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Showing posts with label Private vs public contract. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Private vs public contract. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 12, 2021

Race, Religion, and Privacy: Oh My!

Government Contracting does not exists in a vacuum. It exists within the public domain, with governance features that distinguish it entirely from private contracting.

 Lexology, always a reliable source for government contracting updates (and more), hit a trifecta of such features with its procurement related article selections that hit my inbox today.  Here's a brief sampling of them.

Race: Executive Order Prohibiting Bias Training? Ignore That. DoD Issues Class Deviation to Comply with Nationwide Ban on EO 13950 Provisions


On January 6, 2021, the DoD issued a class deviation, effective immediately, to implement the nationwide court order enjoining Sections 4 and 5 of Executive Order (EO) 13950, Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping. EO 13950 prohibits federal agencies, contractors, and grant recipients from using workplace diversity and inclusion trainings to “promote race or sex stereotyping or scapegoating,” with Section 4 applying specifically to government contractors.
That new Court Order trumped Executive Order 13950. Also see Venable's post,Dismantling EO 13950 – Nationwide Preliminary Injunction Results in Suspension of Enforcement Measures for a bit more flavor and information.
For the foreseeable future, Federal contractors, subcontractors, and grant recipients alike no longer need to comply with or worry about the enforcement of EO 13950, especially given President‑elect Joe Biden's very recent announcement that he is appointing Boston Mayor Marty Walsh as the Secretary of Labor. In particular, Mayor Walsh has issued executive orders over the past few years that declare racism an emergency and public health crisis with the goal of "dismantl[ing] [] systemic racism"; acknowledge and improve racial equity through government, as further reported on here; and "create a national model for breaking down system racism across all aspects" of Boston, as reported here. Given that history, it is likely safe to assume that, if confirmed, Mr. Walsh has no intention of advancing policies akin to those in EO 13950.
Religion: OFCCP Issues Final Rule on Religious Exemptions for Government Contractors
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs issued Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause’s Religious Exemption final rule, which becomes effective on January 8, 2021. The final rule is intended to clarify the scope and application of the religious exemption in light of recent developments, including Supreme Court rulings and Executive Orders. Among other things, it clarifies that, in addition to churches, the exemption covers employers that: are organized for a religious purpose; hold themselves out to the public as carrying out a religious purpose; engage in exercise of religion consistent with and in furtherance of a religious purpose; and either operate on a not-for-profit basis or present other strong evidence that their purpose is substantially religious. Moreover, religious employers may condition employment on compliance with religious tenets, as long as they do not discriminate on other protected bases. This particular provision has caused concern, as some have interpreted it to permit discrimination against LGBTQ individuals. Among its key provisions, the final rule adds a rule of construction to provide the maximum legal protection of religious exercise permitted by the Constitution and laws, including the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Privacy (well, one person's privacy is another person's transparency): New Corporate Transparency Act Will Impose Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements on Many Companies, Particularly Small Businesses
The Corporate Transparency Act (CTA), part of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act enacted into law on January 1, 2021, will impose new beneficial ownership reporting requirements on many companies. The stated purposes of the CTA include the collection of beneficial ownership interest information for corporations, limited liability companies and similar entities "to (A) set a clear, Federal standard for incorporation practices; (B) protect vital United States national security interests; (C) protect interstate and foreign commerce; (D) better enable critical national security, intelligence and law enforcement efforts to counter money laundering, the financing of terrorism and other illicit activity; and (E) bring the United States into compliance with international anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism standards." Many types of entities, however, are exempted from the requirements of the CTA. These entities include, among others: public companies; governmental entities; banks and bank holding companies; credit unions; broker dealers; registered investment companies; registered investment advisers; insurance companies; registered public accounting firms; public utilities; certain pooled investment vehicles; 501(c) entities; companies with more than 20 full-time employees in the United States, more than $5 million in gross receipts or sales, and an operating presence at a physical office in the United States; and entities owned or controlled by one or more of such exempt entities. A reporting company will be required to identify each beneficial owner and applicant and report the individual's full legal name, date of birth, current residential or business address, and a "unique identifying number from an acceptable identification document" (generally a nonexpired passport, state issued driver's license or identification card or, if the individual does not have any of these, a nonexpired foreign passport) or a FinCen identifying number. The reporting company need only report the name of the exempt entity having a direct or indirect ownership interest in the reporting company (and not any of the other identifying information otherwise required). There are many issues of scope, definition and interpretation in the CTA which are expected to be addressed by the Treasury's forthcoming implementing regulations.
See, also, How do you determine prospective contractor responsibility if you don't know who the contractor really is?

Tuesday, January 28, 2020

Of smoke and mirrors; nonresponsibility and invisibility

This post is prompted by a November 2019 GOA report about defense procurement, specifically posing the proposition that "Ongoing DOD Fraud Risk Assessment Efforts Should Include Contractor Ownership".

In explaining why GAO did the report, it says, "DOD generally accounts for about two-thirds of federal contracting activity. Some companies doing business with DOD may have an opaque ownership structure that conceals other entities or individuals who own, control, or financially benefit from the company. Opaque ownership could be used to facilitate fraud and other unlawful activity." GAO describes "opague" in the context: opaque ownership is a structure of business form or governance that may conceal or obfuscate entities or individuals who own, control, or benefit financially from a business. (See also, e.g., in other contexts, this and this and this.)

The report recalled the impetus for the report came out of "the committee report on the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018,[in which] the House Armed Services Committee expressed concerns that DOD contractors may disguise their identities and cost structures from procurement officers, in effect acting as hidden monopolies with unreasonable prices or establishing opaque ownership structures for benefits that are contrary to the government’s interest. The committee report included a provision that GAO examine DOD’s processes to identify contractors’ ownership structures and the risks posed to DOD by contractors with opaque ownership structures. As a general finding in this GAO report, GAO noted, "DOD has also begun a department-wide fraud risk management program, but it has neither assessed risks of contractor ownership across the department nor identified risks posed by contractor ownership as a specific area for assessment."

In undertaking the study leading to this report, GAO "reviewed GAO bid-protest decisions to identify cases in which contractors may have failed to disclose foreign ownership or concealed beneficial-owner information to obtain contracts that they were not eligible to receive"; also studying cases where there appeared "the risk that contractors could be disguising their ownership to create the appearance of competition.

Paraphrasing, GAO explains that real ownership of an entity includes the ostensible ownership disclosed to regulators and the beneficial ownership by the persons who directly or indirectly pull the levers of control and management or reap the substantial rewards of ownership of the entity. The more layers of ownership there are, the difficult it is to determine who really owns the entity. This is compounded by the observation that "In the United States, no centralized information source or national registry maintains company ownership information. In 2014, the National Association of Secretaries of State found that most states collect minimal ownership data. ... During both the entity-formation process and in annual or periodic reporting, the association found that very few states collect some form of entity ownership or control information from limited liability companies or corporations." It conceded that "the Securities and Exchange Commission collects some ownership information on publicly traded companies"; that is, the relatively few, but relatively large, businesses in the USA. The Securities and Exchange Commission collects [only] some ownership information on publicly traded companies.

This limited view from the business world has implications for procurement.
"The FAR contains several provisions governing the selection of an offeror. Provisions such as price and past performance of the offeror are generally applicable in determining which offeror should win a contract. ... A prospective contractor must affirmatively demonstrate its responsibility, including, when necessary, the responsibility of its proposed subcontractors. Contracting officers must then determine the responsibility of prospective contractors, including whether prospective contractors can perform the terms of a contract. To be determined responsible, a prospective contractor must have adequate financial resources to perform the contract (or the ability to obtain them); be able to comply with the required delivery or performance schedule; have a satisfactory performance, integrity, and ethics record; have the necessary organization, experience, accounting and operational controls, and facilities to carry out the contract (or the ability to obtain them); and be otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under applicable laws and regulations.

Before awarding a contract over the simplified acquisition threshold, a contracting officer must review the prospective contractor’s performance and integrity information available in the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS). FAPIIS is a federal government-wide database designed to assist contracting officers with making a responsibility determination by providing integrity and performance information of covered federal agency contractors and grantees. FAPIIS provides a prospective contractor “Report Card” that includes information pertaining to the prospective contractor’s past performance (if applicable), such as any administrative agreements, contract terminations, nonresponsibility determinations, and exclusions, among other things. It also includes the ability to view the company relationship information, which details the ownership information that prospective contractors are required to report in SAM. [The System for Award Management, or SAM, is a government-wide portal that is consolidating the capabilities of multiple systems and information sources used by the Federal government in conducting acquisitions. In order to contract with the federal government businesses and agencies must complete the required registration with SAM.] When making a responsibility determination, the contracting officer must consider all the information available through FAPIIS with regard to the prospective contractor and any immediate owner, predecessor (an entity that the prospective contractor replaced by acquiring assets and carrying out affairs under a new name), or subsidiary identified for that prospective contractor in FAPIIS. The contracting officer must document in the contract file how the information in FAPIIS was considered in any responsibility determination, as well as the action that was taken as a result of the information.
There is much more to the report, and the need for knowledge about the person or entity with who the government is, or may be, engaging in business. But this post is concentrating on the responsibility factor, and that is only part of the report. I really want to encourage you to read the whole report and how entity information is critical to matters national security and the mitigation of fraud.

GAO notes that, although DOD and other agencies have taken some baby steps to shed light on the issue of contractor ownership (e.g., "DOD, GSA, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration amended the FAR in May 2014 to require prospective contractors to self-report their immediate and highest-level entity owner, but not their beneficial owner, as part of contractors’ annual registration process in SAM), DOD "faces a number of challenges in identifying and verifying" it. Because "the scope and scale of this activity makes DOD procurement inherently susceptible to fraud", GAO recommended "The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) should include an assessment of risks related to contractor ownership as part of its ongoing efforts to plan and conduct a department-wide fraud risk assessment."

Guam law follows the ABA Model Procurement Code when it comes to issues of responsibility, which is also the framework of the federal government as described above. I also has a (problematic) requirement (5 GCA § 5233) that, in some procurement methods, a bidder, "as a condition of bidding" must disclose "the name and address of any person who has held more than ten percent (10%) of the outstanding interest or shares of [a] partnership, sole proprietorship or corporation at any time during the twelve (12) month period immediately preceding submission of a bid." The "wild wild West" current darling of business entities is an LLC, but this law, written before Guam adopted an LLC law, does not make any disclosure requirement for that form of entity. Nor does it include trusts within the prophylactic disclosure requirement.

It is interesting to know that trusts have also been used to create invisibility in the procurement context. The following article discussing this issue in light of the trend described in the GAO report above.

Trust but Verify: Disclosure of Trust Ownership May Be Required for Family-Owned Government Contractors
Family-owned businesses are often owned and controlled by family trusts. Trusts are used by families for estate planning, tax planning and asset protection. Family-owned government contractors with trust ownership structures should be mindful of ownership
disclosures required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Failure to comply with the required disclosures could result in False Claims Act or false statement allegations, loss of Facility Security Clearances, rejections of bids and proposals, and loss of bid protests.

Under rules adopted in 2014, a government contractor or offeror owned by another entity must disclose its own Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code and the CAGE codes of its “immediate owner” and “highest level owner” both in the System for Award Management (SAM) and to the contracting officer before contract award. Under FAR 52.204-17 (Ownership or Control of Offeror), “immediate owners” and “highest-level owners” are required to obtain their own CAGE codes even if they will not be directly contracting with the government. “Immediate owner” means an entity, other than the offeror, that has direct control of the offeror. “Highest-level owner” means the entity that owns or controls the
immediate owner of the offeror, or that owns or controls one or more entities that control an immediate owner of the offeror. No entity owns or exercises control of the highest-level owner.

If an offeror is owned directly by individuals, the offeror does not have an “immediate owner” or a “highest-level owner.” If an offeror is directly owned by another entity, the ownership entity is the “immediate owner” of the offeror. If an offeror’s immediate owner is, in turn, owned by another entity or series of entities, the last entity at the top of the offeror’s organizational chart is the “highest-level owner.” An offeror is required to certify its ownership disclosures in the “Representations and Certifications” section of its registration on SAM.gov.

The term “entity” is not defined in the FAR, [but is described at the Commercial and Government Entity webpage: "In business, an entity is a person, department, corporation, cooperative, partnership, business, manufacturer, organization, or other groups with whom it is possible to conduct business", and a trust can fall within that description.] The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the agency responsible for assigning CAGE codes, suggest that trusts are considered entities under the FAR and should have their own CAGE codes and be disclosed on SAM.gov." Trusts are commonly referenced in state business entity statutes. Trusts also have certain characteristics that are similar to other business entities such as corporations and limited liability companies. Namely, trusts can buy, sell and own personal property and real property; own equity in other business entities; and enter into contracts. Trusts may also shield their beneficiaries from the claims of creditors.

The author of that article warns, "In order to avoid possible False Claims Act or false statement allegations, loss of security clearances, rejections of bids and proposals, and adverse bid protest decisions, family-owned government contractors with trust ownership structures should review their SAM.gov registration to ensure that disclosures about their “immediate owner” and “highest-level owner” are accurate."

The interests of the government, be it state, local or federal, in good governance principles of transparency and responsibility are antithetical to the interests of private sector contractors. There may be some giving and taking, but the government must always heed those principles. History has shown there are many other structures that provide the flexibility commerce requires to carry on,but government, and the broader community must stay vigilant to any "Houdini factor" that jeopardizes the foundation of principles which good governance, and good procurement, that our democratic society depends on.

Monday, June 5, 2017

No emergency, just a desire to act quickly, like business

The procurement issues here raise issues of noncompetitive acquisitions, the requirement to obtain a fair and reasonable price before acquiring anything, even by sole source, and the contrast between government acquisition and private business. Government contracting requires market research to have independent knowledge of source alternatives in the market, prices and costs, as part of the acquisition process before a selection process is even chosen.

The governance policies of government acquisition are intended to assure transparency and the pursuit of effective competition within the free enterprise system. It is meant to avoid the secretive and arbitrary selection of colleagues and strong-arm "horse trading" linked to matters far afield from the instant acquisition that is the norm in private business ("you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours").

Government procurement is concerned with public confidence, fair and equitable treatment of market participants, maximization of public funds, and safeguards to establish and maintain a contracting system of integrity with accountability to the public. It's not meant to trade products or services for votes or favors or other "godfather offers".

In these respects, government procurement is intentionally designed to be the antithesis of private business, especially private business whose only concern is the welfare of the business owner. Not that there is anything wrong with that in the context of people betting their own money in their own smoke-filled rooms or out on the golf course or the box seat of some entertainment venue. 

But, private business has no concern about other people's money, whereas government must be concerned with other people's money or face a fractious public, as well as a mutinous supply of vendors. 
 
Again, I advise readers of articles I present to read the articles themselves, at the link provided. I omit, rearrange, slice, dice, paraphrase, editorialize and generally use the general fact situation of articles to provide teachable moments concerning procurement practice and principle. My version may or may not reflect the article's author's intent, and likely do not to my re-working of the following story, so read the original; click the link at the title.


No competition, no cost estimate as Kansas City firm picked for coveted VA contract McClatchy Washington Bureau
The federal government typically awards contracts to private companies after a competitive bidding process in order to keep costs low and avoid conflicts of interest. “When you have competitive bidding it prevents government officials from throwing contracts to their friends or keeping them from people they don’t like,” said Richard Painter, chairman of the board of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, a nonpartisan watchdog group.

But, the Trump administration picked Kansas City-based Cerner Corp. for a coveted contract to modernize veterans health records, and there will be no competition for the taxpayer-funded project. Cerner partnered with defense technology contractor Leidos, Accenture Federal Services and Intermountain Healthcare in its bid for the $4.3 billion, 10-year defense contract. Other health IT companies didn’t have a chance.

VA Secretary David Shulkin told reporters his decision to waive competition and acquire Cerner’s software directly was motivated by President Donald Trump’s desire to act quickly. “From the outset that when the president selected me to be secretary, he made clear to me that he expected us to act with faster decisions, to act like business, and to really make sure that we are really doing the right thing to change veterans’ health care. And that's exactly what we’re trying to do today,” Shulkin said.

Shulkin said there was a “public interest exception” to allow awarding the Cerner contract without a “full and open competition.” The VA still must draw up a justification for waiving open and public competition, and Tester’s office will be following up with VA for those documents, said his spokesman, Dave Kuntz.

Sen. Jon Tester of Montana, the top Democrat on Senate’s Veterans Affairs Committee, was supportive of Shulkin’s announcement but his spokesman said he has some questions and concerns about timing and costs that the secretary did not answer. Neither Cerner nor the Department of Veterans Affairs could say how much the contract will cost, however.

“The challenge here is that by giving up competition, the VA has given up all control to the company” when it comes to price, said Phillip Carter, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security who teaches government contracts law at Georgetown University Law Center. “At the end of the day ... they’re probably going to pay whatever Cerner asks,” Carter said.

The new VA health records system won’t be identical to the Defense Department’s, but its core will be Cerner’s Millennium software, Shulkin said on Monday. He said Cerner’s work on the Pentagon’s system, now known as MHS Genesis, pushed his decision in Cerner’s favor. Adoption of the same system “will ultimately result in all patient data residing in one common system,” the secretary said.
To me, adopting a system that will ultimately result in "all data residing in one common" (but proprietary) software will assure everyone else will become locked out. There are historical precedents, such as Motorola's lock on emergency radio systems, and Microsoft's lock on desktop software systems. See, Sure, Kid, first one's free.


The US government has been trying hard to break free of such locks.  This procurement seems to also go against the US Government's Federal Source Code Policy: Achieving Efficiency, Transparency, and Innovation through Reusable and Open Source Software:
When Federal agencies are unable to identify an existing Federal or commercial software solution that satisfies their specific needs, they may choose to develop a custom software solution on their own or pay for its development. When agencies procure custom-developed source code, however, they do not necessarily make their new code (source code or code) broadly available for Federal Government-wide reuse.

Even when agencies are in a position to make their source code available on a Government-wide basis, they do not make such code available to other agencies in a consistent manner. In some cases, agencies may even have difficulty establishing that the software was produced in the performance of a Federal Government contract.
These challenges may result in duplicative acquisitions for substantially similar code and an inefficient use of taxpayer dollars.

This policy seeks to address these challenges by ensuring that new custom-developed Federal source code be made broadly available for reuse across the Federal Government. This is consistent with the Digital Government Strategy’s “Shared Platform” approach, which enables Federal employees to work together—both within and across agencies—to reduce costs, streamline development, apply uniform standards, and ensure consistency in creating and delivering information. Enhanced reuse of custom-developed code across the Federal Government can have significant benefits for American taxpayers, including decreasing duplicative costs for the same code and reducing Federal vendor lock-in.
Note also the internationally informed Open Source for Government component of the Open Spouse Initiative.

Other article(s) on this topic: VA to dump Vista for DOD's electronic health record system











Friday, December 30, 2016

The business of government

I've taken the following article and sliced and diced it to my own editorial fancy, to make particular points about procurement, as is my wont in this blawg. So, if you really want to know the article's author's intent, read it at the title link.

Go on. Click the link and read it from the horse's mouth; some may view it as thought provoking. I did.  My convoluted version follows the link and hopefully does not too much damage to the author's intent.  Pay attention to my identified tags/labels (in the head of this blawg) to put this post in my context.

Thinking about the business of government, By CHRIS DISHMAN, a Ph.D. candidate in public affairs at the University of Texas at Dallas, who wrote it for the Dallas Morning News.
Total spending for the executive branch, known as “discretionary funding,” amounts to 30 percent of all U.S. spending. “Mandatory spending” accounted for 70 percent of total government spending in 2016.

The Department of Defense accounts for half of “discretionary” spending, so agencies like Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs make up 15 percent of total spending. If Congress eliminated the Department of Energy, for instance, the government would save $28 billion annually, which is roughly equivalent to the cost of two new CVN-class aircraft carriers.

Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security and interest on the debt make up the bulk of “mandatory” spending, together with other “entitlements”, social as well as corporate.

The executive branch is the same size as it was in the 1970s, despite the increasing number of laws and regulations passed by Congress. The government remains at 2.1 million people or less.

The government’s workload has skyrocketed, as measured by the amount of spending per government employee, yet neither Congress nor any executive will support additional resources to implement the rules and regulations they advocate. The result of this dilemma is that government contracts out many of its duties to the private sector. And this forces government managers to shift existing resources — those used to undertake other governmental duties — to “manage” those contracts.

The government is paying big dollars to companies to undertake governmental missions. Why? Because it is politically palatable. Mandatory spending must be addressed to balance the budget, but politicians know that threatening a reduction in these programs is electoral suicide. Do you wonder why lobbyists like this approach?

There are fundamental differences between business and government.

Constitutional values, not corporate law and profit, guide the public sector. Ideally, government serves public interests while protecting the competing values that underpin those interests.

The private sector, in contrast, is governed by corporate law and profit, and business executives are, in the main, disinterested in anyone who cannot support that goal.

These differences do not mean that government cannot learn from the private sector. But we should remember that the republic’s founders intended the structure and processes of government to reflect constitutional values, not those of free enterprise.

Tuesday, June 2, 2015

Special needs and higher education

I'm not quite sure what it is about public universities and their yearning freedom from a scrutable contracting regime that is good enough for the rest of tax-supported government enterprise. The prior post was about plans to exempt Illinois colleges from common procurement practices of the state. Today I read of another such move afoot in Wisconsin:

UW funding cut trimmed
Lawmakers on the powerful budget committee trimmed Gov. Scott Walker’s proposed $300 million two-year funding cut to the University of Wisconsin System and introduced significant changes to faculty tenure and shared governance that will take away some power from faculty, students and staff and give more power to campus chancellors and the UW System Board of Regents, who are appointed by Walker. The proposed changes by the Joint Finance Committee also officially put an end to Walker’s proposal, supported by top System officials, to spin the system off from state control to be operated as a public authority.

The lawmakers restored at least in part two key operating flexibilities that were included in Walker’s public authority model. They’d be exempt from state oversight on purchasing and procurement once the regents develop their own rules governing them. They’d also be exempt from state rules on building projects provided the projects are funded entirely through gifts or grants.

The first proposal reminds me of a prior post about the University of Hawaii, and the second one of a post about the University of South Carolina.

The situation in Hawaii is particularly worth recalling.

UH’s procurement privilege could release $337M, May 23, 2010
The University of Hawaii system will be exempt from following the state’s public procurement code, which it has largely blamed for its backlog of deferred maintenance and capital improvement projects, under a new law that takes effect July 1.

University officials say the exemption, effective for two years, will help the 10-campus system operate more efficiently and with greater flexibility in awarding contracts for goods and services, including construction work. The university system has pointed to the existing code, which requires larger contracts to be awarded through a competitive sealed bidding process, for tying up projects and increasing costs as a result.

“This will allow the university to get construction projects started more efficiently and at a faster pace — and it has the added benefit of saving taxpayers’ money by allowing us to take advantage of current construction costs, which are coming in 30 [percent] to 40 percent lower in some cases.”

House Bill 347, which Gov. Linda Lingle signed into law May 6 as Act 82, allows the statewide public university system to come up with its own procurement process “in lieu of” the state procurement code. This was the sixth consecutive year that UH asked lawmakers for the exemption. It previously had flexibility from 1998 through 2004.
And how did that work out for them?

UH to lose procurement exemption as bill flops Apr 27, 2012

University of Hawaii Procurement Under Fire for Wasting Millions of Dollars on Fraud and Corruption March 12th, 2013
Local construction industry leaders are questioning as the University doles out a total of $622 million in contracts including $206 million for major contracts now underway, $229 million of major projects being procured and $187 million in health, safety, code and repairs and maintenance projects.

Dennis Mitsunaga, a successful and politically connected government contractor who has worked for virtually every state agency over the last 40 years, sent shock waves through his industry when he testified at a recent Senate hearing about waste, fraud and abuse that he witnessed firsthand in the University’s procurement system. Mitsunaga, a practicing structural engineer since 1969 and a general contractor since 1971, has worked on several projects including the University of Hawaii Chemistry building, the University of Hawaii Cancer Research Center, the Rainbow Baseball Stadium, and the University of Hawaii- Hilo Housing Project, Phase 1.

He focused much of his criticism on Brian Minaai, a University administrator who has overseen the capital improvement projects for all of the campuses since March 2008. “Brian’s process for selection of non-bid contracts is highly suspect. His selection committee consists of two ‘yes men’ assistants and a third member from the department involved in the project. In essence he controls two out of the three votes he himself makes each selection. He selects only friends from a pool of hundreds of qualified architects and engineers in Honolulu. An investigation will show that the consultants he selected were very small and not the best qualified for the projects he gave them,” Mitsunaga added.

Mitsunaga, who has two companies, Mitsunaga and Associates and Mitsunaga Construction, said Minaai directed him to replace his own civil engineering company on the job with Minaai’s pick, Wesley Segawa, even though Mitsunaga and Associates had applied for and was selected for the project as the civil engineer of record. Segawa charged the University another $293,260 for the civil engineering work and Mitsunaga and Associates had to add a 10 percent coordination fee of $29,326 plus General Excise tax; boosting the cost of the project by $30,000.

Minaai also directed Mitsunaga and Associates to replace Kimura International as the environmental assessment consultant with Wilson Okamoto and directed Mitsunaga and Associates to use Palekana Permitting and Planning to do the permit and processing at a cost of $23,000. “That work is usually covered by the companies involved so the $23,000 was an additional cost, plus a 10 percent coordination fee and GE Tax,” Mitsunaga said.

On another job for the University of Hawaii Cancer Research Center in Kakaako, Palekana Permitting and Planning charged $120,000 to process the permits even though the Kakaako district is currently exempt from such permitting.

Other architects and engineers have privately confirmed Mitsunaga’s claims. One claimed on average on University construction jobs, a construction management firm will charge 10 to 28 percent of the construction contract instead of 5 to 6 percent other state agencies would allow for the same service. Similar allegations were made public when the University of Hawaii agreed to pay $2.5 million to settle a lawsuit that alleged cronyism played a role in the award of a key development contract at the $120 million Cancer Research Center of Hawaii.

The University of Hawaii received a great deal of autonomy in 1999 from Legislature, including management of its own legal affairs, tuition and salaries and contracting.

But some senators said their own investigations have shown the University administration is failing in all of these areas. In addition, students have complained about tuition skyrocketing at the school, making it unaffordable for many local residents, because tuition has been increasing by 141 percent over the last 11 years.

Senate President Donna Mercado Kim proposed several bills this session that would take some of the power away from the University administration and its president, MRC Greenwood, including procurement responsibilities, and help bring what some legislators believe is excessive spending under control. However, during two recent Senate hearings, University officials opposed the plan to transfer procurement responsibilities to the state, and maintained autonomy is necessary.

The procurement bill passed the Senate Higher Education Committee this session, but was killed by Senators,







Sunday, May 31, 2015

Virginia's road project got PPP'd on

How Virginia paid more than $250 million for a road that never got built
The problems help explain why top officials in Gov. Terry McAuliffe’s administration have recently increased scrutiny of public-private partnership deals, a sharp shift in tone in a state that has for 20 years been a national leader in pushing such projects. Transportation Secretary Aubrey Layne said this month that the I-66 project should not be ceded to private investors for “ideological” reasons, as might have happened in the past. Keeping the construction of toll and carpool lanes under state control could generate hundreds of millions of dollars for additional transportation projects, he said, and avoid a repeat of cases in which the state was left “holding the bag.”

Virginia officials are trying to get back tens of millions of dollars from a private company that was supposed to build a 55-mile toll road in southeastern Virginia. State officials had been sending the company multimillion-dollar installments each month to build the road. But the state lacked federal construction permits, so the road wasn’t built. And now the commonwealth is out about $256 million.

Virginia officials governed the project using the state’s Public-Private Transportation Act, which went into effect 20 years ago and gave officials extraordinary flexibility in pairing public projects with private firms. The idea was to try to tap the construction expertise, business acumen and cost-consciousness of private companies, with the benefits flowing to shareholders and state taxpayers. If Virginia officials didn’t have the stomach to set aside large sums to add long stretches of highway, they could lure private investors to put up much of the money. Companies would cover project costs and company profits with the decades of toll revenues they collected.

Among the critical problems, Layne said, was a sort of automatic payment plan, which sent millions to the firm monthly starting in early 2013. Those routine payments were in addition to funds sent to cover specific work that was completed. "Payments continued to go to the contractor for things they knew couldn’t possibly be accomplished, because they didn’t even have a permit,” Layne said. Del. S. Chris Jones (R-Suffolk), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, said, “I can’t think of a worse contract that I have seen in my years of public service.” Jones said that the deal was rushed to avoid political scrutiny.

Layne said he was not seeking to disparage state representatives, but noted that they emerged from a more “process oriented” background within state agencies and lacked the entrepreneurial and negotiating experience and resources of private firms. Private negotiators had often been doing a much better job than their well-meaning state counterparts. “These guys are buying the best attorneys in the world.”

Layne said the company negotiated in good faith. It is the commonwealth’s responsibility to protect its interests, he argued. “I don’t think they’ve done anything that wasn’t allowed in the contract,” Layne said. But, “I’m not saying it was a good contract.” “I don’t blame them for taking the money. It was a negotiated payment schedule,” Layne said. “They didn’t ask to stop getting payments. . . . If I were them, I wouldn’t either.”

The initial concept was that a private firm would pay to build the toll road and control it for decades, a major undertaking with significant risk. The Public-Private Transportation Act allowed many of the state’s basic procurement rules to be bypassed, Layne said, a feature intended to give the state flexibility to find the best deal.

But private firms balked at taking long-term control of the road because traffic tallies and resulting toll revenues were projected to be too low. So state officials changed course. They decided they wanted to hire a company whose primary responsibilities would be to design and build the road. But in a quirk of the transportation act, the state’s basic procurement rules — which limit certain types of financing arrangements and require more rigorous oversight — did not kick back in, even after the nature of the project shifted radically.

State officials then failed to invite a wider group of firms to vie for the business. That left just the three groups that had been competing for the original public-private partnership, Layne said.

Officials “continued to negotiate with a group that was really set up to do something else,” Layne said, noting that only a few large firms had the needed financial heft and inclination to finance, design, build and operate the project as it was initially envisioned. “Had they opened it up, they would have had many more firms willing to bid on this particular project,” Layne said. “It was basically, ‘Build the road and turn it over.’ ”

And more competition could have brought a better deal, he argued.

Project executives with the two firms that make up 460 Mobility – Ferrovial Agroman, a major multinational construction and engineering concern with roots in Spain, and a Pennsylvania-based building firm now known as Allan Myers – declined to comment. “Our employees and contractors have been professional and accommodating throughout the commonwealth’s reconsideration of this project,” said Shannon Moody, 460 Mobility’s public relations manager.

Tuesday, January 13, 2015

The "Toyota Way" has gone wayward

Over and over, we hear that government should purchase like private business, and develop better working relationships and collaboration with its suppliers. Maybe, but consider this case in point (please read the article at the link): Daihatsu Dismantling 'Toyota Way' As Market Changes, by Norihiko Shirouzu, Reuters
Daihatsu Motor Co launched the Mira e:S minicar in 2011, and the car was a hit. A number of improvements – in manufacturing, engineering, procurement – went into the car. But the real secret to success, says Kosuke Shiramizu, Daihatsu’s chairman at the time, lay in taking something out of the company’s business model. Daihatsu shaved off roughly $1,000 in the manufacturing costs of the car by dismantling its keiretsu - an informal but close interlocking business relationship between a manufacturer and its suppliers, cemented by cross-shareholdings and personnel exchanges.

Keiretsu, pundits preached, defused adversarial relationships between assembler and supplier, allowing them to share information and create better product quality. Hence Japanese automakers were able to leap ahead. [Cause and effect are not so easily understood.]

Shiramizu says the days of the keiretsu are numbered. Companies, he says, are competing for price and value by using market mechanisms instead of relationship-based arrangements. "The Toyota way is the high-cost way,” says Shiramizu, 74, in an interview at Daihatsu headquarters in the Osaka suburb of Ikeda. “Keiretsu doesn’t work anymore. If we stick with it, Daihatsu won't survive. Toyota might face a similar fate, too."

Shiramizu, who became advisor to Daihatsu's board and technical executive after stepping down as chairman three and a half years ago, says his parts procurement reform isn’t meant to be a template for Toyota. But it is being taken seriously there, he says.

Two major shifts over the past two decades in the competitive landscape have been working against Japanese car makers and their keiretsu systems.

First, Western rivals dramatically closed the gap with the Japanese. That was partly due to the fact cars have become easier to design and manufacture, because they are less mechanical and are controlled more electronically. Competition thus shifted to who could offer more value to the customer: the highest fuel economy, the sexiest look, and the most compelling functions for the lowest price.

The other competitive shift came from the emerging world. Keiretsu worked beautifully for Toyota because an overwhelming majority of the finely engineered cars it made were sold in the high-priced developed markets of the United States, Europe and Japan. That began changing in the early 2000s, with the rise of emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey. These economies already collectively buy half of the automobiles sold worldwide today.

Daihatsu is mostly in the lower end of the market. As it began buying more components from Toyota-group suppliers such as Denso and Aisin Seiki over the years, it was also stuck with Toyota's lofty quality standards. Shiramizu says Toyota’s specs are often too high for vehicles that some Daihatsu officials describe as “sandals,” as opposed to the dress shoes that Toyota makes. “Do we need parts and cars that withstand the desert heat in Arizona?” Shiramizu asks.

Shiramizu's first move was to send agents of change into the company’s procurement office. Until then, Daihatsu's purchasing office was staffed by non-technical types with little knowledge on how components are designed and produced and, says Shiramizu, "no ability to assess true cost." Instead of attacking costs, those purchasing managers put a priority on their relationships with suppliers - getting wined and dined and showered with gifts in the process, Shiramizu says.

Shiramizu then initiated another move: abolishing the “account” system that governed procurement deals. The status quo, he says, made it almost impossible for new, non-Toyota-group suppliers to do business with Daihatsu, even when they offered better quality and price. Under the account system, only existing suppliers with Daihatsu accounts could supply parts to Daihatsu. [Sounds a bit like the "best value" focus on "proven reliability".]

It allowed Shiramizu to deploy his new procurement leaders in the hunt for lower-cost parts across Japan - and beyond to China, Indonesia and India. Inoue, who was plucked out of the production engineering division by Shiramizu, and his team focused on China. The team quickly found Chinese suppliers of windshields, mirrors, speakers, and aluminum wheels at savings up to 50 percent.

One of the team's most critical findings was not a new supplier, however. It was the discovery that some account holders were slapping a hefty margin on components they procured cheaply in China.

Daihatsu last year bought approximately 1.3 billion yen worth of aluminum wheels in China without going through middlemen. “We have too many middlemen skimming off," Shiramizu says. "Getting rid of those middlemen is the shortest cut to cost savings.”

Buying directly from those suppliers has made the job of procurement specialists more complex. They have to ensure that the logistics for parts delivery are sound, making sure equipment orders are delivered to plants on time. It's worth it, Daihatsu officials say.

The China team discovered factory hubs in the eastern China province of Zhejiang for dirt-cheap generic auto parts – or, as one Daihatsu executive puts it, “fakes.” The results have been mixed: Designs by the generic parts producers are often robust, but the production quality is unreliable, according to Daihatsu officials.

One solution being pursued now is to produce on its own many of the core, high-ticket parts Daihatsu currently buys from Toyota suppliers. Those include air-conditioning and steering systems, drive shafts and wire harnesses. “Toyota suppliers aren't going to like it,” one official says, “but our basic philosophy is to go ‘in house’ - and that means no more middlemen.
Daihatsu had to find a better way to procure when it faced an austere emerging marketplace. That is exactly the condition the US, and other advanced economies, are in: austerity is the new black.

One of my takeaways from this fascinating case study is that we should not allow a fully assembled (or "bundled") product to determine if something should be made subject to "best value" rather than low price bidding.

Here, Daihatsu took the product apart, and even if it did not then acquire each part independently, it learned the true cost of the product, and that is a valuable piece of knowledge when buying in bulk, versus building in house. That's some serious market research.

An article I referenced in a recent post contained a statement by the author of it, Eric S. Crusius, that
"prior to the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act, which jumped-started best-value contracting in the federal marketplace, a common refrain heard in the federal market was “good enough for the government.” In other words, the government was content to settle for mediocrity—or worse."
That's a curious turn of phrase, as pointed out by the distinguished James F. Nagle, in his treatise, "History of Government Contracting". He points out that, in the early days of US procurement, before the Civil War, the government abandoned purchasing weaponry and other things from manufacturers when it found it could make all the parts and then assemble them "in house" in US armories and ship yards. It thereby developed the specifications needed to get exactly what it wanted, both in house and from suppliers. He says,
The rigorous inspection standards gave rise to a saying still in use today but with vastly different meaning. The saying was "close enough for government work". Originally the saying was a boast by contractors to would-be commercial customers, that their products were so well manufactured that the government would accept them even with its known high standards. Unfortunately, by the middle of the twentieth century because of scandals [recounted in the book], the same saying now is used to denote a feeling by a contractor that even shoddy work will be accepted by the government.
If we are ignorant of history, we are bound to repeat its mistakes. Taking the steps Daihatsu has taken are something out of the early days of US federal procurement; if they can do that and avoid the scandals Dr. Nagle described, we may go somewhere in procurement where man has gone before, but survive it with our integrity intact.

Friday, March 14, 2014

Private partners succeed where transparency fails the public

Government accused of deliberate attempt to cover up fraudulent, incompetent and embarrassing outsourcing contracts
The Government is today condemned by MPs of all parties for hiding behind a “veil of secrecy” over the award of contracts worth nearly £100 billion a year to huge private companies. Problems are particularly acute at the Department for Work and Pensions, which is on the “verge of meltdown” over the privately-run operation of welfare reforms and employment programmes, they say.

The PAC calls today for Freedom of Information legislation to be extended to cover government deals with private firms, for contractors to be obliged to “open their books up” and for the National Audit Office to be given greater authority to scrutinise contracts. It also said suppliers should be required to have policies on whistleblowing in place.

“Too often the government has used commercial confidentiality as an excuse to withhold information, often in response to Freedom of Information requests from the public or MPs,” the committee says.

Conservative and Labour governments alike have turned to private companies over the last 30 years. The Government spends around £187 billion a year on goods and services, about half of which is estimated to be spent on contracting out to private and voluntary providers. Contractors are now responsible for vast areas of public services from managing offices, providing computer equipment and paying pensions to running prisons and immigration removal schemes, assessing benefit claimants and even maintaining nuclear weapons.

Coalition ministers are stepping up the process with the part-privatisation of the probation service and by handing responsibility to welfare-to-work programme to private companies. Ministers argue that the practice saves cash for the public purse because large companies can achieve economies of scale.

In a scathing verdict on the Coalition’s drive to contract out public services, the Commons public accounts committee (PAC) accused ministers of trying to cover up mistakes by refusing to divulge details of contracts. It said the Government was failing to get best value for money and lacked the expertise to ensure “privately-owned public monopolies” provided quality services.

The committee’s chair, Margaret Hodge, said: “If it’s not sorted out it will become the biggest ad for re-nationalising public services.” Protesting that contracts were too often “shrouded in a veil of secrecy”, she claimed: “We are in danger of creating a shadow state that is neither transparent nor accountable to Parliament or the public.”

The committee demanded that contracts with private companies are put into the public arena. It said four major firms it quizzed – Atos, Capita, G4S and Serco –were prepared to agree to the move, adding that it appears that “the main barriers to greater transparency lie within Government itself”.

Mrs Hodge said: “An absence of real competition has led to the evolution of privately-owned public monopolies which have become too big to fail.

TUC’s general secretary Frances O’Grady said: “It is time to end the default assumption that anything done by the public sector is better done by private contractors.

“The truth is that there has been a growing tide of outsourcing scandals, fraud and service failure. Some of this is down to government incompetence in contracting out, but much is an inevitable result of replacing the public sector ethos with the profit motive and cost-cutting.”
MoJ singled out in damning review of government contracting
The Public Accounts Committee’s 47th report, on contracting out public services to the private sector, cites several examples of contract mishandling by the MoJ.

Noting that the Cabinet Office admits that Whitehall 'has a long way to go before it has the skills required to manage contracts properly' it comments: 'This is a concern, given the speed at which some departments - such as the MoJ - are going ahead with outsourcing, despite a poor track record.’

Probation and offender rehabilitation are two significant areas the MoJ intends to outsource in the near future.

The report says it was ‘shocking’ that it took the ministry eight years to spot overcharging by G4S and Serco for the tagging of prisoners.

It also said fines of ‘a mere £2,200’ to Capita over its inadequate supply of interpreters to the court service did ‘not come close to taking into account the cost to the criminal justice system and to individuals caused by their failure to deliver’.

The report calls for the extension of the Freedom of Information Act to include public contracts with private providers to tackle the lack of openness around government contracts.

Wednesday, March 12, 2014

The pot vs. the kettle

One in five businesses think public procurement skills are getting worse
More than 60 per cent of businesses have not seen an improvement in commercial skills in public procurement in the past year, and one in five believes capability has deteriorated.

That’s the results of a survey of CBI members, in which respondents also said improving the public sector’s commercial skills is essential to transforming the procurement process.

CBI added inconsistency across government departments and a short-term approach to commercial contracts are also key concerns amongst businesses.
Sometime last year, I gave a brief presentation to one of the Rotary Clubs on Guam on procurement matters in general. The Rotarians included some of the leaders of the business community, many with more than passing involvement in selling to the government.

I asked for a show of hands to grade Guam's government procurement capability, starting with 'A' down to 'F'.  Overwhelmingly, they rated Guam's government contracting effectiveness an 'F'.

I then asked for a show of hands to grade the private sector's effectiveness with the government contracting system.  The question seemed to unsettle the crowd a bit, and the show of hands going up didn't get much support until down to 'C' and 'D' (but no 'F'). I admired my colleagues for their critical self-examination.

All contracts require (at least) two parties. Failure of the contract formation process, and contract administration, is bound to deteriorate if either or both parties fail to understand their role in that process, whether it is private or public contracting.

Even the government (on Guam and likely elsewhere) seems to recognize that government handling of its contracting does not always go well, let alone ideally. It is also important that the private sector appreciate that they have a role to play in facilitating that process, however.

There are thousands of protests every year in the federal system, as any search of the GAO website will reveal. Far and away, the bulk of them fail to gain traction. Those that succeed reveal flaws in the government's handling of the solicitation. Those that don't often suggest if not reveal a failure on the part of the private sector participants to understand that government contracting is very much unlike private contracting due to the governance strictures associated with expenditure of public funds. 

There are unyielding standards, disclosure requirements, timelines and limited discretion authorities that make government contracting a whole different ball game than the cut and thrust of private contracting.  Contractors should be aware of the difference and the different approaches required for each.

I have been working with Guam Community College to create a Basic Training procurement program. It consists of 4 "modules", each with 18 hours of class time teaching. 

Module 1 is an introduction to procurement, including its nature, principles, fundamentals, and statutory authority and structure. 

Module 2 is an examination of the methods of source selection, including an understanding of principles applicable to specifications, determinations of responsiveness and responsibility and the like; it is very code and regulation focused. 

Module 3 covers the administrative and judicial review processes of the controversies cognizable under Guam procurement law: solicitations and awards, suspensions and debarments, and contract disputes. 

Module 4 deals with the management aspects of government acquisition, from needs assessment and market research to creating audit trails and contract administration and enforcement. At the end, the students have had 72 hours of fairly rigorous exposure to the nuts and bolts of Guam procurement.

I'm told there has been in excess of 150 students have already gone through at least one of the three modules.  Almost all of them have been government employees (albeit with a modicum of legislative incentive).  This program will eventually raise the bar of the government's handling of Guam procurement.

Government contracting would improve significantly more if the private sector took the same interest. It takes two to tango, and practice to keep off the other's toes.

Monday, September 30, 2013

Why not take all of me? Here's why...

Mom told me not to put all my eggs in one basket.

Contractor’s U.S. Ties Tough to Break After Vetting Lapse
USIS has won at least $588 million under U.S. government contracts set to expire within a year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. USIS has at least 40 federal contracts for work related to investigations, 14 of which are scheduled to expire by Oct. 1, 2014, according to federal procurement data compiled by Bloomberg. The company performs background checks and other investigative work for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Department of Agriculture, among other agencies.

The agreements include a lucrative deal with the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, which is responsible for most federal background checks. While the expiring contracts might provide agencies with opportunities to begin dropping USIS, replacing the government’s top provider of background checks might lead to more chaos in an already overburdened system.

“USIS provides the heart, the limbs and the guts of the operation for the Office of Personnel Management,” said Tiefer, now a law professor at the University of Baltimore.

The number of people with security clearances ballooned to about 5 million last year, and contract investigators have struggled to keep up with the demand for background checks, according to security specialists.

The government increasingly has relied on USIS for that vetting. Dumping a firm like USIS, a unit of Falls Church, Virginia-based Altegrity Inc. that has more than a half-billion dollars in federal contracts running out in a year, could create as many problems as it solves. It might shift a backlog of cases to two other companies, which could lead to more vetting lapses.

Shifting the load to competitors such as Arlington, Virginia-based CACI International Inc. (CACI) or KeyPoint Government Solutions Inc. -- a unit of Veritas Capital, a New York-based private-equity firm -- might worsen the situation, Tiefer said.

“There are not a lot of players in this field,” Brian Friel, a Bloomberg Industries analyst, said. “The government doesn’t have a lot of options.”

USIS’s prominence as a background-check contractor is due to its origin as the Federal Investigations Division of Office of Personnel Management. The unit, originally known as U.S. Investigations Services Inc., was privatized in 1996 as part of then-Vice President Al Gore’s effort to “reinvent” government by reducing the size of the civil service, according to a 2011 report by the Congressional Research Service.

Contracting out security reviews was designed to save the government money and offer new work for about 700 investigators no longer needed because of a declining clearance workload as the Cold War ended. Instead, demand for security clearances surged after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

USIS was given a non-competitive, three-year contract for investigative work with the personnel office and granted free access to federal computer databases that weren’t available to other firms.

Since 2006, at least 20 investigators have pleaded guilty or have been convicted of falsifying background-check reports for the personnel office, according to the agency’s office of the inspector general.

Ten of those were contractors. Eight of them worked for USIS.
Surely there must be some way to generate more competition with the industry behemoths? Not all of America's innovation is limited to the IT industry, is it? There is a cost to contracting with too-big-to-flail, and it includes creating complacency as well as dependency.  And  myopia.

Noting that USIS was at one time a government agency, I am reminded of the many instances mentioned in James Nagle's A History of Government Contracting which illustrates the many times when American government has instigated industrial innovation, including the industrial revolution. He reminds us that "good enough for government work" was not originally the pejorative it now is, but indicated the gold standard of workmanship.

For another exposition of that proposition, see 'The Entrepreneurial State': Apple Didn't Build Your iPhone; Your Taxes Did, by Mariana Mazzucato, with some excerpts as follows.  
Throughout history, strategic government expenditures have played a key role in spurring economic growth. private finance is too risk-averse -- afraid -- to engage with industries characterized by high technological and market risk. The fear explains why we have seen venture capital entering, in industry after industry, only decades after the initial high risk has been absorbed by government.

Mission-oriented public investment put men on the moon, and later, lead to the invention and commercialization of the Internet, which in turn has stimulated growth in many sectors of the economy. Indeed, as I describe in the longest chapter of my book, the U.S. government has been a leading player in funding not only the Internet but all the other technologies -- GPS, touchscreen display, and the new Siri voice-activated personal assistant -- that make the iPhone, for example, a miracle of American technology.

Casting the public sector as the villain and business as savior has relieved the private sector from any obligation to increase its own commitment to the innovation process. There simply are not enough large businesses today playing the role that Xerox PARC (the Palo Alto Research Center) and AT&T (Bell Labs) played in the past.

Today's big companies, like Cisco and Pfizer, spend almost as much on share-repurchase schemes (which enrich those who own stock) as they spend on research. Interestingly, the big "repurchasers" (the biggest being in oil and pharma) often justify such buybacks with the claim that there are no other "opportunities" for their investments. But really? No opportunities in health for pharma these days? Nothing for oil companies to invest in? What about safe and clean renewable energy?

When building innovation "eco-systems," then, it is important to make sure the role of business is symbiotic, not parasitic. That means, if we want to rebalance the economy, we need to rebalance the story we tell about who the innovators really are. Interestingly, it was the venture capital lobby in the mid-1970s that pushed for the capital gains tax to fall by 50 percent (from 40 percent in 1976 to 20 percent in the mid '80s). It has been falling ever since, based on the narrative that only thus will the entrepreneurial "risk-takers' do their thing and enrich us all.

But that narrative is false. The entrepreneurial state has funded the radical innovation behind much if not most of modern economic growth. Denying government today the resources to do its thing endangers us all.

Tuesday, July 23, 2013

2 stories

Two stories from today's press via Google News. This first story poses a question.

Official: Rotate contracting officers between government, private sector
Joseph Jordan, the White House’s top contracting policy chief, floated the idea Tuesday of having contracting professionals rotate between government and the private sector. “There are all sorts of issues, I know,” said Jordan, who is the administrator for the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. “But I refuse to say this is off the table.”

The Obama administration has placed tight rules clamping down on the so-called revolving door between government and special interests among political appointees, though Jordan’s remarks were aimed an audience of career workforce professionals.

“Is there a way where we can have people kind of bounce back and forth ... between industry and agencies?” Jordan said in remarks here at the National Contract Management Association conference.
Does this second story hint at a reason this might not be such a great idea?

Former government contracting official sentenced to prison
A former government contracting official, Robert Edwin Steele, 38, of Alexandria, was sentenced Friday to 48 months in prison for 14 counts of unauthorized access to a protected computer. In addition to his 48-month term of imprisonment, Judge Lee also ordered Steele to serve two years of supervised release, imposed a fine of $50,000, and required restitution $335,977.68.

When Steele left Company A on December 15, 2010, he gave verbal and written assurances to officials of Company A that he would not access its systems after his departure, and even urged them to shut down his existing accounts. That same day, however, Steele began logging into Company A’s e-mail systems using a secret administrative account which he learned about during his work for Company A. Steele immediately began downloading hundreds of proprietary documents using this administrative account.

Shortly after resigning, Steele joined another government contractor, Company C, that directly competed with Companies A and B for government contracts. At Company C, Steele worked as “Director of Law Enforcement” and prepared bids for government contracts on law enforcement projects. In that position, Steele undercut Company A’s bid on a government contract by approximately $100,000, while downloading Company A’s documents on the same contract. Although his attempt to win the bid failed, Steele continued to methodically sift through thousands of valuable documents stored on computers for Company A.
Of course, you need to read both stories in full for context, but why would you need to hack for information if you can just bounce back and forth and gather as you go?

Wednesday, May 22, 2013

Outsourcing defense procurement: an experiment

The UK is going to conduct an experiment, of sorts, with full and serious consideration being had, if not preferred, to privatize (or outsource, take your pick) the conduct of the country's defense spend.

It is a proposition, of course, that is controversial.

This article from supplymanagement.com (which provides views inside the world of government contracting as well as private sector contracting) describes the experiment.

Defence procurement outsourcing needs more examination
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is to carry out a year-long assessment phase before eventually deciding whether to outsource defence procurement to the private sector.

In a statement to Parliament yesterday defence secretary Philip Hammond revealed the government will invite proposals from the private sector that will detail the provider’s capability and how they would operate a ‘government-owned, contractor-operated’ (GoCo) entity. In his statement, Hammond made clear he believes the GoCo option will prove preferable. “We have made no secret of our expectation that the GoCo option is likely to prove better value for money, but we need to test this assumption with the market, to see what can be delivered and at what cost.”

In parallel, it will assess a public sector comparator, described as ‘Defence Equipment & Support plus’ to decide which option provides greater value for money. Once the assessment phase has been completed, the government will decide whether to contract one of the bidding parties or to keep the purchase of military supplies - from helmets to helicopters - within the public sector.
Some consider this the Holy Grail, as in this next opinion piece by Andrew Pringle from The Telegraph.  Andrew Pringle is president of KBR’s UK defence business.  KBR provides defence work for the UK. One is reminded of Candy Rice-Davies.

It might be noted, as does the last mentioned article below, that this is a £14bn annual procurement programme. It is big bikkies, and big business, in anyone's currency.

The Ministry of Defence can get better value from the private sector
Good equipment saves lives, while failures in supply or specification can endanger or even cost them. Those on the front line do not care how it is procured, as long as they get the right equipment, in the right place, at the right time.

Yesterday’s announcement by Philip Hammond, the Defence Secretary, that private firms will be brought into the heart of the MoD’s procurement process – with the Defence Equipment and Supply organisation (DE&S) becoming, in the jargon, a government-owned, contractor-operated entity – has attracted criticism. But having been on both sides of the divide – as a commander at every level from platoon to division, and now the president of a global leader in the delivery of defence projects – I have no doubt that commercial-sector expertise could greatly enhance the way our Forces are equipped, and provide far better value for money for the taxpayer.

Lord Browne, the Government’s lead non-executive director, argued that by adopting best practice from the private sector, the country could save between 10 and 30 per cent of that total. This must start with the ethos. From the beginning to the end of the process, everyone must focus on that fundamental business concept: time is money.

Making defence procurement faster and more cost-efficient is not “privatising” or “taking over” the Civil Service. This is a model of equal partnership. It is about loosening the bureaucratic straitjacket to create the freedom for the thousands of excellent civil servants who work in the DE&S to do their job better.

How will this work? First, new skills. The existing staff are drawn from the Armed Forces, mostly with a background in operations, or the Civil Service, often with a background in policy. Their ability to run increasingly challenging acquisition programmes, on a £14 billion budget, can be enhanced by introducing individuals whose sole focus in their working life has been to extract the best deals from the supply chain and force it to deliver on time and to budget. This new partnership will level that playing field, and allow the ministry to cultivate, retain and recruit the best in the market.

The second great benefit will be private expertise in large-scale programme management. Lord Browne’s recommendations are again a good starting point. Projects must be held to a high level of scrutiny before the button is pushed, and no money should be committed without an experienced project manager and team in place.

The skills needed to run such projects translate directly into what’s required at DE&S to deliver the best possible kit to our soldiers at the best possible price. That is why this new approach may well prove a model for the world.
Others are far less sanguine, as reported in the Financial Times (you will likely need to register for a free, but limited, right to view this article, but you should always check the source, especially on this blog since I often extract, cut and rearrange and paraphrase to make a teachable moment of the item).

MoD procurement reform plan gets cool industry response
Howard Wheeldon, a veteran industry analyst, said on Thursday: “I have not heard of anybody who is in favour . . . I have not heard of one [defence] company that has put its hat in the ring.

“It still must be proven beyond all reasonable doubt that this is going to provide value for money for the taxpayer and to the armed forces and some benefit for those companies the MoD procures equipment from,” he added.

Sir Brian Burridge, vice-president of ADS, the industry trade group, said: “There needs to be a proper dialogue, a proper recognition of the legitimacy of the industry’s concerns and a proper resolution of those concerns.”

These include commercial confidentiality and intellectual property issues, especially if the job of running the Goco is given to a competitor.

However, the Royal United Services Institute, one of the UK’s most influential military think-tanks, expressed stronger doubts. “We cannot easily see how the . . . Goco would even work in practice, let alone why it would be a less expensive and better alternative to what is in place today,” it said, adding that history was littered with failed outsourcing deals.
I am supportive of this kind of experimentation.  Assuming the race is a fair one (and I question whether the defects in outsourcing this complex task will show up in only the first year), we need practical studies of the effects of the choices available to get the right balance of transparency and accountability against bang for buck and efficiency appropriate for the job.

But we cannot, in my mind, abdicate due process and public interest, especially when it comes to critical government functions and services, such as the defense of the country. We could, for instance, sell advertising space on uniforms, replacing the flag of the country for, say, a golden arches patch, and that would give us bang for buck. Sports teams do that, and it is a common private sector practice. But is that commercial model one we want for our military, our public works department, our school teachers?  

I get queasy with the thought of off-loading our governmental responsibilities to and conferring our sovereign immunity on the highest bidder, even the best value bidder. 




Sunday, February 17, 2013

Pay (your taxes) To Play

From the UK: Bidders for Government contracts must self certify that they have not been involved in tax avoidance, says Treasury
From 1 April 2013 companies bidding for Government above-threshold contracts worth more than £2 million will be obliged to self certify that they have not been involved in certain types of tax avoidance, according to a Treasury press notice.

During the selection stage of the procurement process, bidders will be asked to self certify their tax compliance "via a simple question" as to whether they have had any 'occasions of non-compliance' within a defined period - proposed to be any time in the last ten years.
Non-compliance will occur if a tax return is found to be incorrect as a consequence of HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) successfully taking action under the new General Anti Abuse Rule (GAAR), under any targeted anti-avoidance rule (TAAR), or under the “Halifax abuse” principle. The Halifax principle applies in relation to VAT and potentially some cross-EU border direct tax planning.

There will also be non compliance if any tax return is found to be incorrect because a scheme which the supplier was involved in, and which was, or should have been, notified under the Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Scheme (DOTAS) rules, has proved to have failed or the supplier’s tax affairs have given rise to a conviction for tax related offences or to a penalty for civil fraud or evasion.

HMRC is "successful" in this context when a tax return is amended, whether following the outcome of litigation or simply by agreement between HMRC and the taxpayer.

Foreign suppliers and suppliers with tax obligations in foreign jurisdictions will be required to certify that there has not been an ‘occasion of non compliance’ in relation to the equivalent foreign tax rules.
As usual, read more at the article link above.

For another review of this subject matter by attorneys Heather Gething, Neil Warriner, Adrian Brown and Michael Hunt from the UK law firm Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, see 
Government procurement rules: tax compliance is a factor to be considered: With effect from 1 April 2013, Her Majesty's Government will use the procurement process to secure compliance with UK and foreign tax obligations.

Wednesday, October 10, 2012

Will FOIA be foiled by outsourced subcontracting?

I have previously reported how a couple of states have responded to claims that contractors are immune from making disclosures under Freedom of Information Act requests, using that phrase loosely since rights to government data are not uniform, either in substance or practice.

In Reveal the truth or face the consequences, I discussed a New Mexico state decision that followed Florida law to the effect that contractors who perform state functions by acting on behalf of a government entity must disclose disclosable information under the relevant local FOIA law. The test applied there was essentially based on an agency analysis under the totality of the circumstances.

The issue is being raised elsewhere, as revealed in the following two articles.

Transparency Outsourced as U.S. Hires Vendors for Disclosure Aid
At least 25 federal agencies are outsourcing parts of the FOIA process. The contractors, sometimes using workers with security clearances, are building FOIA software, corresponding with requesters, redacting documents and recommending what information should be withheld.

With contractors involved, the process becomes more complicated because the companies employing the FOIA workers aren’t directly subject to FOIA laws, said John Wonderlich, policy director at the Sunlight Foundation, a Washington-based group that pushes to open government records.

“If I was in charge of an agency and wanted to create an unaccountable FOIA process, the first thing I would do is put an outside contractor in charge of it because fewer of our accountability laws apply to them,” Wonderlich said in an interview. “It would just be another layer between me and the public.”

Using contractors to answer FOIA requests falls into a murky area of law, said Scott Amey, general counsel at the Washington-based Project on Government Oversight.

The vendors aren’t allowed to approve agency responses to FOIA requests because the work is considered “inherently governmental,” according to federal acquisition rules. On the other hand, they are permitted to “support” the preparation of responses.

While contractors may suggest what information will be released, redacted or denied, the agency must make the final decision, Amey said.

“They are walking right up to the line,” he said. “It still makes you question the integrity of the system if contractors play such a vital role and merely have their guidance approved.”

Some open-records advocates say hiring contractors to speed up the FOIA process may help federal agencies as they wrestle with budget cuts and a growing backlog of requests. FOIA contractors know employees aren’t allowed to make decisions for the government and would never cross that line, said Randolph Wagner, chief financial officer for Wagner Resources Inc., another Gaithersburg-based company.

“It’s more like a cliff,” said Wagner, whose company derives about 50 to 60 percent of its revenue from FOIA-related tasks. “We don’t want to make the decision on behalf of the government.”

His employees, who work on-site at agencies, may be involved in the process from “beginning to end,” he said.

They receive requests, communicate with information seekers and contact agency officials to retrieve the records, Wagner said. When they receive the records, his employees provide recommendations about how much information can be released. A higher authority in the agency makes the final decision, Wagner said.

The FOIA offices aren’t manned to handle all of the work, Wagner said. “In most cases, we outnumber the people we work with, three to one. They’re the decision-makers and we’re the workers.” The work isn’t glamorous and there isn’t much opportunity for federal employees in FOIA offices to get promoted, Wagner said. “If you want open transparency, you’ve got to have somebody work on it,” he said.
Government contracts called public data
In a sweeping ruling Tuesday, the Minnesota Court of Appeals said government contractors are subject to state open records laws.

The ruling means that Milwaukee-based Johnson Controls must reveal to Timberjay Newspapers of Tower, Minn., details of its subcontract with a Minnesota architectural firm to build schools in St. Louis County.

Helmberger was concerned about flaws he noticed in an $80 million project involving construction and renovation of several St. Louis County schools, whose district contracted with Johnson Controls for the project. In 2010 he requested a copy of Johnson's subcontract with Duluth-based Architectural Resources Inc. under the state's Data Practices Act. Johnson refused Helmberger's request, maintaining that the contract contained proprietary secrets and was not subject to open records laws.

Under the law, private residents or businesses contracting with the government must comply with the Data Practices Act "as if it were a government entity."

In March 2011, the Minnesota Department of Administration sided with Helmberger, but an administrative law judge threw out the request because the subcontract "did not involve the performance of a governmental function."

The Appeals Court disagreed, arguing that the planning, design and construction of five public schools falls under state laws that mandate the duty of a school district to "furnish school facilities" to children -- including constructing and renovating buildings.

Attorneys for the contractors have not yet decided whether to petition the state Supreme Court to hear the case.