Labels and Tags

Accountability (71) Adequate documentation (7) ADR in procurement (4) Allocation of risks (6) Best interest of government (11) Best practices (19) Best value (15) Bidder prejudice (11) Blanket purchase agreement (1) Bridge contract (2) Bundling (6) Cancellation and rejection (2) Centralized procurement structure (12) Changes during bid process (14) Clarifications vs Discussions (1) Competence (9) Competition vs Efficiency (29) Competitive position (3) Compliance (35) Conflict of interest (32) Contract administration (26) Contract disputes (4) Contract extension or modification (9) Contract formation (1) Contract interpretation (1) Contract terms (3) Contract types (6) Contract vs solicitation dispute (2) Contractor responsibility (20) Conviction (4) Cooperative purchasing (3) Corrective action (1) Cost and pricing (13) Debarment (4) Determinations (8) Determining responsibility (37) Disclosure requirements (7) Discussions during solicitation (10) Disposal of surplus property (3) Effective enforcement requirement (35) Effective procurement management (5) Effective specifications (36) Emergency procurement (14) eProcurement (5) Equitable tolling (2) Evaluation of submissions (22) Fair and equitable treatment (14) Fair and reasonable value (23) Fiscal effect of procurement (14) Frivolous protest (1) Good governance (12) Governmental functions (27) Guam (14) Guam procurement law (12) Improper influence (11) Incumbency (13) Integrity of system (31) Interested party (7) Jurisdiction (1) Justification (1) Life-cycle cost (1) Limits of government contracting (5) Lore vs Law (4) market research (7) Materiality (3) Methods of source selection (33) Mistakes (4) Models of Procurement (1) Needs assessment (11) No harm no foul? (8) Offer & acceptance (1) Other procurement links (14) Outsourcing (34) Past performance (12) Planning policy (34) Politics of procurement (52) PPPs (6) Prequalification (1) Principle of competition (95) Principles of procurement (25) Private vs public contract (17) Procurement authority (5) Procurement controversies series (79) Procurement ethics (19) Procurement fraud (31) Procurement lifecycle (9) Procurement philosophy (17) Procurement procedures (30) Procurement reform (63) Procurement theory (11) Procurement workforce (2) Procurment philosophy (6) Professionalism (17) Protest - formality (2) Protest - timing (12) Protests - general (37) Purposes and policies of procurement (11) Recusal (1) Remedies (17) Requirement for new procurement (4) Resolution of protests (4) Responsiveness (14) Restrictive specifications (5) Review procedures (13) RFQ vs RFP (1) Scope of contract (16) Settlement (2) Social preference provisions (60) Sole source (48) Sovereign immunity (3) Staffing (8) Standard commercial products (3) Standards of review (2) Standing (6) Stays and injunctions (6) Structure of procurement (1) Substantiation (9) Surety (1) Suspension (6) The procurement record (1) The role of price (10) The subject matter of procurement (23) Trade agreements vs procurement (1) Training (33) Transparency (63) Uniformity (6) Unsolicited proposals (3)
Showing posts with label Suspension. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Suspension. Show all posts

Friday, January 30, 2015

Reverse all auctions, full steam ahead

There is one main theme here, and a case study that gave rise to it. The main theme is the light shown on the so-called "reverse auction" fad. 

The business about the FedBid business is just to add a bit of salacious spice to the otherwise drab story line. Most procurement story lines are drab. But that doesn't diminish their importance, as this blawg hopes to point out.

First, the juicy bits:

Air Force moves to debar FedBid
On Jan. 26, the Air Force suspended and moved to debar FedBid from providing reverse auctions for federal agencies contracts, on the grounds that there was "adequate evidence" of a "lack of business honesty or integrity" at the company.

Most recently, the company split its federal auction and commercial operations into separate companies. FedBid founder and former chief executive Ali Saadat is now head of the private sector business, but remains chairman of the FedBid board, while Jordan was named CEO of the federal side.

Saadat was also suspended by the Air Force while the service considers whether to debar the company.

In the immediate wake of the report, the company's board of directors appointed a special committee to determine any response or actions the company should take related to the report. That committee retained the law firm Arnold & Porter as outside counsel to conduct an independent review of company employees' actions. That review is said to have found "no legal wrongdoing by FedBid or its employees," though it did raise some concerns about how the company's internal culture dealt with third-party relationships.
So far, this is not that juicy. Just how juicy is a "cultural" problem, anyway? Blaming the culture means no one is at fault. Can't convict a culture, can we?

So, read on.

The real dirt:

FedBid barred from new government contracts after watchdog report
The federal government has barred a fast-growing Northern Virginia contractor with deep ties to the Washington establishment from winning new work because of “conduct indicating a lack of business honesty or integrity.”

Last year, the company was the subject of an investigation by the Veterans Affairs inspector general, which found that an agency contracting official helped steer a contract to the company. When a more senior VA official became concerned about the contract and put a hold on it, FedBid mounted an aggressive campaign to have the moratorium overturned, the IG found. It concluded that FedBid executives were part of an effort to discredit the VA official who put the hold on the contract and to “unduly influence VA decision makers.”

“Need to assassinate his character and discredit him,” read an e-mail from a top executive in 2012, according to the IG. The firm also vowed to “unleash the hounds” and “take off the gloves” in its “storm the castle” campaign to win back the business.
The theme -- Reverse Auctions:

Continuing with the WaPo story immediately above:
FedBid has built a thriving business over the past decade helping the government hold what are known as reverse auctions. Through FedBid Web sites, federal contracting officials post solicitations for items such as office supplies, computer equipment or furniture. Companies submit bids for the work and are told through the site whether they are the lowest bidder. If they aren’t the lowest bidder, they can try again with a reduced price, which ultimately should save taxpayer money.

The government’s reliance on reverse auctions has recently exploded, with FedBid leading the way. The company said that from 2007 to last year, the federal government made 131,623 awards through FedBid, totaling $8.2 billion, which represented nearly $1 billion in savings. In 2013 alone, FedBid said, $1.8 billion in government contracts were awarded through its system.
VA rips FedBid, questions value of reverse auctions
FedBid's claims of sizable savings generated by the reverse auctions the firm provides for federal contractors are overblown and misleading, according to the Department of Veterans Affairs' Office of Inspector General. Furthermore, Maureen Regan, counselor to VA's IG, told FCW that reverse auctions can unduly complicate the contracting process and limit competition by squeezing out potential vendors.

What Regan told FCW echoed a second IG report that says reverse auctions can inadvertently derail federal efforts to properly record contract documentation.

More significant, however, was the assertion by the OIG that the main purpose of reverse auctions -- to save money -- can be negated by multiple factors, including FedBid's fees and the Industrial Funding Fee customers paid to cover the General Services Administration's operation of the Federal Supply Schedules program.

Furthermore, the formula that reverse auction providers use to calculate savings -- subtracting the final award price from the "independent government cost estimate" -- was not reliable, the OIG argued, in part because of frequent mismatches between that independent estimate (which is required by VA policy) and the target price set by agency contracting officers. In addition, contract prices represent funds obligated at the time a contract was awarded, but many purchases were not fully funded at that time, resulting in inflation of the reported savings.

"We are enormously proud of the role that FedBid is playing, and will continue to play, in facilitating millions in cost savings for U.S. taxpayers," a FedBid spokesperson said in an emailed statement -- noting that "last year alone," the FedBid marketplace "enabled an estimated $160 million in savings for the government and taxpayers."

Regan, however, asserted that reverse auctions contain other costs, including GSA's Industrial Funding Fee, that might not be readily apparent to agencies.

The federal contracting schedules offer baseline pricing that agencies can use to negotiate lower costs, she said, adding that "it's not uncommon to get price reductions on schedule items," often by conducting a limited competition among schedule vendors. Regan said the OIG has had complaints from vendors, including a substantial number from health care supply companies, that FedBid's reverse auctions set up a "pay-to-play" system that is cost-prohibitive.

At the same time, other reverse auction vehicles might be getting short shrift. Regan said GSA offers services that comply with federal contract documentation requirements and include items on federal schedules.

Regan recommends that agencies "look at contracts and how people are buying things" before committing to the approach. "Reverse auctions were something of a fad in the 1990s," she said. "Everyone decided at the time they weren't really worth it."
Review of the Veterans Health Administration’s Use of Reverse Auction Acquisitions (RAs)
We found that priority sources such as the FSS (Federal Supply Schedule) are not utilized as required by VA policy and VHA’s SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) for all RAs.  Further, when RAs are used for FS S purchases, VHA is paying the Industrial Funding Fee (IFF) in addition to the FedBid RA fee when FedBid’s RA fee is not waived by FedBid. 
We found instances where the CO would identify an FSS source for the required products; however the Invitation for Bid (IFB) would subsequently be issued for open market bids. These situations occurred without any documentation in the contract file to justify the use of other than priority sources. In addition, if the awardee is an FSS vendor, these sales may be considered non-FSS sales which deprive the Government of the IFF.

We found that the reported claimed savings, computed by subtracting the final award price from the target price, was not reliable in determining the success of using RAs for several reasons. 
First, although the target price set by the CO should be equal to the Independent Government Estimate (IGE) as stated in VA policy and the implementing VHA SOP, we found that the target price was not always equal to the IGE, and that the basis for the target price was often not documented within the contract file.

Second, we found that the award price represented funds obligated at award and that many buys were not fully funded at the time of award, thereby inflating the reported savings. Lastly, we found that the target price could be changed by the CO during an active RA via a reposting of the IFB. Such changes were not always documented and justified within the eCMS contract file.

We also determined that COs run the risk of acquiring gray market items through RAs, because sellers are only required to self-certify that they are authorized distributors of the procured items. We found VHA was procuring items from unauthorized distributors through the use of RAs.

Monday, July 28, 2014

Non-responsibility, suspension and debarment

This post is inspired by a well written article describing debarment by the Canadian government I happened to read. Since I am neither licensed nor competent to comment at all on Canadian law I will only comment on what may be a contrast between common US practice.  I will set out the author's counsel without the cut, paste, paraphrasing that I usually apply, though I will be selective, so better to read the whole article for context as well as accuracy, as you should with every article cited on this blawg. 

Besides which, there are in this article and those in other posts, many points of information and issues raised that I do not focus on; even more reason to read the original piece at the link provided.

A practical approach to navigating debarment by the Canadian government
Federal debarment of contractors that violate federal contracting rules is sharply on the rise. The recent Integrity Framework[1] issued by Public Works and Government Services Canada is fuelled by a desire for government accountability in an age of unprecedented government spending. The consequences of debarment are significant and include the right of the government to terminate the contract for default and to demand the immediate return of any advance payments made.

The federal government uses debarment to ensure that contracts are awarded only to “reliable and dependable” contractors. In simple terms, debarment amounts to a government-wide ban. Federal departments are prohibited from doing business for a period of 10 years with an individual contractor that has engaged in improper conduct. Unlike in other jurisdictions, Canada’s debarment regime is not codified under any particular statute or regulation but rather is a policy[2] administered through a series of certifications and standard terms and conditions given by the bidder or contractor in its proposal or contract with the government.

A contractor may be debarred from participating in government procurements for 10 years from the date when the contractor or its affiliate has been convicted of an “integrity offence.” Integrity offences include bribery of Canadian and foreign public officials, extortion, tax evasion, bid-rigging, forgery, fraudulent manipulation of stock exchange transactions, insider trading, falsification of books, money laundering and acceptance of secret commissions.

Canada’s debarment regime is implemented by way of a series of certifications provided by the bidder in federal government solicitation documents and resulting contracts. The bidder or contractor, as the case may be, must certify in its bid (or contract) that neither it, nor any member of its board of directors or any of its affiliates has a conviction or been discharged of any of the following integrity offences during the previous 10 years....

A bidder that is unable to provide the certifications will be “debarred” or disqualified from the bidding process. The government has retained for itself the right to enter into a contract with an otherwise non-compliant bidder when it is in the “public interest” to do so, which includes when no one else is capable of performing the contract or for reasons related to emergency, national security, health and safety or economic harm.
I was interested in how much this subject matter is so similar to Guam law and its American Bar Association Model Code inspiration. But also a tad perplexed.

One the one hand, it appears that failure to certify integrity by way of certain affirmative certifications disqualifies a bidder from the bidding process.   But at the same time, it suggests that such failure is an automatic debarment. Consider these statements from the article:
The federal government uses debarment to ensure that contracts are awarded only to “reliable and dependable” contractors.

A bidder that is unable to provide the certifications will be “debarred” or disqualified from the bidding process.

In simple terms, debarment amounts to a government-wide ban.

A contractor may be debarred from participating in government procurements for 10 years from the date when the contractor or its affiliate has been convicted of an “integrity offence.

In our regime, the legislation and policy have the same goals: "to ensure that contracts are awarded only to “reliable and dependable” contractors". Unless I missed the intent of the article, however, our regime differentiates from eliminating a bidder "from the bidding process", and invoking "a government-wide ban" on the contractor.

Under our regime, no bidder or offeror (or contractor tendering a proposal) is eligible to receive an award if found to be "nonresponsible". Responsibility is a judgment made by the contracting officer considering a variety of "Standards of Responsibility", which are not restricted to self-certification. (See Guam Procurement Regulation 2 GAR § 3116(b)(2), and ABA Model Procurement Regulation R-3.401.02.) 

Responsibility is defined in terms of capability to perform, as well as integrity and reliability. (See Guam law 5 GCA § 5201(f); ABA Model Code 3-101(6).)

Thus, a bidder lacking in integrity may be found nonresponsible even if capable, and a bidder lacking in capability may be found nonresponsible even if of high integrity.  Responsibility does not necessarily hinge on improper behaviour alone.

Since capability is a factor even when there is no question of integrity, in our regime, we do not automatically suspend or debar a contractor which is found to be nonresponsible; it may be have capabilities to perform adequately in another contracting context.

There is, though, a separate process by which bidders or offerors may be suspended or debared "from consideration for award of contracts" (suspension being instant but lasting only 3 months, and debarment allows for hearing and lasts for 3 years; see, Guam law 5 GCA § 5426 and ABA Model Code 9-102). 


Among reasons substantiating a suspension or debarment are findings of convictions of certain crimes evidencing lack of commercially moral turpitude, deliberate failure without good cause to perform, a recent record of failure to perform or of unsatisfactory performance caused by acts beyond the control of the contractor, violation of procurement ethics, and filing a frivolous or fraudulent petition, protest or appeal under the procurement law.

Although contracts may contain provisions allowing for termination of the contract by the government, the suspension or debarment does not automatically apply to continued performance of a contract, since is specifically applies to "consideration for award of contracts".

Thursday, May 22, 2014

Suspension mounts

The federal GAO (Government Accountability Office) has this month released a new report revealing a marked attempt by US government agencies to police the ranks of contractors and improve contractor responsibility standards.

The report, number GAO-14-513, is entitled FEDERAL CONTRACTS AND GRANTS, Agencies Have Taken Steps to Improve Suspension and Debarment Programs.

In the transmittal of the report to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of Representatives, William T. Woods said, by way of background:
Suspensions and debarments are tools that agencies may use to protect the government’s interests by excluding individuals, contractors, and grantees from receiving federal contracts, grants, and other forms of financial assistance based on various types of misconduct. In 2011, we reviewed suspension and debarment efforts at selected agencies and found that the agencies with the most procurement-related suspensions and debarments shared common characteristics, including a suspension and debarment program with dedicated staff, detailed policies and procedures, and practices that encourage an active referral process.
In the summary of what GAO found, it said:
The number of suspension and debarment actions government-wide has more than doubled from 1,836 in fiscal year 2009 to 4,812 in fiscal year 2013. The number of suspension and debarment actions for the six agencies increased from 19 in fiscal year 2009 to 271 in fiscal year 2013 (see table below). The six agencies generally experienced a notable increase starting in fiscal year 2011 when the agencies began to take action to incorporate the characteristics associated with active suspension and debarment programs.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee (ISDC) have taken action to strengthen government-wide suspension and debarment efforts. The ISDC has promoted best practices, coordinated mentoring and training, and helped coordinate lead agency responsibility when multiple agencies have an interest in pursuing suspension and debarment of the same entity. Reported increases in the number of suspension or debarment actions suggest that its efforts have been effective. ISDC officials emphasized that increased activity has been coupled with an increased capability to use suspension and debarment appropriately while adhering to the principles of fairness and due process.
The letter observed,
The six agencies we reviewed reported that they highly value the functions performed by the ISDC as a focal point for government-wide suspension and debarment efforts. For example, Treasury officials told us that they designed their suspension and debarment program around the best practices identified by the ISDC, taking advantage of templates, guidance, and mentoring available through the committee. Officials from several agencies noted that the ISDC is instrumental in managing an informal process to help agencies coordinate lead agency responsibility when multiple agencies have a potential interest in pursuing suspension and debarment of the same entity. According to officials from the agencies we reviewed, the ISDC regularly distributes information on new potential cases reported by the agencies. The agencies take into consideration factors such as financial, regulatory, and investigative interests in determining which agency should take the lead in the case. Several of the agencies we reviewed reported that this process helps identify the most appropriate lead, while also involving other agencies that may have a stake in a particular action. Officials from several agencies also reported that ISDC monthly meetings provide an important forum through which suspension and debarment officials can seek advice from agency counterparts on a range of issues.

In addition to speaking with officials from the six agencies we reviewed in 2011, we also reviewed the VA’s suspension and debarment program to determine if government-wide efforts had affected the program. Based on our review, we found that the VA currently has the characteristics associated with active suspension debarment programs. For example, VA has a Debarment and Suspension Committee with a staff of about 10 positions that review all referrals for procurement-related suspension and debarment actions, conduct fact-finding, and present facts and recommendations to the Suspension and Debarring Official. Officials reported that VA has taken action to improve its suspension and debarment program in part in response to government-wide efforts. For example, VA’s Suspension and Debarment Committee is currently drafting standard operating procedures to reflect leading practices. VA officials reported that the number of procurement-related suspension and debarment actions at VA has increased from 34 in fiscal year 2011 to 73 in fiscal year 2013.
Given the current uproar (not before time) regarding the failings in the Veterans Administration mishandling of veteran care, the finding in respect of the VA are particularly newsworthy.
Agency reaction to the report is described as follows: We provided a draft of this report to OMB and the Departments of Commerce, Health and Human Services, Justice, Homeland Security, State, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs for review and comment. In an email response, the Associate Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy commented that OMB is pleased with the progress agencies have been making to strengthen their capabilities to consider the use of suspension and debarment when necessary. Further, OMB credits the work of the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee in helping to make many of the achievements possible. None of the seven agencies we reviewed provided substantive comments, but the Departments of Commerce, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security provided technical comments which we incorporated, as appropriate.
It is regrettable that no substantive response from any of the agencies reviewed were received. An insider's view would be illuminating, shall we say.

See more at this WaPo article: GAO says U.S. government is suspending risky contractors more often, by Christian Davenport.

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

Of bad actors and Emmys

Should a bad actor be given an Emmy award?

How about a contract award?

Read on.

Lawmakers, OMB push to ban more `bad-actor' contractors by Charles S. Clark
At a Wednesday hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Chairman Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., expressed alarm that a series of reports from the Government Accountability Office and inspectors general have shown a reluctance of many agencies to refer unsatisfactory contractors to the Excluded Parties List System maintained by the General Services Administration.

A Pentagon report "just last month shows that over a 10-year period, DoD awarded $255 million to contractors who were convicted of criminal fraud; and almost $574 billion to contractors involved in civil fraud cases that resulted in a settlement or judgment against the contractor," Lieberman said. "Last year, the Department of Homeland Security's inspector general found 23 cases where the department had canceled a contract because of poor performance, but in none of those cases did DHS suspend or debar the contractor."

The Federal Emergency Management Agency, despite the existence of an anti-fraud task force following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, has not sent a single name to the list, Lieberman added, noting that the rarity of suspensions and debarments has been a concern of the committee as far back as 1981.

Sen. Claire McCaskill, D-Mo., regretted that proposals to require more suspensions and debarments founder because of a fear of litigation, because it's "too much trouble," some contractors are seen as "too big to fail," or "it is unclear who is accountable for a failure" to pursue that course, she said.

Dan Gordon, the departing administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, said the system's "weak link" is ensuring that a fraudulent contractor is flagged for action in a timely way. "Sometimes the referral takes too long, as historically agencies have been very bad about sharing, either because officials didn't check the list, checked it too late, or because of problems in the spelling of an entity's name."

But he expressed skepticism toward any prospective legislation making certain referrals mandatory, saying agency cultures differ and mandatory referrals that take away discretion could undermine the role of suspension and debarment officials.

Panelists agreed that the model policy is that practiced by the Air Force. Steven Shaw, deputy general counsel for contractor responsibility at the Air Force described two recent suspensions, one involving the Boeing Co.'s launch systems units and the other involving programs within L-3 Communications. Sixty-two percent of his suspensions and debarments are "fact-based," he said, meaning his team doesn't wait for the Justice Department to bring criminal charges. "We take a broad view of the type of misconduct, not just criminal fraud but as it relates to business integrity, tax issues, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or commercial fraud," he said.

The Air Force also uses a "carrot-and-stick approach that is aggressive at the front end" but still allows contractors to prevent fraud through risk management and ethics programs.

Ranking committee member Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, who as a staff director worked on the 1981 hearing chaired by then-Sen. William Cohen, R-Maine, reminded the hearing that the goal of suspension and debarment is "not to punish contractors but to protect" the taxpayer, and that allowing "bad actors" to win new contracts is "not fair or ethical to the honest contractors."

Thursday, May 6, 2010

Contractor disqualified to tender

Aetna disqualified from defense health contract UPDATE 3-
Health insurer Aetna Inc (AET.N) said on Wednesday it has been disqualified from a multibillion-dollar contract to provide services under a U.S. Defense Department health care plan.

The contract, covering the northern region of the department's TRICARE program, was awarded to the current provider, Health Net Inc (HNT.N), which argued that Aetna had an unfair advantage because it had hired a TRICARE insider.

The $2.8 billion contract includes five one-year renewal options for a total potential value of nearly $17 billion.

"We believe we acted appropriately throughout the procurement process and that no nonpublic information was ever used in preparing the bid," Susan Peters, president of Aetna's government health plans, said in a statement.

COMMENT: Under Guam Procurement Law (and this is speaking generally), it is a breach of ethical standards for a present or former (1 year) government employee to act as an agent for a bidder. It is not clear that such action would be a violation of the employer/bidder, although it is a violation to induce an employee to breach ethical standards. Remedies assessable against the non-employee could include termination of any transaction as well as suspension or debarment.

Thursday, February 25, 2010

US Government slow to sanction slack contractors

DHS officials reluctant to debar, suspend contractors, IG reports
Homeland Security Department contracting officials are reluctant to pursue suspension and debarment actions against contractors even when those actions may be warranted, according to a new audit released today by DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner.

“The Department of Homeland Security has suspension and debarment policies and procedures in place. However, the department is reluctant to apply the policies and procedures against poorly performing contractors,” Skinner wrote.

"Department procurement officials characterized the suspension and debarment process as being too resource-intensive, punitive and as negatively impacting the size of the contractor pool. The procurement officials prefer to use other administrative remedies to address poor contractor performance,” the report stated.

But reluctance to pursue suspension and debarment actions could put the government at risk of doing business with poor contractors, Skinner warned.

The IG recommended that DHS develop policies to ensure that contracts that are terminated for cause are evaluated for possible suspension or debarment actions as well as policies to record all pertinent information on contractor performance.

Read the IG report here. It notes:
The Department of Homeland Security spends an estimated 40% of its annual congressional appropriation through contracts and grants. The department’s FY 2009 appropriation was $43 billion, of which an estimated $17 billion is expected to be spent through federal contracts and grants.

Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) require agencies to solicit offers from, award contracts to, and consent to subcontracts only with responsible contractors. Suspensions and debarments are discretionary actions that agencies implement to protect the federal government by excluding contractors who commit fraud, behave unethically, or willfully fail to perform or have a history of failure to perform according to the terms of a contract from conducting business with the federal government.

Suspensions are temporary in nature and are used to protect the federal government until investigations and any ensuing legal proceedings that could lead to debarment actions are completed.

Causes for suspension actions include, among others, adequate evidence of the following:
>> Commission of fraud or a criminal offense in connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a public contract or state contract;
>> Commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of records, making false statements, tax evasion, violating federal criminal tax laws, or receiving stolen property;
>> Commission of any other offense indicating a lack of business integrity or business honesty that seriously and directly affects the present responsibility of a government contractor or subcontractor; or
>> Any other cause of so serious or compelling a nature that it affects the present responsibility of a government contractor or subcontractor.

Debarments, on the other hand, generally do not exceed 3 years but can be extended if it is determined that it is in the government’s best interest.

Causes for debarment actions include, among others, the following:
>> Conviction of or civil judgment for fraud, violation of antitrust laws, embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, false statements, or other offenses indicating a lack of business integrity;
>> Violation of the terms of a government contract or subcontract so serious as to justify debarment, such as a willful failure to perform in accordance with the terms of one or more contracts or a history of failure to perform, or of unsatisfactory performance of, one or more contracts;
>> Noncompliance with Immigration and Nationality Act employment provisions; or
>> Any other cause of so serious or compelling a nature that it affects the present responsibility of the contractor or subcontractor.

The FAR requires agencies to list all suspended or debarred contractors in the General Services Administration’s Excluded Parties List System.