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Showing posts with label Procurement philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Procurement philosophy. Show all posts

Thursday, February 21, 2019

The risky business of outsourcing essential government services

Britain to tackle doubts about outsourcing risks with new guidelines
Britain, which hires private firms to run parts of its health service, schools, prisons and public transport, has been rethinking how it awards contracts after the collapse of contractor Carillion just over a year ago. Carillion became the largest construction bankruptcy in British history last year, leaving creditors and pensioners facing steep losses and putting thousands of jobs at risk. Its demise reduced the number of big corporate bidders for government contracts and increased scrutiny of how the sector is run, driving down share prices of firms that provide outsourcing services, such as Babcock, Capita, Serco, G4S, Mitie and Compass.

Britain’s government will take measures to identify and reduce risks taken by private firms that provide public services, it will say on Wednesday, in a bid to encourage companies that have become increasingly wary of taking on new government business. “A more considered approach to risk allocation will make us a smarter, more attractive client to do business with,” cabinet office minister Oliver Dowden will tell business leaders at the Confederation of British Industry on Wednesday.

Guidelines, set out in the “Outsourcing Playbook”, will specify that “when designing contracts, departments must seek to mitigate, reduce and then allocate risks to the party best able to manage it”, Dowden will say, according to a text of his remarks released before delivery. The aim is to improve how government works with industry and deliver better public services by, for example, piloting services needed in advance and publishing details of work departments will require, so companies are better able to plan.

Public departments will also be required to say when it is best to deliver public services in-house or when there is benefit from drawing on private sector expertise.
Read this and other articles at the link(s) provided; I tend to slice and dice, rearrange, omit, paraphrase and pretty much destroy the integrity of the original work to try to create a teachable moment fitting the context of this blog.

Professor Steven L. Schooner, of the George Washington Law School, has asked, "what does your government hope to achieve through its government procurement law? It seems reasonable to attempt to describe general aspirations for a procurement system before drafting begins." In a paper he wrote, published in the Public Procurement Law Review in 2002, he identifies the principle of "risk avoidance" as one of nine particular desiderata often mentioned for a successful procurement regime.
It is difficult to describe a procurement regime without acknowledging the role of risk avoidance. Avoiding undue risk is a fundamental responsibility of any governing body. Conversely, improper obsession with risk avoidance can suffocate creativity, stifle innovation and render and institution ineffective. Further, there are infinite mechanisms available to control different types of risk.

No system can fully achieve all of the nine goals. Nor can a state expect that its objectives for its system will remain constant over time. Determining which goals are most important is a daunting, ever-evolving challenge. Because no system can achieve all of the goals, your desiderata entails important tradeoffs. Ultimately, each government must decide how much discretion or flexibility it wishes to delegate to its buyers.
Prof Schooner applied that principle of risk avoidance in testimony before the United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, in 2007, commenting on "the benefits, challenges, and risks of agencies’ increased reliance on contractors to provide critical services". He noted:
The challenges associated with extensive contractor reliance include, among others: (1) planning, which includes understanding what outcome will be sought from the private sector; (2) both understanding and accurately describing that outcome (or task) to the private sector; (3) selecting appropriate, qualified contractors in a timely fashion; (4) negotiating cost-effective agreements and drafting clear contracts that contain effective incentives (or profit mechanisms) to maximize contractor performance; (5) managing the contractual relationship to ensure that the government receives value for its money; (6) providing appropriate oversight throughout the process to, among other things, avoid corruption; and, most importantly, (7) maintaining a sufficiently educated, experienced, and motivated government workforce (or augmented workforce) to take on these challenges.

These challenges can be difficult to accomplish because the combination of government recruiting policies, salaries, benefits, opportunities, and quality of work lag much of the private sector, particularly in high-demand career fields. Thus, the “market” reflects that the government undervalues critical skills.

By the same token, slavish focus upon the relative cost of contractor support is misguided. Specifically, it is not productive to criticize agencies for paying contractors “too much” without: (1) permitting an agency to hire additional personnel; (2) confirming that sufficient personnel are available in the marketplace and willing to work for the government; (3) comparing “apples to apples,” such as taking into account all of the costs of civil servants or members of the armed services; and (4) considering critical issues such as flexibility and surge capacity. For example, higher contractor salaries may be offset, at least in part, by long-run costs avoided. Indeed, a strong case could be made that, for short-term demands for additional resources, it makes sense to pay higher, and potentially significantly higher, amounts for contractor support.

Fundamentally, though, it is difficult to conceive of a higher priority for a heavily outsourced agency than to “assess program office staff and expertise
necessary to provide sufficient oversight” of its most important service contracts. And, empirical evidence is scant to demonstrate that government employees are more talented, committed, motivated, or honest than their private sector counterparts, and vice-versa. However, the private sector’s exposure to market forces, and the related corporate purpose of pursuing profit, permits (and, arguably, requires) a more diverse and potent arsenal of employee incentives and disincentives. These tools include compensation (salary, salary increases, bonuses, stock incentives), opportunity for advancement, and, of course, the risk of termination. While the Government can use similar tools, their impact (or the degree to which these tools can influence behavior) is at least perceived as far less dramatic, given a heavily constrained promotion and bonus regime and an impenetrable de facto tenure system. The private sector-government contrast is greatest at the extremes. The private sector offers far greater economic rewards for success and threatens more credible sanctions for less than desirable performance.

Ultimately, however, the debate between in-house services or privatized services is increasingly academic. The government today relies on the private sector because we have restricted the size of government or, more specifically, the number of government employees. The government currently has no short-term choice but to rely upon contractors for every conceivable task that it is understaffed to fulfill. It is not an option to consolidate its missions, jettison a number of its tasks, terminate contracts, and take on only those missions it is appropriately staffed to perform. Nor is it feasible to wait while it embarks upon an aggressive program to identify, recruit, hire, and retain an extraordinary number of civil servants.

Only serious, long term, far reaching personnel reforms can, in any meaningful manner, begin to reverse the current trend. Accordingly, the government must continue to expend its best efforts to achieve its mission with the resources available, acknowledge that it is a rather “hollow” agency, and invest significant energy and resources in improving its use of contractors to help it achieve its mission. This involves conceding that contractors will continue to perform what historically have been perceived as inherently governmental functions. But even that notion is becoming increasingly quaint, outmoded, anachronistic, or simply irrelevant. At least, that is, until our increasing reliance on contractors to perform services for core government activities is matched by the capacity of government officials to supervise and evaluate the performance of these activities.

As our procurement system has struggled throughout this decade, Congress has been quick to call for more auditors and inspectors general to scrutinize contracting. That’s a responsible gesture. But the corresponding call – for more contracting experts to perform the many functions that are necessary for the procurement system to work well – has been both delayed and muted. In order to serve the taxpaying public and meet the needs of agency customers, acquisition professionals must promptly and accurately describe what the government wants to buy, identify and select quality suppliers, ensure fair prices, structure contracts with proper monetary incentives for good performance, and manage and evaluate contractor performance. Accordingly, the contracting workforce – understaffed, under-resourced, and under-appreciated – desperately requires a dramatic recapitalization.

We have witnessed an explosive growth in what we refer to as body shop or employee augmentation arrangements. As the name implies, the government uses this type of contract to hire contractor personnel to replace, supplement, or work alongside civil servants or members of the armed forces. Civil servants work alongside, with, and at times, for, contractor employees who sit in seats previously occupied by government employees. Unfortunately, no one stopped to train the government workforce on how to operate in such an environment. Worst-case scenarios have arisen where contractors have performed work under an
open-ended contracts (e.g., with a vague or ambiguous statement of work) without guidance or management from a responsible government official.

More than fifteen years of ill-conceived under-investment in the acquisition workforce, followed by a government-wide failure to respond to a dramatic increase in procurement activity has lead to a triage-type focus on buying, with insufficient the resources available for contract administration, management, and oversight. The old adage – an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure – rings true. More auditors and inspectors general will guarantee a steady stream of scandals, but they’ll neither help avoid the scandals nor improve the procurement system. Conversely, a prospective investment in upgrading the number, skills, and morale of government purchasing officials would reap huge dividends for the taxpayers.


Tuesday, March 27, 2018

For the times, they are a'changing -- or are they?

Here is the first of a couple of intriguing and thought-provoking current articles, each from very good sources (or so I've observed), considering aspects of the current "changes" in federal government acquisition. The second will be in the next post (see here). 

Remember, I take indecent liberty with articles advanced here, to provide context to students of local government procurement, and Guam's in particular. Thus, I slice and dice, omit great swaths of critical data, paraphrase, rearrange, and perhaps tilt to one side or the other, the original information in these articles. It is imperative that you read the articles in their original form and the authors' intent, and not rely on my iteration of them.



“Other Transaction Authorities” might seem like a risky new acquisition method, but it’s been around longer than the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
Before there was a Federal Acquisition Regulation regime describing the many procurement laws adopted at the federal level in the last three decades plus, there were “other transaction authorities,” also known by the shorthand OTAs or OTs. This contracting method, outside the usual federal process, is not widely used and even less understood. But that’s beginning to change. “Even though it’s been around for a fairly lengthy period of time, it’s just not been used very much. So, people are afraid of it because they haven’t seen how it’s worked,” Douglas Maughan, director of the Homeland Security Department's Science and Technology Directorate’s Cyber Security Division, told Nextgov.

It comes across as new and scary but is potentially a game-changing acquisition model and it is catching fire across government. After all, it has no structure, no built in roadmaps, accountability or paper trails. But, it doesn’t have to be scary and is not really all that new, if you are a big believer in getting to the future by going back before the dawn of modern procurement rules-based practices. It has roots going back to the 1950's, long before the FAR and the Competition in Contracting Act. Three decades later that same language came to be used to grant the Defense Department similar authorities. “Under these authorities, agencies may develop agreements that are not required to follow a standard format or include terms and conditions that are typically required when using traditional mechanisms,” according to a Government Accountability Office definition. In other words, OTAs rely more on principles than rules.

By 1994, that authority had been broadened beyond research to include prototyping and then updated again in 2017 to enable contracts to move into production after successful prototypes. Over that time, several departments have been granted other transaction authorities, including Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security and Transportation. Under these departments, five component agencies have also been given explicit OT authority: the Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation Security Administration, National Institutes of Health, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy, or ARPA-E.

Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate awarded its first OT contract for cybersecurity in February 2016 after launching its Silicon Valley Innovation program. While the primary focus for OTs is on research and development, not all agencies are using them for that express purpose. For instance, TSA and NASA use them for other services, such as airport security, education and outreach, according to GAO.

The reluctance to use OTs is based on “fear of giving people a lot of discretion,” said Nash, the procurement law expert. “If you’re in a government agency and you’ve got an inspector general and you’ve got congressional oversight … there’s a tendency to be pretty cautious about how you do business.”

That said, “It’s the same oversight you have over any other transaction where you’re giving a company money,” Nash said. “The problem is, if you have a lot of discretion, you take away a lot of the rules, but you still have basic ethics problems. If you gave an OT to your father without telling anybody else about it, you’d have the same ethical violation you’d have with a contract or a grant.”

The other major roadblock is the fear of funding projects that don't pan out, Nash said. “People have a hard time understanding that when you fund research, over half the time you’re funding failure,” Nash said. “You do not get 100 percent payout from research; and you shouldn’t expect it.” If you were to see a 100 percent success rate in funding research, that would just mean you weren't looking far enough into the future. “There’s nothing wrong with failure,” Nash said.

Homeland Security’s Maughan agreed. “We have a lot of successes we can talk about with return on investment, but even the failures” have some return, he said. He cited a program to downsize a Defense Department radar system to fit on smaller drones used by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The company awarded a contract ultimately failed to produce a working prototype, but everyone involved still consider it a successful venture. The company was able to get funding to move their research forward and CBP learned what is feasible for the size of drones they use. “They were still really happy about being part of the program,” Maughan said. “We helped them move the technology down the roadmap toward a smaller device and that will help them in some of their DOD missions.”

“I think there’s still some return on investment," Maughan added. "Our investment was less than $400,000 with them, so I think it falls into the category of: If you’re going to fail, fail quickly."

Had the office used a traditional contracting method for this project, it likely would have taken six to 12 months just to make an award, let alone discover that the idea would not work. Under the Science and Technology Directorate's OT authority, the time from application to award can be as short as 60 to 90 days.

Broadening OTs beyond research seems to increase their use accordingly. GAO reports that while most agencies do fewer than 75 OT transactions a year, TSA and NASA conducted 640 and 3,220, respectively, in 2014 alone.

Many in government have been reluctant to use their OT authorities precisely because of the lack of regulations governing their use. Since the contracts exist outside of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, they can be written with far less stringent requirements. But that also means there are fewer protections along the way to avoid a catastrophic contracting failure—one that could land a government official in front of a congressional committee.

“Even though it’s not FAR-based, we still have to do procurement documentation, we have to do a source-selection plan that says what are the criteria by which we’re going to evaluate proposals. For the most part, it’s the same as a traditional FAR-based contract, it’s just that the vehicle you’re using is not a FAR-based vehicle,” Maughan said. Despite appearances, “It’s not the wild, wild west,” Maughan added. “You still have to make sure the government is making the decisions on what gets awarded. Even still, we have a contracting officer—who’s called an ‘other transaction authority officer’—so you’re still doing the same kinds of things with the contracting folks as part of the team.”

The company was able to get funding to move their research forward and CBP learned what is feasible for the size of drones they use. “They were still really happy about being part of the program,” Maughan said. “We helped them move the technology down the roadmap toward a smaller device and that will help them in some of their DOD missions.”

“I think there’s still some return on investment," he added. "Our investment was less than $400,000 with them, so I think it falls into the category of: If you’re going to fail, fail quickly."

Had the office used a traditional contracting method for this project, it likely would have taken six to 12 months just to make an award, let alone discover that the idea would not work. Under the Science and Technology Directorate's OT authority, the time from application to award can be as short as 60 to 90 days.

“It’s not a solution for every case,” Maughan said. “It’s not the answer for all things,” he added. “If you’re trying to get startups with new innovation, then an OT might be good for you as an organization. There’s a little bit of risk working with a startup company—if you’re really just looking for a solutions provider and you’re not willing to take some risk, then an OT might not be for you.”

Nash agreed and offered some advice to agencies interested in getting in on OTs. “Let’s say you find a company out there that’s never done business with the government and that has some fascinating technology. You go to them and you say, ‘How could we sponsor you to do this? And we’ll give you all the money.’ Well, they may say, ‘The only way we’ll deal with you is this, this, this and this,’” Nash said. “We’re talking about intellectual property issues; we’re talking about accounting issues. And a normal contracting office might be pretty darn uncomfortable when they hear that because that’s not their norm.”

“You’ve got accounting problems. You want to make sure the company spends the money for what you gave them the money,” which can be particularly difficult, as one advantage of an OT contract is the company does not have to abide by government accounting standards. “But you need to make sure they have some systems.

“You need to worry about intellectual property—who’s going to have rights to it. And that would mean that if they said, ‘We’ll only do it if you take zero rights,’ that would be a problem. You might do it but you certainly would know that that’s a flashpoint that you would worry about. And then, of course, you’ve got to worry about audit rights because the government always wants to be able to audit and the contractor might not want to be audited.
Additional reading for this subject: Acquisition Disruption - Innovative Concepts in Government Contracting
Excerpt:  "This term is not defined by statute or regulation; it is best defined by what it is not. An OTA is not a procurement contract, grant, or cooperative agreement. It is a different type of agreement with the government – one that is not subject to the strict regulatory regimes that characterize other types of contracting." 

In my mind, adherence to principles is absolutely necessary for a successful procurement regime, but principles are not, in themselves, sufficient, any more than rules alone are.  See, The ethics of paper work.

Friday, December 30, 2016

The business of government

I've taken the following article and sliced and diced it to my own editorial fancy, to make particular points about procurement, as is my wont in this blawg. So, if you really want to know the article's author's intent, read it at the title link.

Go on. Click the link and read it from the horse's mouth; some may view it as thought provoking. I did.  My convoluted version follows the link and hopefully does not too much damage to the author's intent.  Pay attention to my identified tags/labels (in the head of this blawg) to put this post in my context.

Thinking about the business of government, By CHRIS DISHMAN, a Ph.D. candidate in public affairs at the University of Texas at Dallas, who wrote it for the Dallas Morning News.
Total spending for the executive branch, known as “discretionary funding,” amounts to 30 percent of all U.S. spending. “Mandatory spending” accounted for 70 percent of total government spending in 2016.

The Department of Defense accounts for half of “discretionary” spending, so agencies like Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs make up 15 percent of total spending. If Congress eliminated the Department of Energy, for instance, the government would save $28 billion annually, which is roughly equivalent to the cost of two new CVN-class aircraft carriers.

Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security and interest on the debt make up the bulk of “mandatory” spending, together with other “entitlements”, social as well as corporate.

The executive branch is the same size as it was in the 1970s, despite the increasing number of laws and regulations passed by Congress. The government remains at 2.1 million people or less.

The government’s workload has skyrocketed, as measured by the amount of spending per government employee, yet neither Congress nor any executive will support additional resources to implement the rules and regulations they advocate. The result of this dilemma is that government contracts out many of its duties to the private sector. And this forces government managers to shift existing resources — those used to undertake other governmental duties — to “manage” those contracts.

The government is paying big dollars to companies to undertake governmental missions. Why? Because it is politically palatable. Mandatory spending must be addressed to balance the budget, but politicians know that threatening a reduction in these programs is electoral suicide. Do you wonder why lobbyists like this approach?

There are fundamental differences between business and government.

Constitutional values, not corporate law and profit, guide the public sector. Ideally, government serves public interests while protecting the competing values that underpin those interests.

The private sector, in contrast, is governed by corporate law and profit, and business executives are, in the main, disinterested in anyone who cannot support that goal.

These differences do not mean that government cannot learn from the private sector. But we should remember that the republic’s founders intended the structure and processes of government to reflect constitutional values, not those of free enterprise.

Friday, April 22, 2016

Of legs up, hand outs, and ... fingers crossed, eyes shut?

Government contracting staff have it hard enough making sure the public fisc is prudentially targeted to acquiring satisfaction of minimum needs with maximum value and efficiency. When social welfare schemes, or other political aims, let alone nefarious criminal schemes, are interjected into the process, acquisition staff and resources quickly get distracted from the primary purpose of the acquisition process. Putting responsibility on the acquisition process to account for such incidental matters is a step too far, a straw that may break the camel's back.

Responsibility for the smooth handling of those extraneous non-acquistition issues should be shouldered by other instrumentalities with the expertise required for those matters and dealing with the controversies that come with those activities. But someone must be saddled with that responsibility. Because, as we all know, government contracting money is a significant part of any government's budget, and unaccountable diversion of acquisition funds to non-acquisition activities taints public perception of the acquisition process, and reduces the government's purchasing power.

But when everyone is made responsible, no one is.

Note that you should read the article in its original at the link. I tend to cut, paste, delete, paraphrase and otherwise alter the story line to fit in the educational theme and space of this blog.

Governments Struggle to Root Out Fake Minority Contractors
Like many cities and states, Portland, Ord. has a program allowing it to give special consideration to women- and minority-owned companies when handing out government contracts. The goal, of course, is to help support traditionally disadvantaged companies by giving them a leg up. But as Margie Sollinger, the city's ombudsman, began to discover, the city wasn’t necessarily helping the firms it thought it was.

As the city’s ombudsman, Sollinger had for some time been hearing from business owners about fraud in the city’s minority- and women-owned contracting program. According to state law, the city of Portland wasn’t allowed to take action against minority-owned firms it believed to be fraudulent; those complaints had to be referred to the state. But Sollinger says the state Office of Minority, Women and Emerging Small Businesses initially shrugged her off.

So she referred the case to the Oregon Department of Justice, where the investigation continued for nearly two years. Simple city inspections to make sure the awarded company is showing up to perform the job would have caught past violators. But cities and states across the country are struggling to provide sufficient oversight when it comes to minority- and women-owned firms, also known as disadvantaged business enterprises, or DBEs. As a result, much of the money that’s targeted to help these businesses doesn’t really go where governments want it to.

State legislators took an interest in the issue, and last year passed legislation allowing all public agencies in the state to conduct their own investigations into future allegations of minority contract fraud.

It’s a problem that’s shown up all over the place. In Louisville, Ky., the metro sewer district banned two minority businesses from receiving future contracts after it was discovered that they were subcontracting with nonminority-owned businesses. An audit in Pittsburgh found the city didn’t even have a way to track how much work was going to DBEs. The city of Denver has also been dealt a blow by contracting scandals in recent years. In 2014, the city proudly touted a new contract for mechanical work at Denver International Airport that had been awarded to a company owned by an African-American woman; at $39.6 million, it was the city’s largest-ever minority contract. But it later became clear that the company was subcontracting more than $23 million of the work to a different firm, one that didn’t qualify as a minority contractor.

Nationwide data on DBE contracting programs is spotty; states’ efforts vary widely. The National Association of State Procurement Officials doesn’t monitor them. The US GAO has published a smattering of reports over the past 25 years on women- and minority-owned contracting programs with two main conclusions: More information was needed, and the contracting world in general lacks women and minorities.

Wendell Stemley, president of the board of the National Association of Minority Contractors believes states owe it to their residents to help minority firms. He says, "the faces of these businesses should reflect how diverse the locality actually is. And if a state has lax compliance standards, then of course there are going to be firms willing and able to game the system.”

Ensuring that a minority contracting program is functioning properly takes a lot of work. A 2013 internal audit by the Minnesota Department of Transportation found extensive problems with its DBE program, ranging from mismanagement and weak oversight to outright fraud. “We just weren’t seeing a lot of success, and we were even having protests outside the state Department of Transportation office,” says Minnesota state Sen. Scott Dibble, chairman of the Transportation and Public Safety Committee. The scathing audit highlighted millions of dollars that had been passed through to non-DBEs and a consistent failure to meet the state’s own DBE goals. But the key finding, says Dibble, was from the state Office of Civil Rights. “There were some serious concerns within that office that numbers were fudged,” he says.

This year a consortium of state agencies will be working together to develop more objective criteria for what really qualifies as a disadvantaged business. Perhaps most important, Dibble says, the effort has raised awareness among lawmakers of the need for intense oversight. “In order to remedy age-old injustices” against disadvantaged firms, he says, “it requires proactive action, not passive acceptance.” Still there’s an inherent challenge when a state endeavors to mix bureaucracy with “complicated social problems,” says Dibble. “It’s a problem, and I don’t really know how to solve it.”

Another place that’s taking on contract reform is New Orleans. The city has long had a minority contracting program in place, but when construction projects ramped up as the city rebuilt after Hurricane Katrina, it became clear the program had extensive problems. There was a two-year backlog of companies waiting to be certified as minority- or women-owned businesses, and the city had virtually no record-keeping or monitoring processes in place. In 2013, Mayor Mitch Landrieu introduced a set of proposals to raise the profile of the program. These reforms focused mostly on outreach and oversight of public contracts.

Last fall the city implemented a second wave of regulations, focused more on enforcement and compliance. Now, when fraudulent activity is discovered, the city can withhold payments and exclude that particular firm from future contracts. The city has also introduced new technology tools to monitor existing contracts and payments. (As a side benefit, the technology will allow subcontractors to see when a primary contractor gets paid, adding another level of transparency to the entire contracting process.) The city needed to invest in more people. When Landrieu took office in 2010, the Office of Supplier Diversity was made up of one person. But thanks to a local millage, the city was able to budget $700,000 to beef up staffing. Now there’s a staff of seven people. It’s too soon to know how effective the new technology and compliance measures will be; the city only began training employees on them in February.

National Association of Minority Contractors’ Stemley believes the high-profile cases of fraud and noncompliance are the exception to the rule. The onus, he says, is on states and cities to step up their efforts to attract more minority- and women-owned businesses. “We need to be trying harder to make sure we have workforce diversity in the contracting community,” he says. “We can’t ignore these underserved communities that need jobs.”
And don't forget that the main job of the acquisition program and staff is to get the government's needed things and services delivered when and where needed and on budget. Too many times, preference programs are simple political campaigns, big on promotion and bereft of substance and accountability, and the acquisition process gets blamed for the short-changes of the programs.

Thursday, August 13, 2015

Models of procurement

You can go your own way
Go your own way
You can call it another lonely day
You can go your own way
Go your own way
by Fleetwood Mac

Here we look at several of the multitude of models of procurement (from various U.S. states)  in  articles brought to us via Lexology and provided by the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP.   I keep finding more of these state reviews and have tacked them on, and Husch Blackwell is to be commended for cataloging these various state versions, because we can better learn what works, what works well, and what doesn't seem like such a good idea after all (but of course, that all depends on what you are trying to achieve -- a matter for other posts).

Of course, as always here, you need to refer to the original article at the links provided, as I may take considerable liberty with editing, paraphrasing, etc., typically leaving out vital information you will want if you are particularly interested in the subject.

Missouri bid protest procedures by Lowell Pearson and R. Ryan Harding.
Public procurement in Missouri is conducted according to statutes and the rules published by the Division of Purchasing and Materials Management within the Missouri Office of Administration. Although many protesters opt to bring their protest actions directly in court, there are voluntary procedures for the submission and resolution of bid protests involving purchases by Missouri state government agencies.

How and when to file a bid protest

A protest challenging the award of a Missouri contract may be submitted in writing, setting out the usual matters (basic description of the protestor and solicitation as well as legal and factual grounds of protest, with supporting documentation) to the Director of the Division of Purchasing and Materials Management (“DPMM”) or to another person designated to receive the protests. A timely protest of a contract award must be received by the director of the DPMM or the designee within ten business days after the date of the contract award. If the tenth day falls on a weekend or a state holiday, the deadline extends to the next business day.

There is no published regulation establishing a procedure for the resolution of pre-award protests in Missouri. If they cannot be resolved informally before the submission of bids, a challenge to the specifications, contract provisions, or other solicitation provisions would have to be addressed in a court proceeding.
How is a Missouri bid protest resolved?
A timely and complete bid protest will be reviewed and decided by the director of the DPMM or the designee. An incomplete protest or one that does not establish that the protester has standing to challenge the award will be summarily denied. A decision addressing the merits of the protest will contain findings of fact and an analysis of the issues presented in the protest. The decision will sustain or deny the protest. If the protest is sustained, available remedies include canceling the award. Recognize that the administrative procedure set out in the regulations is not mandatory and deciding not to use it does not bar a court action.

An adverse decision on a bid protest may be challenged in court through a Writ of Mandamus, a declaratory judgment action, or other judicial means. A court action is generally filed in the Cole County Missouri Circuit Court. Challengers (particularly incumbent vendors who do not receive the new contract) often want injunctive relief to prevent a transition of the contract, and the administrative bid protest procedure does not stay the transition. Accordingly, it is common for unsuccessful bidders to go directly to court.
Can a successful protestor recover attorney’s fees?
The award of reasonable attorney’s fees to parties that prevail in agency proceedings or civil actions may be allowed. But, fees are not available if the court or the agency finds that “the position of the state was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” That is a high burden, and the statute also imposes caps on the size of the fee applicant and on the hourly rate. For these reasons, fee awards are not common.
South Carolina bid protests by Christopher A. Smith and Elizabeth A. Bozicevic
South Carolina law provides a statutory procedure for the submission and resolution of bid protests. Under South Carolina’s Consolidated Procurement Code and procurement regulations, bid protests relating to procurements greater than $50,000 may be initiated with a letter directed to the appropriate chief procurement officer (“CPO”). A protest must be in writing and must set forth the grounds of protest and the relief requested with enough particularity to give notice of the issues to be decided.

The submission of a bid protest is "short" [but not as short as Guam's, and many other jurisdictions in the US, such as Tennessee as the third article below reveals). If challenging the terms of a solicitation, a prospective bidder must file the protest within 15 days of the issue date of the invitation for bids or request for proposals. If an amendment to the solicitation is at issue, the protest must be filed within 15 days of the amendment. The deadline for protesting the award or intended award of a contract is even shorter. Unsuccessful bidders must file such protests within 10 days of the date of award or notification of intent to award, whichever is earlier. The protest can be amended after it is filed, but such amendments must be filed within 15 days after the date of award.

A protest bond is not required for protests to the terms of a solicitation. A bond is not automatically required for post-award protests but the CPO can require security if the agency requests and if the contract at issue is: (a) solicited under Article 5 of South Carolina’s Consolidated Procurement Code; and (b) valued at $1 million or more. If the CPO requires a bond, it must be in an amount equal to one percent of the potential contract value. The CPO’s decision to require a bond is not appealable.

Before a protest is considered on its merits, South Carolina law directs the CPO to make a “reasonable attempt” to settle the protest by mutual agreement with the protester. Settlement negotiations can take place with the CPO, the head of the purchasing agency, or their designees, and the CPO has authority to approve any mutually agreeable settlements.

If a protest cannot be settled at the outset, the CPO is required to promptly conduct an “administrative review.” The CPO must issue a written decision resolving the protest within 10 days of completing the administrative review and must “state the reasons for the actions taken.” The decision must be posted as well as mailed “or otherwise furnished” to the protester and any intervening parties immediately.

A party that is adversely affected by a CPO’s decision on a bid protest may seek administrative review with South Carolina’s Procurement Review Panel, which is comprised of two South Carolina employees and five individuals from private industry. The members of the Procurement Review Panel are appointed by the Governor. A written request for this administrative review must be submitted within 10 days of the posting of the CPO’s decision. The request should describe the reasons behind the protestor’s disagreement with the CPO’s decision; it must be limited to issues raised in the protest and cannot raise new protest grounds, even if those grounds are newly discovered. The Panel is required to convene in response to a bid protest within 15 days of receiving the request or to schedule a hearing to facilitate the administrative review. T he Panel reviews the CPO’s decision under a de novo standard of review. The Panel must record its determination within 10 working days, unless the matter is designated as complex, in which case the Panel 30 days to record its determination.

A timely filed bid protest imposes an automatic stay that stops the procurement or the award of a contract until 10 days after the CPO posts its administrative review decision. The automatic stay remains in effect during an appeal to the Procurement Review Panel. The agency involved in the solicitation and/or the party who was awarded the contract may request a lift of the stay. The stay may be lifted if the CPO, in consultation with the head of the agency, determines that the immediate solicitation or award of the contract is necessary to protect the best interests of the state. There is no automatic stay when a protest action is filed in the circuit court.

The decision of the Procurement Review Panel may be appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court’s review generally is confined to the record before the Procurement Review Panel and the court may overturn the Panel’s decision only in accordance with certain specific grounds.

If it is determined that the protestor should have been awarded the contract under the solicitation but was not, the protestor may request and be awarded a reasonable reimbursement amount, including reimbursement of bid preparation costs and the costs of providing a bond or other security at the agency’s request. If the Procurement Review Panel determines that a protest was frivolous, the Panel may require the protesting party to pay the fees and/or costs of the parties who responded to the protest. A protest is “frivolous” if it is not well grounded in fact; and is not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and is posed for an improper purpose, such as to harass, limit competition, or cause unnecessary delay.
The Tennessee bid protest process by Steven A. Neeley Jr. and Hillary L. Klein
Tennessee law explicitly provides interested parties the right to protest the terms of a solicitation for a contract with a state agency or the award or intended award of a state government contract. In each case, Tennessee’s procurement code and procurement regulations require the submission of a protest letter directed to the “Chief Procurement Officer” located in Nashville. Bid protests be submitted in writing and identify all of the reasons for the protest. They should be presented in the form of a letter that identifies the solicitation and the interested parties and summarizes the grounds for the protest.

Pre-award protests addressing ambiguities or defects in a solicitation that are apparent before bid opening or the closing date for receipt of initial proposals must be submitted within seven calendar days after the solicitation has been posted to the website of the Central Procurement Office or the Delegated State Agency. Post-award protests must be submitted within seven calendar days after the notice of award or notice of intent to award the contract is issued, whichever is earlier. Issues raised after the seven-day period will not be considered. The notice of award or notice of intent to award usually specifies a date on which the agency’s procurement files will be open to bidders; they contain the agency’s proposal evaluations. This is known as the “Open File Period.” Under Tennessee law, bidders are deemed to know all of the facts in the agency’s files on the first day of the Open File Period, so a post-award protest must be submitted within seven calendar days from the start of the Open File Period.

Although there are exceptions for small businesses bidding on contracts under $1 million, a bid protest in Tennessee must be accompanied by a bond or other security. The amount of the bond is five percent of the lowest evaluated cost or five percent of the estimated maximum liability established in the solicitation. The bond will be forfeited if the protest is not well-grounded or is filed in bad faith.

Tennessee law imposes an automatic stay that goes into effect upon the state’s receipt of a protest and supporting bond. There is a procedure that allows the state to override the stay if it is necessary to protect the interests of the state.

The Chief Procurement Officer, in consultation with the head of the state agency, has the authority to resolve a bid protest. The Chief Procurement Officer is generally required to resolve a protest within 60 calendar days after it is filed. The final determination of the Chief Procurement Officer is made in writing and is submitted to the protesting party, the Protest Committee, and the Comptroller of the Treasury. A protest may be resolved in the protester’s favor only under one or more of five circumstances—
• the contract award was arbitrary, an abuse of discretion or exceeded the authority of the Central Procurement Office or the State Agency;
• the procurement process violated a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision;
• the Central Procurement Office or the Delegated State Agency did not follow the rules of the procurement set forth in the solicitation in making the award, and their failure to follow the rules of the procurement materially affected the contract award;
• the procurement process involved responses that were not independently arrived at in open competition, were collusive, or were submitted in bad faith; or
• the contract award was the result of a technical or mathematical error during the evaluation process.
A protester may challenge a decision by the Chief Procurement Officer by appealing to the State Protest Committee within seven calendar days of the decision. An appeal may also be filed directly with the State Protest Committee if the Chief Procurement Officer fails to acknowledge the protest within 15 calendar days after receiving it, fails to resolve the protest within 60 calendar days, or consents in writing to a direct appeal to the Protest Committee.

Decisions issued by the State Protest Committee may be appealed to state chancery court. Court review is limited to the record made before the protest committee and involves only an inquiry into whether the protest committee exceeded its jurisdiction, followed an unlawful procedure, or acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily without material evidence to support its action.

Tennessee law does not specify the recovery of costs for filing a protest. Because each prospective contractor could justifiably expect fair consideration of its offer by the state, in rare cases, a protester may be able to recover attorney’s fees as well as protest and bid preparation costs under the theory of promissory estoppel. (Attorneys’ fees are also available in a successful challenge to bid specifications under the Tennessee Freedom in Contracting Act (“FICA”), but those are very limited circumstances that rarely occur. The FICA only prohibits solicitation provisions that establish or require relationships with labor organizations or which discriminate against workers.)
Bid protests in Virginia by Brian P. Waagner
An actual or prospective bidder seeking to challenge the award of a Virginia government contract must submit a protest to the procuring agency or to an official designated by the agency. The protest must be submitted in writing. It must include the basis for the protest and the relief sought. A bid protest must be submitted no later than ten days after the award or the announcement of the decision to award, whichever occurs first. This deadline is extended if the protest depends on obtaining access to documents. In those situations, the protest must be submitted within ten days after the records are made available. The VPPA does not specifically allow for the submission of a pre-award protest that challenges the terms and conditions of a solicitation.

If a protest is timely filed, the award and performance of the contract is automatically stayed unless the agency determines in writing that “proceeding without delay is necessary to protect the public interest or unless that bid or offer would expire.”

Parties that are not satisfied with the initial decision on a Virginia bid protest have a right of appeal, but they must take action within ten days of receiving the initial decision. If the agency has established a procedure for hearing appeals, the appealing party may choose to invoke the administrative appeal process. Upon the conclusion of the administrative appeal, a party that is not satisfied with the result may proceed with an action in state court. Although a party that invokes an administrative appeal must complete it before beginning a court action, a protest decision can be appealed directly to a state court without even beginning the administrative appeal process.
Colorado bid protests by Fred Miles
The Colorado Procurement Code grants the right to submit a protest to “[a]ny actual or prospective bidder, offeror, or contractor who is aggrieved in connection with the solicitation or award of a contract.” A protest must be submitted in writing within seven working days after the protester knew or should have known of the grounds for the protest. [This indicates the Colorado regime is, like the South Carolina law above, as well as the Guam law, modeled on the ABA Model Procurement Code.] The purchasing agent for the agency may settle and resolve protests concerning the solicitation and contract award. Absent a settlement, a written decision is required within seven working days after the protest is filed. This decision is to be based on and limited to the issues raised in the protest. It must explain each of the factors taken into account in reaching the determination and must advise the protester of its appeal rights.

Two options are available for a party seeking to appeal an unfavorable initial protest decision. An appeal may be filed with the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Personnel and Administration. This agency encompasses Colorado’s State Purchasing Office. Appeals are usually determined by this agency’s designee, the State Purchasing Director.

It is also possible to appeal an initial protest decision through a court action in the District Court for the City and County of Denver, which hears most legal challenges to Colorado state agency decisions.

Unlike federal bid protests and the procedures followed in many other states, the automatic stay of the contract award pending the result of a solicitation or bid protest is extremely limited in Colorado. The primary provision providing for an across- the-board stay while all protests and appeals were pending was repealed in the early 1980s. Under current law, an automatic stay of the award of a contract is available only while the initial protest is pending.

When a protest is sustained by the agency’s purchasing agent, full relief may be accorded to the protester, including an order requiring the agency to conduct a new procurement. The availability of relief is much more limited in a protest that is sustained on appeal. If the contract has already been awarded and the party awarded the contract has not acted fraudulently or in bad faith, the contract still may be ratified or affirmed as being awarded to this party if it is determined to be in the best interests of the state. Alternatively, the contract may be terminated, in which case the party awarded the contract shall be compensated for the actual expenses reasonably incurred under the contract prior to termination, plus a reasonable profit. Even when a protest is upheld on appeal, the protesting party is entitled only to the reasonable costs incurred in connection with the solicitation or bid, including solicitation or bid preparation costs. Under this statutory provision, reasonable costs do not include attorney fees. [Again, these last limited remedies rhyme with Guam law.]

There is a lot to be learned by comparing different procurement regimes, in the first place, then studying outcomes of those regimes, in terms of efficiency, inclusiveness and fostering competition, and governance issues, such as fair and equitable treatment, integrity of the process and accountability.

NASPO, the National Association of State Procurement Officials, publishes A Practical Guide to State & Local Government Procurement, which attempts to collect and summarize the procurement processes in the U.S. It's latest iteration has a long history dating back to the late 1940's. There are also models of procurement published by the American Bar Association (which South Carolina and Guam tend to follow), the UN, the World Bank, The Asia Development Bank, as well as the plethora of national regimes of the various countries around the world. 

NASPO's Practical Guide notes:
State and local governments are not carbon copies of each other. They act as natural laboratories for differing approaches to public procurement and other public services. Keep that in mind when analyzing survey results or reading about trends.  A substantial majority may not constitute a consensus.  Every procurement program has its strengths and weaknesses attributable to governing law, operating rules, quality of management, political tradition, and availability of resources. [This kind of study] is a road map with effective procurement as the destination rather than a detailed blueprint that limits ingenuity and innovation.

Monday, January 12, 2015

Cultural change is a procurement problem, too

Attacking the root of the problem in DoD acquisitions by Alex Haber, a business analyst in the national security practice at Censeo Consulting Group.
Policy changes may be limited in their ability to drive improvements in cost, schedule and performance. Many of the root causes of the chronic underperformance in defense acquisition stem from the culture that exists around who is buying. As such, results from policy changes alone without a cultural overhaul will inevitably fall short of the mark.

The list of human capital problems in the acquisition community begins with a misguided incentive structure. Few institutionalized benefits exist for edging away from the DoD 5000.02 Acquisition Lifecycle– the elaborate roadmap that directs DoD purchasing. In the words of a 25-year Air Force veteran with significant budgetary experience, acquisition officers are encouraged to focus on the “near rocks” (immediate challenges) and lean on reliable—though potentially sub-optimal—strategies. Locking in on the status quo can only serve to smother technological innovation and suppress adaptive business practices.

This issue is compounded by both internal and external misperceptions about the acquisition process. A 30-year Navy officer noted bluntly that some active duty personnel avoid or quickly seek to move out of acquisition assignments since they do not look at buying goods as the work of a warfighter. Additionally, a former Army Program Manager complained that legislators on the Hill appropriate dollars to DoD acquisition hubs without knowing “how the sausage is made."

The acquisition function’s relationship with industry is another pain point that policy changes cannot easily cure. As my former Navy colleague remarked, DoD acquisition leaders and their partners in industry use similar language in handling acquisition activities, but often mean different things. For example, a DoD-generated ‘should-cost’ modeling exercise on a particular program doesn’t decompose cost components with the granularity and analytic rigor that industry uses when conducting a similar exercise. A dollar is a dollar no matter how it is spent, yet the different ways that government and private industry evaluate cost leads to communication breakdowns and inefficiencies.

Going further, the Pentagon continues to commit substantial financial and human resources to internal Research & Development efforts even as procurement specialists habitually look first to private industry to meet their technology and management needs. DoD-wide policy can certainly nudge the department’s procurement arms in the direction of healthier, more efficient relationships with their suppliers. However, organic partnerships will only truly evolve when leaders in the acquisitions community start re-examining this dynamic and better articulating roles and responsibilities to industry on their own, program-specific terms.

To go back to incentives, the emphasis for rank-and-file procurement specialists is on designing briefings, not developing technological capability. In some cases, colleagues in the Pentagon have heard of acquisition managers presenting nearly 80 separate briefings to over 100 people… on a single program in a single year! Already restricted by weighty procedural obligations, a distressing trend of budgetary uncertainty and the resulting focus on the execution year alone further limits the procurement function’s ability to exercise foresight and creative thought.

If Ashton Carter can inspire a new wave of cultural norms along these lines, broad-based acquisition reform might actually amount to more than just a bureaucratic Band-Aid.

Wednesday, December 17, 2014

The always optimistic efforts to improve US DOD procurement


This post links to recent articles down below on yet another discussion to improve US defense procurement. The comments are surely interesting, maybe helpful. 

But, to put this in perspective, I begin with some observations by Prof. James F. Nagle, in his excellent study, "History of Government Contracting" (2nd Edition 1999).
If someone were asked to devise a contracting system for the federal government, it is inconceivable that one reasonable person or a committee of reasonable people could come up with our current system That system is the result of thousands of decisions made by thousands of individuals, both in and out of government. It reflects the collision and collaboration of special interests, the impact of innumerable scandals and successes, and the tensions imposed by conflicting ideologies and personalities.

Much of the country's contracting history has been spent trying to find the best combination of three factors: the right contracting apparatus, the right government-contractor relationship, and the correct contract form itself.

In its search for an efficient, fair, and reasonably priced procurement apparatus, the government has tinkered endlessly with its procurement agencies. It has experimented with centralized czars of government-wide procurement, decentralized, overlapping contracting agencies; and variations in between. Originally, contracting officers were vested with a great deal of discretion, hampered by very few regulations which constricted their judgment. They could adapt contracts and clauses to individual circumstances. Throughout the nineteenth century ... that discretion decreased.

In 1984, Congress enacted the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA). CICA required agencies to obtain "full and open" competition -- the new hallmark of government contracting -- so taxpayers received the best possible value for their funds. To ensure that all responsible sources could submit sealed bids or competitive proposals, Congress mandated extensive requirement for advertising, and struck down obstacles to competition. This completed a philosophical shift from the earliest days of the country. Now, while no one had a right to a government contract, everyone has a right to know about and compete for government contracts.

Believing that a strong mechanism was needed to enforce competition, Congress enlisted a powerful and unlimited army -- disgruntled competitor! CICA strengthened the protest process If Congress thought more protests would check abuses and assure the health of the system, it got its wish. But the result was slower procurement, more paperwork, and more expense for both contractors and the government.

From 1983 to 1989 the country experienced a collective angst that fraud and inefficiency permeated government contracting. Acting on that premise, Congress and the agencies tried behavior modification on a grand scale, adding dramatically to the process' paperwork, complexity, and risks. Professor William Kovacic points out that the 1980s revisions made three basic assumptions about the procurement system: (1) the government purchasing officials lacked the ability to choose suppliers as wisely as their private sector counterparts: (2) government purchasing officials needed greater tools to identify and prosecute contractor misconduct; (3) contractors were beset by sloth and corruption.

Between 1989 to 1993 came the recognition that such harsh medicines caused some unpleasant side effects. Government contracting had become so paperladen and fraught with financial and criminal risk that contractors shunned federal business or inflated their bids to compensate.

[More and more reforms were implemented, many criminalizing contractor misbehavior.] Professor Kovacic notes that the 1990s reforms reveal a long overdue awareness that procurement regulation is not free;

1990s reforms represent a realistic look at the problems caused by incompetence, fraud and a knee-jerk reaction to such maladies; These reforms took a comprehensive approach and made fundamentally different assumptions regarding the participants; Where the 1980s had assumed government personnel were lazy, incompetent or inefficient, the 1990s saw them as innovative hard workers who should be freed of the restrictions placed on their ability to devise flexible solutions to individual problems; Where the 1980s had assumed contractors were greedy criminals, the 1990s recognized that most contractors are industrious resources willing to fulfill the government's needs with ingenious solutions for a fair price.

The situation is as healthy as any I can recall in the history of peacetime government contracting.  That is not to say it is idyllic. Protests and lawsuits still abound. Contracting officers trained in the old system still refuse to change and many contractors still try to cheat.

My fear is that laws can not change human nature. Some contracting officer somewhere will make a stupid or corrupt decision; Some contractor somewhere will pounce on the situation to defraud the government; Headlines will blare; Congress will overreact; and the cycle of contracting reforms will continue.
The articles?

Efforts underway to improve Pentagon’s procurement system

(Also reported as Experts, lawmakers optimistic for changes to the way Pentagon buys technology)

Acquisition Reform: It’s Mostly Up to Congress





Friday, August 8, 2014

Protest busting solicitation busted on technicallity -- and a short history of bid protesting

The following story is very roughly related to a prior recent post, Open sourcing sole sourced contracts. It is a very readable column, and you should take the short time needed to click the link and read it. I've only provided a taste teaser for the whole piece.

When it comes to GAO bid protests, pay careful attention to the web of procedure

Bid protests, especially at the Government Accountability Office, can involve many procedural, non-substantive issues — the timing of the protest, the content of the protest, and the like. Sometimes, if you are not careful, you can find yourself caught up in this web of procedure and get bounced out of the protest before the GAO can ever consider the merits of the protest. That’s what happened to Harris Corp. in this case.

In this case, Harris proposed to provide a Motorola radio and, during the first protest, Motorola proved that it did not and would not provide Harris with permission to offer its radio on the procurement. The GAO recommended the existing proposals be re-evaluated, which the Army did. The Army found the Harris proposal to be non-compliant and awarded the contract to Motorola. Harris then filed this new protest.

Harris first argued that the RFP requirement to include an explicit agreement with the manufacturer was overly restrictive and not necessary to meet the agency’s needs. Harris also alleged that it believed the Motorola proposal also failed to meet the RFP requirements. The GAO dismissed both protest claims on procedural grounds.

First, the Harris allegation that the RFP is overly restrictive of the needs of the agency relates to the terms of the RFP itself. The GAO rules clearly state that any challenge to the terms of the RFP must be filed prior to the time for proposal submissions. Since the Harris protest was well after that fact, Harris failed to meet the procedural requirement for challenging the terms of the RFP.

The remaining allegation, that Harris thought the Motorola proposal failed to include sufficient agreements to document the parts of the radio system that Motorola did not manufacture, is more interesting and more frustrating for the protester. The GAO dismissed this allegation as mere speculation and not sufficient to meet the requirements of a well-founded protest. In particular, the GAO held that “speculation, without more, does not meet the requirements of our Bid Protest Regulations that a protest include a detailed statement of the legal and factual grounds for protest.”

More interestingly, the GAO noted that Harris, as the awardee, had failed to participate as an intervenor under the GAO rules in the first protest. An awardee is always allowed to participate in a protest against its award, to protect its own interests during the protest. The GAO noted that “while Harris was not required to intervene in the earlier protest, if Harris had participated, it would have had an opportunity to review the Motorola proposal as part of the record, and could have advanced any and all challenges to the acceptability of the Motorola proposal at that time.” In other words, had they participated in the first protest and reviewed the Motorola proposal, they would have had a reasonable basis to raise the issue in the second protest.
You can read the whole GAO opinion here.

The protest procedure was begun less than 100 years ago with an eye to facilitate government expenditure accountability (more on that in a moment). But, the government also has a blind eye. Whether your protest gets the careful, prophylactic gaze of the good eye, or the short shrift of the blind eye, depends on your understanding and compliance with the technicalities required to place your problem before the reviewing agency or court, be that GAO or any other reviewing authority. The represents a balancing of the need to police government expenditures in real time before badly spent money flies out the door, and the need to make sure that the government wheels keep turning however poorly the money has been spent. I would point out that this balance also depends on how well the government back-stops the protest process with critically meaningful audit review and enforcement procedures to make sure that those poorly spent dollars are uncovered and the error of those ways corrected, albeit after the fact.

The history of bid protests is outlined by Daniel I. Gordon, the Associate Dean for Government Procurement Law Studies at The George Washington University Law School and the former Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, in his paper, "Bid Protests: The Costs are Real, But the Benefits Outweigh Them", published in 42:3 Pub. Contract L.J., Spring 2013, and available through the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons online here. The history noted below and the paper from which is comes has been noted before on this blawg, but bears repeating. As usual, I selectively cut, rearrange, paraphrase and paste, including deleting footnotes and citations, to suit myself, so read the source.

He explains,
In 1924, a few companies began writing to the then relatively new General Accounting Office (GAO) to complain that agencies had improperly awarded contracts to their competitors. There was hesitation within the GAO about the appropriateness of considering complaints by private firms about the federal procurement process. Ultimately, the GAO decided to consider the complaints as part of its responsibility to ensure that funds appropriated by Congress are lawfully spent, which is also known as the Office’s account settlement function.

Then in 1925, a company wrote to the GAO alleging that Panama Canal officials had issued a solicitation with specifications for a truck that were “wired” to a particular brand name and that thereby unfairly precluded the complaining firm from fair consideration for the contract. The GAO requested the agency’s views on the matter, and, when the Canal authorities admitted that they had used the specifications of one company’s truck in the solicitation, the GAO issued the first published bid protest decision, ruling that the challenged solicitation was unlawful.

For many years, courts did not consider bid protests, so that the GAO (and the contracting agencies themselves) represented the only place to file a protest.14 Then, for three decades U.S. district courts had bid protest jurisdiction, beginning with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer.

Meanwhile, from the enactment of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) until its jurisdiction ended pursuant to section 5101 of the Clinger Cohen Act of 1996, there was another administrative forum with jurisdiction over bid protests that pertained to information technology: the General Services Administration’s Board of Contract Appeals. Finally, a statutory change in 1996 resulted in the Court of Federal Claims, which had only pre-award protest jurisdiction for many years, later gaining post-award jurisdiction as well.

Consequently, for more than a decade now, the only places outside the contracting agency where disappointed bidders have been able to file protests have been the GAO and the Court of Federal Claims. From time to time there are differences between the GAO and the Court of Federal Claims, with respect to both process and outcome. The author views occasional differences between the two fora as inevitable. That is particularly the case where, as here, one forum is administrative and the other is judicial. In any event, having two fora hear bid protests may be healthy for the procurement system.

The protest process has received substantial attention around the world in recent years. More than ever, a protest system has come to be seen as a required part of a good public procurement regime. As evidence of this trend, the U.S. includes a bid protest provision in the free trade agreements it negotiates. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) likewise includes a provision requiring that WTO members that accede to the GPA have a forum to hear protests (called a domestic review procedure). Finally, there is a protest provision in Chapter VIII of the model procurement law of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

Perhaps most interesting is the attention bid protests have received during the past twenty years in the European Union (EU). Not mentioned in the EU’s Public Procurement Directives, protests were first addressed by the European Commission in what is known as the Remedies Directive. Initially issued in 1989, the Remedies Directive was revised in 2007. The Remedies Directive has had an enormous impact, requiring all member states to have a forum that considers protests. Furthermore, the Court of Justice of the European Union has also issued decisions that have reshaped the protest process in the EU. Of particular importance was the Alcatel decision that led to the requirement (codified in Article 2a of the 2007 revision to the Remedies Directive) that there be a “standstill” period (typically ten days) between the announcement of a potential awardee and contract signing to allow a window for filing protests. Bid protest procedures have therefore received important consideration from the international community.
Many posts on this blawg have referred to the EU rules and the interplay of EU and Member State rules of procurement, e.g., here and here and here. 

As well, this blawg carries many procurement stories from elsewhere around the globe, including Canada, Caribbean nations, Africa, India and Southeast Asia. Procurement is a work in progress, and there is much to be learned from looking around.







Monday, September 30, 2013

Why not take all of me? Here's why...

Mom told me not to put all my eggs in one basket.

Contractor’s U.S. Ties Tough to Break After Vetting Lapse
USIS has won at least $588 million under U.S. government contracts set to expire within a year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. USIS has at least 40 federal contracts for work related to investigations, 14 of which are scheduled to expire by Oct. 1, 2014, according to federal procurement data compiled by Bloomberg. The company performs background checks and other investigative work for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Department of Agriculture, among other agencies.

The agreements include a lucrative deal with the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, which is responsible for most federal background checks. While the expiring contracts might provide agencies with opportunities to begin dropping USIS, replacing the government’s top provider of background checks might lead to more chaos in an already overburdened system.

“USIS provides the heart, the limbs and the guts of the operation for the Office of Personnel Management,” said Tiefer, now a law professor at the University of Baltimore.

The number of people with security clearances ballooned to about 5 million last year, and contract investigators have struggled to keep up with the demand for background checks, according to security specialists.

The government increasingly has relied on USIS for that vetting. Dumping a firm like USIS, a unit of Falls Church, Virginia-based Altegrity Inc. that has more than a half-billion dollars in federal contracts running out in a year, could create as many problems as it solves. It might shift a backlog of cases to two other companies, which could lead to more vetting lapses.

Shifting the load to competitors such as Arlington, Virginia-based CACI International Inc. (CACI) or KeyPoint Government Solutions Inc. -- a unit of Veritas Capital, a New York-based private-equity firm -- might worsen the situation, Tiefer said.

“There are not a lot of players in this field,” Brian Friel, a Bloomberg Industries analyst, said. “The government doesn’t have a lot of options.”

USIS’s prominence as a background-check contractor is due to its origin as the Federal Investigations Division of Office of Personnel Management. The unit, originally known as U.S. Investigations Services Inc., was privatized in 1996 as part of then-Vice President Al Gore’s effort to “reinvent” government by reducing the size of the civil service, according to a 2011 report by the Congressional Research Service.

Contracting out security reviews was designed to save the government money and offer new work for about 700 investigators no longer needed because of a declining clearance workload as the Cold War ended. Instead, demand for security clearances surged after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

USIS was given a non-competitive, three-year contract for investigative work with the personnel office and granted free access to federal computer databases that weren’t available to other firms.

Since 2006, at least 20 investigators have pleaded guilty or have been convicted of falsifying background-check reports for the personnel office, according to the agency’s office of the inspector general.

Ten of those were contractors. Eight of them worked for USIS.
Surely there must be some way to generate more competition with the industry behemoths? Not all of America's innovation is limited to the IT industry, is it? There is a cost to contracting with too-big-to-flail, and it includes creating complacency as well as dependency.  And  myopia.

Noting that USIS was at one time a government agency, I am reminded of the many instances mentioned in James Nagle's A History of Government Contracting which illustrates the many times when American government has instigated industrial innovation, including the industrial revolution. He reminds us that "good enough for government work" was not originally the pejorative it now is, but indicated the gold standard of workmanship.

For another exposition of that proposition, see 'The Entrepreneurial State': Apple Didn't Build Your iPhone; Your Taxes Did, by Mariana Mazzucato, with some excerpts as follows.  
Throughout history, strategic government expenditures have played a key role in spurring economic growth. private finance is too risk-averse -- afraid -- to engage with industries characterized by high technological and market risk. The fear explains why we have seen venture capital entering, in industry after industry, only decades after the initial high risk has been absorbed by government.

Mission-oriented public investment put men on the moon, and later, lead to the invention and commercialization of the Internet, which in turn has stimulated growth in many sectors of the economy. Indeed, as I describe in the longest chapter of my book, the U.S. government has been a leading player in funding not only the Internet but all the other technologies -- GPS, touchscreen display, and the new Siri voice-activated personal assistant -- that make the iPhone, for example, a miracle of American technology.

Casting the public sector as the villain and business as savior has relieved the private sector from any obligation to increase its own commitment to the innovation process. There simply are not enough large businesses today playing the role that Xerox PARC (the Palo Alto Research Center) and AT&T (Bell Labs) played in the past.

Today's big companies, like Cisco and Pfizer, spend almost as much on share-repurchase schemes (which enrich those who own stock) as they spend on research. Interestingly, the big "repurchasers" (the biggest being in oil and pharma) often justify such buybacks with the claim that there are no other "opportunities" for their investments. But really? No opportunities in health for pharma these days? Nothing for oil companies to invest in? What about safe and clean renewable energy?

When building innovation "eco-systems," then, it is important to make sure the role of business is symbiotic, not parasitic. That means, if we want to rebalance the economy, we need to rebalance the story we tell about who the innovators really are. Interestingly, it was the venture capital lobby in the mid-1970s that pushed for the capital gains tax to fall by 50 percent (from 40 percent in 1976 to 20 percent in the mid '80s). It has been falling ever since, based on the narrative that only thus will the entrepreneurial "risk-takers' do their thing and enrich us all.

But that narrative is false. The entrepreneurial state has funded the radical innovation behind much if not most of modern economic growth. Denying government today the resources to do its thing endangers us all.

Tuesday, July 23, 2013

2 stories

Two stories from today's press via Google News. This first story poses a question.

Official: Rotate contracting officers between government, private sector
Joseph Jordan, the White House’s top contracting policy chief, floated the idea Tuesday of having contracting professionals rotate between government and the private sector. “There are all sorts of issues, I know,” said Jordan, who is the administrator for the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. “But I refuse to say this is off the table.”

The Obama administration has placed tight rules clamping down on the so-called revolving door between government and special interests among political appointees, though Jordan’s remarks were aimed an audience of career workforce professionals.

“Is there a way where we can have people kind of bounce back and forth ... between industry and agencies?” Jordan said in remarks here at the National Contract Management Association conference.
Does this second story hint at a reason this might not be such a great idea?

Former government contracting official sentenced to prison
A former government contracting official, Robert Edwin Steele, 38, of Alexandria, was sentenced Friday to 48 months in prison for 14 counts of unauthorized access to a protected computer. In addition to his 48-month term of imprisonment, Judge Lee also ordered Steele to serve two years of supervised release, imposed a fine of $50,000, and required restitution $335,977.68.

When Steele left Company A on December 15, 2010, he gave verbal and written assurances to officials of Company A that he would not access its systems after his departure, and even urged them to shut down his existing accounts. That same day, however, Steele began logging into Company A’s e-mail systems using a secret administrative account which he learned about during his work for Company A. Steele immediately began downloading hundreds of proprietary documents using this administrative account.

Shortly after resigning, Steele joined another government contractor, Company C, that directly competed with Companies A and B for government contracts. At Company C, Steele worked as “Director of Law Enforcement” and prepared bids for government contracts on law enforcement projects. In that position, Steele undercut Company A’s bid on a government contract by approximately $100,000, while downloading Company A’s documents on the same contract. Although his attempt to win the bid failed, Steele continued to methodically sift through thousands of valuable documents stored on computers for Company A.
Of course, you need to read both stories in full for context, but why would you need to hack for information if you can just bounce back and forth and gather as you go?

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

Monopsony: monopoly through the looking glass

Government Should Leverage Its Size to Get Better Prices, Senators Say
“When Wal-Mart buys, I guarantee they get the best price, and when Honeywell buys, they get the best price,” said ranking member Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla.

Chairman Tom Carper, D-Del., called the Obama administration’s key procurement officers to respond to Government Accountability Office reports showing that the top four purchasing departments -- Defense, Energy, Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs -- were achieving only 5 percent of contracts using strategic sourcing’s careful analysis of spending needs and markets and rigorous monitoring of vendor prices. “Federal agencies appear to behave more like medium-sized, unrelated businesses than the largest purchaser in the world -- which is what the U.S. government is,” Carper said.

A defense of progress to date came from Joe Jordan, administrator of the White House Office of Federal Procurement Policy. The obstacles include “a decentralized process with a lack of visibility into what other agencies do,” Jordan said. But he cited progress in reducing what once was 4,000 separate wireless phone agreements with 800 plans to one contract vehicle, the saving of $600 million through shared contracts for janitorial services, and the General Services Administration’s office supplies contracts that have upped the rate of small business participation from 67 percent to 76 percent.

Dan Tangherlini, newly confirmed as administrator of GSA, said strategic sourcing in 20 agencies has saved $300 million since 2010. “Contractors are required to report transactional data on all program sales,” he said. “For the first time, this level of financial information collection provides us with a clear picture of agency spending behavior. Over the last several months, GSA has used this data to show contractors their pricing item by item, compared with their competitors in an anonymous fashion. This has empowered contractors to understand their competitive position, and in many cases offer better deals.”
I'm reminded of the post from a couple of days ago: Published benchmark costs bring procurement savings.

In the article in chief above, criticism of government procurement uniformly complained that the government did not achieve the market-leveraged savings of private business. Private business, of course, is not burdened with the many so-called "wealth distribution" programs (see, here) of the federal government, such as Buy American. And, WalMart acquires large parts of its product in China and other non-US production centers. Do we want our government to do likewise? We could do it.

America made a great leap forward economically at the start of the 20th century by dismantling the monopoly "trusts", a form of forced "creative destruction" of concentrated capital. The lesson learned is that too much concentrated market power is not good for the larger society or economy.

So, what is a Monopsony? According to Investopedia:
Definition of 'Monopsony': A market similar to a monopoly except that a large buyer not seller controls a large proportion of the market and drives the prices down. Sometimes referred to as the buyer's monopoly.

Investopedia explains 'Monopsony': People have accused Ernest and Julio Gallo (the big wine makers) of being a monopsony. They had such power buying grapes from growers, that sellers had no choice but to agree to their terms.

“The rule is, jam to-morrow and jam yesterday--but never jam to-day.'

'It MUST come sometimes to "jam to-day,"' Alice objected.

'No, it can't,' said the Queen. '
It's jam every OTHER day: to-day isn't any OTHER day, you know.'

'I don't understand you,' said Alice. 'It's dreadfully confusing!'

'That's the effect of living backwards,' the Queen said kindly: 'it always makes one a little giddy at first--'

'Living backwards!' Alice repeated in great astonishment. 'I never heard of such a thing!'

'--but there's one great advantage in it, that one's memory works both ways.'

‘I'm sure MINE only works one way,' Alice remarked. 'I can't remember things before they happen.'

'It's a poor sort of memory that only works backwards,' the Queen remarked.”
― Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There