and time permits, they may contract in an external consultant or commissioner to give an expert opinion on a proposed contract. But such advice carries the risks of perverse incentives attached to all forms of external contracting and consulting. The consultants' objective is to gain future contracts, which encourages them to say what they think governments want to hear in preference to what they ought to hear. Once again, without the professional judgment to tell the difference and without their own in-house, trusted staff to advise them, public service managers are at the mercy of self-interested outsiders. This vulnerability is compounded by the lack of transparency that surrounds contracting. Overuse of commercial-in-confidence provisions has shielded public servants from the bracing effects of public scrutiny.

The lack of in-house capacity can affect not only the initial process of drawing up contracts but also the oversight of how contracts are implemented. However, as the constant stream of scandals illustrates, many commercial providers are more interested in profit than in good service and cannot be trusted to do the right thing. As a result, governments are being driven to impose tighter controls and regulations. Even then, in the face of determined rorting and corner-cutting, most government agencies lack the resources to prevent opportunistic contractors from wrongfully expropriating public funds.

After two decades of wholesale outsourcing, some general conclusions are clear. Contracting out is an efficient and effective alternative to in-house provision where the objectives are clear and easily monitored, and where there is a competitive market of alternative providers. It also works well for more complex services where providers can be trusted to pursue public-interest objectives for their own reasons. However, where these conditions of either simplicity or trust do not apply, the risks that governments will not receive value for money start to build. Moreover, extensive experience with outsourcing has itself compounded these risks by reducing governments' capacity to effectively draw up and monitor outsourcing contracts. Some complex service contracts that could have been safely contemplated a generation ago are now beyond the professional expertise of public servants to administer.

politicians need to recognise that outsourcing complex government services requires the development of trust between the parties, which means looking beyond the short-term bottom line and not always preferring the cheapest option. In addition, successful contracting depends on well-resourced government agencies with the skills and experience necessary to manage ongoing relationships with contractors. Running down government staffing levels while relying more on private contractors is a recipe for continuing policy failure.

Contractors, for their part, must earn the right to be treated as trusted partners. They must be prepared for the long haul and willing to learn from experience. They must also be ready to submit to the level of public scrutiny and accountability that public servants take for granted. Indeed, given that the commercial private sector is not imbued with the same commitment to serving the public interest, there is a case for subjecting private contractors to more scrutiny than the public service, not less.

Monday, December 19, 2016

Minor post-bid mistatkes

Protests arise following Shop Road extension contract award
The Richland County Council has spoken on a contract for a $25 million road project aimed at sparking industrial development. However, one of the firms that lost out is still fighting to overturn the decision.

On Friday, attorney Kathleen McDaniel for Richardson Construction Company, a Richland County-based company, went to court in a last ditch effort to win a contract of at least $22 million dollars. She says the contract was wrongly awarded to another bidder. “We believe this is not consistent with Richland County's procurement ordinance.”

McDaniel admits Richardson made a minor and easily correctable mistake on its bid proposal. However, that mistake could cost taxpayers about $2.9 million if the contract goes to McClam and Associates - the highest bidder and the one approved by a 9-2 majority of the county council.

“The county has a concern that if they permit any type of revision to a bid, post-bid I think, that would be inconsistent with the county procurement code. I think we just have a different interpretation of what the procurement code permits and that's why we will be filing a protest with the Richland County procurement review board,” McDaniel said.

It won't be easy for Richardson to prevail, however. Richland County Council's Torrey Rush and others in county government are worried about setting a precedent for other bidders to try to change their proposals after submitting them. County government is also concerned that overturning the decision could cause construction delays and problems for development of another project dependent on the road.

Read more and more accurately at the link.

In a related article, Construction company suing Richland County over Shop Road project, it is reported:
The plaintiff, Richardson Construction Co. of Columbia, says it was the lowest bidder for the project by $3 million but made what it considers a minor mistake in its bid that caused the county not to consider the company for the job. Richardson’s complaint was filed Thursday in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas.

County administrator Gerald Seals has told County Council the county’s procurement laws do not require the county to allow bidders to correct errors in bids once the bids have been opened.

Read more and more accurately at the link.
The American Bar Association procurement law and regulations have provisions that speak to this situation, and could aid Attorney McDaniel if the same or substantively similar rules apply in Richland County and the facts are amenable.

Guam's procurement law is based on the ABA model, so I will refer to the Guam version.  Guam has a regulation dealing with mistakes in bids, generally, and with mistakes made in various stages of the solicitation process. 2 GAR § 3109(m)(4) particularly deals with mistakes made after bid opening but before award.

Generally speaking, the rule distinguishes between mistakes of judgment and other non-judgmental mistakes. "If the mistake is attributable to an error in judgment, the bid may not be corrected. Bid correction or withdrawal by reason of a nonjudgmental mistake is permissible, but only to the extent it is not contrary to the interest of the territory or the fair treatment of other bidders." (§ 3109(m)(1).)

A nonjudgmental mistake made after opening but before award may consist of a minor informality or a matter of substance that is insignificant. Such insignificant mistakes "can be waived or corrected without prejudice to other bidders; that is, the effect on price, quantity, quality, delivery, or contractual conditions is negligible. The Procurement Officer shall waive such informalities or allow the bidder to correct them depending on which is in the best interest of the territory." (§ 3109(m)(4).)

This regulation is specifically backed up by statute: "Correction or withdrawal of inadvertently erroneous bids before or after award, or cancellation of awards or contracts based on such bid mistakes, shall be permitted in accordance with regulations...." (5 GCA § 5211(f).) The corresponding ABA Model Procurement Code cite is §3-202(6) and the Model Regulation is §R3-202.11.

As an aside, regulation § 3109(m)(4) incidentally provides a guide to what is meant by the term "bidder prejudice", indeed it is the only reference in the Model Code and Regulation that comes close to specifically defining the term. 

Insignificant mistakes, the regulation tells us, can be waived or corrected "without prejudice to other bidders; that is, the effect on price, quantity, quality, delivery, or contractual conditions is negligible". Thus, a claim of bidder prejudice must be based in something in the bid that has an effect on price, quantity, quality, delivery, or contractual condition which is more than negligible. For instance, bidder responsibility is based on factors concerning the nature of the bidder, not the nature of the bid. This can be a handy guide to distinguishing between what constitutes an issue of responsiveness and what constitutes a matter of responsibility.

Saturday, March 14, 2015

Charity begins at homage?

Click links to articles.

Longtime USAID contractor embroiled in scandal fires top managers, others
International Relief and Development Inc., once one of the largest nonprofit contractors working for the U.S. Agency for International Development, has dismissed its board of directors and laid off 21 employees in an effort to stabilize the struggling organization, senior managers said Friday.

The managers are trying to lift a Jan. 26 suspension issued by USAID, preventing the nonprofit group from receiving federal work. The agency reported that it had found evidence of “serious misconduct” at IRD, including allegations of unchecked spending and mismanagement in humanitarian and stabilization programs, many of them in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since 2007, IRD has received nearly $2.4 billion to administer USAID-funded programs.
Nonprofit contractor sent government $1.1 million bill for parties and retreats
The largest nonprofit contractor working for the U.S. Agency for International Development during the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan billed the government $1.1 million for staff parties and pricey retreats — three of them held at one of the poshest destinations on the East Coast, Nemacolin Woodlands Resort in Pennsylvania.

Attendance was compulsory, and more than 100 IRD employees went to two of the mountain retreats. Among the perks they received at Nemacolin: private rooms; open bars; gala dinner parties; free iPods at one retreat, Nikon Coolpix cameras at another; skeet-shooting outings at the resort’s Field Club; extreme-driving classes at its Jeep Off-Road Driving Academy; and complimentary $50 gift certificates to spend on clothing, jewelry, massages — whatever the employees wanted.

“It was scandalous,” said Andrea Clarke, IRD’s former media and communications officer, who attended the 2008 retreat. “I remember thinking, ‘We’re dealing with issues where people are actually dying overseas, and here we were at this five-star resort and we are living it up.’ There were alarm bells going off every day. It was no way to run a nonprofit.”

In January, USAID suspended IRD from receiving any more federal work, citing other spending that involved “serious misconduct.”

The couple who presided over IRD — Arthur B. Keys, an ordained minister, and his wife, Jasna Basaric-Keys — retired from the nonprofit last summer. Attorneys for the couple have denied any wrongdoing, saying, “Dr. Keys made sure that things were charged correctly.” A new chief executive, Roger Ervin, took over at IRD in December and has forced seven of the nonprofit group’s longtime officers to resign and removed its board members. The nonprofit’s annual revenue from USAID has plummeted from $587 million in 2010 to $78 million last year.

IRD was one of the biggest beneficiaries of U.S.-financed projects in Iraq and Afghanistan designed to rebuild the countries and quell insurgencies after the U.S. invasions. Of the more than $2.4 billion IRD has collected from USAID since 2007, 82 percent went toward projects in the battle zones. “It was heartbreaking,” said one former IRD employee who attended the Nemacolin conference and spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the ongoing investigations. “We had all of these people working on programs in Third World countries, and then there were all of these people trying to get as much money as they could out of the programs.”
For departing USAID administrator, Afghanistan is rarely mentioned
Despite $100 billion and counting in reconstruction funding from the United States since 2001, Afghanistan has rarely rated a mention by Shah, particularly during his last year. With USAID’s Afghanistan projects fraught with graft, questionable spending and corruption by Afghan contractors and some major U.S. partners, the agency has struggled to prove its programs’ success and justify continued U.S. government spending in the war-riven nation. During his five years at USAID, he has made three visits to the region, according to the official agency website.

For years, John Sopko, the top U.S. government official tasked with oversight of spending in Afghanistan, and his staff at the Congress-appointed office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) have attempted to verify USAID’s spending on development programs in that country. He says he has been routinely frustrated by the agency’s inability to specify initiatives that have worked.

“I said, ‘Can you point to any program? Is it better to put money into building schools, or was it better to hire teachers, or was it better to train?’” he says. “The American taxpayer deserves an answer. Congress deserves an answer.”

Last year SIGAR concluded that the success of USAID’s spending on women-related projects in Afghanistan could not be evaluated because the agency was unable to identify which portions of programs specifically related to women.

Saturday, January 24, 2015

You can't get just anything you want at the FSS restaurant

Apologies to Arlo Guthrie.

This is not an accurately complete rendition of the GAO's decision. Read that at the link.

Matter of: US Investigations Services, Professional Services Division, Inc.: B-410454.2, January 15, 2015
DIGEST: Protest against issuance of a task order to a vendor for support services pursuant to its General Services Administration Federal Supply Schedule contract is sustained where the record does not support contracting agency’s determination that the services called for under the task order were within the scope of the vendor’s contract.
US Investigations Services, Professional Services Division, Inc. (USIS) protests the issuance of a delivery order to FCi Federal, Inc. under request for quotations (RFQ) issued by the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for services in connection with the agency’s Name Check and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)/Declassification programs. The Delivery Order was issued under FCi’s Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contract.

The RFQ contemplates the award of a fixed-price delivery order for a 12-month period of performance. The successful contractor will provide personnel to perform services in connection with the agency’s National Name Check Program. Under that program, the successful contractor will provide research, analytical, and reporting services for authorized federal agencies. Essentially, contractor personnel research FBI files to provide available and appropriate information within legal and policy constraints. The RFQ also contemplates services in connection with the agency’s FOIA/Declassification program. Under that program, the successful contractor will provide services to the agency in connection with responding to FOIA requests, and also in making determinations regarding the appropriate classification of national security related information.

The agency received three quotations in response to the solicitation. All three quotations were found technically acceptable, and all three firms also received past performance ratings of good. FCi submitted the lowest price of $13,298,366, followed by USIS and the third firm. The agency made award to FCi because it submitted the lowest price.

After being advised of the agency’s issuance of a task order to FCi, USIS filed this protest. USIS alleges that issuance of a task order to FCi was improper because the labor categories required to perform the task order are not on FCi’s FSS contract. The protester maintains that the agency erred in finding that the labor categories included on the awardee’s FSS contract encompass the types of employees required to perform the requirement. We agree with the protester that the labor categories included on FCi’s FSS contract do not encompass the solicited services.

As a general matter, FSS procedures provide agencies a simplified process for obtaining commonly used commercial supplies and services and, although streamlined, by regulation, satisfy the requirement for full and open competition. However, non-FSS products and services may not be purchased using FSS procedures; their purchase requires compliance with otherwise applicable procurement laws and regulations, including those requiring the use of full competitive procedures.

Where an agency announces its intention to order from an existing FSS, all items quoted and ordered are required to be on the vendor’s schedule contract as a precondition to its receiving the order. In the case of a services task order such as the one at issue here, all of the solicited labor categories must be on the successful vendor’s FSS contract.

The RFQ here essentially included four principal labor categories: research analysts, program managers, general consultants, and legal administrative specialists. For three of the four labor categories -- research analysts, general consultants, and legal administrative specialists -- FCi proposed a single labor category from its FSS contract, program management analyst. FCi’s FSS contract includes the following description of its program management analyst labor category:
Plans and provides analytical support for facilitation, methodology development and evaluation, business management techniques, and organizational development. Supports business process improvements and modernization projects. Key responsibilities include: Developing modern business methods, identifying best practices, and creating and assessing performance measurements.
An examination of the labor categories required under the RFQ, however, shows that the duties, responsibilities and qualifications of the types of employees solicited by the agency are not encompassed within FCi’s program management analyst labor category.

Comparing the above-quoted definitions found in FCi’s FSS contract and the RFQ, we conclude that FCi’s program management analyst labor category does not include many of the requirements for the labor categories identified in the RFQ. For example, FCi’s labor category description makes no mention of experience with paralegal, records management, declassification review or historical research career fields, and also makes no mention of in-depth knowledge of FBI policy, functions, and familiarity with other government agencies’ functions. FCi’s labor category description also makes no mention of applying knowledge of administrative principles, practices, and techniques; organizing and maintaining files and database record keeping systems; preparing, writing, editing, and creating graphs and charts; or drafting, reviewing, evaluating, and processing technical and administrative documents.

Instead of the disciplines and career fields identified in the RFQ, the principal disciplines and capabilities described in FCi’s program management analyst labor category are the development of business methods, the identification of best practices, and creating and assessing performance measurements. The focus of FCi’s labor category appears principally to be the development of business techniques and organizational development activities. Simply stated, none of the responsibilities or activities described in FCi’s labor category description -- identified as ‘key’ responsibilities in FCi’s labor category description -- is germane to the work required under the RFQ.

The contemporaneous evaluation record does not show that the agency gave any meaningful consideration to the question of whether or not FCi’s FSS contract included labor categories that encompassed the requirements of the task order. In this connection, the agency’s individual evaluators did not prepare any narrative materials when reviewing the proposals. The agency’s summary technical evaluation report and award determination similarly are devoid of any meaningful consideration of whether award could be made to FCi in light of the labor categories available under its FSS contract.

Finally, in responding to the protest, the agency states only generally that it gave consideration to whether or not FCi’s FSS contract included labor categories that encompassed the requirements of the RFQ. Even in responding to USIS’s specific allegations, the agency has not meaningfully or critically analyzed the question, or explained how it reasonably could reconcile the apparent divergence between FCi’s labor category description quoted above and the requirements of the RFQ.

[But here, the GAO ran into an obstacle preventing the usually implemented remedial recommendation, because the FBI pulled a quicky ("urgent and compelling") stay override.]

In light of our discussion above, we conclude that FCi is ineligible for award because the labor categories required to perform are not available under FCi’s FSS contract.

Ordinarily, our Office would recommend that the agency terminate the task order issued to FCi because FCi is ineligible for award. However, during the pendency of the protest, the agency elected to override the automatic stay of performance of the FCi task order based on urgent and compelling circumstances.

Accordingly, we recommend that the agency consider the feasibility of terminating the task order awarded to FCi. Should the agency conclude that it is not feasible to terminate FCi’s task order, we recommend that USIS be reimbursed the costs associated with preparing its quotation in response to the RFQ. In addition, and regardless of whether or not the agency decides to terminate FCi’s task order, we recommend that USIS be reimbursed the costs associated with filing and pursuing its protest, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. In the alternative, if the agency determines that it is feasible to terminate FCi’s task order, we recommend that the agency make award to the concern next in line for award, if otherwise proper.

It is perhaps worth reminding here that the GAO, which hears most protests in federal government contracting, has no enforcement power, thus "recommends" remedial actions it finds appropriate. The overwhelming majority of these recommendations are, however, adhered to by agencies.

Also, though not directly related to the focus of the decision, the GAO's decision included a very instructive footnote, as well as a "zingy":
[1] USIS alleges that the agency improperly found FCi’s prices reasonable. According to the protester, because FCi did not propose labor categories that were required by the RFQ, the firm’s proposed hourly rates were unreasonably low. There is no merit to this aspect of USIS’s protest. In a fixed-price contract setting, determinations of price reasonableness relate to whether a firm’s proposed prices are too high, not too low. An allegation that a firm’s prices are too low does not provide a basis for our Office to object to the agency’s price evaluation.

USIS also challenges the agency’s evaluation of its past performance. We have considered this aspect of its protest and conclude that USIS’s allegation amounts to no more than disagreement with the agency’s evaluation findings in the area of past performance. USIS’s disagreement with the agency’s evaluation, without more, does not provide a basis for our Office to find the agency’s evaluation unreasonable.

[4] It would appear that USIS is the next firm in line for award. In considering whether or not award to USIS is otherwise proper, the agency will be required to find the firm responsible. In a recent decision of our Office, we specifically questioned an affirmative determination of USIS’s responsibility made by the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, because the record demonstrated that the contracting officer there failed to consider specific allegations of fraud advanced by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in a civil suit filed against USIS’s parent company, USIS LLC; failed to consider the relationship between USIS and its parent concern; and applied an incorrect legal standard in determining whether USIS was responsible. FCi Federal, Inc., B-408558.4, et al., Oct. 20, 2014, 2014 CPD ¶ 308 at 11. [See also, The responsibility to consider all factors to make a determination of responsibility]

Tuesday, December 16, 2014

Integrity -- Sometimes it's the "little" things

One of the "three overarching principles" of procurement law is integrity, according to Prof. Steven Schooner's famous Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law available here and here.

Integrity is also a key standard of responsibility required of anyone wanting to become a government contractor. See ABA Model Procurement Regulation R3-401.01.1(c), and Guam Regulation 2 GAR § 3116(2)(A)(iii).

Personal integrity, of course, follows you wherever you go: if you have it. It is not something you get once, put it on the shelf, and forget about it. It is something that requires consistent care and attention.

In the current environment of the embarrassed (we'd hope) financial industry, we see that it can come down to basic character as revealed in little things.

Dishonesty at Heart of Ban for Ex-BlackRock Director Train Cheat
A former managing director at BlackRock Asset Management Investor Services Ltd. has become an emblem of regulators' efforts to crack down on ethical lapses. The U.K. Financial Conduct Authority banned Jonathan Burrows from all regulated financial-services work, saying he “lacks honesty and integrity” after cheating to pay less for his commute.

On Nov. 19, 2013, Burrows was stopped by a transport officer at the exit gates of London’s Cannon Street station for not having a ticket valid for his entire journey. The former money manager used his London travel card to exit the station, paying 7.20 pounds rather than the 21.50 pounds he should have paid for traveling in from beyond the capital’s borders. Burrows told the FCA that he’d done it a number of times and knew he’d been breaking the law.

Burrows’s exploitation of the way railway prices are calculated echoes the behavior of traders who tried to profit by gaming currency and interest-rate benchmarks -- in the face of rules requiring honest personal conduct. Banning someone from the industry over conduct outside the workplace shows how far the FCA is willing to reach as it tries to rebuild trust in London’s financial markets, lawyers said.

The FCA requirements for so-called approved persons “are not simply limited to conduct in the workplace between 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.,” said Simon Hart, a London-based lawyer at RPC LLP. “While the FCA are not there to punish every minor infringement of the law outside of work, his actions were deemed dishonest and that is where the line is drawn.”

The regulator is working to tighten its scrutiny of people going into roles that require its authorization -- typically client-facing work -- and honesty, integrity and reputation are three core values it looks at when considering whether to grant approval to work in the industry.
Think this might just catch on in government contracting? The principle is the same.

Monday, July 28, 2014

Non-responsibility, suspension and debarment

This post is inspired by a well written article describing debarment by the Canadian government I happened to read. Since I am neither licensed nor competent to comment at all on Canadian law I will only comment on what may be a contrast between common US practice.  I will set out the author's counsel without the cut, paste, paraphrasing that I usually apply, though I will be selective, so better to read the whole article for context as well as accuracy, as you should with every article cited on this blawg. 

Besides which, there are in this article and those in other posts, many points of information and issues raised that I do not focus on; even more reason to read the original piece at the link provided.

A practical approach to navigating debarment by the Canadian government
Federal debarment of contractors that violate federal contracting rules is sharply on the rise. The recent Integrity Framework[1] issued by Public Works and Government Services Canada is fuelled by a desire for government accountability in an age of unprecedented government spending. The consequences of debarment are significant and include the right of the government to terminate the contract for default and to demand the immediate return of any advance payments made.

The federal government uses debarment to ensure that contracts are awarded only to “reliable and dependable” contractors. In simple terms, debarment amounts to a government-wide ban. Federal departments are prohibited from doing business for a period of 10 years with an individual contractor that has engaged in improper conduct. Unlike in other jurisdictions, Canada’s debarment regime is not codified under any particular statute or regulation but rather is a policy[2] administered through a series of certifications and standard terms and conditions given by the bidder or contractor in its proposal or contract with the government.

A contractor may be debarred from participating in government procurements for 10 years from the date when the contractor or its affiliate has been convicted of an “integrity offence.” Integrity offences include bribery of Canadian and foreign public officials, extortion, tax evasion, bid-rigging, forgery, fraudulent manipulation of stock exchange transactions, insider trading, falsification of books, money laundering and acceptance of secret commissions.

Canada’s debarment regime is implemented by way of a series of certifications provided by the bidder in federal government solicitation documents and resulting contracts. The bidder or contractor, as the case may be, must certify in its bid (or contract) that neither it, nor any member of its board of directors or any of its affiliates has a conviction or been discharged of any of the following integrity offences during the previous 10 years....

A bidder that is unable to provide the certifications will be “debarred” or disqualified from the bidding process. The government has retained for itself the right to enter into a contract with an otherwise non-compliant bidder when it is in the “public interest” to do so, which includes when no one else is capable of performing the contract or for reasons related to emergency, national security, health and safety or economic harm.
I was interested in how much this subject matter is so similar to Guam law and its American Bar Association Model Code inspiration. But also a tad perplexed.

One the one hand, it appears that failure to certify integrity by way of certain affirmative certifications disqualifies a bidder from the bidding process.   But at the same time, it suggests that such failure is an automatic debarment. Consider these statements from the article:
The federal government uses debarment to ensure that contracts are awarded only to “reliable and dependable” contractors.

A bidder that is unable to provide the certifications will be “debarred” or disqualified from the bidding process.

In simple terms, debarment amounts to a government-wide ban.

A contractor may be debarred from participating in government procurements for 10 years from the date when the contractor or its affiliate has been convicted of an “integrity offence.

In our regime, the legislation and policy have the same goals: "to ensure that contracts are awarded only to “reliable and dependable” contractors". Unless I missed the intent of the article, however, our regime differentiates from eliminating a bidder "from the bidding process", and invoking "a government-wide ban" on the contractor.

Under our regime, no bidder or offeror (or contractor tendering a proposal) is eligible to receive an award if found to be "nonresponsible". Responsibility is a judgment made by the contracting officer considering a variety of "Standards of Responsibility", which are not restricted to self-certification. (See Guam Procurement Regulation 2 GAR § 3116(b)(2), and ABA Model Procurement Regulation R-3.401.02.) 

Responsibility is defined in terms of capability to perform, as well as integrity and reliability. (See Guam law 5 GCA § 5201(f); ABA Model Code 3-101(6).)

Thus, a bidder lacking in integrity may be found nonresponsible even if capable, and a bidder lacking in capability may be found nonresponsible even if of high integrity.  Responsibility does not necessarily hinge on improper behaviour alone.

Since capability is a factor even when there is no question of integrity, in our regime, we do not automatically suspend or debar a contractor which is found to be nonresponsible; it may be have capabilities to perform adequately in another contracting context.

There is, though, a separate process by which bidders or offerors may be suspended or debared "from consideration for award of contracts" (suspension being instant but lasting only 3 months, and debarment allows for hearing and lasts for 3 years; see, Guam law 5 GCA § 5426 and ABA Model Code 9-102). 


Among reasons substantiating a suspension or debarment are findings of convictions of certain crimes evidencing lack of commercially moral turpitude, deliberate failure without good cause to perform, a recent record of failure to perform or of unsatisfactory performance caused by acts beyond the control of the contractor, violation of procurement ethics, and filing a frivolous or fraudulent petition, protest or appeal under the procurement law.

Although contracts may contain provisions allowing for termination of the contract by the government, the suspension or debarment does not automatically apply to continued performance of a contract, since is specifically applies to "consideration for award of contracts".

Thursday, May 22, 2014

Suspension mounts

The federal GAO (Government Accountability Office) has this month released a new report revealing a marked attempt by US government agencies to police the ranks of contractors and improve contractor responsibility standards.

The report, number GAO-14-513, is entitled FEDERAL CONTRACTS AND GRANTS, Agencies Have Taken Steps to Improve Suspension and Debarment Programs.

In the transmittal of the report to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of Representatives, William T. Woods said, by way of background:
Suspensions and debarments are tools that agencies may use to protect the government’s interests by excluding individuals, contractors, and grantees from receiving federal contracts, grants, and other forms of financial assistance based on various types of misconduct. In 2011, we reviewed suspension and debarment efforts at selected agencies and found that the agencies with the most procurement-related suspensions and debarments shared common characteristics, including a suspension and debarment program with dedicated staff, detailed policies and procedures, and practices that encourage an active referral process.
In the summary of what GAO found, it said:
The number of suspension and debarment actions government-wide has more than doubled from 1,836 in fiscal year 2009 to 4,812 in fiscal year 2013. The number of suspension and debarment actions for the six agencies increased from 19 in fiscal year 2009 to 271 in fiscal year 2013 (see table below). The six agencies generally experienced a notable increase starting in fiscal year 2011 when the agencies began to take action to incorporate the characteristics associated with active suspension and debarment programs.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee (ISDC) have taken action to strengthen government-wide suspension and debarment efforts. The ISDC has promoted best practices, coordinated mentoring and training, and helped coordinate lead agency responsibility when multiple agencies have an interest in pursuing suspension and debarment of the same entity. Reported increases in the number of suspension or debarment actions suggest that its efforts have been effective. ISDC officials emphasized that increased activity has been coupled with an increased capability to use suspension and debarment appropriately while adhering to the principles of fairness and due process.
The letter observed,
The six agencies we reviewed reported that they highly value the functions performed by the ISDC as a focal point for government-wide suspension and debarment efforts. For example, Treasury officials told us that they designed their suspension and debarment program around the best practices identified by the ISDC, taking advantage of templates, guidance, and mentoring available through the committee. Officials from several agencies noted that the ISDC is instrumental in managing an informal process to help agencies coordinate lead agency responsibility when multiple agencies have a potential interest in pursuing suspension and debarment of the same entity. According to officials from the agencies we reviewed, the ISDC regularly distributes information on new potential cases reported by the agencies. The agencies take into consideration factors such as financial, regulatory, and investigative interests in determining which agency should take the lead in the case. Several of the agencies we reviewed reported that this process helps identify the most appropriate lead, while also involving other agencies that may have a stake in a particular action. Officials from several agencies also reported that ISDC monthly meetings provide an important forum through which suspension and debarment officials can seek advice from agency counterparts on a range of issues.

In addition to speaking with officials from the six agencies we reviewed in 2011, we also reviewed the VA’s suspension and debarment program to determine if government-wide efforts had affected the program. Based on our review, we found that the VA currently has the characteristics associated with active suspension debarment programs. For example, VA has a Debarment and Suspension Committee with a staff of about 10 positions that review all referrals for procurement-related suspension and debarment actions, conduct fact-finding, and present facts and recommendations to the Suspension and Debarring Official. Officials reported that VA has taken action to improve its suspension and debarment program in part in response to government-wide efforts. For example, VA’s Suspension and Debarment Committee is currently drafting standard operating procedures to reflect leading practices. VA officials reported that the number of procurement-related suspension and debarment actions at VA has increased from 34 in fiscal year 2011 to 73 in fiscal year 2013.
Given the current uproar (not before time) regarding the failings in the Veterans Administration mishandling of veteran care, the finding in respect of the VA are particularly newsworthy.
Agency reaction to the report is described as follows: We provided a draft of this report to OMB and the Departments of Commerce, Health and Human Services, Justice, Homeland Security, State, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs for review and comment. In an email response, the Associate Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy commented that OMB is pleased with the progress agencies have been making to strengthen their capabilities to consider the use of suspension and debarment when necessary. Further, OMB credits the work of the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee in helping to make many of the achievements possible. None of the seven agencies we reviewed provided substantive comments, but the Departments of Commerce, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security provided technical comments which we incorporated, as appropriate.
It is regrettable that no substantive response from any of the agencies reviewed were received. An insider's view would be illuminating, shall we say.

See more at this WaPo article: GAO says U.S. government is suspending risky contractors more often, by Christian Davenport.

Sunday, January 12, 2014

Procurement controversies -- Selangor State, Malaysia

Loopholes in government contracting mechanism — Sin Chew Daily
The chief contractor responsible for cleaning of government hospitals in Selangor, Radicare (M) Sdn Bhd, has apparently breached the contract regulations. The shortage of cleaners in Klang, Kajang, Selayang and Banting Hospitals has resulted in poor hospital hygiene conditions. Two operating theaters in Kajang Hospital have to be temporarily closed while non-urgent surgeries have to be postponed due to difficulty in maintaining the hygiene at these operating theatres. It is shocking to find that several hospitals are facing the same problem at the same time.

The Health Ministry must take stern action against Radicare to warn other contractors. In addition, since Radicare was appointed and contracted by the Health Ministry, the ministry should also be blamed for the incapability of Radicare to perform the contract, affecting the normal operation of hospitals. Also, the Selangor state government should also make a review for its lax oversight, as maintaining healthcare quality and ensuring the safety and hygiene of patients and the public is a shared responsible of the Health Ministry and state government.

The problem originated from the drawbacks in the government’s contract bidding mechanism. For instance, contractors are appointed without going through the process of bidding; contract conditions do not adequately protect the interests of the government; and the government’s inability to assess and compare the qualities of contractors. Contractors’ poor quality and lack of integrity would not only drag the administrative progress of government agencies, but also harm the people’s interests.

On the other hand, after signing a contract with the government, the appointed contractor is allowed to hire its own sub-contractors to handle the project or job. Such a practice makes it easy to have poor supervision and loopholes. The Health Ministry has appointed three companies to take care of the non-clinical support services of healthcare establishments in the country tasked with the responsibility of maintaining the cleanliness of state government hospitals. Radicare, one of the contractors, has actually hired incapable sub-contractor for the job and thus, led to the cleaner shortage problem.

Taking it as a lesson, the government will need to draw a transparent and more professional contract bidding mechanism to ensure that all contractors are good in quality, as well as integrity. The public’s demand for transparency in government operations, including the request of open tender for government contracts, has increased, and some "Ali Baba" contractors who gained government contracts through relations instead of open tender will only undermine the government’s credibility.

Tuesday, August 13, 2013

Banned contractor wants its subsidiaries and related companies to get more government contracts

The stories throughout years, probably decades, of large government contractors continuing to get work in spite of poor performance, questionable billing practices and other contracting disgraces are legend. Small contractors  get the "non-responsible" book thrown at them all the time, preventing any further government work. Large contractors are too big to flail. But is that right?

So finally, a large contractor with a dismal display of irresponsible work and coverup gets the boot, and what does it want to do? Continue getting work through its subsidiaries. And it is suing to do so.

BP sues U.S. government over contract suspensions after oil spill

Last November the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sprung the ban on BP (BP.L), citing BP's "lack of business integrity" after the Deepwater Horizon blowout that killed 11 workers and gushed millions of barrels of oil into coastal waters. The company is currently paying out millions of dollars to settle damage claims from Gulf residents in a contentious process that BP says is being mismanaged by the administrator, Louisiana lawyer Patrick Juneau. The suit, filed in U.S. District Court in southern Texas, claims keeping the ban in place risks causing the company "irreparable harm."

BP Sues EPA to Get New Contracts
BP says it has lost out on billions of dollars of potential contracts, such as supplying fuel to the U.S. military, because the EPA refuses to lift the prohibition on new contracts first put in place in November 2012. That was when BP said it would pay $4.5 billion in fines and plead guilty to criminal charges including obstruction of justice, involuntary manslaughter and a misdemeanor violation of the Clean Water Act.

At the time, BP said it believed the suspension would be brief and that it was working with the EPA on an agreement that would effectively end the suspension. But according to the court filing, which was reported earlier by the Houston Chronicle, the EPA refused to lift the ban even after the company entered its formal pleas and the criminal case was closed.
BP sues US government over federal contracts ban
BP is one of the biggest suppliers of fuel to the US government.

Tuesday, July 17, 2012

Gee, for that we coulda done it ourselves, yes?

If you haven't followed the G4S/Olympic security story, you can get a sense of it many places, such as in this story: London Olympics' security woes overshadow questions about how much is too much?. It's about the outsourcing of security services for the London Olympics to a company that boasts 600,000 employees but failed to get the 10,-20,000 it promised and needed for the job.

A timely warning about dogma and outsourcing
Consider what this fiasco means for the members of the armed forces, who learnt this week that thousands of army jobs are to go in the next few years, men returning from duty in Afghanistan who are now being told they must stand in where a private company has failed to fulfil a contract. The people who appear to be angriest of all are the chief constables. They, too, face the loss of thousands of staff, yet they are being asked to provide cover for a firm being handsomely paid to do a job that the police will usually do for far less.

For purposes of comparison, the nation's highest-paid policeman, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, was paid £260,088 in 2011. The Chief of Defence Staff was paid £240,000. Mr Buckles's pay was recorded in the company's accounts as £830,000, but that does not include bonuses and extras which will have taken his total packet to around £1.2m. He is paid four times as much as the heads of the armed forces and police who must now dig his company out of this mess.

The one thing that can be said in G4S's defence is that it was originally contracted to provide 6,500 security staff, a figure that was revised upwards at the end of last year to an alarming total of 23,000. That was a massive task, but the company undertook to do it and, according to the Home Secretary, Theresa May, gave no warning until 11 July that it was in difficulty.

Mr Buckles told MPs that he did not know until 3 July. As recently as 6 July, G4S's account manager for the Games, Ian Horseman-Sewell, told Reuters that the firm would be able to handle an event in Australia at the same time as guarding the Olympics.

A bigger political question is about outsourcing, under which private companies are hired to perform tasks previously undertaken by the State in the belief that they will do a better job. There certainly are circumstances in which private firms subject to market discipline outperform agencies of the State – but this has not been one of them. It provides a salutary warning to those who hold an ideological conviction that private is necessarily good, and public necessarily bad.

Finally, there is the question of G4S's £57m fee. "Even after all that has happened, you still want to claim the management fee? I find that astonishing," the Home Affairs Committee chairman, Keith Vaz, exclaimed yesterday. Mr Buckles responded that he did.

Friday, June 29, 2012

A Federal Business Opportunity too good to pass up

Although it may be changing to a new replacement, the FedBizOpps gateway to contracting opportunities has served as the official go-to cite for registry of opportunities and opportunists in US government contracting.

There's a short description of its utility here. It is meant to help generate competition for government business by focusing market information both to and from potential suppliers. Such competition is the economic driver of procurement.

Obviously, the cite gathers and disseminates a lot of content and time sensitive information.

So what might happen if the gatekeeper is outsourced? Might the gatekeeper use the keys to the city for personal gain?

FedBizOpps.gov contractor under FBI investigation
The federal contractor running three governmentwide websites, including FedBizOpps.gov, is under investigation by the FBI for allegedly trying to access without permission websites of their competitors in the education sector.

The Eastern District Court of Virginia in Alexandria issued a search warrant March 5 to the FBI. The FBI conducted the search before March 19 of Symplicity Corporation's offices in Arlington, Va.

The FBI stated in its request to the judge for the search warrant that a witness alleges Symplicity tried on several occasions since 2009 to access the networks of its competitors, Maxient LLC of Charlottesville, Va., and Pave Systems of Richardson, Texas. Both Maxient and Pave Systems offer software to colleges and universities, and neither have done any federal business in fiscal 2012, according to USASpending.gov.

"On Nov. 4, 2011, a cooperating witness who formerly had been employed by Symplicity for approximately five years provided information to the FBI concerning the conduct of Ariel Friedler, the Chief Executive Officer of Symplicity. According to the [witness], Ariel Friedler showed the [witness] how to connect to Maxient's website and to look for specific customers by putting in Maxient's main URL, , followed by a question mark and a school abbreviation," the search warrant obtained by Federal News Radio stated. "Friedler told the [witness] that this was how Friedler checked for new customers on Maxient's website. The [witness] stated that every time Friedler found a new customer on Maxient's website, Friedler would send an instant message or email to the [witness] about it. The [witness] also stated that Friedler discussed using anonymizers and The Onion Router to hide Friedler's activity when Friedler was looking at competitor's networks and that Friedler was very interested in using these technologies."


The Onion Router Project is intended to enable online anonymity on the Internet.

Symplicity, which is in the Small Business Administration's 8(a) program, won more than $30 million in contracts so far in 2012 from a variety of agencies, according to USASpending.gov. More than half of their contracts and dollars came from the General Services Administration for providing services and running FedBizOpps.gov, the Electronic Subcontracting Reporting System and the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. It also won $4.4 million in contracts from the Executive Office of the President and $3.2 million from the Veterans Affairs Department.

n the search warrant, the FBI alleges someone using IP addresses assigned to Symplicity tried to access Maxient's client log-in pages in May 2009. In 2010, Maxient's audit logs showed someone using a Symplicity IP address again tried several times to log-in to their client pages, the bureau stated.

The search warrant also alleges several other attempts from IP addresses that either belonged to Symplicity or employees of Symplicity.

The FBI also alleges Symplicity used Structured Query Language (SQL) Injection attacks to get inside Maxient's network.

"Based on my training and experience, I know that attempting to repeatedly submit malformed queries like the ones submitted to Maxient's website from the Symplicity IP address is a method often used by hackers to attempt to gain unauthorized access to websites," wrote Michael French, a FBI special agent who is in charge of the investigation.

The FBI also stated Friedler called the owner of Pave Systems, Ghasson Nino in 2010 with an offer to buy the company's student conduct business. During the call, the search warrant stated, Nino said Friedler mentioned several clients by name even though such a list is confidential and not publicly available.

Friedler vehemently denies the allegations.

"Over the past few months, information has been made public by some of our competitors, which deals with a preliminary investigation related to the higher education sector. We believe the legal process should be allowed to run its course, and in deference to the authorities, we cannot comment on the details of the investigation at this time," Friedler said in a statement. "We understand that a copy of an affidavit related to the investigation has been circulated. It is important to understand that no one at Symplicity has been charged with any crime. The affidavit is nothing more than the government's one-sided justification for conducting an investigation. It is not evidence of any wrongdoing nor is it admissible in court for that purpose. It would be unfair to draw any conclusions based upon the highly selective content of such an affidavit. We are fully cooperating with the authorities to help them find the answers necessary to resolve this issue as quickly as possible."


Read more at the article link above.

Wednesday, February 1, 2012

Federal government contracting: how to get in with the in crowd

I'm in with the in crowd
I go where the in crowd goes
I'm in with the in crowd
And I know what the in crowd knows

Anytime of the year
Don't you hear
Dressin' fine, makin' time

We breeze up an down the street
We get respect
From the people we meet
They make way day or night
They know the in crowd is out of sight

We make every minute count, yeah!
Our share is always the biggest amount
Other guys imitate us
But the original's still the greatest

Got our own way a walkin'
We got our own way of talkin', yeah!

Anytime of the year, don't you hear
Spendin' cash, talkin' trash

Girl, I'll show you a real good time
Come on with me and leave your troubles behind
I don't care where you've been
You ain't been no where
'Till you've been in

With the in crowd, yeah!
(Billy Page, sung by Dobie Gray --)
Lyrics from elyrics.net

The following article concerns US federal procurement and the same type of bureaucratic thinking that brought us Catch 22.

How to Overcome Past Performance Issues When You Lack Government Contracting Experience

Past performance in the federal government can be tricky. Like any business, the government requires contractors to have past-performance (or prior government experience). But for business owners new to government contracting, how are they supposed to earn past performance?

According to a report by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), most agencies continue to award contracts to businesses with past performances, making prior experience the second most important selection criteria after price. So how do novice business owners overcome this obstacle?
The author goes on to suggest six different strategies for racking up "past performance" credits. Frankly, it is a conundrum brought on by whack-a-mole mentality, risk avoidance run amuck, the "old boy" network by default if not design. Someone ought to be informed "past performance is no guarantee of success", and look for a way that is more equitable, rational and that expands the pool of vendors.

Anyway, here are his six ideas, and you should read his post to get more detail:

1. Consider relevant commercial experience to boost your proposal

2. Look for micro-purchases or credit card purchases to gain past performance in a timely fashion

3. Obtain subcontracts and acquire experience

4. Team up with a more experienced company to get your foot in the door

5. Look for awarded contracts on www.fbo.com within your specific field and location

6. Research the Small Business Administration website to find out if your business is eligible for any Small Business Certifications, such as the 8(a) and Hub-Zone programs

Monday, July 11, 2011

Interested party determination not based on responsibility

Other cases have made the point that bid responsiveness and bidder responsibility are entirely separate and independent issues, judged by separate criteria and standards and at separate times in the solicitation process.

This US Federal GAO case reiterates that "interested party" status is similar to responsiveness, and that it is inappropriate to test it by reference to matters of bidder responsibility.

Here, the protester sought to turn a requirement in the solicitation that the bidder provide information about bidder responsibility with the proposal into a test of "interested party" status. Based on the principle that issues of bidder responsibility cannot be transformed into issues of bid responsiveness by the dictates of a solicitation requirement, the protester failed.

There is also some interesting sidelights about the way GAO integrates ADR processes in its review processes.

Curiously, though, the protester was awarded costs and legal fees: "Request for reimbursement of costs for filing and pursuing an earlier protest is granted where the protester raised a clearly meritorious protest ground, and the agency did not take prompt corrective action."

There were other issues in this case, including what it takes to overturn an evaluation, but those will not be discussed here.

Matter of: Waterfront Technologies, Inc., B-401948.16, June 24, 2011
DOL argues that Waterfront is not an interested party to challenge the award to 21st Century because the protester did not meet a mandatory solicitation requirement to have an interim secret facility clearance.

As relevant here, the RFP stated that offerors would be required to hold “at a minimum, an interim secret facility clearance prior to the RFP closing date.”

The RFP did not expressly state that offerors were required to provide documentation concerning this requirement in their proposals.

However, in an email to the protester on August 28, 2009, after receipt of proposals, the agency asked Waterfront to address the following question: “Does your company hold at a minimum an ‘INTERIM SECRET FACILITY CLEARANCE’ prior to the RFP closing date as referenced in the subject SOW?”

The protester responded that it did not have an interim secret facility clearance.

Based on the foregoing, DOL has argued throughout the various protests that Waterfront’s proposal did not meet a mandatory solicitation requirement and therefore should not have been considered eligible for award.

Our Office has held that the ability to obtain a security clearance is generally a matter of responsibility, absent an express requirement in the solicitation to demonstrate the ability prior to award.

SBA has conclusive authority to determine the responsibility of small business concerns. Thus, when a procuring agency finds that a small business is not eligible for award based on a nonresponsibility determination or a failure to satisfy definitive responsibility criteria, the agency is required to refer the matter to the SBA for a final determination under its certificate of competency (COC) procedures.

On October 15, 2009, prior to the submission of an agency report on that protest, the GAO attorney assigned to the protest conducted an outcome prediction ADR, in which she advised that Waterfront’s asserted failure to provide an interim facility security clearance was a matter of “responsibility,” rather than “responsiveness” or technical acceptability, and predicted that our Office would likely sustain Waterfront’s protest. She also advised the parties that since Waterfront was a small business concern, a finding of non-responsibility would require the DOL to submit the matter to the SBA for a COC review.

DOL took corrective action in response to the ADR and advised our Office that it would refer the matter of Waterfront’s responsibility to the SBA for a COC determination. In its referral to the SBA, however, DOL stated that Waterfront was not the apparent successful offeror for the procurement, and for this reason, the SBA declined to consider whether to issue a COC to the protester.

In connection with Waterfront’s subsequent protest DOL again argued that Waterfront was not eligible for award based on the protester’s lack of an interim secret facility clearance. Our Office asked the SBA to address this issue. SBA again concluded that it need not evaluate Waterfront for a COC, but would consider a COC referral in the event that Waterfront was rejected as nonresponsible or unacceptable on the basis of a definitive responsibility criterion. Waterfront asserts that it is compliant with the RFP’s interim secret facility clearance requirement.

On this record, we think that Waterfront is therefore an interested party eligible to challenge the award to 21st Century.


This case is consistent with a long line of federal authority for the proposition that it is responsiveness, not responsibility, that lies at the heart of the inquiry into interested party status, e.g.:

U.S. v. International Business Machines Corp., 892 F.2d 1006 (C.A.Fed., 1989)
The Brooks Act empowers the board to hear protests of disappointed bidders who are "interested parties." An "interested party" is in turn defined as "an actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract." In contrast to statutes like the Administrative Procedure Act, under which Congress has extended the traditional basis for standing beyond direct economic injury, in the Brooks Act Congress has deliberately and substantially narrowed the class of persons entitled to invoke the authority of the board.

We have suggested above that Congress intended the phrase "interested party" to be a meaningful limitation on the authority of the board to entertain, and this court to review, protests of an agency's conduct of a Brooks Act procurement. We see responsiveness as another facet of the interested party inquiry. When responsiveness is an issue, it must be resolved before the board can proceed. If a bid is not responsive, the protester has no more right to invoke the office of the board than the proverbial man on the street. A nonresponsive bidder is the epitome of one who lacks a direct economic interest.