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Showing posts with label Standard commercial products. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Standard commercial products. Show all posts

Sunday, June 21, 2020

NASA Adminsitrator bounced by an unusually cozy relationship with federal regulators

Although federal procurement directives are moving towards acquisitions of supplies and services described in terms of common commercial standards, some needs of the government can only be met by particularized specifications and contractors. Take, for instance, spaceships (although we are now seeing the development of private sector contractors even in the space field, a circumstance not dreamed of when space exploration began in the era of Sputnik).

Why commercial standards? In a word, competition. As the American Bar Association Model Procurement Code elucidates,
"Fair and open competition is a basic tenet of public procurement. Such competition reduces the opportunity for favoritism and inspires public confidence that contracts are awarded equitably and economically." Code § 3-201, Commentary 3.
Indeed, an fundamental purpose and policy of the Model Procurement Code is "to foster effective broad-based competition within the free enterprise system". §1-101((2)(g). And, this is not a mere aspiration. "It is the general policy of this [State] to procure standard commercial products whenever practicable. In developing specifications, accepted commercial standards shall be used and unique requirements shall be avoided, to the extent practicable." MPC Regulation § R4-201.01.2 "All specifications shall seek to promote overall economy for the purposes intended and encourage competition in satisfying the [State's] needs, and shall not be unduly restrictive." MPC § 4-205. Further, in general, "Correction or withdrawal of a bid because of an inadvertent, non-judgmental mistake in the bid requires careful consideration to protect the integrity of the competitive bidding system, and to assure fairness. If the mistake is attributable to an error in judgment, the bid may not be corrected." MPC § R3-202.11.1

One of the big impediments to preferring standard commercial products and standards is the pushback and lobbying of entrenched contractors, the "good old boy" network. The basis for such a network is understandable from the standpoint of preferring the devil we know, but it runs foul of the demands of procurement when we become enamored of those well-known devils.

This post, and the article from the Washington Post that inspired it, illustrate the kind of relationship that can, and often does, call such discrimination into question. Once again, I caution that I slice and dice, rearrange, omit, and shade original articles to fit the didactic intent and space of this blawg, to be read as a hypothetical for educational purposes, and not as evidence or insinuation of guilt or wrongdoing. So, you are IMPLORED to link to and read the source material cited, and do not to rely on the rendition here.

Boeing tried to amend bid after guidance from NASA official, raising concerns it received inside information
After a top NASA official contacted a senior Boeing executive about a bid to win a contract potentially worth hundreds of millions of dollars, the company attempted to amend its proposal past the deadline for doing so, according to the article. That raised alarm bells inside the space agency, where officials were concerned that Boeing was attempting to take advantage of inside information. The conversation at the root of the investigation was between Loverro and Jim Chilton, the senior vice president of Boeing’s space and launch division, putting one of the company’s top executives in the middle of the probe.

Federal procurement regulations encourage the government to communicate with contractors about their bids to help agencies get the products and services that best fit their requirements. “The question becomes when is it okay to have those discussions, and more importantly, whether you have to have the exact same discussions with all potential bidders,” said David Berteau, the president and chief executive of the Professional Services Council, a trade group that represents federal contractors. According to the article, a person with direct knowledge of the matter who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the ongoing investigation said: “I can tell you with 100 percent confidence that no laws were broken. What we are talking about are conversations that occurred outside the normal dictated channels but didn’t violate the sanctity of the procurement process.”

According to a congressional aide with knowledge of the matter, NASA procurement officials grew concerned earlier this year when Boeing contacted the agency, saying it wanted to change parts of its bid for the lunar lander contract. Not only was it late in the process, but the specificity of Boeing’s proposed changes raised “red flags” inside NASA that the company had received inside information improperly. NASA officials wondered, “How did they know to raise this issue or try to fix this issue?” according to the aide, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the ongoing investigation.

NASA officials have stressed that the agency has gone to great lengths to ensure the integrity of the contract awards, worth $1 billion combined, that went to teams led by Jeff Bezos’s Blue Origin and Dynetics, as well as Elon Musk’s SpaceX.

Ultimately, the matter was referred to NASA’s inspector general office, and NASA’s leadership last month forced Doug Loverro to resign from his position as the associate administrator of NASA’s human spaceflight directorate. In his resignation letter, Loverro wrote that he took “a risk earlier in the year because I judged it necessary to fulfill our mission. Now, over the balance of time, it is clear that I made a mistake in that choice for which I alone must bear the consequences.” The inspector general investigation could be another headache for Boeing, under fire for having an unusually cozy relationship with federal regulators, especially if it identifies wrongdoing on the part of Boeing senior executives.

In an interview with The Post last month, Loverro said he was trying to speed up the Artemis moon program to meet a White House mandate to return astronauts to the lunar surface by 2024. “It had to do with moving fast on Artemis, and I don’t want to characterize it in any more detail than that,” he said.

But the probe is also focusing on Boeing, officials said. “This certainly goes both ways. It’s one thing to have a mistake that violated the Integrity in Procurement Act,” the aide said. “It’s another if the company took that information and acted on it.”
FURTHER READING:
• Special Compliance Requirements for Government Contractors Part 1, and Part 2

• FAR 52.203-13 Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct.

Thursday, March 29, 2018

The ups and downs of procurement reform: the POGO schtick

has long supported common-sense solutions to streamline
 federal procurement processes, modernize procurement policies, and 
utilize commercial practices to the maximum extent practicable. 
Policies and programs that effectively and efficiently 
leverage the commercial marketplace are essential for the delivery of
 best value commercial products, services and solutions 
for federal customers and the American people.

Procurement reform is in the eye of the stakeholder

These days, it appears that increasingly the dialogue regarding the condition of the federal acquisition systems has soured, as a seemingly ever-growing inventory of the deficiencies and shortcomings has overtaken the conversation. Indeed, more and more we are told that the procurement process is in crisis, that it is unable to sustain access to innovative technologies, and that it is an obsolete relic of a bygone era.

The inherent reaction to this narrative is the call for the implementation of new reforms — i.e. policies, statutes, and regulations — to completely overhaul the procurement process. Before embracing this conclusion, however, we should reflect upon both the historical context of the procurement process and the lessons we have learned over time. In particular, it is important to understand how Congress, with the enactment of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) in 1994, has already reformed the procurement system.

As recognized by the recently published first volume of the report of the Section 809 Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition (Section 809 Panel),  FASA 
established a definition for the term commercial item, a preference for procuring commercial items, an emphasis on commercial market research, greater reliance of commercial sector business processes, a requirement to use standard commercial terms and conditions to the maximum extent practicable, waiver of many statutes that would otherwise have been applicable to commercial items, and a framework for maintaining a limit on the number of future statutes that may be applied to procurements of commercial items.

However, since FASA was implemented, the number of DoD-related commercial buying provisions and clauses has increased by 188 percent, and the number of commercial clauses that may be flowed down has increased five-fold. In 1995, the FAR and DFARS contained a combined total of 57 government clauses applicable to commercial items. Today there are 165 clauses, with 122 originating in statute, 20 originating in executive orders, and 23 originating in agency-level policies.
In addition, we should consider the testimony on major weapons system acquisition provided in 2013 by Paul Francis of the Government Accountability Office before the House Armed Services Committee.
We should build on existing reforms — not necessarily by revisiting the process itself but by augmenting it by tackling incentives. To do this, we need to look differently at the familiar outcomes of weapon systems acquisition—such as cost growth, schedule delays, large support burdens, and reduced buying power.

Some of these undesirable outcomes … occur not because they are inadvertent but because they are encouraged by the incentive structure.

I do not think it is sufficient to define the problem as an objective process that is broken. Rather, it is more accurate to view the problem as a sophisticated process whose consistent results are indicative of its being in equilibrium.

The rules and policies are clear about what to do, but other incentives force compromises. The persistence of undesirable outcomes such as cost growth and schedule delays suggests that these are consequences that participants in the process have been willing to accept.
Before strapping dynamite to the procurement system, we would do well to reflect on the incentives inherent to the system, how they can be rebalanced in light of current policy imperatives, and adjust our buying practices, including our rules, accordingly. To do otherwise, risks perpetuating the cycle of reform and re-regulation that we have seen over the decades.

Tuesday, January 17, 2017

What a revolting development this is

Ok, I'm showing my near-septuagenarian age, but from the 1940's world of entertainment came the oft-used line, "what a revolting development this is".

And from later days in the U.S. Navy comes the "KISS principle": Keep It Simple, Stupid.

These two phrases, and the sentiment they express, come together in the following article written by David P. Goodwin and Erik C. Porcaro of the law firm Troutman Sanders LLP which can be found on the Mondaq website. 

In the era of just a few decades ago, particularly but not exclusively in IT procurements, the government procured bespoke supplies, services and systems, developed from the ground up for a particular purpose, and typically with proprietary locks on all the doors and windows which, obviously, benefit an incumbent.

But the industry has evolved, and IT systems these days often sport a variety of generic core programs that can easily be focused for particular purposes by the add-on of an "app" or two. This is the result of programmers taking the risk of creating a profitable program and putting it on the shelf marked "Sale". 

Both the federal government and local governments using the ABA Model Procurement Code for a guide (e.g., 2 GAR § 4102(a)(3): Preference for Commercially Available Products) have expressed preference for standard commercial products and services over development contracts. But it is hard to wean institutions from their habits, as this article illustrates.

New Leverage In The Federal Marketplace For Commercial Item And Commercial Systems Contractors
In Palantir USG Inc. v. U.S., the Court of Federal Claims recently issued a ruling in favor of Palantir's pre-award protest citing the need for the government to evaluate all viable commercial options under the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 ("FASA") when issuing solicitations. Palantir, a data-mining company, lost their initial GAO bid protest challenging the Army's bid solicitation process relating to an enhancement of the Distributed Common Ground/Surface Systems (DCGS) which allows for sharing of multi-sensor combat intelligence and weather information among the armed forces.

FASA lowered procurement barriers and opened up government contracts to bids from small businesses by promoting fixed-price contracting based on performance. Another example is the preference FASA created given to buying commercial off-the-shelf items (COTS Items), rather than purchasing through the more complex contracting process for government-unique items. FASA also defined commercial items more broadly and exempted such purchases from over thirty statutes that contain requirements unique to government procurements. The goal of these changes was to simplify the procurement process for companies who do not ordinarily sell to the government. Though this goal has been achieved in certain ways, many in Government and in industry feel that the Government continues to lose out on the faster pace of commercial sector development, especially in high-tech and information technology.

At the heart of the Palantir case were Palantir's assertions that the solicitation process for bids blocked commercial firms like Palantir from competing, in violation of FASA. The Army issued a developmental solicitation which required bids for the creation of an entirely new data integration system. Palantir argued the Government could buy the existing core functionality from the commercial market and integrate any number of additional applications at less cost than developing new systems. In choosing to issue a developmental solicitation, the Army overlooked a viable commercial market system thereby violating FASA, which requires government agencies to frame their requirements so as to accept commercial products "to the maximum extent practicable."