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Showing posts with label Requirement for new procurement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Requirement for new procurement. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 6, 2017

Own up to those mistakes; don't put lipstick on that pig

Jason Miller is an astute federal procurement journalist with Federal News Radio, with a knack for making arcane and difficult matters interesting and graspable. I don't read him regularly, but when I do I wonder why not. (Not enough time in a day comes to mind.)

Jason wrote the following article, and his respect for action of the protagonist in the unfortunate circumstances of the story is palpable, and deserved. You may just want to click the link to the article and get it from the horse's mouth. Or you can stick around with me and my rendition, and be sorry.

What happened in a nutshell is that the Department of Homeland Security solicited, and then cancelled (after protests began), a solicitation for certain technical services, known as "Flexible Agile Support for the Homeland" ('FLASH'). It was framed as a small business set-aside procurement focused on agile development methodologies. (That's another story; read it, too.)

As Jason explained in a prior article, DHS' Procurement Innovation Lab (PIL) set out to get its arms around one of the problems of federal acquisition — the need to close out low-risk, low-dollar contracts. Too often these contracts are forgotten or under prioritized, and a backlog builds up. At DHS, for example, its backlog grew to more than 350,000, and 92 percent of the contracts had been completed more than a year ago. PIL took an innovation risk and re-engineered the business processes a simplified means for contract closeout. (Look, as I said he can explain better than I, so read that article, too.)

To re-engineer the business processes, DHS first created PIL, a cross-functional team of policy, finance, general counsel, contracting and industry and then had to identify the low-risk contracts. It was all about coordinating, good communications and making sure that all the people that could be involved and are looking at the process to collaboratively understand what to do and all the appropriate steps to do it. PIL completed nine projects and is working on others.

One of the PIL's biggest experiments was FLASH.   As Soraya Correa, the chief procurement officer at DHS, described it, FLASH was meant to take care of "contracts that are typically small dollar value, generally firm fixed price, no activity over the last 12-to-24 months, final goods and services have been delivered so we know they are probably ready for close out. What we are doing is a streamlined approach trying to close them in one fell swoop.”

Correa explained, “Everything we’ve done on FLASH has been very different from what we’ve done in the past. Start with our industry day where our communications were more of a discussion where we provided the ability to do speed teaming or speed dating, but also an opportunity for vendors to meet with government officials and ask questions,” she said. “We also had experts in various business areas like small business, digital services and others so industry could come up to speed on what we were doing in those areas. It was a very interactive day that focused a little more on the business processes around bidding as opposed to focusing on the requirements that would be contained in the solicitation.”

DHS evaluated contractors based on a technical challenge where the bidders had to present to the agency how they would go through an agile development process. Correa said the bidders then had 4-to-6 hours to actually complete and then did a presentation. DHS received 114 proposals.

Now, flash forward a bit to last month when Jason reported "DHS cancels $1.5B contract for agile services".
DHS has been working on the multiple award vehicle for the better part of a year. The goal of FLASH was to give department components access to innovative methods and industry best practices to acquire agile design and development support services. DHS said in the solicitation it was seeking to develop an acquisition contract that includes the concepts from the U.S. Digital Services Playbook such as user-centered design, dev/ops, automated testing and agile. DHS’s Procurement Innovation Lab (PIL) was running FLASH.

But since November when DHS awarded FLASH to 13 companies, it faced an uphill battle to get the contract off the ground. Eight vendors who didn’t make the cut submitted protests to GAO. DHS decided to take corrective action instead of letting GAO decide the protests and reopened bidding.

Then in early March, DHS announced 11 new winners under the FLASH contract, and 12 unsuccessful bidders protested to GAO again.

The decision to cancel FLASH comes as more and more agencies are developing contract vehicles to buy agile services. Along with the DHS, the General Services Administration’s 18F organization also struggled to award and ultimately cancelled the second and third contracts under its agile blanket purchase agreement. 18F awarded 16 vendors a spot in part one of its agile BPA in August 2015.

It’s unclear what comes next for FLASH — whether DHS will try again with a new procurement or give up entirely on a separate contract vehicle for agile services and rely on an existing one like EAGLE II.
So, now for the denouement:

DHS’ internal assessment of its $1.5B agile contract: ‘significant errors and missteps’
If the Homeland Security Department’s decision to cancel its $1.5 billion contract for agile services wasn’t shocking enough, the details of the missteps and problems the agency detailed in its “motion to dismiss” left long-time federal procurement attorneys and vendors with their collective mouths agape.

“DHS has determined that cancellation of the FLASH solicitation, HSHQDC-16-R-00118, is the only viable option to address the many issues that DHS has identified as problems with the requirement and the record,” DHS lawyers wrote to GAO in the document, which Federal News Radio obtained. “The integrity of the procurement process will be served by this cancellation.”

Barbara Kinosky, managing partner with Centre Law and Consulting LLC, said she was “floored” by DHS’s honesty and the level of detail it provided.

“They did everything but name names,” she said. “It is absolutely draconian to cancel the contract at this point. It means it is so flawed that they couldn’t tweak this, or conversely they decided not to let all the protestors on to the vehicle. I suspect the whole methodology was flawed and even if they tweaked the evaluation factors it was still susceptive (sic) to more protests.”

In the motion to dismiss, DHS said the problems with FLASH ranged from the evaluation criteria and adjectival ratings to the price evaluations and best value tradeoffs to lacking the expertise in agile software services to do a proper evaluation.

“DHS has also determined that the evaluation of the offerors may have resulted in unequal treatment of offerors’ weaknesses and risks. This is partially due to the adjectival ratings that were used, but also due to the evaluation process used to evaluate and assess offerors during the technical challenge exercises,” DHS stated in its motion.

“DHS has identified issues in the price evaluation report (PER) and best value tradeoff analysis (BVTA) which do not adequately support its award decisions. The methodology by which the price evaluation team evaluated price realism is not identified in the PER. Nor is it evident in the PER itself what DHS reviewed and evaluated to determine whether prices were reasonable and realistic.”

Christoph Mlinarchik, a government contracts expert and owner of Christoph LLC, a consulting firm, said DHS’s self-assessment of the FLASH procurement resulted in a firm vote of “no confidence” due to a “comedy of errors: poorly executed technical challenge evaluations, sparse price analysis, inadequate tradeoff analysis and more.”

“The most glaring admission by DHS is that critical documents were altered after award, like the technical evaluation report and best value tradeoff analysis. These critical documents were changed after submission to the GAO as part of the official record– a flagrant foul that undermines the bid protest system,” Mlinarchik said. “In summary, DHS rolled over, showed its belly, and provided ample reasons that the FLASH procurement was a total failure.

This does not look good for DHS, but it shows courage in admitting fault and starting from scratch instead of putting lipstick on a pig.”

The decision to cancel FLASH left vendors both relieved and in disbelief. One industry source, who requested anonymity for fear of retaliation from DHS, said it was a painful process from the beginning.

As Soraya Correa, DHS chief procurement officer, said in December in a NextGov article after the initial set of protests delayed FLASH:

“We’ve got to start getting rid of that fear,” Correa said. “We’ve got to start making it OK to sometimes make a mistake, as long as you’re making an intelligent mistake. It’s OK to take a few chances, and you know what? Every now and then, we’re going to stub our toe.”

Wednesday, February 18, 2015

Contract changes to accommodate changes in economic conditions in delayed performance require new procurement

This case from England involved a Development Agreement made between a local council and a developer. As usual, I only give a partial report of the case, and you must read it in its entirety at the link for context, accuracy and fullness (there is much of interest and importance left out here). If you would like a quicker analysis of it, read this article: Winchester property development case highlights changeable 'material variations' test under procurement rules.
The Council, as owner of various freehold and leasehold sites in the city centre, entered into a "Development Agreement relating to a site at Broadway/Friarsgate Winchester" with Thornfield Properties (Winchester) Limited (the Developer) on 22 December 2004. On 9 February 2009, the Council granted planning permission for the redevelopment scheme by the developer designated in 2004, but thereafter, due to economic conditions affecting the concerned area, the original developer went into administration and the project was ultimately sold to a third party.

The Development Agreement WAS varied on a number of occasions, namely on 22 October 2009, on 10 December 2010 and on 30 January 2014, and many changes were made from the original agreement, making it more profitable to the developer. The variations to the development agreement, inter alia, allowed the Council to request that the affordable housing be provided off-site or by way of a commuted sum. The parties to the Development Agreement had also agreed in an exchange of letters that the Council would not take advantage of its ability to terminate the Agreement.

Restrictive procurement practices by public bodies (in particular, entering into contracts only with preferred domestic contractors) does not allow for fair competition between firms from other member states and may result in market distortions. The Council ought to have complied with the procurement requirements, but did not do so, in reliance on mistaken legal advice. Instead it entered into an agreement with Thornfield Properties because it had a pre-existing commercial relationship with Stagecoach to redevelop its bus station on the site. No other contractors were considered. It is now too late to challenge the lawfulness of the Development Agreement on this basis.

it is agreed that the question whether or not the variations to the Development Agreement were so substantial as to require a new procurement procedure is to be determined by reference to the case law.

The leading textbook, Arrowsmith: The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (3rd ed.), sets out the principles at paragraph 6.267:
"Another issue to consider is when a proposed extension, renewal or modification to an existing arrangement amounts to a new "contract" under the 2004 Public Sector Directive and Public Contract Regulations 2006. When this is the case a contracting authority may not simply place the work with the existing contracting party, but must award it using a new procedure under the directive/regulations. This issue is not currently dealt with by explicit provisions in the directive/regulations. However, the principle that amendments to an existing contract may be regarded as a new contract needing a new procedure has been established and elaborated in the case law of the CJ, most notably in the case of Pressetext.

A key reason for this principle relates to the purpose of the legislation of ensuring that work is awarded in accordance with transparent procedures to prevent discrimination. If the contract awarded is later changed, there is a risk that such changes are made for discriminatory motives (for example, to award the firm more work or allow it to operate under easier terms) and that national firms, in collusion with the contracting authority or otherwise, may be able to obtain an advantage in the award procedure by tendering favourable terms in the expectation that they will be changed after conclusion of the contract. Changes to concluded contracts can also potentially undermine any policy that contracts should be undertaken by the best tenderer in order to develop the single market. If this is considered as an objective of the directive, rules to limit changes to concluded contracts are also appropriate from this perspective, on the basis that the existing contracting partner may not be the best firm to perform the revised contract. Changing a contract also potentially violates the equal treatment principle that can support such objectives. From a national perspective, changing a contract without a competition for the revised contract raises value-for-money issues as the change is made without considering whether other economic operators can offer value for money and without the terms being fixed under the pressure of competition."

The leading case is Case C-454/06 Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v. Republik Österreich [2008] ECR I-4401. The CJEU held:
34. In order to ensure transparency of procedures and equal treatment of tenderers, amendments to the provisions of a public contract during the currency of the contract constitute a new award of a contract within the meaning of Directive 92/50 when they are materially different in character from the original contract and, therefore, such as to demonstrate the intention of the parties to renegotiate the essential terms of that contract (see, to that effect, Case C-337/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-8377, paragraphs 44 and 46).

35. An amendment to a public contract during its currency may be regarded as being material when it introduces conditions which, had they been part of the initial award procedure, would have allowed for the admission of tenderers other than those initially admitted or would have allowed for the acceptance of a tender other than the one initially accepted.

36. Likewise, an amendment to the initial contract may be regarded as being material when it extends the scope of the contract considerably to encompass services not initially covered. This latter interpretation is confirmed in Article 11(3)(e) and (f) of Directive 92/50, which imposes, in respect of contracts concerning, either solely or for the most part, services listed in Annex I A thereto, restrictions on the extent to which contracting authorities may use the negotiated procedure for awarding services in addition to those covered by an initial contract.

37. An amendment may also be regarded as being material when it changes the economic balance of the contract in favour of the contractor in a manner which was not provided for in the terms of the initial contract.
Thus, the test to be applied is whether the variations to the contract "are materially different in character from the original contract and, therefore, such as to demonstrate the intention of the parties to renegotiate the essential terms of that contract" (paragraph 34). Any material difference has to be assessed by comparing the contract as originally entered into and the contract after variation.

Both counsel agreed that the likelihood of other economic operators bidding for the contract, had it been advertised as amended, ought to be considered as part of the test in paragraph 34 of Pressetext, reflecting its underlying purpose of ensuring equal opportunity for economic operators. Both counsel agreed that the reference in paragraph 35 to "allowing" other tenderers to be admitted or tenders accepted should be broadly construed. It could include a range of possibilities, for example, where operators had been deterred from applying by the less favourable terms but were interested in applying under the improved terms, or where threshold conditions had been relaxed, enabling more operators to qualify.

Contrary to Mr Elvin's submission, I consider that an increase in potential profitability for the economic operator can be a material variation for the purpose of the Pressetext test. Although paragraph 37 can be read as limited to the economic balance as between the contracting parties, where (as here) the court is considering a development contract or a concession contract, the commercial value will be judged by the potential profits to be obtained from third parties, not the awarding authority. The financial terms between the parties remain relevant but they are not the only consideration.

Mr Elvin submitted that, in order to succeed, the Claimant had to identify other economic operators who would have wished to bid for the contract, and would have had a realistic prospect of success. He pointed to the use of the "would" in paragraph 35 of Pressetext rather than "might". He also relied upon the judgment of Andrews J. in Edenred, at:
"There is much to be said for the approach taken by Coulson J. [in AG Quidnet Hounslow LLP v Hounslow LBC [2012] EWHC 2639 (TCC)] of requiring evidence that someone beside the original bidders would have bid for the contract, because the EU procurement rules are designed to protect against real, not hypothetical distortion of competition. However, I do not need to decide the point, because even if one approaches the question on the basis that a hypothetical bidder has been shut out of the bidding process by the absence of reference to the subject-matter of the proposed amendment, it seems to me that in principle that must necessarily be a realistic hypothetical bidder – i.e. the evidence must demonstrate that there would be someone else who would have been ready, willing and able to bid and who would have wished to have done so if the opportunity had been made clear, but who did not do so because it was not."
Mr Palmer did not object to the requirement of a "realistic hypothetical bidder" but he submitted that Pressetext and other CJEU cases on the procurement Directives did not require firm evidence of an alternative potential bidder in order to satisfy the test in paragraph 34 of Pressetext. In my view, Mr Palmer's analysis is correct.

I agree with Mr Palmer's submission that Andrews J.'s approach to the evidence reflected the particular facts in Edenred, where there had recently been a full tendering process and so the unsuccessful bidders and those who had expressed an initial interest could all be identified. The Claimant in this case is in a more difficult position, as no tendering process has ever been carried out, and so he cannot identify any actual or potential bidders who were deterred or disadvantaged. The requirement suggested by Mr Elvin would have the undesirable consequence of placing a Defendant who fails to comply with any procurement requirements in a better position than one who does.

In R (Law Society) v Legal Services Commission [2007] EWCA Civ 1264, the Court of Appeal was concerned with legal aid contracts which had been awarded by the Legal Services Commission to solicitors without a competitive bidding process. The Court concluded that the contract did not meet the requirements of transparency under the 2004 Directive and the 2006 Regulations. Lord Phillips LC said, at [80]:
"We consider that the principle of transparency will not be satisfied in the present context if uncertainty as to the nature and effect of the amendments that may be made deters, or is liable to deter, some potential service providers from entering into the contract."
Thus, the court made its assessment, at least in part, on the basis that the amendments deterred or were liable to deter potential service providers.

In my judgment, the task of the court is to apply the test in Pressetext on the evidence before it. Evidence of actual or potential bidders may assist but it is not a pre-requisite. Here the Claimant relies on evidence of the commercial appeal of this development contract to potential developers, and the significantly more favourable terms offered in 2014, compared with 2004. In my judgment, the Claimant has to satisfy the Court, on the balance of probabilities, that a realistic hypothetical bidder would have applied for the contract, had it been advertised, but he is not required to identify actual potential bidders.

The evidence demonstrates that the variations to the Development Agreement contract were made because the Council accepted the Developer's representations that the project was not viable on the original contractual terms, and therefore it would not proceed. It is evident that, in order to save the project, the parties did re-negotiate the terms of the contract. Although I recognise that the subject-matter of the contract remains the same, in my view, the varied contract is materially different in character to the original contract.

The most significant difference is that, overall, the varied contract is considered by the contracting parties to be viable for the Developer, whereas they consider the original contract to be unviable. Overall, I consider that, had this variation been in place in 2004, the contract would have been of significantly greater commercial value to potential bidders. A potential bidder could not have anticipated this change; nor was it anticipated or provided for in the contract. In my view, this is a major change to the contract.
The discussion of the issues in this case would be familiar to most students of procurement on the other side of The Pond, which is an odd statement to make by me, being entirely out in the middle of The Other Pond. The need for a new procurement here was related to changes beyond the scope of the contract ("an amendment to the initial contract may be regarded as being material when it extends the scope of the contract considerably to encompass services not initially covered") and outside the field of competition ("the likelihood of other economic operators bidding for the contract, had it been advertised as amended, ought to be considered"), two familiar concepts here.

I do, though, take small issue with the statement in the article quoted at the beginning of this post, that "changes to the economic viability of property development schemes over time could influence whether re-procurements by local authorities are necessary when changes to property development contracts are made to account for the changed economic conditions". It must be considered that the primary, if not only relevant, focus is on the nature of the changes actually made to the contract, not the cause (economic viability of the property development schemes over time).

Tuesday, December 21, 2010

Lost bid? Out of luck? Not if out of scope changes

I briefly introduced this subject from the Government Contracts Blog a week or so back but did not have time then to report much about it. It is worth taking the time, so here it is:

Let Bygones Be Bygones - Except When It Comes To "Out of Scope" Modifications
As a general matter, the GAO does not review matters pertaining to an agency’s contract administration decisions. 4 C.F.R. § 21.5(a). Contract modifications and changes fall into this category and bid protests raising issues related to the issuance of modifications or changes generally will not be considered by the GAO.

At other times, however, it may be to a contractor’s benefit to have a long memory and a watchful eye.

The Competition in Contracting Act (“CICA”) requires agencies to use full and open competition when acquiring goods or services. 10 U.S.C. § 2304.

Unless an agency invokes an exception, an “out of scope” modification or change is essentially an improper sole-source award that circumvents CICA’s competition requirements. The GAO will thus entertain a protest challenging a contract modification or change when the contractor alleges that the modification or change is “out of scope” of the awarded contract.

If the GAO sustains the protest, it may order the agency to terminate the contract and re-solicit its modified requirements on a competitive basis, as it should have done in the first place. This remedy may afford a contractor another opportunity to compete for the agency’s requirements. A contractor should thus keep a watchful eye on its competitor’s contract to ensure that the work its competitor is being asked to perform falls within the scope of the contract as awarded and that it preserves its right to file a timely challenge at the GAO.

To prevail on a protest alleging an “out of scope” modification, a contractor must show that the contract as modified is materially different from the contract as awarded.

While no one factor is dispositive, the contract type and changes to the nature and type of work have received heightened attention in bid protest decisions. A contractor’s chances for success increase based on the number of factors that support the conclusion that the modification or change was “out of scope.”

Despite the lack of a bright-line rule, one thing remains certain. A contractor that lets bygones be bygones and ignores the manner in which its competitor’s contract is proceeding may never have an opportunity to make this showing and may be deprived of an opportunity to compete for a requirement that should have been subject to competition. Maintaining a vigilant guard could thus provide a piece of the pie that had appeared previously to be out of reach.

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

Procurement Controversies -- Guam

Report says procurement broke Guam law
Governor's Chief of Staff George Bamba and government chief procurement officer Claudia Acfalle broke Guam law when they approved a Port Authority of Guam community outreach program, according to the Guam Office of the Attorney General.

The job needed to go through a separate procurement process, the attorney general's office said, and noted the procurement also appears to violate federal grant regulations.

The governor's office should consider taking "appropriate action" against Bamba and Acfalle, according to the attorney general's office, and Bamba should be "admonished" for allowing a contractor to be paid for a service or product that was not delivered.

AG: Bamba should be admonished
While the AG's Office found that there wasn't a conflict of interest that would constitute ethical violations under the procurement law by Bamba or Port General Manager, Glenn Leon Guerrero.

Chief Deputy Attorney General Phil Tydingco determined that the procurement of the Community Outreach Program by the General Services Agency at the direction of Bamba violated Guam law because the acquisition of the program was beyond the scope of the original procurement of the Port Master Plan and should have been a separate procurement of professional services.

The AG's Office has also recommended that the Office of the Governor consider having procurement training for those staff directly involved with procurement.

AG's review of the Port Authority of Guam procurement process