Acquisition malpractice

If we are to consider that procurement staff should be identified as a profession, and certificated as such, then we must accept the concept of "acquisition malpractice". Still, this article is the first I've seen that uses the term (not that I've been around long enough or experienced the field wide enough to have had a significant exposure to the field).

Procurement chief knocks early F-35 production

“Putting the F-35 into production years before the first test flight was acquisition malpractice,” said acting Pentagon procurement chief Frank Kendall, speaking at a Monday event hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “It should not have been done.”

Kendall said that the Pentagon had made “optimistic” predictions about the capabilities of design tools, simulations and modeling to build a fighter that would breeze through test flights without problems.

“We didn’t model everything as precisely as we thought,” Kendall said. “Now we’re paying the price for being wrong.”

Transitioning from development to production is traditionally been one of the most difficult challenges for any program.

Kendall said there is a tendency to start production too early, adding that the F-35 is an “extreme example.”

Barry Watts, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C., agreed with Kendall’s assessment. But with then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates terminating the F-22 Raptor program, the Pentagon “has put all of its eggs in the JSF basket,” he said.

“My understanding is the amount of concurrency on this program is as great as or greater than any past program,” he said.

Watts, who has been to Lockheed’s Fort Worth, Texas, plant, described long lines of F-35s already being built. The F-35 is an extremely complicated engineering challenge with its many missions and three variants, Watts said.

“Most of those, if they’re going to be operational airplanes eventually, are going to have to go back and have a bunch of changes made to them,” he said. “That drives up cost and delays things.”

Watts said that the Pentagon should have insisted on more flight tests before starting low rate initial production.