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Monday, November 15, 2010

Resistance is fertile

The US Federal government is likely the single largest purchaser in the world. To say that vested interests are endemic would be an understatement. So when change is sought from without or above, it is resisted from within -- within the government and within the industry that does most of the business with the government.

And I don't imply any judgment about the nature of the resistance, because that will speak for itself. In fact, most humans in most circumstances resist change. So regardless of good or bad, resistance is often fertile.

But back to the topic, the current administration is following tradition of trying to put its own stamp on the procurement system, and those who operate the machinery are finding plenty of reasons to fault the changes desired by those who have oversight of the mission.

Pentagon official searches for the source of contracting waste
Frank Kendall arguably has the most difficult job in all of federal acquisition -- rooting out the source of entrenched waste in the Defense Department's $375 billion-per-year contracting system.

Kendall told Government Executive that he plans to approach the mission from a different perspective -- a ground-up strategy examining the root causes of waste and inefficiency.

As the department's second-highest ranking politically appointed acquisition official, Kendall has assembled a team of people from Pentagon headquarters and the various service agencies to decipher and measure the sources of acquisition waste.

But the examination is more than a simple process-oriented review to eliminate system redundancy or streams of paperwork. Kendall wants to reform the behavior and incentives that lead to cost inefficiencies, some of which are deeply engrained in the Defense acquisition process.

For example, Defense has a tendency to sign on to the next latest and greatest technological advance, no matter if the program is necessary, ready or affordable, he said. Budget operators and service leaders, meanwhile, want to spend as little as possible for weapons systems, but then impose unrealistic schedules on contractors. And companies place bids on contracts that are overly optimistic, hoping they will recoup costs further downstream, according to Kendall.

"I am hopeful that once we understand what those behaviors are costing us in terms of inefficiency then it will be easier to change them," he said. "That is a hypothesis that has yet to be proved."

Reforming the acquisition system of the largest single buyer of goods and services on the planet will not be easy. Interest groups scattered throughout the Pentagon advocate passionately for pet projects. Congress is deeply invested in keeping Defense projects -- and the jobs associated with them -- in their backyard, an all-too familiar scenario that most recently has played out with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

"There is a certain amount of institutional inertia that needs to be overcome," Kendall said.

Last year, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced he would reduce the percentage of support service contractors from its current level of 39 percent of the workforce to its pre-2001 level of 26 percent. The Pentagon will replace those contractors during the next five years with 39,000 new full-time government employees, 20,000 of whom would be acquisition professionals, although the latter figure could grow, Kendall said.

The additions to the Pentagon acquisition workforce would be split roughly between 10,000 insourcing conversions and 10,000 new hires. As of the end of March, the department has hired approximately 4,800 new employees, nearly two-thirds through insourcing, according to Defense spokeswoman Cheryl Irwin.

Industry officials have criticized the insourcing initiative as "quota driven," arguing routine commercial activities are being moved in-house without any verifiable cost savings. But Kendall claims those concerns are off target and miss the big picture.

"When people use the word 'quota' there is a perception of arbitrariness," he said. "That is not our intent. We are trying to bring in specific needs of the government to do jobs where they atrophied too much. ... We are not measuring performance in terms of pure numbers. We want quality and we want the right kinds of people brought in to do the work that needs to get done."

Bad press makes contracting an unattractive field, professor says
Norm Augustine, who was chairman of the Business Executives for National Security task force on Defense acquisition law and oversight, said finding the right balance between recruitment and training is crucial.

"Adding, say, 10,000 people each with one year's experience is different than adding 500 people with 20 years' experience," Augustine said.

Senior acquisition officials question procurement policy direction
The biennial survey by the Professional Services Council, a contractor trade association, and Grant Thornton LLP, a business advisory firm, interviewed 33 officials from across government, including senior acquisition executives, congressional staff and oversight employees, on a host of topics.

On many key issues there appears to be a widening chasm between operational and oversight officials

For example, recent legislative and regulatory actions have shown a preference for fixed-price contracts above cost-plus or time-and-materials awards. In many cases, officials are required to provide lengthy written explanations when using the latter contract types. But the survey showed that 71 percent of respondents felt the fixed-price mandates had not resulted in better contract outcomes for the government or the taxpayer.

A similar disconnect between a policy's intention and result was found in response to questions about insourcing. Many officials argued the concept, while necessary to restore core government capabilities, has not been conducted thoughtfully or strategically and might be moving too rapidly. Meanwhile, a whopping 94 percent of respondents said insourcing will hurt small businesses.

"Insourcing is moving too quickly and it is too focused on hitting metrics," one interviewee said.

As in previous surveys, enhancing, training and managing the acquisition workforce remain the biggest operational challenges in acquisition, respondents said. They noted that while the addition of direct hiring authority at some agencies has helped to a point, constant turnover, insufficient training and a reliance on interns have created functional concerns. Acquisition officials suggested the system might be improving, but oversight officials generally were more skeptical.

Contract administrators also appeared to be struggling under the weight of oversight mandates. Nearly 90 percent of those surveyed agreed more resources were devoted to back-end oversight than front-end contract management. Others suggested overly burdensome oversight was inhibiting innovation while stressing rigidity and a focus on lowest cost.

"Resources are absolutely not in balance," one interviewee said. "They have thrown resources at [inspectors general] and auditors, but they have done nothing to facilitate contract administration."

The divide was evident in other areas. More than 70 percent of operational executives said existing structures designed to prevent organizational conflicts of interest function effectively. Sixty percent of oversight professionals disagreed. The two sides also disagreed on the need to reform personal conflict-of-interest rules, with operational officials generally in favor of maintaining the existing structure.

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