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Showing posts with label No harm no foul?. Show all posts
Showing posts with label No harm no foul?. Show all posts

Saturday, March 28, 2015

The unmitigated gall of unmitigated conflicts of interest

Hattip to the lawfirm Venable LLP for pointing out this new case. You may prefer to read their explanation of the case here rather than the rendition of the decision below.

MONTEREY CONSULTANTS, INC., vs USA, US Court of Federal Claims, No.14-1164C, Re-filed: March 26, 2015 Read the full decision at the link; this is a capriciously selected and edited version of it.
This is a protest of the Department of Veteran Affair’s recision of a task order to Monterey Consultants, Inc. for services in support of the agency’s program to verify the status of small and veteran-owned businesses. The task order to Monterey was cancelled as a corrective action because the agency concluded that Monterey had a potential or actual organizational conflict of interest. Plaintiff alleges that neither is true.

Monterey Consultants, Inc. (“Monterey”), held a blanket purchase agreement (“BPA”) with the Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”) under which it provided support services to the VA’s Center for Verification and Evaluation (“CVE”) and Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (“OSDBU”). This BPA, called the “IPT”,was the agency’s long-standing contract vehicle for procuring a wide variety of services in support of all of OSDBU’s various missions (e.g., research, verification, analysis, outreach, and training). Monterey was awarded the BPA in February 2013. It did work under a variety of call orders, including processing and verification services for the CVE and administrative support of the OSDBU’s acquisition efforts.

In an effort to reduce the scope of the work procured with a single contracting vehicle, the IPT BPA, the agency let the BPA expire on its terms and sought to replace its acquisition of some of those services through two separate contracts placed as task orders under the GSA’s Federal Supply Schedule (“FSS”). The solicitation at issue in this protest was identified by the agency as a follow-on for two specific BPA call orders, 18 and 19. Call orders 18 and 19 were for support services related to the CVE’s verification of small business status. Monterey had performed under both of those orders pursuant to the BPA. Monterey also provided support for other OSDBU work, including acquisition support under call order 17.

The VA issued a Request for Quote (“RFQ” or “solicitation”) on June 13, 2014, as a 100 percent set-aside for service-disabled veteran owned small businesses holding one or both of two GSA FSS contracts for support services. The RFQ sought “administrative, paralegal, project management, and professional support” for the CVE. Specifically, these services were to be in support of the CVE’s verification processing and management of that processing.


The RFQ addressed Organizational Conflicts of Interest (“OCIs”) in section 18:
It is recognized by the parties that the efforts to be performed by the contractor under this contract are of such a nature that they may create a potential Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI) as contemplated by Subpart 9.5 of the FAR. It is the intention of the parties that the contractor shall not engage in any contractual activities which may impair its ability to render unbiased advice and recommendations, or in which it may gain an unfair competitive advantage as a result of the knowledge, information and experience gained during the performance of this contract. It does not include the normal flow of benefits from incumbency. Contractors performing on other contracts in support of Verification shall be presumed to have an OCI with respect to this contract and are ineligible to quote on this requirement, due to the integrated nature of work perform[ed] under this solicitation and existing contracts. (emphasis supplied).
A further condition for bidding on the RFQ was that offerors were required to “agree not to participate . . . in any acquisition wherein: (1) The contractor has participated in the analysis and recommendation leading to the acquisition decision to acquire such services; or (2) the Contractor may have an unfair competitive advantage resulting from information gained during the performance of this contract.”

The solicitation went on to instruct offerors who believed that their participation would cause an OCI to “include in [their] proposal[s] an appropriate discussion and mitigation plan.” The VA would review such materials, make a determination of whether there was an OCI, and, if so, determine whether the mitigation plan was sufficient to allow the offeror to participate.

Three offerors submitted proposals. Monterey was initially awarded the contract on September 8, 2014, based on its higher technical scores, which, in the agency’s eyes, made it a better value despite its higher price.

Loch Harbour filed a protest in this court, the principal ground of which was that Monterey was ineligible for award because it had an OCI stemming from its prior work under the BPA. Upon reviewing the complaint, the Contracting Officer (“CO”), James Boughner, began an investigation into the possible OCI based on Monterey’s prior work for OSDBU and CVE.

The CO recorded his initial findings in a letter to Monterey.  In the letter, he stated his finding that, prior to the solicitation’s public release, all of Monterey’s and its subcontractor’s personnel had access to documents relating to the solicitation, including the requirements, independent government cost estimates, acquisition plan, market research, and evaluation criteria. The CO also found that Monterey personnel provided services directly relating to the preparation of the solicitation. AR 1569. The letter also detailed Mr. Boughner’s communication with Mr. Skinner of OSDBU and Zachary Wilcox of the VA’s Strategic Acquisition Center. Both of those gentlemen informed Mr. Boughner that Monterey did not have, or did not provide, an OCI mitigation plan for its work under the BPA.

Mr. Boughner sent another letter to Monterey informing it of his final conclusions regarding the OCI investigation and the agency’s intent to take corrective action. He found a potential OCI resulting from Monterey employee access to solicitation documents and a lack of mitigation plan in place for Monterey. The CO’s letter stated that Monterey had a potential OCI “at the time [it] submitted its offer and that no efforts were made by either OSDBU or Monterey to avoid or mitigate the conflict of interest prior to award to Monterey.”

The CO also pointed out that Monterey’s technical proposal in response to the RFQ represented that neither Monterey nor its subcontractors had an OCI. The CO found this to be further support for
his conclusion that Monterey did not have an mitigation plan in place (because one would not have been needed if the bidder felt it had no OCI). Although Monterey employees “signed Non-Disclosure Agreements in the course of their duties in accessing these documents, this was inadequate, because there was no Mitigation Plan . . . to show how their organizational and/or management system or other actions would avoid or mitigation any actual or potential [OCIs]”.

As a result, Monterey’s task order award was rescinded.

Monterey responded to the two letters from the CO with a series of phone calls, emails, and letters over a three week span. Monterey represented to Mr. Boughner both that it had a mitigation plan, dating back to its BPA proposal, and that any solicitation information to which it had access would not have conferred on it any competitive advantage because all the information was eventually released to the other offerors. Monterey and CACI employees claimed in declarations not to have had access to “any information” or “any non-public documents” relating to the solicitation.

During the course of the OCI investigation, OSDBU’s Director of Acquisition Support, Jules Tchoujan became aware of an email exchange between CACI employees Daniel Swart and Kathleen Wilson, both of whom worked under the BPA. From this correspondence it is clear that one of them is advising the other on drafting Monterey/CACI’s proposal in response to the other solicitation for the OSDBU work. As a result, the CO made an additional finding that Monterey had an actual OCI as a result of the involvement of Mr. Swart in both the preparation of Monterey’s proposal for the follow-on work and his work under the BPA in preparing pre-solicitation acquisition documents. The CO noted that this was a violation of Mr. Swart’s NDA, and cited that fact as evidence of the lack of force and effect of the purported mitigation plans in place for Monterey and CACI, in a further letter to Montery.

In the context of an organizational conflict of interest, the Federal Circuit has explained that each situation should be examined “on the basis of its particular facts and the nature of the proposed contract,” and that, “the identification of OCIs . . . requires the exercise of considerable discretion on the part of the agency.” This means that contracting officers must be afforded “great latitude in handling OCIs,” and thus their decisions will not be reversed absent irrationality. It is important also to recognize that the CO need not find an actual organizational conflict. All that is necessary to support agency action in response to an OCI is the potential for impropriety: even one based solely on the appearance of impropriety.

Plaintiff argues that the CO’s decision regarding Monterey’s OCI was irrational because it was both factually unsupported and wrong in the particulars. We examine each of the CO’s findings in turn.

Although the CO's first letter is not specific as to which of the documents investigate were accessed, edited, or otherwise only available for access by plaintiff’s personnel, the problem is clear: prior to public availability, Monterey had access to information that could give it a competitive edge in crafting its proposal for the follow-on procurement.

The CO then identified a compounding problem–that Monterey did not have an OCI risk mitigation plan to alleviate the problem of access to documents. The CO quoted Monterey’s proposal for the IPT BPA in which Monterey represented that it was not aware of any OCI related to the work under that solicitation. The CO recognized that Monterey, and presumably CACI, employees had signed nondisclosure agreements during their work on the BPA and in support of the acquisition, but found this fact to be unavailing for Monterey because of the absence of a risk mitigation plan. He found these measures to be inadequate because Monterey had not shown how the NDAs themselves would “avoid or mitigate any actual or potential [OCIs].”

Plaintiff attacks those findings as unfounded. First, as to the unequal access to information, plaintiff argues that Monterey’s work on the BPA “did not involve the development of requirements/performance work statements.” This is critical in its view because it shows a lack of prejudice to the agency and other offerors from Monterey’s access to information prior to the solicitation’s release. In essence, “no harm, no foul” is plaintiff’s view of the situation.

Plaintiff further directs our attention to evidence provided by the Director of CVE, that CVE “fire walled Monterey from every activity in the requirements preparation” and that Monterey had no role in formulating the performance work statement, costing, or any other contract documents. Plaintiff’s point is that, a CO’s finding of mere access to pre-solicitation documents is not enough to disqualify it here.

Second, plaintiff argues that any document it might have had access to eventually became public anyway, further supporting its notion of lack of prejudice to other offerors.

Third, plaintiff points to the NDAs signed by its employees as evidence of the fire wall maintained by Monterey pursuant to its mitigation plan. It avers that none of its employees with access to the server on which solicitation and other acquisition documents were stored were allowed to work on its proposal for this RFQ. Instead, according to plaintiff, only government employees had a hand in preparing acquisition documents such as the statement of work and other requirements documents. Thus, despite access, Monterey gained no competitive advantage from its incumbency.

Defendant responds by relying on the undisputed facts that 1) Monterey and/or CACI did acquisition support work under several BPA call orders, 2) the RFQ was a follow-on from two BPA call orders performed by Monterey, 3) Monterey personnel had access to all solicitation documents, including confidential documents never shared with other offerors, and 4) Monterey was required by the RFQ to identify any potential OCIs but failed to do so. This, in combination with the RFQ’s stated assumption that anyone who had previously performed CVE verification work was presumed to be ineligible,
provided the necessary backdrop to support the CO’s investigation and conclusion.

In light of the government’s interest in safeguarding the integrity of the procurement process, the facts on this record establish the rationality of the CO’s conclusion. We begin with the undisputed
facts. Plaintiff had access to all of the acquisition documents, and at least one or two Monterey/CACI employees did access them when providing editing and other quality control services in support of the acquisition efforts of OSDBU/CVE. Plaintiff admitted at oral argument that it did have access to some documents never released to the public, such as the internal government cost estimates.
With regard to other documents, regardless of whether they later became public, it is not disputed that Monterey had access to them first. This creates, on its face, the potential for an OCI.

Monterey therefore had a duty to mitigate that conflict or face ineligibility to bid on the follow-on solicitation. The solicitation stated a presumption that offerors who had performed support of CVE verification in the past would be ineligible for award and also required any offeror who identified a potential OCI to provide and implement a mitigation plan to alleviate the possibility of unfair competitive advantage.

The CO found Monterey not to have had a mitigation plan in place during its performance of the BPA. Several agency officials told the CO that they were unaware of any mitigation plan during Monterey’s performance under the BPA. The CO took into account the representation by Monterey in its BPA proposal that it had no actual or potential OCIs as evidence that it did not have a mitigation plan in place, along with the fact that it did not present a plan with its bid for the follow-on RFQ. He took both of those facts at face value as indications of plaintiff’s then-belief that it had nothing to mitigate. He thus gave no credit to the after-the-fact plan provided by Monterey.   Our own examination of the plan provided to the CO provides us with little confidence that it was related specifically to the work performed by Monterey under the BPA.

The CO reasonably concluded that the NDAs signed by Montery employees were insufficient mitigation measures without a working mitigation plan. He was unprepared to supply, by force of imagination or otherwise, the details of how non-disclosure agreements would actually operate to prevent, at a minimum, the appearance of impropriety.

Given the discretion we afford on review of agency action in this regard, we cannot say that the CO acted arbitrarily and capriciously with regard to his conclusion of a potential, unmitigated OCI. Here, the CO found very recent potential access to presolicitation documents and no plan for mitigation. The information that might have been gleaned was neither stale nor irrelevant. The CO’s finding of an unmitigated potential conflict of interest was thus neither arbitrary, capricious, nor contrary to law.

Lastly, the CO sent an additional letter to Monterey, informing it of a further basis for the recision of Monterey’s award. In this letter, he found an actual OCI existed. He relied on emails between Mr. Swart and Ms. Wilson, two CACI employees working under Monterey’s BPA. The CO found in these email exchanges a violation of Mr. Swart’s NDA. This is then cited by the CO as evidence that any mitigation plan alleged by plaintiff to have been in place by Monterey or CACI was either not implemented or not followed by their employees.

It is important to understand that the solicitation referenced by the CO in this letter is not the present solicitation. It instead relates to other work in support of OSDBU, separately solicited. This work for OSDBU was, however, previously consolidated under the single BPA held by plaintiff prior to the solicitation at issue. Plaintiff’s primary argument in this regard is thus that the actual OCI is irrelevant to the issues at bar and could not have presented a reasonable basis for the CO’s conclusion to rescind Monterey’s task order award. Plaintiff also presents the three unsworn statements of Mr. Swart to argue that the CO was factually incorrect in his findings of an actual OCI.

Defendant answers that the OCI resulted from related work under the same prior contract and thus is highly relevant to Monterey’s eligibility to bid on the solicitation at issue here. The fact that the same alleged mitigation plan should have prevented Mr. Swart’s disclosure of pre-solicitation information is important, asserts defendant, because it shows the irrelevance of that plan to Monterey’s OCI. Although the CO’s conclusion was reasonable even absent this evidence of actual impropriety, we agree that it provides further support for his conclusion and recision of Monterey’s award. Plaintiff reads too much into the letter and relies too heavily on an arbitrary division of the two solicitations. The CO cited this information as illustrative of what it identified as the primary problem he found with regard to Monterey’s potential OCI for the CVE solicitation: "[whatever] Mitigation Plans were in place by Monterey and CACI to avoid OCI is unfounded, as the mplementation of any alleged plan was clearly not followed by Monterey employees.”

He found the disclosure to be evidence of the lack of an effective mitigation plan. The mitigation plan alleged to have been in place for this solicitation is the same as that which should have prevented the actions of Mr. Swart with regard to the OSDBU work solicitation. Because it was the same purported mitigation plan at issue in both instances, it was proper for the CO to have considered the actions of Mr. Swart regarding the related solicitation. The CO’s conclusion was thus not irrational in this regard.

Conclusion

We find that the contracting officer’s decision to rescind the award to Monterey was rational and supported by the record. The CO correctly identified a potential OCI on the part of plaintiff as the incumbent contractor and a bidder for the follow-on procurement. The CO further found that plaintiff had no effective, implemented risk mitigation plan, leading him to conclude that Monterey should not have been awarded the contract. We find no irrationality in his conclusion.







Friday, March 6, 2015

There's prejudice, and then there's prejudice

A few posts back, I reported on a Federal Court of Claims case, Universal Marine Co., K.S.C., v U.S, that held a protestor lacked standing if it could not support a claim of economic interest in a solicitation if it did not provide at least some facts alleging injury to itself from the mishandling of a solicitation, or as it is known, "prejudice". 

As the Court in that case concluded, "even though “proving prejudice for purposes of standing merely requires ‘allegational prejudice,’” Universal Marine has not alleged facts that, if true, would create a “substantial chance” that it would be awarded the contract."

Lawyers Alex D. Tomaszczuk and Alexander B. Ginsberg, from the firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, have expanded on the lessons from Universal Marine, in an article on the Lexology.com website, which I think you will find edifying. 

The lesson added is this: It's one thing to claim prejudice, and another to prove it.

As they put it:
It is important to note that the “allegational prejudice” relevant in Universal Marine is distinct from, but often confused with, a second variety of prejudice necessary for a protester ultimately to prevail on the merits of its protest. This second variety of prejudice—often referred to as “APA [Administrative Procedure Act] prejudice”—requires a protester to demonstrate that, but for any errors it identifies during the protest, it had a “substantial chance” of receiving the award. See Linc Govt. Servs., LLC v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 672, 695-96 (2010). (“In order to prevail in a bid protest, however, a plaintiff must satisfy a second type of prejudice requirement, one that has caused a good deal of confusion because it is often mistaken for its standing doctrinal fraternal twin. ...

The need for this second showing of prejudice is captured in section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act. ... In particular, the APA instructs that ‘due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error’ when determining whether to set aside any unlawful agency decision.”) Thus, the first variety of prejudice — that discussed in Universal Marine — relates to the protest as alleged, while the second variety of prejudice examines the effect of errors actually demonstrated on the merits. See USfalcon, Inc. v. United States, 92 Fed Cl. 436, 450 (2010). (“Since the prejudice determination for purposes of standing necessarily occurs before the merits of a protest are reached, the Court must accept the well-pled allegations of agency error to be true. ... Normally, if the protester's case rests on just one allegedly irrational action, or just one purported violation of a law or regulation, the finding of prejudice in the standing context will be replicated on the merits, once the asserted error is confirmed. But a different outcome is possible if more than one ground is raised, as multiple errors might cumulatively establish prejudice, but not a smaller combination of them.”)

Thus, a protester ultimately must show both types of prejudice for its protest to succeed. The Court, however, will never reach consideration of “APA prejudice” if the protester fails to allege—as Universal Marine failed to allege—that it is an interested party.

Wednesday, August 6, 2014

Not so straight-laced procurement in Victoria, Australia

We begin this post with the following articles. You can and should read the articles in full at the links associated with their headlines. I tend to selectively cut, paste and rearrange them to suit myself in this blawg, and there is a lot of additional information and context that gets left on the cutting room floor.

Office of Living Victoria broke procurement rules, says Ombudsman
Victoria's recently abolished water agency deliberately flouted procurement rules and back-dated documents to award contracts worth millions to consultants in a manner which implied a "jobs for mates" culture, the Ombudsman has found.

In a major setback for Water Minister Peter Walsh, Ombudsman Deborah Glass has found the agency he created, the Office of Living Victoria, to be rife with undeclared perceived conflicts of interest and having lacked respect for "public sector values and accountability for its use of funds". Mr Walsh told the Ombudsman he was not told of the procurement breaches by Mr Fennessy. But Mr Fennessy told the Ombudsman he last year advised Mr Walsh he needed to audit OLV and that more recently he told the minister ''we've got some procurement problems ... this is why I have been saying for the last six months that I need to audit OLV''.

Mr Waller and Mr Want initially reacted strongly to Ms Glass' draft report, rejecting many of the findings. They commissioned legal advice that stated the OLV was not bound by procurement rules because of its status as an administrative agency. Their advice conflicted with other legal opinion held by the government.

The pair later accepted that the OLV should have paid more attention to ensuring compliance with Victoria's purchasing policies. "I accept OLV made some poor decisions," Mr Waller told the Ombudsman. Mr Walsh said on Tuesday that all government departments had to adhere to procurement rules. He said despite allegations against OLV being raised publicly in recent months it was not appropriate for him to interfere.
Victoria's water agency ignored government policies, the ombudsman says.
The underlying attitude at the Office of Living Victoria (OLV) seemed to put procedures and principles second to urgency, Ombudsman Deborah Glass found. "From the earliest days of OLV, the inclination and focus have been on the end, not the means," the report said.

Ms Glass said the prevailing attitude at the office had been that it needed to "crash through" a bureaucracy that would stymie effective and timely change. "Government procedures exist to protect the public purse," Ms Glass said. "Poorly managed conflicts of interest fundamentally undermine the integrity of public policy."
Ombudsman finds water agency, Office of Living Victoria, mishandled conflict-of-interest concerns
The office was established by Water Minister Peter Walsh in May 2012 to manage the change in the way water services are managed in Victoria.

"Conflict of interest was poorly understood and badly managed by OLV."

The ombudsman was also critical of procurement practices in the agency. In one example examined by the ombudsman, three companies provided quotes for events management services. The ombudsman found OLV accepted the most expensive quote without explaining why.

The report found OLV rushed a number of project briefs, quotations and other documents. "In some cases they were prepared after the contract was in place, to give some semblance of credibility to the arrangement," the ombudsman said.

Mr Walsh acknowledged mistakes were made in the management of the water agency but said the OLV had operated effectively. "Good governance and effective and timely policy reform are not mutually exclusive, but having said that, OLV has delivered some significant benefits."
By the way, you can read the whole "Investigation into allegations of improper conduct in the Office of Living Victoria" here, and an earlier 2014 report on "Investigation into allegations of improper procurement of services by the Department of Education and Early Childhood Development" here.

Well now.

First observation, those last comments of Mr. Walsh in the last article above are routine, de rigueur responses typical of government comment when caught with its pants down in procurement.  I call it the "no harm, no foul" defense, even though there is always obvious harm when good governance is given short shrift whilst the means is meant to justify a result.

Second observation, this smacks of a procurement regime that has no real-time procurement police on the beat. It relies on ex post facto reviews, well after the horses have bolted, with the hope that someone will uncover the stuff-up and fix it (or, as is most often the case, with the hope that it will pass unnoticed at all).

I do not believe that ex post facto discovery is any kind of effective prophylactic or deterrent, and is a blunt instrument when error is found that could be corrected. Rather, what we see too often, as in this case, is that the whole baby is thrown out with the bathwater; here, the whole department was shuttered due to failure of its leadership.

For mine, the most effective way to police procurement is to encourage real-time critique and intervention by the people with most real interest in a fair and equitable system, which is commonly called a "protest" procedure. 

Hell hath no fury like a competitor scorned, and that is exactly the cop on the beat you want, provided you have a fair and expeditious procedure for assessing and resolving the protests. It has to be fair or no one will engage the process, which puts you right back where you started from. It has to be expeditious because the government must quickly and effectively address the issue or get sidelined by the controversy.

On Guam, the law requires that all new elected or appointed officials and department heads undertake and every 4 years re-take a one day course in ethics and or administrative safeguards, which includes an introduction to conflicts of interest and procurement. See 4 GCA §§ 15409 and 15410. At least they can't say they weren't told.

That said, consider the following article: Australian government must take ‘great care’ over public procurement rules
The Australian government needs to take “great care” in the policy, practice and operation of public sector procurement rules to work in the interest of the country’s citizens.

That’s the view of senator Kate Lundy, chairman of the Finance and Public Administration References Committee, which has published its conclusions following an inquiry into the operation and effectiveness of the country's procurement rules. Lundy added: “Government procurement decisions may well be a significant determinant of the social and economic health of many Australian communities and regions. As a result, great care needs to be taken in the policy, practice and operation of the Commonwealth Government procurement rules if they are to operate in the interests of the Australian people.”

Recommendations included calling on the Department of Finance to establish an “independent and effective complaints mechanism” for procurement processes. But the department said that it does not support this because there are a “number of opportunities” for people with complaints and there have been a “very low” number of complaints received.





Saturday, December 14, 2013

Ethical conflicts: disclose or shun?

In the commercial world it is often sufficient, in cases of conflicts of interests, between, say a board member and a corporation, that a board member disclose conflicts and recuse from voting, maybe even "the deliberation process". This simple disclosure requirement is sometimes found in public procurement. But since public procurement involves the expenditure of state funds, i.e., your money, disclosure is more often than not insufficient to cure the taint of conflict.

Guam law procurement ethics, for example, following the ABA Model Procurement Code, requires that "any [government] employee who has, or obtains any benefit from, any territorial contract with a
business in which the employee has a financial interest shall report such benefit", but the bar is higher in the case of conflicts: "it shall be a breach of ethical standards for any employee to participate directly or indirectly in a procurement when the employee knows" of the usual conflicts.

Furthermore, "notwithstanding any other provision of law, any member of any elected or appointed board or commission shall be prohibited from acting or participating in discussion on any matter in which he is a principal, has a financial interest in, or acts as an agent for anyone other than the government of Guam. Interests held in blind trust shall not be exempt from this provision. The member shall be prohibited from influencing any determination made by the board or commission on which the member serves and in which the member either participates personally and substantially through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation or otherwise, or which is the subject of the member’s official responsibility, where the government of Guam is a party or has a direct and substantial interest."

The judicious expenditure of government taxpayer money is a significant feature of good public governance. Any appearance of impropriety begins to tear at the public confidence in its government. Public procurement professionals are the sentinels who protect the government of the people by insisting on avoidance of all such appearances. It rots at the core otherwise.

Conflicts of interest is just one of the issues in the following reported case involving the New York Power Authority:

Report finds ethical misconduct at NYPA under Richard Kessel
A state investigation of New York Power Authority practices under then-chief Richard Kessel found "ethical misconduct, procurement irregularities and financial mismanagement" in 2009 and 2010, according to a newly released report. The probe, which took nearly three years, was initiated in February 2011 by former Inspector General Ellen Biben. [Which is why real time policing by protests and public disclosre requirement is so crucial to the integrity of the procurement process.]

For example, Kessel, had "apparent conflicts of interest that he failed to reveal" in recommending that NYPA consider a law firm for a "substantial contract for legal services," the probe found. It said Kessel failed to disclose "his own ongoing personal legal relationship with the same firm," according to the state Inspector General's office.

The probe also uncovered a $15,000 loan in 2009 that Kessel solicited and accepted from a subordinate, "which neither individual reported as required in their annual financial disclosure statements," the IG found. The IG's report said Kessel told DeJesu he was having financial difficulties in November 2009 and "he couldn't come to anyone else." DeJesu, who reported to Kessel at NYPA, provided the loan interest-free, according to the report. By requesting and accepting the loan, the report says, "Kessel created an appearance or situation where [he] could be either improperly influenced [or] give or be given preferential treatment."

Under Kessel's tenure, the probe also found that charitable contributions and business-related contributions increased at NYPA, both statewide and "specifically related to the Long Island area where Kessel lived." The report said NYPA's charitable donations to groups on Long Island, where NYPA has a "limited presence," increased 50 percent under Kessel. The IG's office noted that while the contributions increased under Kessel, investigators did not find "any undue influence with regard to the contributions made to Long Island organizations. NYPA had a deficient policy which lacked provisions for identifying, monitoring, and justifying these purported business-related contributions," the report found.

The Inspector General's office recommended NYPA enact a series of new controls, among them:

• A management audit of its procurement policies, practices, procedures, and organizational structure;

• More exacting procurement standards and full documentation and record retention;

• Disclosure of "actual, potential, or perceived conflicts of interest" when issuing and reviewing procurement requests for proposals and train officials and employees on disclosure requirements;

• Training regarding the prohibition of seeking a loan from a subordinate and loaning money to a superior;

• A policy prohibiting active board members from seeking NYPA employment;

• A policy for business-related contributions, which includes documentation and justification of each expenditure, as well as disclosure of any ties between a NYPA employee and the funding recipient; and

• Monthly reports delineating contributions, sponsorships and business-related contributions for presentation to the NYPA board.
This is a good example, assuming all is as reported and there are no unreported mitigating factors, of slow rot. 

Not outrageous corruption and theft, but the kind of undermining whimsy that comes from treating public funds as the booty of office or pleasure of the director.   

It does not show any criminal act, but does show an arrogant disregard of the trust we place in our governing officers.  Punishment should follow, but be proportionate to the legal harm done.  In some cases, and with some people, the exposure and shame may be sufficient, if they "get it".


POST SCRIPT January 26, 2014

On a similar topic, whether to disclose or shun political "gifts", is this comment in a WaPo article today:

Virginia was ripe for a scandal
The indictment, against former Virginia governor Bob McDonnell and his wife, Maureen, stems from an investigation of gifts the McDonnells received from businessman Jonnie Williams. In return for these gifts, it is charged, the governor did official favors for Williams’s diet supplement company.

Some might say that Virginia was ripe for such a scandal. After all, until newly-elected Gov. Terry McCauliffe changed it (for only one year, by the way), the law allowed public officials to accept unlimited gifts as long as they were reported. Tim Kaine, for example, reported gifts in excess of $300,000 while governor. For that matter, so did McDonnell (although the gifts cited in the indictment were not reported). This kind of lax ethics would seem an invitation to corruption and is one reason the Center for Public Integrity ranked Virginia 47th out of 50 in “state integrity” and gave it an “F” in combating corruption risk.

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

Value for money is not the central procurement ideal

I have had previous posts illustrating the "no harm, no foul" excuse for improper procurement, collected here. But it has been awhile since the last example, so to remind, here is another example.

Council broke procurement rules in 78% of deals
Auditors have found significant problems with how Waterford City Council has spent public money. A report into the local authority’s expenditure said that proper procurement rules were not followed in 78% of deals examined.

This meant that €4.3m, out of €4.9m which was audited in 2010, did not meet requirements. In 40% of these cases contracts were awarded without a procurement process. A quarter of all problem purchases, spotted by the internal audit team, related to the €8m investment the council made in the relocated visitors’ centre for WWRD’s Waterford crystal operation.

In other areas of spending the auditors could find no evidence of a procurement file on the traffic fine management system; the Tramore Rd improvement scheme; the work at Knockboy junction and repair works on Rice Bridge.

In total the council spent €822,941 on 12 different projects in 2010 where there was no procurement file available for the auditors to inspect.

In the case of €788,328 of spending, the contracts in question were not advertised.

In the case of one construction company on this project there was no evidence of other firms being involved in a tender competition.

Because of this Waterford City Council was told to give back €101,866 in grant aid it got from the European Structural Fund. In total the council had to return €218,952 of ESF money received for the Waterford crystal project because it was not spent according to the rules.

The council said it believed it got value for money.

“Whilst acknowledged that the full rigours of the procurement rules were not adhered to, the adhered to principle of obtaining value for money was of upmost importance,” it told the auditors.
It is never an acceptable excuse for improper procurement to say, "well, we spent the money well, so what's the fuss?"

First, if the rules are not followed, if competition is not sought by effective specifications and needs assessment, what faith should we hold that prices paid were indeed the best obtainable, that the thing acquired was indeed the one best matched to our needs?

More importantly, when shortcuts are taken, they tend to be repeated, and before long there is no rigorous procurement system. There is always a systemic risk created when we try to rationalize away failure to follow the system with after-the-fact valuation satisfaction. 

Best value, value for money, are matters that should be judged, if ever, at the beginning of the process, to assure by rigorous methodology that we have wrung the best price for the most suited product available from the marketplace. Otherwise, it is simply a cover-up.

Sunday, January 23, 2011

Procurement controversies du jour, 24 Jan 2011

Bangalore, India: Civic body’s projects are ‘urgent’ only on paper
The BBMP had planned several projects in the run-up to Aero Show 2009, the biggest aviation event of the country. But today, when the city is gearing up for the 2011 edition of the show, these ‘urgent’ works still lie incomplete while those completed are riddled with inferior quality of work, reveals an audit by the Technical Vigilance Cell under Commissioner (TVCC).

Under the circumstances, what was the point of exempting the projects from the Transparency Act and tendering process?’’ an official said.

Exemption from scrutiny was sought saying that the projects could not be held up in paper work as they had to be implemented immediately. Among other things, the audit revealed that contracts were given to select contractors and administrative procedures ignored.

Geneva (AP): Fraud plagues global health fund
A $21.7 billion development fund backed by celebrities and hailed as an alternative to the bureaucracy of the United Nations sees as much as two-thirds of some grants eaten up by corruption, The Associated Press has learned.

Much of the money is accounted for with forged documents or improper bookkeeping, indicating it was pocketed, investigators for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria say. Donated prescription drugs wind up being sold on the black market.

"The messenger is being shot to some extent," fund spokesman Jon Liden said. "We would contend that we do not have any corruption problems that are significantly different in scale or nature to any other international financing institution."

New Jersey, USA: Audit shows Rutgers' spending procedures lacking
Rutgers University routinely flouts competitive bidding standards in purchasing a wide range of goods and services, an audit by the state comptroller has found. The audit said the university had yet to implement tighter fiscal controls recommended by a report by the State Commission of Investigation three years ago.

Comptroller A. Matthew Boxer said in a press release, “its procurement policy allows for exceptions that are so general and undefined, they essentially give Rutgers officials unfettered discretion when selecting vendors.”

The audit found that in “almost all instances” the university does not publicly advertise for its contracts, instead selecting preferred vendors. Rutgers further limits competition by entering into noncompetitive “negotiated” agreements

The university issued a statement in response noting that the comptroller found no evidence of illegal activity. Rutgers said it had been a good steward of public money, getting better deals on some goods and services than had other agencies that used the state’s purchasing system.

The university's defense in this last story once again illustrates the "no harm, no foul" proposition I have previously objected to.

All three stories illustrate that the "cost" of effective procurement procedures is cheaper than the cost of ineffective ones. It may be easier to put a price on the cost of performing the procedures, but the cost to the integrity of the government and institutions cannot so easily be quantified.

Wednesday, August 4, 2010

Hard line taken in Atlanta on procurement violation

It is often disheartening for a bidder on a government contract to experience blatant wrongdoing in a solicitation, and whether they win a protest or lose, find that their remedies are hardly worthwhile. They don't get their legal fees (on Guam and in most of the US), and too often the wrongfully awarded contract is nevertheless affirmed as being in the government's best interest.

But the real salt in the wound is in seeing the procurement officer and staff, who bumbled the award, go off free as a lark, to perpetuate their lackadaisical behavior without any as much as a strong word being placed in their personnel file.

Atlanta, Georgia, did not go down that road.

4 Atlanta watershed workers fired, manager quits over procurement violations
After firing four workers Friday, Peter Aman, Atlanta’s usually calm and mild-mannered chief operating officer, had a stern message for thousands of city employees:

“Don’t [mess] with the procurement procedures of the city of Atlanta. We are serious about people following the city code.”

Immediately after finding out that key members of the Department of Watershed Management’s security division circumvented rules to purchase $2.1 million worth of equipment, Aman fired them.

Aman said the workers wrote 160 invoices to Siemens Building Technologies for security equipment like cameras and access control pads for watershed facilities. The problem was that all of the invoices were for less than $20,000, which requires less rigorous approval standards from department managers, Aman said.

“So this was not an accident,” Aman said. “This was a clear subdivision of invoices.”

“They thought they were doing the right thing, but clearly they were contravening a standing city policy.”

“They would contend they saved months, and it probably was faster,” Aman said of the workers skipping procedures. “But when all is said and done, they didn’t comply to the code.”

“Whatever the rationale was, it doesn’t make a difference,” said Rob Hunter, the commissioner of the watershed department. “With the severity of the penalty, people will get the message that if you do this, you lose your job.”

Aman and Hunter said, there is no evidence that any money was stolen or that there was a criminal relationship with the vendor.

“All of the equipment was installed and it seemed consistent with the master security plan,” Aman said. “This was just a group eager to move forward more rapidly.”

While there has not been any criminal evidence yet, Hunter was unclear what kind of pressure the workers might have been under.

The watershed department is operating under a federal consent decree, which has put in place a series of ladders that the city has to meet before a 2014 deadline. The city is trying to get that extended to 2029.

The workers were ex-military and may have been eager to comply with Homeland Security rules to secure the city’s water supply, officials said.

“I don’t think they felt external pressure to do anything quickly. These were very experienced security professionals,” Hunter said. “The pressure they would have felt was the pressure of identifying a need and wanting to meet that need. But you don’t solve the problem this way.”

COMMENTARY: I am impressed. It must be made very clear that the procurement rules are there to serve ulterior purposes than simple expeditious performance.

It may seem draconian at times, but when people put themselves above the law, whatever the goal, they tend over time to ignore it altogether.

As I have said before, there is no place for the "no harm, no foul" notion in effective procurement regimes.


SUPPLEMENT TO ORIGINAL POST: Following a link to one of the hits to this post led me to some background on Atlanta's commitment to effective procurement. Atlanta has a very proactive Board of Ethics, and it is very public about what it is that the Board does, publishing both quarterly newsletters, such as this current one, as well as periodic annual or other reports, such as this 5 year review in 2009. In addition it publishes its Ethics Opinions online.

I would consider that to be an excellent benchmark for other jurisdictions to emulate.

Sunday, July 11, 2010

Putting a price on integrity

Under Guam's procurement law, all bidders and offerors must be responsible to qualify for award of a contract. Responsibility is defined to mean both the capability to perform as well as the integrity needed to assure good faith performance.

It is the duty of the Public Auditor to promote the "integrity" of the Guam procurement process.

In Massachusetts, a little lying on a resume doesn't seem to affect one's integrity if the government is not proven to have relied on the lie, particularly where the lying contractor saves the government a bunch of bucks. Another case of finding no harm from the foul.

Applicants to Harvard and Boston College might cite the situation to admissions personnel who question a little "padding" in your resume.

SJC ruling gives municipalities discretion in bidding process
At issue was the decision by Hanover officials to hire Callahan Inc., a Bridgewater-based firm, for the high school project even though it was discovered that the firm had provided fraudulent information to qualify for bidding. The company took credit for a North Andover high school building project, even though another corporation held the lead role, according to the court.

Losing bidders said Callahan should be disqualified from bidding for violating ethical rules. Coakley recommended that Hanover end its contract with Callahan and accept the next qualified bidder. Town officials refused, saying they took Callahan’s misdeeds into account.

The unanimous ruling by the Supreme Judicial Court clears the way for the town of Hanover to finish its $50 million new high school. The state’s high court said yesterday that local governments can hire companies for public works projects even if the firms misrepresented their track records, provided there is no sign of corruption in the bidding process.

But critics in the construction industry said the ruling undermines the spirit of the open, honest, public bidding process created by the Ward Commission after bid-rigging scandals in the 1970s.

“I think the likely result will be a compromising of the integrity of the competitive process," said Donald J. Siegel, a Boston attorney who represented the Foundation for Fair Contracting before the SJC.

Attorney General Martha Coakley, whose office tried to halt the Hanover project after misrepresentations were discovered in the winning bidder’s paperwork, said accuracy is crucial.

“We believe all contractors who bid on public construction projects should accurately and fully describe their qualifications." she said in a statement.

Writing for the court, Justice Ralph W. Gants said Hanover’s actions were reasonable and not the result of official corruption or fraud. The SJC threw out an injunction issued by a lower court judge.

“We conclude that where, as here, there is no allegation that any member of the town’s prequalification committee acted corruptly in deciding to prequalify Callahan, there is unrefuted evidence that the committee did not act in reliance on any of the alleged misrepresentations, and the town wishes to proceed with the contract" the injunction must be dismissed.

The decision gives “discretion to procurement officers at the local level to really go for the lowest reliable and qualified bidder,’’ said Christopher Petrini, a Framingham attorney who represented municipal lawyers before the SJC. “The [Hanover] taxpayers got a project for $1 million less."’

Dennis Sheehan, vice president of Callahan Inc., said company officials are relieved.

“We’re certainly very pleased,’’ he said, adding “there was no intent to mislead anybody.’’